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INTRODUCTION
. . .
The fraudulent alienation of the state domains, the robbery of the common 
lands, the usurpation of feudal and clan property, and its transformation into 
modern private property under circumstances of reckless terrorism, were just 
so many idyllic methods of primitive accumulation.—Karl Marx, Capital
When I traveled to Colombia in 2004, at the invitation of Coca-Cola 
workers from the Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Industria 
de Alimentos (National Union of Food and Beverage Workers, SINAL-
TRAINAL), it was the most dangerous country in the world to be a trade 
unionist. For several years, labor leaders had alleged that clandestine 
paramilitary groups were murdering and terrorizing them and union 
members with the collusion of Coca-Cola Company management. A 
lawsuit filed by SINALTRAINAL in U.S. federal court had charged Coca-
Cola with gross human rights violations, and the union, feeling its back 
to the wall, was desperately trying to build international support for a 
campaign against Coca-Cola that would pressure the corporation and 
the Colombian government to stop the repression that was rapidly 
eroding the ranks of union membership. Coming on the heels of the 
1999 protests against the World Trade Organization in Seattle—the so-
called Battle of Seattle—the efforts of SINALTRAINAL to focus interna-
tional attention on the crimes taking place in Colombia, amid a vicious, 
decades-long civil war, struck me as a compelling aspect of what was 
still referred to as the “global social justice movement.”
The leaders of SINALTRAINAL sent me off on a five-city tour in which 
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I talked with workers from various industries and walks of life about 
the violence that was tearing their lives apart. The oil-refining center 
of Barrancabermeja, located on the torrid plains of the Middle Magda-
lena River valley, was my first stop. Juan Carlos Galvis, a member of the 
SINALTRAINAL local directorate and a longtime Coca-Cola worker, met 
me at the airport. As I stepped off the small, propeller-driven plane, it 
took some searching before I spied Galvis among the cluster of people 
waiting in the passenger arrival area; he was a head shorter than most 
of the other men. Yet Galvis stood out in his own way. Dressed in a 
T-shirt emblazoned with the image of Ernesto “Che” Guevara on the 
front and stamped with the slogan “Hasta la victoria siempre” across 
the back, Galvis was making a political point at a moment when Barran-
cabermeja was coming out of a long strike decreed by the oil workers’ 
union, the Unión Sindical Obrera (Syndicated Worker Union, USO),
Colombia’s most militant and powerful trade union. For Galvis, Che 
was much more than an ageless icon of youthful rebellion. The mur-
dered guerrilla leader represented a utopian vision of socialism and 
commitment to ideals that had inspired Galvis for years.
As we left the terminal, two men emerged from the shuffle of de-
parting travelers and hovered around us. Galvis introduced them as 
his bodyguards. They followed us to the parking lot, where a large SUV
with darkened windows baked in the sun. Galvis got into the right-
side backseat, a place designated by his security protocol; I sat behind 
the driver. With one bodyguard at the wheel and the other riding shot-
gun, the four of us headed into town along a winding road. We passed 
pipelines and birdlike oil pumps that monotonously dipped up and 
down as if drinking from the earth. Pastures covered in low trees and 
shrubs and crisscrossed by cow paths interspersed the oil fields that 
pockmarked the countryside. Enervated cattle chewing their cuds and 
brushing away flies clustered under the occasional tree large enough to 
cast a circle of shade. Galvis talked about the tensions that the oil strike 
had generated in the city.
The USO had called the strike on April 15 to halt government plans 
to privatize the state oil company, the Empresa Colombiana de Petró-
leos (Colombian Oil Company, ECOPETROL) and further open the door 
to multinational corporations to exploit Colombia’s mineral reserves. 
The work stoppage lasted more than thirty days, and ECOPETROL fired 
248 workers. Operations had still not resumed in the oil fields, and 
rumors were circulating that a special team of paramilitaries from Calí 
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had come to town to assassinate strike organizers. As Galvis filled me 
in, his cell phone rang repeatedly, interrupting his account and forcing 
him to circle back to previous points after each hurried conversation. 
When we reached the outer ring of neighborhoods that rimmed Ba-
rrancabermeja, the bodyguards detoured past the refinery, which was 
bristling with concertina wire and surrounded by soldiers, before head-
ing down Calle 52 to a large, two-story cement building that housed the 
USO headquarters, where a meeting was under way. Galvis and I joined 
USO leaders and representatives of several popular organizations who 
were planning a march through the city to protest the detention of 
dozens of strike leaders. Although I did not appreciate it at the time, I 
was witnessing the last gasp of a once-powerful working class.
Over the next couple of years, I returned to Barrancabermeja, or 
Barranca, as locals referred to it, and visited other Colombian cities, 
interviewing scores of Coca-Cola workers and their family members 
and accumulating information about Coca-Cola’s worldwide opera-
tions. Yet I gradually spent more and more time in Barrancabermeja, 
where Galvis and SINALTRAINAL president William Mendoza went out 
of their way to facilitate my research. Both men insisted that I talk with 
other trade unionists, human rights defenders, neighborhood activists, 
and peasant leaders because they understood that there was a deeper 
story to tell than the one about Coca-Cola.
Galvis and Mendoza opened the world of left political activism to 
me, or at least what remained of it, and the opportunity to talk with so 
many social movement leaders and grassroots activists was thrilling. 
But it was also overwhelming. My research subjects quickly cast me in 
the role of human rights defender because of my willingness to hang 
around with them and do whatever it was that they were doing. What 
I understood as participant observation—a basic anthropological re-
search method—they defined as acompañamiento (accompaniment), 
which, when done by a foreigner, especially one from North America 
or Europe, was widely believed to make people safer from paramilitary 
attack.1 There were, in fact, several human rights organizations in Ba-
rrancabermeja that specialized in this kind of practice.
Being identified as a human rights advocate overestimated my ca-
pacity to do anything about what was happening.2 People expected me 
to speak out against the violence that was shredding the social fabric 
because doing so would demonstrate that they were part of interna-
tional networks that were capable of mobilizing a rapid response in 
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case of emergency. I was happy to oblige, but I could not always verify 
the stories that I heard, nor did I have the international connections 
that some imagined. In addition, the horrifying accounts that people 
told me initially did not go beyond tales of individual victimization. The 
traumatic narratives, and the urgency and presentism of human rights 
accompaniment-cum-participant-observation, complicated any explo-
ration of the political projects and organizations in which people were 
involved or the passions that motivated working people, especially at a 
time when discussing one’s involvement, past or present, with the legal 
or illegal left was dangerous. All of this made it easy to overlook a story 
that went beyond Coca-Cola and the individual stories of brutalization.
The deeper story was about the violent destruction of a working 
class and about how violence was neither a peripheral nor an acciden-
tal part of the disorganization of labor. As the Colombian economy 
became one of the most liberalized in the Americas during the 1990s, 
harsh new laws had made it easier for firms to hire temporary laborers, 
while escalating paramilitary violence suppressed opposition to the 
new policies with threats, massacres, and targeted assassinations. Be-
tween 1977 and 2004, 114 members of the USO were murdered; 89 of 
them lived in Barrancabermeja (Valencia and Celis 2012: 125). Between 
2000 and 2003, the number of permanent workers affiliated with the 
USO dropped by 50 percent, while the number of temporary workers 
rose. At the same time, the government outsourced much of ECO-
PETROL’s maintenance and support operations to thousands of private 
contractors, some of whom were tied to illegal paramilitary groups that 
placed their own people in jobs once held by USO members and weak-
ened the union from within. Under such conditions, the USO’s ability 
to maintain a prolonged strike in 2004 and the popular support that 
it received were remarkable. But the effort was not enough. The 2004 
strike was never repeated, and the privatization of ECOPETROL and the 
restructuring of its labor force continued. Violence was a central part 
of capitalist development and the dismantling of a once vibrant, politi-
cally militant working class, and the experiences of the USO and SINAL-
TRAINAL were being repeated over and over again.
Although international human rights organizations documented 
the deaths and relentless violence in Barrancabermeja and across 
Colombia, their reports did not explain what people were fighting for 
or the intense emotions that drove them into conflict. In an era when 
wealth and power were being redistributed upward, the accounts of the 
INTRODUCTION 5
dead, the disappeared, and the massacred provided few clues to under-
standing the setbacks of organized labor. This was because the class 
dynamics tearing Colombian society apart were largely ignored. They 
were replaced by a moral argument against abusive state power that be-
came a consolation prize for working people struggling to expand the 
parameters of democracy and to protect their jobs, organizations, and 
social arrangements from the neoliberal capitalist order envisioned by 
state policy makers, Colombian elites, and corporate managers.
Political violence and capitalist development were ruthless engines 
of social fragmentation, but even though the late twentieth-century 
terror that engulfed Barrancabermeja was extreme, the dispossession 
and disorganization of its working class were not unique. From the 
cold tin mines of Llallagua in the Bolivian mountains to the sprawl-
ing automobile factories of Detroit in the American Midwest, working 
classes and centers of working-class power were fracturing under the 
combined pressures of capitalist restructuring, free-trade policies, aus-
terity programs, and political oppression. The production of precari-
ousness in the lives of ordinary people stood in stark contrast to the 
emergence of enclaves of wealth, where newly minted global billion-
aires withdrew from the turmoil affecting the rest of the world. As 
working-class lives were uprooted and people thrown into the breach, 
the chaos forced people to reimagine and re-create their ties to each 
other, even as the dispossessed and disenfranchised were incorporated 
into new relationships of domination and exploitation to which they 
had never agreed.
A Century of Violence in a Red City documents the making and un-
making of a working class amid the violent conflicts that shaped the 
Middle Magdalena region of northwest Colombia, particularly the oil 
town of Barrancabermeja. Beginning in the early twentieth century, a 
heterogeneous group of peasants, oil workers, small-scale merchants, 
and prostitutes transformed the sleepy Magdalena River port of Ba-
rrancabermeja into a center of working-class power. They did so as the 
advent of petroleum extraction drew impoverished people from the 
far corners of Colombia to the middle stretch of the Magdalena River 
valley and forever changed a tropical frontier region in one of Latin 
America’s most conservative countries. Hoping for a better life, these 
intrepid souls fought the humidity, diseases, torrential rains, petro-
leum contamination, and the oil company—a subsidiary of the Stan-
dard Oil Company of New Jersey—to forge a confrontational class cul-
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ture leavened with anti-imperialist nationalism. Until the early 1980s, 
diverse working people forged relationships of solidarity and fought 
to enact a vision of popular democracy that went beyond the official 
state’s promises of modernity and national progress. They also chal-
lenged the presumptions of foreign oil corporations and regional elites 
to dictate the terms of social life. Their democratic vision embraced 
national sovereignty, agrarian reform, labor rights, public services, the 
rights of liberal citizenship (e.g., legal equality, constitutional protec-
tions, and individual freedom) and socialist-inspired notions of the 
common good, and it opposed the disruptive forces of capitalism that 
roiled Barrancabermeja and the Middle Magdalena region.
By the early twenty-first century, this vision had dimmed. Barranca’s 
dense infrastructure of popular solidarity—unions, neighborhood as-
sociations, church groups, student organizations, left political parties, 
and, for a time, guerrilla militias—lay in ruins. Counterinsurgent vio-
lence that escalated in the 1980s and spun out of control in the 1990s 
and the first decade of the new millennium led to the deaths, forcible 
displacement, or disappearance of thousands of people. Many people 
suffered the trauma of losing family members, friends, neighbors, and 
workmates. Years of dirty war and neoliberal economic policies had 
sparked a boom in extractive minerals and biofuel production on the 
graves of those who had imagined a different future. Worker rights and 
protections won in past struggles either no longer existed or lingered in 
degraded form, and anyone who questioned the status quo was warned 
against their challenge with death threats. As dispossessed peasants, 
downsized workers, and impoverished urbanites negotiated a path 
through a more unequal and authoritarian city, they found themselves 
much more alone than in the past, severed from the social networks 
and institutions that once sustained them and exposed to forces be-
yond their control. The specter of Barrancabermeja’s defeated working 
class and divided memories about the dirty war hung over the lives of 
the victims and survivors like a hungry ghost, haunting their efforts to 
rebuild livelihoods and bedeviling the reimagination of a shared future.
This book is less concerned with documenting the existence of a 
class and its subsequent dissolution than with analyzing the violent 
political struggles that undergirded the composition and decomposi-
tion of working-class power, organization, and culture. It places up-
rooted peasants, wage laborers, and unwaged and wage-insecure urban 
immigrants within a single analytic framework and explores how their 
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struggles over labor rights, public services, and human rights brought 
them together and pulled them apart over nearly a century. These 
struggles were central to the formation and dissolution of class. The 
book contributes to the development of a new anthropology of labor 
that dispenses with static typologies—waged and unwaged, rural and 
urban, and formal and informal—and revives the notion of class as a 
fluid analytic category that captures the centrality of conflict to the 
formation of social relations. In this way, it attends to E. P. Thompson’s 
(1963) insistence on a processual and relational approach to the study 
of labor, one that focuses on the always open-ended making of class. 
This perspective helps us explore the common understandings and alli-
ances, as well as the social ruptures and ideological divisions, that pro-
pel changes in how working people understand their experiences, their 
ties to each other, and their relationships to more powerful groups and 
institutions.3
A Century of Violence in a Red City also examines how processes of 
class formation and capital accumulation generated fierce battles over 
territory in which, at different times, transnational oil companies, 
guerrilla insurgencies, and paramilitary organizations operated along-
side, with, or against official state representatives and institutions and 
attempted to regulate the lives of people under their control. I argue 
that “the state” never operated alone but in overt or covert alliances 
with other powerful actors to promote particular projects of rule that 
sought to produce, normalize, and legitimate different forms of politi-
cal and economic inequality. Such complex geographies of power were 
dynamic, unstable, and violent. They arose from the contradictions 
generated by capitalist accumulation practices and forms of popular 
mobilization, or demobilization, in particular historical moments. They 
also conditioned the ability of working people to sustain themselves, 
their organizations, and their visions of the future and to connect their 
struggles to wider political movements. Building on the work of previ-
ous scholars who have examined the tensions between popular politi-
cal struggles and processes of state formation (e.g., Joseph and Nugent 
1994; Mallon 2005; Nugent 1997), this book places working people at 
the center of concern. It shows that shifting configurations of power 
and processes of state formation turned on the control of resources, 
changing forms of labor exploitation, and the making and unmaking of 
class in which the demands, visions, and struggles of a heterogeneous 
group of working people played a central part. State and class forma-
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tion were thus imbricated with each other and shaped changing forms 
of social regulation over time.
State formation, as well as the making, unmaking, and remaking of 
class, is rooted in violence. Yet violence often passes unobserved in ab-
stract, economistic accounts of capitalist processes in which the mar-
ket’s “invisible hand,” capital, the state, and globalization have a decep-
tive coherence and rationality. To the extent that violence appears at all, 
it does so as an episodic, regrettable, and temporary side effect of the 
disruptions that accompany the reforms demanded by ruling classes 
and state officials for economic expansion to take place. The experience 
of working people in Barrancabermeja, however, suggests a more criti-
cal perspective in which violence is one of the major tools that forges 
the development of capitalist relations, propels the formation of com-
peting projects of rule within and across space, and drives the pace of 
social change. The story of working-class Barrancabermeja offers in-
sights into how violence becomes enmeshed within the interrelated 
processes of capital accumulation, state formation, and working-class 
disorganization and dispossession.
The Politics of Labor and Class
With notable exceptions, anthropologists have not focused on “class” 
as an important social relationship or analytic category.4 As August 
Carbonella and Sharryn Kasmir (2014) note, scholars have often inter-
preted the decline of Fordist production systems in the United States 
and Europe as the end of class itself, rather than the passing of a his-
torically specific class formation and its accompanying social welfare 
state. Meanwhile, the collapse of Soviet and Eastern European com-
munism, China’s “capitalist turn,” and new labor relations and forms of 
inequality generated by the post–cold war expansion of neoliberalism 
have incorporated millions of new workers into capitalist processes, 
while the so-called Great Recession that began in 2008 has deepened 
social suffering and amplified previously unheard critiques of the un-
fettered “market” as the source of freedom and well-being. The out-
sourcing of production from traditional manufacturing centers to low-
wage regions has dispersed working-class power away from former 
union strongholds, while the opening of new extractive frontiers in 
oil, natural gas, precious gems, minerals, and drugs, secured by para-
militaries, mafias, and private security firms, has created new spaces of 
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marginalization and exploitation (e.g., Ferguson 2005; Richani 2007). 
Yet despite the proliferation of new and remade ways of working, as 
well as wide-ranging evidence of stark disparities in wealth and social 
well-being, discussions of class have only recently reentered main-
stream political debate, after a wave of social protests, from Occupy 
Wall Street to revolts in Europe and Latin America, pried open the pub-
lic agenda and energized new research.
What David Harvey (2003) calls “accumulation by dispossession”—
the recurrent dispossession of working people under capitalism—has 
made or reconfigured working classes over and over again, creating 
new divisions and labor relations, and forcing people to assess what 
they can, and cannot, do with each other. Updating Marx’s notion of 
“primitive accumulation,” a one-off process that entailed the enclosure 
of common property, the expulsion of peasants, and the commodifica-
tion of their labor at the dawn of capitalism, Harvey argues that what 
Marx described as the “reckless terror” of plunder and enslavement is 
actually a feature of capitalism that happens, and has happened, re-
peatedly in the long history of capitalist development. It consists of a 
variety of processes that include usury, violent physical displacement, 
debt, and the privatization of public assets, such as land and natural 
resources, as well as the social wage (pensions, health care, welfare, 
etc.) won through years of struggle (Harvey 2003: 137–82). In the past 
three decades, accumulation by dispossession and the violence asso-
ciated with it have intensified poverty, marginalization, and social 
fragmentation among a larger swath of the world’s population through 
the monetization of social relationships and the upward redistribution 
of wealth. It has obliged more people to become dependent on cash in-
comes and migrate to find work. In the context of so much upheaval, 
how to categorize the people whose lives have been uprooted and torn 
apart, and who counts as a worker, is not always clear.
Hernando de Soto (1989), for example, is well known for claiming 
that the ruined peasants and part-time laborers in the impoverished 
fringes of Latin American, African, and Asian cities are less workers 
than “microentrepreneurs,” eager for property titles and microcredit to 
propel their capitalist ventures forward. Yet the notion of microentre-
preneur and older categories, such as “penny capitalist” (Tax 1963), fail 
to draw a distinction between small-scale accumulation and bare sur-
vival, and they imply that the rights of property, rather than rights 
and protections for labor, are the central issue faced by impoverished 
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urban residents today. In contrast, Jan Breman (1994) characterizes 
the denizens of India’s peri-urban settlements as “wage hunters and 
gatherers,” and Michael Denning (2010) emphasizes the centrality of 
wagelessness among the poor, marginalized inhabitants of burgeon-
ing urban peripheries, arguing that the imperative to earn a living, not 
the wage contract, constitutes the analytic starting point for under-
standing contemporary labor processes. Breman and Denning remind 
us that being without a wage is a widely shared experience of contem-
porary capitalism and, as Carbonella and Kasmir note, “solidarity, as 
well as difference, is always a possibility” (2014: 9). Similarly, Charles 
Bergquist argues that issues of control lie at the core of labor studies 
and that by addressing the multiple ways that diverse people struggle 
to control their work, the products of their labor, and their living con-
ditions, social scientists can “see the informal sector less as a school 
for petty capitalists than as an extension of the working class” (1996: 
193). Addressing these issues, Bergquist insists, enables scholars to 
move beyond conceptualizing labor as “the study of free but not co-
erced workers, urban but not rural workers, industrial but not agricul-
tural workers” (184–85).
Carbonella and Kasmir suggest that who gets labeled as a “worker” 
and what sorts of labor arrangements (e.g., formal/informal, waged/
unwaged, rural/industrial) figure as valued economic activities are 
political questions whose answers have not always provided analytic 
clarity. They argue that labor is best understood as “a political entity,
whose social protests and quietude, formal and informal organizations 
and political cultures reflect its multiple engagements with capital and 
the state, as well as the relationships with other workers, locally, region-
ally, and globally” (Carbonella and Kasmir 2014: 7). This understanding 
of labor embraces numerous ways of working and is not limited to the 
proletariat, and it makes room for exploring how working people come 
together (or not) within shifting fields of power. Various combinations 
of waged and unwaged labor have always been present—and simulta-
neously produced—throughout the long history of capitalism.
Multiple forms of dispossession, such as land loss, forced displace-
ment, the privatization of public utilities and resources, job loss, and 
cuts to pensions and health care, have given rise to a new mix of labor 
relations in places like Colombia, where political violence and neoliber-
alism are intertwined. Peasant production systems are in decline; tem-
porary or part-time, nonunionized workers are replacing a relatively 
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small group of people who once had stable union jobs; and unwaged, 
wage-insecure, and criminalized labor are intensifying on the impov-
erished urban peripheries, where the victims of dispossession have 
settled. These transformations open the door for exploring the fluidity 
of class relations over time. They enable us to focus our attention on the 
numerous, changing ways of working, as well as the connections and 
divisions that arise among working people within shifting contexts of 
violence and inequality, as states, corporations, guerrilla insurgencies, 
and paramilitary armies contend with the organizational forms (e.g., 
unions, neighborhood associations, political parties) that express and 
channel popular concerns. We can also begin to grasp how memories of 
the violent past take shape in particular political contexts and inform 
how diverse people understand the present and imagine the future.
Studies of the “precariat” (Standing 2011), or “informal proletariat” 
(Davis 2006) in the global South, where its expansion is most pro-
nounced, reveal the importance of wage-insecure and wageless labor 
to the production of wealth within local, national, and international 
circuits of capital flows. Judith Whitehead (2012), for example, docu-
ments the extreme fragmentation of labor markets and labor in a 
Mumbai shantytown, where most of the laboring population works as 
street venders, home workers, petty commodity producers, contract 
workers in larger firms, construction workers, and so forth. She ex-
plores how specific livelihood practices are repeatedly connected, dis-
connected, and reconnected to global and national capital flows in a 
context where capital is hypermobile and labor is relatively fixed in 
place. Her work offers insights into the ways that neoliberal capitalism 
sucks surplus value out of poor neighborhoods by creating a range of 
new, spatially configured labor relations that localize working people 
while simultaneously incorporating them into volatile national and 
international networks of capital accumulation that are constantly 
fragmented and recomposed. This process creates vulnerability and 
constant uncertainty among those who must continually scramble to 
get by.
In Barrancabermeja, the discovery of oil propelled the growth of a 
heterogeneous workforce and the accumulation of laborers through 
recurrent rounds of dispossession, disorganization, and displacement 
that generated powerful forms of solidarity and deep divisions over the 
twentieth century. Beginning in the 1920s, migrants from the tropical 
northern plains and the mountainous Andean highlands fled poverty, 
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landlord violence, and property enclosure for the prospect of jobs in 
the nascent oil industry. Barrancabermeja quickly acquired the largest 
concentration of wage laborers of any Colombian city, and the orga-
nization of a powerful oil workers’ union proved decisive in decades-
long popular struggles against the transnational oil corporation and, 
subsequently, the state-owned oil company. Yet despite their organiza-
tional power and importance to a key industry, the oil workers rarely 
acted alone. Semiproletarianized peasants, petty merchants, and im-
poverished urbanites backed their demands for better conditions in 
the oil fields and the labor camps, and the oil workers, in turn, sup-
ported struggles for land, access to markets, social services, and na-
tional sovereignty. Diverse working people forged a remarkable degree 
of self-organization and mutual support that was nurtured by vari-
ous political currents—liberalism, anarchism, socialism, communism, 
and Christian humanism. The dismantling of this tightly knit class cul-
ture did not happen all at once. It was an uneven, discontinuous pro-
cess that erupted during the mid-twentieth-century period of national 
bloodletting known simply as “La Violencia” and then spiraled into a 
deadly vortex at the end of the century, when an emergent far-right 
alliance of drug traffickers, cattle ranchers, politicians, and neoliberal 
entrepreneurs unleashed a dirty war in the countryside and the city 
that remapped power and swept in neoliberalism on a river of blood.
The history of Barrancabermeja demonstrates that the struggles of 
oil workers—the classic proletariat of Marxist theory—had a broad 
base that extended beyond the oil fields and the refinery, and for the 
better part of the twentieth century, diverse working people forged 
connections that spanned the country and the city and claimed iden-
tities within a simmering stew of diverse labor relations. Barrancaber-
meja’s complex labor history further demonstrates that neither the 
fragmentation and dispossession affecting the lives of contemporary 
working people in the city nor the emergence of new and remade labor 
relations and cultural differences elsewhere are unprecedented. Rather, 
it suggests a need to reexamine how labor and conventional labor con-
flicts are understood.5
A focus on class politics highlights the unfolding ways that working 
people understand their experiences, organize livelihood strategies to 
get by, and conceptualize and create relationships as they engage with 
each other and contend with more powerful groups. We can grasp how, 
at times, they may build relationships that connect people across racial, 
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ethnic, national, and gender divisions to press claims on the powerful. 
We can also understand how dispossession, social ruptures, and fear 
sever social ties, expose working people to new kinds of discipline, and 
aggravate old and create new forms of inequality (e.g., Carbonella 2014; 
Kasmir 2014; Narotzky and Smith 2006). Class as an analytic category 
captures the conflicts, accommodations, and alliances that shape and 
reshape power-laden relationships. This book seeks to understand how 
a century of capitalist development and popular mobilization continu-
ally remade class relations through the periodic dispossession, dis-
placement, and disorganization of working people and their institu-
tions. Central to this process were intense political struggles over the 
spaces of labor exploitation, capital accumulation, and power.
Geographies of Power
By 1930, the growth of the oil export enclave had transformed the 
sleepy river settlement of Barrancabermeja into a thriving outpost of 
working-class culture and society. After oil workers received their pay 
on what became known as “big Saturdays,” an exodus from the rudi-
mentary encampments in “El Centro,” where the oil fields were located, 
to the bustling river port began. Gonzalo Buenahora, a physician who 
worked in Barrancabermeja for forty years, recalled that “Barranca 
only had 16,000 inhabitants, and the workers who arrived [from the 
oil fields] were like three thousand.” They came on a train owned by 
the oil company, “dressed impeccably in white from the feet to the 
bow tie and with pockets full of money. . . . And they all came, no-
body remained [behind]” (qtd. in Archila 1978: 98). The men spent their 
money in bars, restaurants, and bordellos, where regional accents from 
the north coast and the Antioquian valleys mixed with the foreign-
accented Spanish of merchants from as far afield as Lebanon, contract 
laborers from the British West Indies, supervisors and engineers from 
North America, and prostitutes from across Colombia and abroad.
Although it is tempting to view the continual accumulation of di-
verse workers in Barrancabermeja—from the early migrations that 
gave birth to the enclave to the recent displacements of the dirty 
war—as a “local” phenomenon, the temptation should be resisted. The 
enclave, and subsequently the city and the region, took shape amid 
violent struggles over the rights of labor and the rights of citizenship 
in the places where people worked and lived. While working people 
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sought to produce and control space through the extension of their in-
stitutions and alliances, the oil company drew on its ties to the United 
States and mobilized the institutional state, the police, and the mili-
tary to create and regulate space in the interest of global capitalism. 
The dispossession, localization, and isolation of diverse people molded 
the initial formation of the enclave, while disrupting and dislocating 
more or less settled social and political arrangements was key to sub-
sequent projects of rule in Barrancabermeja and the Middle Magda-
lena. These processes underscored the ways that class and state for-
mation were constitutive of each other. How different, power-laden 
geographies emerged from conflicting political and economic agendas 
and how working people organized within and against them to advance 
their concerns are important questions.
This book addresses them by examining the tense dialectic that 
shaped class formation and the production of fragmented and differ-
ently organized forms of territorial control in which, at different times, 
a transnational oil company, guerrilla insurgencies, and right-wing 
paramilitaries regulated social life in the areas under their control and 
alongside, within, and against the institutional state in diverse ways. It 
argues that the “state” always acted through overt and covert alliances 
with other actors who wielded varying degrees of power and who at-
tempted to consolidate, extend, and naturalize what were, in fact, self-
interested and particular claims about the organization of social life in 
the name of the common good.6 Yet these political configurations have 
always been unstable, and they are a central feature of the perpetual 
crisis of hegemony in the Middle Magdalena. The book considers three 
distinct periods in which shifting regimes of capital accumulation, the 
coercive capacities of different actors, and the organization and claims 
making of working people gave rise to changing geographies of power.
First, it explores the development of Barrancabermeja as a foreign-
controlled export enclave from the 1920s to 1960, when the Tropical 
Oil Company (TROCO)—a subsidiary of the Standard Oil Company of 
New Jersey—acquired the subsoil rights to a vast extension of tropical 
forest. The TROCO recruited legions of impoverished migrants to cut 
access roads, construct buildings, and eventually drill for oil. The pro-
cess of sinking wells in the tropical soil and creating an infrastructure 
to support them required that the company physically control territory 
and manage a labor force that was still unschooled in the practices of 
industrial work discipline. The creation of the enclave brought together 
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the managers of a global corporation, state officials, and diverse work-
ing people in far-flung relationships of domination and exploitation 
that were strengthened by the threat of U.S. military intervention; in 
addition, it placed the TROCO in competition with the Texas Petroleum 
Company and Royal Dutch Shell, which also won permission to drill 
for oil in concessions along the river. The development of the oil in-
dustry in the Middle Magdalena mirrored contests between expand-
ing global corporations and nascent working classes in the Mexican 
Huasteca and Venezuela’s Maracaibo Basin, where Royal Dutch Shell, 
British Petroleum, and the Standard Oil Company operated, as well as 
in the emergent banana zones of the circum-Caribbean and Ecuador 
(Santiago 2006; Striffler 2002; Striffler and Moberg 2003; Tinker Salas 
2009; Vega 2002).
Historian Paul Kramer suggests that export enclaves constitute 
“strategic hamlets” of empire that concentrate extraordinary power 
through the control of space and power; they are, he argues, “spatial ex-
ceptions” (2011: 1356) in which corporations produce commodities and 
accumulate capital by enclosing and isolating populations, severing ter-
ritory from local jurisdiction, and arrogating the right to control social 
life within the enclaves.7 Yet because corporations in early twentieth-
century Latin America controlled capital more easily than workers, 
their bid for sovereign power ran up against the contradictions that 
had produced export enclaves from their inception: the generation of 
economic differentiation and cultural differences simultaneously and 
the ensuing tensions that arose from them. The sharp cultural and eco-
nomic divisions that separated foreign managers from Colombian, 
Ecuadoran, Venezuelan, and Mexican workers stoked nationalist re-
sentment, fueled anti-imperialism, and magnified political repression. 
Colombian oil workers fought for a more democratic, sovereign state, 
one that would regulate conflicts with the TROCO, better control access 
to natural resources, and extend the guarantees and protections of lib-
eral citizenship, such as the right to unionize, freedom of assembly 
and speech, and collective bargaining. As historian Charles Bergquist 
(1986) notes, working classes in export enclaves formed the bedrock 
of radical labor movements in early twentieth-century Latin America, 
and their influence was felt well beyond geographically isolated zones 
of commodity production. They periodically mobilized national sen-
timent in their support, and they sometimes even shook the founda-
tions of liberal capitalism, obliging corporations to deal with more far-
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reaching demands than what the firms encountered from workers in 
the United States.
The contests between labor and capital that gave birth to the en-
clave in the 1920s contributed to its demise in the middle decades of 
the twentieth century, the second period in which labor relations and 
capital accumulation were remapped in Barrancabermeja (1960–90). 
By the late 1950s, the foreign-owned enclave was in decline almost 
everywhere, including Barrancabermeja, where growing nationalism, 
intensified union activity, and a government search for more export 
revenue persuaded the TROCO to allow its concession to expire and to 
subsequently relinquish control of the oil industry to the Colombian 
state.8 The midcentury creation of the state-owned ECOPETROL inaugu-
rated an era of direct state control of the Colombian oil industry that 
coincided with the modernization of the economy.
A more interventionist central state embarked on an agenda of capi-
talist modernization. It assumed a greater role in the stewardship of 
economic development, promoting import-substitution policies and 
spurring agro-industrial development though the extension of subsi-
dized credit and machinery to large landowners (Safford and Palacios 
2002). It also oversaw the expansion of the public sector between 1950 
and 1980, which transformed oil workers into employees of the state 
and generated an increase in the number of other public sector employ-
ees, including teachers, civil servants, and health care and telecommu-
nications workers, who joined unions and expanded the labor move-
ment in Barrancabermeja. Yet even though barranqueños no longer 
suffered under the arbitrary power of the TROCO, they were not in-
corporated into the modernizing state as fully entitled citizens. The 
relationship between working people and the institutional state ran 
aground over the provision of public services, labor rights, and the re-
pressive hand of state security forces. A new wave of uprooted peasants 
was washing over the city, pushed out of the countryside by landlord 
violence and the expansion of large-scale commercial agriculture, but 
unlike in the past, the newcomers did not find jobs in the oil indus-
try; they erected shantytowns on the edge of town and became part 
of a floating population of wageless or wage-insecure workers. Popu-
lar demands for public services, backed by the oil workers’ union, were 
criminalized and repressed, as rising cold war tensions and the exclu-
sive nature of the National Front (1958–74) narrowed the parameters 
of political participation.
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Although Colombia became the showcase for the Kennedy admin-
istration’s Alliance for Progress, an economic and military assistance 
program launched in 1961 that sought to stave off demands for radi-
cal social changes, the state-led process of capitalist modernization 
sidestepped the deep inequalities and political exclusions that charac-
terized Colombian society, especially the lopsided landholding struc-
ture. Successive National Front governments, in which the Liberal and 
Conservative Parties alternated in power, marginalized reformist ini-
tiatives and repressed revolutionary demands for more far-reaching 
political, economic, and social transformations. Political exclusion, an 
unresponsive state bureaucracy, and the equation of protest with com-
munist subversion spurred the organization of guerrilla insurgencies 
that put down deep roots in the Middle Magdalena. The insurgencies 
advocated the overthrow and transformation of the state, and, as the 
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia, FARC) and the Ejército Nacional de Liberación (Na-
tional Liberation Army, ELN)—Colombia’s largest and most enduring 
guerrilla organizations—grew more powerful and laid claim to terri-
tory in the Middle Magdalena, they created a political crisis for the 
state that aggravated the fragmentation of sovereignty.
As Barrancabermeja shed its identity as an oil enclave and took on 
the appearance of a thriving urban center in the 1960s and 1970s, the 
juxtaposition of a profitable oil industry with its well-paid workforce 
and destitute immigrant neighborhoods, formed by uprooted peasants 
expelled from the countryside by the expansion of commercial agricul-
ture, laid bare the ways that capitalism produced spaces of poverty and 
wealth concurrently. It also undergirded the role of the state in this 
process. Diverse working people found common cause in the demand 
that the central government live up to its promises of development and 
modernization. The oil workers’ union, neighborhood organizations, 
unions, left political parties and movements, and civic organizations 
claimed a “right to the city” (Harvey 2010), that is, a right to the re-
investment of the surpluses some of them had created into public ser-
vices. A series of civic strikes rocked Barrancabermeja in the 1960s and 
1970s and zeroed in on the dearth of public services, especially water. 
As they had in the past, working people met in the streets to demand 
that the state take care of its citizens. Guerrilla insurgencies, especially 
the ELN, built on this discontentment and constructed long-term re-
lationships with sectors of the urban working class. Yet unlike in other 
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cities, such as Vienna in the 1920s (Gruber 1991) or El Alto, Bolivia, 
today (Hylton and Thomson 2007; Lazar 2008), where working-class 
self-organization and municipal control defined the contours of urban 
life, Barrancabermeja’s working people never controlled state and mu-
nicipal offices. Their power resided in unions, Christian base commu-
nities, student organizations, neighborhood associations, left political 
parties, and ties to the insurgencies. The strength of their reformist 
and revolutionary challenges prefigured the intensity of the terror di-
rected against working people between 1980 and the early twenty-first 
century. The rise of the illegal cocaine economy and an intensifying, 
counterinsurgent dirty war reterritorialized power, reshaped labor re-
lations, and transformed the ways that people advanced claims on the 
state from a focus on national sovereignty, labor protections, and pub-
lic services to human rights.
The emergence of violent paramilitary mafias, the counterinsurgent 
war, and the advent of neoliberalism fired a violent new phase of ter-
ritorial struggle, working-class decomposition, and state formation 
from the 1980s to the present, the primary focus of this book. Political 
violence intensified in Colombia even as the conclusion of the cold war 
led to the cessation of hostilities in Central America, where the signing 
of peace accords in the 1990s brought an end to decades of civil war. 
Insurgencies that were militarily strong but politically weak controlled 
huge swaths of the country’s richest land. In addition, the decline of 
the traditional coffee economy and the increasing importance of other 
legal and illegal export commodities—oil, gold, African palm, bananas, 
emeralds, and especially cocaine—bolstered the configuration of re-
gionally based, reactionary power blocs. These new configurations of 
regional power drew their strength from powerful paramilitary armies 
and formed alliances with state officials and security forces to push the 
insurgencies out of resource-rich areas of the country and destroy any 
organization deemed sympathetic to them (Hylton 2014). Although 
the counterinsurgent war was supposed to extend the power of the 
central state, it deepened the fragmentation of power by abetting the 
formation of regional sovereignties, or parastates, that ruled within, 
alongside, and sometimes against the official state and that adopted 
extreme forms of labor repression (Richani 2007). This process was 
facilitated by political and economic state decentralization, which en-
abled violent mercenaries and their supporters to capture municipal, 
provincial, and national elected office and to reconfigure state territory 
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on deeply undemocratic terms (López 2010; see also Ballvé 2012). The 
counterinsurgent war was financed by the growing fortunes of major 
drug lords who made sophisticated weaponry, vehicles, airplanes, and 
communication equipment available, first, to hit men and emergent 
death squads to protect their extensive operations from the guerril-
las and, then, to standing armies that conquered and controlled ter-
ritory. It was also supported by U.S. intervention in the form of Plan 
Colombia, a multibillion-dollar counterinsurgency program initiated 
by President Bill Clinton in 2000 that provided helicopters, training, 
and intelligence equipment to the police and military, who were key 
allies of the paramilitaries, and through a CIA program, financed by 
a multibillion-dollar black budget authorized by President George W. 
Bush and continued by President Barack Obama, that provided intelli-
gence and “smart bombs” to decimate insurgent forces.9
In Barrancabermeja, right-wing paramilitaries tied to state security 
forces and regional elites crushed working-class power, expelled the 
guerrillas, and took over the city and most of the Middle Magdalena re-
gion by 2003. The mayhem was fueled by impunity, an aspect of power 
that allowed perpetrators to get away with murder again and again, 
and that made it nearly impossible for working people to do anything 
about what was happening. The crisis reconfigured urban space and 
created a sense of pervasive fear and insecurity, which paved the way 
for the incorporation of working people into more authoritarian forms 
of labor discipline, rent extraction, and political subjugation. These 
new and remade relationships provided the grounding for a particu-
larly pernicious form of armed neoliberalism. The “peace” that reigned 
in Barrancabermeja after 2003 was a chimera; it rested on a deep reser-
voir of fear, coerced collaboration, insecurity, and grudging acceptance 
that regulated the lives of residents and made it difficult to repair rup-
tured social relationships and stitch together fragmented memories 
so that urban residents could explain and understand, in shared ways, 
what happened and continued to happen to them.
The configuration and reconfiguration of Barrancabermeja as a cen-
ter of capital accumulation and popular struggle raises questions about 
how power operates through uneven connections to imperial struc-
tures and distant national institutions, and how these connections 
transform societies and condense power in key points on a broader 
global tapestry. It prompts us to ask how distinctions between foreign/
domestic and state/nonstate are constructed and how rights are de-
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fined and distributed to different kinds of people. How, too, do working 
people envision the state and formulate claims against it? Such ques-
tions open the conceptual possibility of exploring how the kinds of so-
cial relations, understandings, and forms of political participation that 
become institutionalized as “the state” are themselves the outcome of 
contending projects of rule, which operate in different scalar dimen-
sions (e.g., Nugent 1997). Indeed, as Christopher Krupa and David 
Nugent (2015) argue, national-territorial models of the state mask how 
conflicting claims to legitimate rule are embedded in the fabric of social 
life. These models and the formal fiction of nation-state sovereignty 
and national control that they preserve shroud the often considerable 
power of subnational groups to command and control territory and 
regulate social life within it. They also mask the imperial power of the 
United States by maintaining its invisibility, even as its corporations, 
security forces, diplomats, and aid programs intrude into the ability of 
client states to control economic activity, regulate social life, and com-
mand territory (Kramer 2011; Tate 2015). Outdated conceptual models 
have prompted analysts to address new questions about what the state 
is, where it is located, and how political life should be organized (Krupa 
and Nugent 2015).
A number of scholars note that the capacity of states to claim effec-
tive control over a territory in the name of the nation and its citizens 
has always been limited because subnational populations play an im-
portant part in how state institutions, ideologies, and practices be-
come established in any given locality. Power may be wielded by dif-
ferent “illegal armed groups” (Ávila 2010), warlords (Duncan 2006), 
and paramilitaries or self-defense forces (Romero 2003) and organized 
among various kinds of fragmented “informal sovereignties” (Hansen 
and Stepputat 2006), “state proxies” (Krupa 2010), “proto-states” (Be-
jarano and Pizarro 2004), “shadow powers” (Gledhill 1999; Nordstrom 
2000), “parastates” (Gill 2009), and forms of “subnational authoritari-
anism” (Bonilla 2007) that enjoy varying degrees of legitimacy. More-
over, frontier regions, such as Colombia’s Putumayo province, that 
have long been perceived as lawless, violent, and “uncivilized” disrupt 
the territorial uniformity often ascribed to the state (Ramírez 2011).
What emerged in Barrancabermeja and other Colombian regions 
at the dawn of the twenty-first century was less the hegemony of a 
particular group than the domination of regionally based alliances of 
right-wing politicians, landlords, drug traffickers, and sectors of the 
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security forces organized into various narco-paramilitary blocs (Ávila 
2010). Based in provincial cities and small towns, these powerful coali-
tions dominated municipal and provincial offices, controlled much 
of the legal and illegal economy, and pushed the fulcrum of political 
power to the right (Hylton 2014; Richani 2007). They were more suc-
cessful than the insurgencies in what Philip Abrams identified as the 
central activity of state formation: “legitimating of the illegitimate” 
(1988: 76). Through the creation and financial backing of new political 
movements that reflected the concerns of their most violent elements, 
they gained national power through the election of candidates to high 
political office, as they sought to legalize ill-gotten lands and wealth, 
avoid prosecution, and gain political legitimacy. A Century of Violence 
in a Red City demonstrates how processes of state formation generated 
various territorially based forms of power in the Middle Magdalena 
region that generated conflicting claims to rule. These shifting geogra-
phies of power regulated social life to different degrees and operated 
in complex relationship to government officials and institutions. They 
were deeply intertwined with the making and unmaking of class and 
the changing scale of working-class power.
Political Violence and Class Politics
As is apparent by now, violence has been constitutive of state forma-
tion, the organization and command of space, and labor processes in 
the Middle Magdalena. Colombia has long been regarded as one of 
Latin America’s most violent countries, and the Middle Magdalena re-
gion is one of the most violent places in Colombia. Yet government offi-
cials like to insist that their country is Latin America’s oldest democ-
racy. With the exception of a brief period in the 1950s, Colombia has not 
experienced the brutal military dictatorships that ruled over most of 
mid-twentieth-century Latin America, and it has held regular elections 
for decades. But the numbers of murdered and disappeared people in 
Colombia are among the largest in twentieth-century Latin American 
history. According to the Grupo de Memoria Histórica (2013), an offi-
cial body charged with clarifying more than fifty years of armed con-
flict, at least 220,000 people died between 1958 and 2012 as a result of 
the war. Between the 1980s and the early twenty-first century, more 
trade unionists have died than in any other country in the world (Soli-
darity Center 2006), and the forcible displacement of more than seven 
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million people has generated the largest internally displaced popula-
tion in the world, after Sudan.10
Even though violence—that is, brute force that aims to crush, elimi-
nate, or mentally destroy an individual or group—is a recurrent feature 
in the periodic dispossession and reconfiguration of working classes, 
its centrality to capitalism is frequently overlooked in social science 
analyses and human rights reporting. Greg Grandin (2010) notes that 
scholars have substituted analytic categories, such as exploitation, for 
humanistic ones, such as suffering, and have chosen violence as a pri-
mary topic of research rather than trying to explain how it emerges 
as a by-product from conflicts with deep historical roots. A spate of 
social science theorizing has sought to extend the concept beyond in-
strumentalized force to better understand how it pervades the fabric 
of social life. Notions such as “structural violence” (Farmer 1997) and 
“continuum of violence” (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004) promise 
deeper insights into the social, cultural, and economic dimensions of 
violence. Yet despite the utility of these formations in certain contexts, 
they risk diluting the concept by finding it everywhere and reifying it. 
Although violence is, indeed, an experiential reality that has important 
meaningful and symbolic consequences, it cannot be dissociated from 
broader analyses of power, such as “the transformation of economic re-
lations and the state, and the evolution of competing ideologies vying 
for common-sense status” (Grandin 2010: 7).
The entanglements of violence and capitalist processes are also left 
unexplored in much human rights reporting on the Middle Magda-
lena region. Reports enumerate the details of massacres, disappear-
ances, and extrajudicial executions, illuminate the operations of clan-
destine security forces, and document incidents of torture, but they 
leave unexamined the social, political, and economic relationships that 
drive victims and perpetrators into conflict (e.g., Human Rights Watch 
2001, 2010). This kind of reporting strives for high levels of factual 
accuracy and political neutrality, but the move to depoliticize human 
rights accounts and to place them above and outside politics is itself 
“political.”11 It removes targeted groups and individuals from the his-
tory of social, economic, and political struggle that generated violence 
in the first place and treats them as passive victims, obscuring how 
they lived and often died. Despite the crucial importance of document-
ing human rights violations, the language of human rights does not 
offer an adequate framework for analyzing political violence because 
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it separates repression from complex, competing political agendas and 
distances itself from any association with politics (Striffler 2015). A 
more dynamic, relational approach that goes beyond the description 
and enumeration of atrocities is necessary, one in which violence—
massacres, extrajudicial executions, torture, and so forth—is less the 
object of analysis than the outcome of social conflicts and examined 
within the broader social and political field from which it arises. How 
force and counterforce operate at the intersection of working people’s 
changing relationships to each other and more powerful groups, on the 
one hand, and their feelings about these transformations, on the other 
hand, is a key question that needs to be addressed.
Although Barrancabermeja represents an extreme case of political 
violence and neoliberal restructuring, it cannot be disconnected from 
the upheavals, polarization, and ideological hardening that buttressed 
Latin America’s cold war, which was less a battle between superpower 
proxies than a campaign by the United States, beginning in the early 
twentieth century, to suppress insurgent challenges to various forms 
of social, political, and economic exclusion and inequality (Grandin 
and Joseph 2010). Grandin (2004) argues persuasively that U.S.-backed 
counterinsurgent violence in Latin America dismantled capacious 
forms of democracy that prevailed in the 1940s and replaced them with 
narrower, restricted democracies defined in terms of personal freedom, 
rather than social security. Several scholars have explored how cold war 
terror paved the way for neoliberalism through the repression of de-
mands for change, the dismantling of organizations that channeled 
popular calls for justice, and the replacement of collective movements 
for social change with individual survival strategies.
A number of analysts, for example, demonstrate how General 
Augusto Pinochet’s assault on Chilean labor unions and shantytown 
activists disarticulated resistance to his dictatorship and terrorized 
working people into passivity, enabling the regime to enact neoliberal 
labor policies detrimental to worker interests (C. Schneider 1995; Winn 
2004). In Guatemala, Deborah Levenson-Estrada (1994) examines how 
the clash between Coca-Cola workers, who wanted to form a union, and 
the intransigence of management and the Guatemalan state generated 
brutal military repression. She also documents how Guatemala’s geno-
cidal war and its aftermath transformed relatively benign youth gangs 
into violence-obsessed groups focused on drug consumption and kill-
ing each other (Levenson 2013). Elsewhere in Colombia, Forrest Hylton 
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(2010) analyzes the “refeudalization” of social relations in the city of 
Medellín as the outgrowth of economic liberalization and the para-
military repression, and Aviva Chomsky (2008) describes how political 
violence suppressed labor protests in the Urabá banana zone and en-
abled banana growers to force former peasants, previously displaced 
from their lands, to labor under appalling conditions on the planta-
tions. Although the intensity of the violence that accompanied neolib-
eral restructuring across Latin America varied, repression was particu-
larly severe in those places where the organized opposition of peasants, 
workers, indigenous, and students resisted the rollback of hard-won 
rights and opposed the handover of fertile, mineral-rich lands to for-
eign corporations and domestic elites.
David Harvey (2005) suggests that neoliberalism is a political 
project, one designed to re-create the conditions for capital accumu-
lation and to sustain or restore the wealth and power of elites. This 
project has been a particularly sanguinary affair in Barrancabermeja. 
Nowadays, there is no common memory of the past that can help work-
ing people better understand the present and get their arms around 
the future. A durable disorder has settled over the city. Threats against 
labor activists, human rights defenders, and leaders of community or-
ganizations persist; state prosecutors pursue critics of the status quo 
on trumped-up charges; and selective assassinations remain a chilling 
reminder of the consequences of questioning the established order. The 
violent unraveling of Barrancabermeja’s militant working class has di-
minished a vision of the state as responsible for the welfare—social, 
economic, and political—of all working people, and the language of 
class as a form of claims making has been stifled. A limited conception 
of individual “human rights” has replaced more ambitious dreams of 
social transformation. More generally, political terror has led to the 
atrophy of working-class consciousness and solidarity, while individual 
rights and actions have become the new, narrower political horizon for 
working people in Barrancabermeja. This reconceptualization of self 
and solidarity is what Grandin (2010) identifies as the key victory of 
cold war, counterinsurgent terror, and the basic requirement for the 
neoliberal regimes that followed in its wake.
Human rights appealed to a moral vision of a global community that 
was not hemmed in by any political system or repressive dictator. It 
represented a form of internationalism that replaced older interna-
tionalist utopias, such as anticolonialism and communism, which em-
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phasized collective self-determination and national sovereignty over 
individual freedom, and which underscored the importance of the 
state, rather than the supremacy of international law (Moyn 2010). 
The liberal concept of human rights, with its emphasis on the indi-
vidual, was not central to leftist traditions in Barrancabermeja, and 
many activists once criticized it for failing to address the main reasons 
of social conflict. By the time of my fieldwork, human rights acom-
pañamiento had become the form of international solidarity, one that 
strove less to connect popular struggles than to provide a modicum of 
cover for activists targeted by the state whom the left could not pro-
tect. The violent destruction of the left, beginning in the 1980s, moved 
persecuted people to understand human rights as both an immediate 
concern and a strategy to generate international support to force the 
Colombian state to respect its own citizens. Rights-based opposition, 
however, offered less a vision of a better world than a critique of what 
was wrong with the present, and the nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) and state-sponsored offices that manifested the institutional 
configuration of human rights activism could not address the economic 
marginalization and social fragmentation that deepened under neo-
liberalism. Because of the overwhelming pressure of the paramilitaries 
and the state security forces, the practice of human rights never devel-
oped beyond a defense of the right to life to rearticulate a collective 
political project, which was crucial at a time when new, far-right coali-
tions were making a bid for power.
Human rights claims represented a defensive strategy that emerged 
when civilian massacres happened with greater frequency and when 
working-class solidarity in Barrancabermeja was being snuffed out. Al-
though the endless repetition of massacres and the documentation of 
them could hardly have been more disempowering of working people, 
human rights activism was the last resort for people desperate to stem 
the violence raining down from all sides. Human rights became the 
central concept around which some working people made demands 
on the official state for justice and accountability (Tate 2007) and 
struggled to rebuild old and craft new forms of alliance. Human rights 
discourse emerged as the “language of contention”—that is, a “com-
mon language or way of talking about social relationships that sets out 
the central terms around which and in terms of which contestation and 
struggle can occur” (Roseberry 1994: 361)—as left political movements 
and organizations were crushed in Barrancabermeja, and as the insur-
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gencies’ participation in kidnapping, drug trafficking, and extortion 
discredited “socialism” as a viable political project. Yet whose rights 
mattered, and what rights counted? What kind of a political project did 
the struggle for human rights represent? A Century of Violence in a Red 
City takes up these questions.
The book is organized in the following manner: chapter 1 examines 
the creation of Barrancabermeja as a foreign-dominated, oil export en-
clave over the first half of the twentieth century. It analyzes how con-
tests over the command of space, the control of labor, and the accumu-
lation of capital shaped relationships between a foreign oil company, 
the Colombian state, and the rural migrants who sought work in the oil 
fields. It asks how the creation of a foreign-dominated export enclave 
concentrated power in the allegedly sovereign territory of the nation-
state and made the extreme exploitation, domination, and subordina-
tion of working people possible. It also asks how the accumulation of 
working people fueled radical popular struggles that led to the forma-
tion of the USO, Colombia’s most militant trade union, and that even-
tually contributed to the demise of the enclave and the nationalization 
of the oil industry.
Chapter 2 considers how, in the wake of the nationalization of the oil 
industry and amid the hardening divisions of the cold war, processes of 
state formation and popular struggle entered a new phase. The insti-
tutional state, rather than a foreign corporation, became the target of 
discontent, and new social movements in alliance with the oil workers’ 
union demanded the provision of public services, as the capitalist mod-
ernization of the countryside propelled the accumulation of waged 
and wage-insecure workers in the city and the emergence of shanty-
towns on the urban periphery. The “civic strikes” that rocked Barran-
cabermeja in the 1970s had much in common with earlier labor strikes 
in which demands for unions, an eight-hour workday, higher wages, 
and so forth, predominated: both forms of popular protest brought 
together diverse working people who overcame their differences, built 
alliances, and rattled the chains of power. Taken together, chapters 1 
and 2 lay out the alliances and connections that made and remade class 
relationships in Barrancabermeja over the early and middle decades of 
the twentieth century, and they preview what was lost in subsequent 
years.
Chapters 3 and 4 discuss how counterinsurgent, paramilitary ter-
ror unmade Barrancabermeja’s working class by rupturing the fabric 
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of popular solidarity and dispossessing and displacing working people 
from the late twentieth century to the present. Political violence pro-
vided both the preconditions and the bedrock for the expansion of 
neoliberalism. Chapter 3 considers how the paramilitary takeover of 
the city created a crisis for working people, one that tore them from 
their social and institutional moorings and exposed them to political 
and economic forces beyond their control. It focuses on how impunity, 
fear, and betrayal shaped working-class disorganization and defeat. 
Chapter 4 then demonstrates, through the example of the Coca-Cola 
workers, how political violence and accumulation by dispossession un-
raveled a relatively privileged and well-organized sector of Barranca-
bermeja’s working class and facilitated the growth of insecure and tem-
porary employment.
Chapter 5 takes up the emergence of a violent new configuration 
of power in Barrancabermeja, between 2000 and 2006, in which para-
militaries forged a realm of de facto sovereignty that was grounded 
in the violent repression of labor, the suppression of democratic pro-
cesses, and the control of illegal activities, especially the cocaine traffic. 
The paramilitary victory shuttered a vision of the state as the guard-
ian of the public interest and raised questions about where the state 
was located and who had the legitimate right to rule. The chapter ex-
plores how barranqueños were incorporated into new or reconfigured 
forms of exploitative labor discipline, rent extraction, and political 
subjugation that characterized the militarized neoliberalism that the 
paramilitary takeover solidified. It also considers how ordinary people 
understood “the state” in a context in which the boundaries between 
paramilitaries and the institutional state and between illegality and 
legality became blurred.
Chapter 6 analyzes the rise of human rights activism within the con-
text of political terror, working-class setback, and ascendant neoliber-
alism. It traces the emergence of human rights advocacy from earlier 
forms of activism and considers how it arose as a new way of making 
claims on the institutional state. It argues that while human rights 
activism opened some room for a new politics of rights to develop in a 
repressive political environment, it was unable to withstand the power 
aligned against it and remained a defensive strategy that never moved 
beyond the condemnation of individual acts of terror. This was, in part, 
because of what the violence had already destroyed: a way of under-
standing and acting on the world rooted in class identities and orga-
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nizations. This chapter argues that what got lost in human rights dis-
course and activism was this sense of class consciousness and collective 
action at a time when a resurgent ruling class was tightening its grip 
on power.
Finally, chapter 7 focuses on the aftermath of counterinsurgency in 
Barrancabermeja, an unstable moment in which the war continues but 
by other means. It considers how the dirty war produced an unstable 
social “order” that rested on a foundation of disorder in which radi-
cal uncertainty and continuing violence undermined working people’s 
ability to establish control over their lives. The chapter explores how, 
in the absence of common memories about the past and disagreement 
about the causes of persistent violence in the present, working people 
struggle anew on a fragmented social terrain to rebuild relationships 
to each other. How, it asks, can men and women create a peaceful co-
existence when they are forced to compete with each other for daily 
survival, and when they hold different memories about the past? By ad-
dressing such questions, the chapter draws attention to the multitude 
of contemporary claims and concerns that shape the ongoing making 





Nowadays, in Colombia, when the topic of Barrancabermeja arises 
in conversation, people often raise their eyebrows and inhale deeply, 
or they purse their lips and shake their heads. While their expres-
sions reflect a range of emotions—horror, dismay, disgust, and some-
times approval—about the dirty war that scarred the city, Barranca 
has always provoked strong passions among Colombians. Some have 
viewed it as a symbol of working-class resistance to foreign imperial-
ism; others have insisted that it is a hotbed of communism, moral de-
cay, and unruliness, a place where “the dangerous classes” run amok. 
The roots of these contradictory images lie in Barranca’s birth as a 
foreign-dominated oil export enclave and the organization of a power-
ful working class that was not averse to rattling the chains of power.
In this chapter, I reconstruct a history of the Barrancabermeja 
labor movement in the early twentieth century based on secondary 
sources and the recollections of residents I interviewed at the time of 
fieldwork. My analysis begins to lay out the importance of class as an 
analytic category that captures the violence that gives form to social 
relations under capitalism. It highlights the fluid, highly contingent 
“making” of class, a process in which diverse working people built alli-
ances across different categories of work (industrial, agricultural, com-
merce), established institutions to voice their concerns, and attempted 
to create scale-spanning solidarities, and in which a foreign oil com-
pany and the Colombian state tried to disrupt and marginalize these 
nascent connections and organizational forms. My perspective runs 
counter to prevailing views of the working class as a static category 
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associated with industrial proletarians. It does so by placing politics at 
the center of analysis and focusing on the tendency of power-laden so-
cial relationships to cohere around the pursuit of capital accumulation 
on the one hand and making a living on the other hand. It also empha-
sizes the violence, disruptions, and contests over the control of space 
associated with class formation. In this way, we can better grasp the 
level of solidarity and the organizational strength achieved by working 
people in early twentieth-century Barrancabermeja and appreciate the 
scale of their defeat at the end of the century, when the intensification 
of paramilitary violence and the rise of neoliberalism “unmade” class 
and obliged people to find new ways to reestablish what had been lost.
In the early twentieth century, after the invention of the internal 
combustion engine and the airplane, oil permanently transformed the 
way humankind lived; the mass production of gasoline-powered auto-
mobiles alone redesigned the physical geography of cities. Although 
most of the oil came from the United States and Europe, a number 
of powerful corporations began to scour the planet for the newly pre-
cious commodity, and the Middle East and several Latin American 
countries, including Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia, attracted their 
attention. In Latin America, the oil firms leveraged states for territory, 
often in sparsely settled, weakly regulated frontier regions with vul-
nerable populations. They mobilized enormous political resources and 
economic clout to concentrate capital, technology, management, and 
labor within spaces carved from the national territories of sovereign 
states, where they created new imperial connections that linked “for-
eign” enclaves to corporate headquarters in North America and Europe. 
They then set about disciplining emergent working classes, in part by 
localizing class relations within the confines of export-oriented zones 
of commodity production over which they strove to exercise complete 
control. The importance of the oil giants lay less in the total number of 
people they employed than in the strategic position they occupied in 
the global economy and in their ability to produce space, control labor, 
and command power.
In Colombia, with the exception of the United Fruit–dominated 
banana enclave on the Caribbean coast, immortalized in Gabriel García 
Márquez’s One Hundred Years of Solitude, Barrancabermeja was the 
country’s most important export enclave. It was forged at the nexus 
of uneven relationships of social, political, and economic power be-
tween the most powerful corporation of the time—the Rockefeller-
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owned Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and its subsidiary, the 
TROCO—Colombian state officials, regional elites based in Bucara-
manga, the provincial capital, and diverse working people who mi-
grated to Barrancabermeja and the Middle Magdalena region. To the 
extent that the Middle Magdalena registered at all on the compasses of 
early twentieth-century corporate managers and urban Colombians, it 
was as a “wild,” “uncivilized” place where the institutions of the central 
state barely reached. Corporate and national elites viewed indigenous 
peoples and mestizo peasants who inhabited the riverbanks as ob-
stacles to the advancement of “civilization” and did not consider their 
various livelihood strategies “work,” which they understood as the 
production of commodities for profit by human laborers under their 
control (Larson 2004). The Middle Magdalena never lost its stigma as 
a turbulent, ungovernable region with an ambiguous relationship to 
the institutions of the central state. This infamy, in turn, marked labor 
struggles, which expanded at times into battles over membership in 
the nation and the meaning of national sovereignty.
Nowadays, the region is generally understood to encompass parts 
of five provinces—Santander, Antioquia, Boyacá, Bolívar, and César—
that border the Magdalena River. Stretching along the riverbank for 
340 kilometers, from Puerto Nare in the south to Rio Viejo in the 
north, the Middle Magdalena region sits in a torrid valley between two 
spectacular mountain ranges. Barrancabermeja today is its most im-
portant commercial center, with a population of some 350,000 people. 
Small boats called chalupas and motorized canoes carry passengers and 
goods between Barrancabermeja and other river ports, and a recently 
modernized airport accommodates travelers from much farther afield. 
Still visited by foreign oil engineers and supervisors, the city is home 
to Colombia’s largest refinery, which is now owned by the Colombian 
state and processes approximately 70 percent of Colombian crude oil. 
A two-hundred-foot flare burns above the refinery, and a wire statue 
of Jesus Christ—el Cristo petrolero—commissioned by the state-owned 
oil company and inaugurated in 1995, rises with outstretched arms 
from a contaminated lagoon. On certain days, a thick, sulfurous odor 
spreads across the commercial district and hangs in the air like a nox-
ious belch, while at night, the grunts and bangs emitted from the re-
finery’s tangled intestines of metal pipes float across the city.
Barrancabermeja’s emergence as a corporate-controlled oil export 
zone raises questions about how power operates in and through long 
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MAP 1.2 Map of the Middle Magdalena.
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distance connections and how these connections transform social re-
lationships and societies. It also poses tricky questions about national 
sovereignty. How, for example, does the creation of export-oriented 
enclaves concentrate power in the allegedly sovereign territory of the 
nation-state and make the extreme foreign exploitation, domination, 
and subordination of working people possible? How, too, does the accu-
mulation of labor in these “strategic hamlets” of empire (see Kramer 
2011: 1356) fuel radical popular struggles? This chapter examines the 
tense dialectic between corporate control and working-class formation 
and resistance that shaped the growth of the enclave and its ultimate 
demise over an approximately forty-year period from 1920 to 1960.
The chapter first explores the corporate effort to control space and 
concentrate labor in ways that allowed it to take on state-like char-
acteristics in a frontier region and regulate the lives of people in the 
emergent enclave. It then considers how a heterogeneous group of 
working people—peasants, oil workers, and merchants—crafted new 
relationships to each other and created a militant political culture that 
enabled them to push back against the overweening power of the oil 
company and demand that the institutional state mediate conflicts 
with the corporation and better control the exploitation of natural re-
sources. Finally, the chapter examines how popular struggles eventu-
ally contributed to the demise of the enclave and the nationalization of 
the oil industry. It demonstrates that processes of state and class for-
mation involved intense conflicts over geography and capital accumu-
lation, as well as the social relations and organizational forms through 
which working people came to understand and articulate their rela-
tionships to the oil company and the institutional state.
The Domestic Politics of a Foreign Enclave
In early twentieth-century Colombia, the notion of the monolithic 
state that regulated social life and monopolized violence within a 
given territory was less a reality than a claim asserted by Bogotá-based 
government officials. Colombia was a fragmented country of regions 
divided by high mountain ranges, turbulent rivers, and dense tropi-
cal forests. Highland elites were divided between the Liberal and Con-
servative Parties and sat atop regional social hierarchies, where they 
competed with each other to control national politics and the patron-
age and wealth-making possibilities that flowed from them. These 
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interparty rivalries generated constant intrigue, unrest, and parti-
san hatreds. Even though the victors of political struggles acted in the 
name of the state, they could neither exercise direct control over the 
entire national territory nor monitor the population in a consistent 
manner, and they viewed the interior tropical forests, eastern plains, 
and Pacific and Caribbean coastal regions as ungovernable territories 
where Afro-Colombians and indigenous peoples existed beyond the 
pale of civilization.
The end of the Thousand Days War (1899–1902), a conflict between 
the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party, which the Conserva-
tives won, enabled a tenuous peace to spread across the country that 
spurred the growth of commodity production. The national govern-
ment funded infrastructure projects that tied some geographic areas to 
the world market and better integrated portions of the national terri-
tory. Coffee cultivation exploded in the central and western mountains; 
cattle ranching expanded on the Caribbean coast; sugarcane developed 
in the Cauca Valley; and foreign-controlled banana and oil enclaves 
arose on the Caribbean coast and in the Middle Magdalena River val-
ley. The commodity boom and the Conservative government’s willing-
ness to finance road, railroad, and port projects gave rise to new spatial 
configurations of land, labor, and power that accentuated regional dif-
ferences. Coffee and oil epitomized new configurations of class power 
and geography and illustrated how the expansion of capitalism was tied 
to particular regional dynamics.
By the late nineteenth century, coffee production had become 
Colombia’s leading export commodity, spurring the colonization of 
new lands in the intermountain valleys of the western mountains. In 
the early twentieth century, settlers and entrepreneurs from Antio-
quia province propelled an expanding coffee frontier that became 
associated with the image of a democratic society of entrepreneurial 
small farmers defined by their Catholicism and “whiteness” (Apple-
baum 2003). Such racial imagery and cultural claims constituted the 
bedrock on which the coffee frontier was associated with “civilization” 
and on which the new commercial and entrepreneurial elites differen-
tiated themselves from other developing frontiers, such as the Middle 
Magdalena (Arredondo 2005: 45–46). The cultivation and sale of coffee 
remained mostly in national hands, and the profits underwrote the 
development of light industry and expanded the domestic market for 
manufactured goods. Coffee production therefore never provoked the 
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development of strong anti-imperialist sentiments as in the oil sector 
(Bushnell 1993: 169–74), and the social organization of coffee cultiva-
tion undermined the formation of the kind of collective solidarity that 
emerged in the oil zone. Coffee growing was based on family-centered, 
labor-intensive production arrangements on smallholdings. It was 
characterized by exceptionally high levels of exploitation, which drove 
a violent struggle for land among small-scale producers and workers 
and between them and elites to better their position or to avoid prole-
tarianization. This contest, in turn, did less to foster collective values 
and challenge the status quo than to promote conservative individual-
ism and strengthen Colombia’s paternalist two-party political system, 
all of which undermined the growth of the Colombian labor movement 
(Bergquist 1986: 274–75).
Unlike coffee, oil represented the intrusion of foreign capital and the 
dominance of a North American corporate elite in the nominally na-
tional space of Barrancabermeja, and it fired collective struggles stoked 
by anti-imperialist nationalism. In 1919, Standard Oil’s subsidiary, the 
Tropical Oil Company, received a territorial land grant—the DeMares 
concession—from the Colombian government to extract petroleum 
in a region where oil literally oozed from the ground and collected in 
surface pools. The concession completely surrounded the river port 
of Barrancabermeja and encompassed over 300,000 hectares, mostly 
covered in dense tropical forest that measured eighty kilometers long 
and forty kilometers wide. The TROCO operated only nominally under 
the jurisdiction of the Colombian government, which arrogated virtual 
sovereignty to it to pump oil, mobilize a labor force, and organize so-
cial life in and around Barrancabermeja. The subsequent development 
of the oil enclave was tied to the construction of roads and pipelines 
and the expansion of fluvial transportation that integrated the oil zone 
more tightly with world markets and the corporation’s North American 
headquarters than with Colombia.
The rise of the enclave on the smooth surface of national sover-
eignty blurred the distinctions between the “foreign” and the “domes-
tic,” as the TROCO, with its infrastructure, technology, and capacity to 
concentrate a huge population of migrant workers, became a power-
ful actor in a sparsely populated region, where regional elites hoped 
that the modernizing impulse of market relations would transform the 
allegedly slothful ways of dark-skinned people who lived beyond the 
frontier of modernity. While it assumed some of the regulatory char-
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acteristics of a state, the TROCO never intended to replace the institu-
tional Colombian state. The company’s administrators recognized the 
importance of working with government officials, who saw the advent 
of foreign corporations as the harbinger of national “progress.”1 They 
understood that the institutional state remained the best way for them 
to secure the social, juridical, and administrative order that the TROCO 
needed to extract oil effectively and efficiently. In 1922, for example, 
the TROCO pressured state officials to make Barrancabermeja an inde-
pendent municipality, even though the port town and its hinterland 
had neither the population nor the historical importance to meet the 
requirements for independent status. Part of the agreement to create a 
new, self-governing locality included the use of 5 percent of the TROCO 
royalties to finance services and infrastructure and to support the sal-
aries of municipal officials.2 Yet because the TROCO had constructed 
Barranca as a base of operations for oil extraction and refining and 
therefore owned most of the utilities, infrastructure, and services, the 
royalties were simply returning to corporate hands, and the new mu-
nicipality quickly became dependent on the company for its budget 
(García 2006: 262; van Isschot 2015: 53–54).
The creation of corporate space through the crafting of a new mu-
nicipality was key to solidifying TROCO power. Mayors served at the 
discretion of the company. According to a local Liberal Party member, 
“It was enough for the TROCO manager to call the governor of Santan-
der and tell him to change the mayor, and the mayor was changed. . . . 
The Tropical was untouchable” (qtd. in Archila 1978: 63). Similarly, the 
institutional state provided the police and military forces—national, 
departmental, and municipal—that the corporation required to ensure 
labor peace in the enclave, a practice that made Barranca, from its in-
ception, one of the most militarized towns in Colombia. In exchange, 
company watchmen, labor inspectors, and medical officials adopted 
hiring policies that favored the party in power (Roldán 2002: 117–18). 
The “boundedness” of the enclave was therefore shaped at the junction 
of wider networks of state and corporate power.3
The TROCO was the first and largest oil corporation to operate in the 
Middle Magdalena, where its production took off in the early 1920s, 
tripled between 1924 and 1925, and then increased another eightfold in 
1926, after seventy-four new wells came online and the completion of a 
pipeline to the Caribbean coast enabled the company to ship oil abroad 
(Gibb and Knowlton 1956). The Standard Oil Company controlled this 
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business from beginning to end. While the TROCO managed the drill-
ing, another Standard Oil subsidiary (the Andian National Corpora-
tion) was charged with transporting the petroleum to the Caribbean 
coast and beyond, and still another subsidiary (Imperial Oil) refined 
the crude in Montreal. In an attempt to avoid charges of U.S. imperi-
alism, all of these firms were registered in Canada. The TROCO did not 
act alone in the Middle Magdalena. Over the first half of the twenti-
eth century, the British Lobitos Oil Field Company began oil explo-
rations close to the nearby town of San Vicente de Chucurí; a couple 
of hours upstream, the Texas Oil Company extracted crude from a 
127,000-hectare concession close to Puerto Boyacá; and across the river 
in the hamlet of Yondó, the Royal Dutch Shell corporation acquired a 
concession, in the 1930s, that encompassed 146,000 hectares. The con-
cessions made Colombia a global player in the burgeoning oil industry, 
rivaling Mexico and Venezuela in the early twentieth century (Palacios 
2006: 86).
The TROCO and the other oil companies did not begin operations 
on a blank slate. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
rapacious violence against indigenous peoples paved the way for the 
advent of the oil men. Fueled by metropolitan views of the frontier as 
geographically and temporally distant—an “empty space”—the hunt-
ing and killing of indigenous peoples was a widespread practice on 
Colombia’s expanding internal frontiers (Bjork-James 2015). As early 
as the mid-nineteenth century, a boom in forest products—chinchona 
bark, palm nuts, rubber, and wood-based dyes—had attracted entre-
preneurs and itinerant workers to the region and brought them into 
conflict with the indigenous Yariguíes. Entrepreneurs got hold of in-
digenous lands through the concession of baldíos—nominally uninhab-
ited state lands—by the state, and immigrant workers, assigned to the 
construction of access roads through the forest, clashed with the Yari-
guíes. By the early twentieth century, on the eve of the oil boom, the 
Yariguíes had been mostly eliminated—either massacred, forcibly dis-
placed, or relocated to Catholic Church–controlled settlements, where 
priests taught them Spanish and religion and sought to assimilate 
them. The physical disorganization and annihilation of the Yariguíes 
opened the door for immigrant workers and defeated Liberal soldiers, 
following the end of the Thousand Days War, to establish small villages 
along the banks of the Magdalena and its tributaries. The dense for-
est provided natural protection, and the availability of nominally un-
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claimed state lands offered the possibility of developing a livelihood 
(van Isschot 2015; Vega, Núñez, and Pereira 2009: 46–58).
The production of dry wood to fuel the steamboats that plied the 
long, navigable stretch of river between the Caribbean port of Barran-
quilla and the inland town of Honda set off a period of indiscriminate 
deforestation in the nineteenth century, and then the advent of the 
oil industry changed the Middle Magdalena forever. Petroleum explo-
ration and production initiated an assault on the environment from 
which it never recovered. The oil companies dumped contaminants 
into the river and spewed sulfurous fumes into the air; they consumed 
more wood for the construction of houses and work encampments; and 
they spilled and leaked oil into the rivers, springs, and swampy marsh-
lands. Oil fires became a new and terrifying hazard. As in Mexico and 
Venezuela, the oil men set in motion processes of migration, dispos-
session, proletarianization, and urbanization and a shift in land tenure 
arrangements unprecedented in regional history.4
Controlling Space and Concentrating Labor
The TROCO established its power in Barrancabermeja through the cre-
ation and control of space and the rigid regimentation of the lives of 
working people within the enclave. Race, gender, region, and national 
origin were key coordinates that guided how the TROCO regulated so-
cial life and organized its labor force. Yet corporate officials quickly dis-
covered that their hands were not free to shape the enclave any way 
they chose. The concentration of thousands of migrants within the 
enclave and the exploitation of them generated tensions between the 
corporation’s desire for control and working people’s search for better, 
more comfortable lives. These tensions played out in the oil fields and 
in the daily lives of working people.
The corporation’s early hiring policies reflected prevailing racist 
sentiments among company managers. During the initial phase of 
clearing forest, building roads, constructing buildings, and laying oil 
pipelines, the TROCO turned to men who lived in the area to fulfill 
its labor needs. These men, described as “a racial-lowlands mixture,” 
were subsequently deemed unsatisfactory because they were “unac-
customed to the discipline of regular labor” (Gibb and Knowlton 1956: 
374). As labor requirements intensified, the company sent contractors 
on recruiting missions to the predominantly Afro-Colombian Carib-
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bean coastal provinces and the Antioquian highlands, where lighter-
skinned individuals were considered “more robust of body and keen of 
mind” than the local population (Gibb and Knowlton 1956: 374). It also 
recruited West Indian workers known as yumecas. The West Indians’ 
ability to speak English, their education within a colonial British sys-
tem, and their previous work experience in the Panama Canal Zone or 
with Standard Oil operations elsewhere, such as Venezuela, made them 
attractive workers. In the opinion of company managers, the Caribbean 
contract laborers understood and accepted orders and were less likely 
to join labor unions. They filled intermediate positions in clerical and 
mechanical work between the Colombian labor force and the North 
American supervisors and drillers. Yet Colombian workers perceived 
them as part of the corporate elite because of their superior treatment 
and command of English (Vega 2002: 213–14), and, along with other 
sectors of Colombian society, some feared that the presence of West 
Indians would lead to racial contamination. On at least one occasion, 
for example, the local police chief opposed the company’s plans to im-
port a sizable contingent of Caribbean laborers because of worries 
about racial defilement (Archila 1978: 106–7; Valbuena 1947).5 Corpo-
rate hiring practices, and sometimes even opposition to them, dem-
onstrate how racist assumptions infused the recruitment and organi-
zation of a workforce and acted initially to hinder connections among 
immigrant laborers congregating in Barrancabermeja; it also illustrates 
what working people themselves had to overcome as they forged iden-
tities and alliances and maneuvered for position and power within the 
enclave’s heterogeneous mix of migrant labor.
As the oil industry expanded in the late 1920s, contract labor was in-
creasingly unnecessary. Personal and familial connections became the 
primary means of acquiring a job, as news of the relatively high wages 
paid in the oil zone circulated around Colombia, and migrants, who 
were mostly young, single men, came in droves. Older immigrants im-
mediately incorporated new arrivals into an exhausting ten- to twelve-
hour-a-day work regime that extended from Monday through Satur-
day, and not surprisingly, turnover was high, averaging 30 percent a 
month in the early years (Gibb and Knowlton 1956). Although some 
of the migrants came from declining gold mining towns in Antioquia 
or had moved from job to job in different locations, most of the new-
comers shared a past as subsistence producers, and they were unaccus-
tomed to the industrial labor discipline of the oil zone, where the work-
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day began and ended with the blow of a whistle. These newly minted 
waged workers occupied an unusual position in early twentieth-century 
Colombia. Like their counterparts in Mexico and Venezuela, they were 
tied to an advanced capitalist industry that operated in an interna-
tional arena, but they had grown up in an overwhelmingly rural society 
that had little connection to the oil industry and that moved to the 
rhythms of the agricultural cycle (Santiago 2006; Tinker Salas 2009).
Controlling the migrants posed a challenge for the oil company, 
whose expansionist and monopolistic ambitions clashed with the sub-
sistence requirements of its workforce. Many workers combined wage 
labor in the oil fields with small-scale agricultural production on plots 
of public land as a means to offset the high cost of living in the enclave. 
The oil company claimed these lands, and even though it was not inter-
ested in agricultural production, it wanted to control access to the sub-
soil to ensure its right to the petroleum that lay beneath the surface. By 
monopolizing access to land, the TROCO also hoped to create a supply 
of local workers with no other means of survival but work in the oil 
fields. Resolving land disputes was a complicated matter because there 
was much uncertainty about the distinction between public and private 
lands, especially in frontier regions like the Middle Magdalena where 
settlers typically did not hold title to their properties but claimed rights 
through occupation and use (LeGrand 1986). The uncertainty arose, in 
part, from the government’s own policies. On the one hand, the Colom-
bian government supported the land claims of settlers in frontier zones 
because it sought to divert agrarian tensions from more populated re-
gions of the country and build a class of small, rural proprietors in areas 
where the institutional presence of the state was weak. On the other 
hand, it had granted an enormous concession to the TROCO and recog-
nized the company’s right to exploit the land in areas where peasants 
had settled. Not surprisingly, when the provincial government had to 
choose whom to support, it sided with the TROCO and assigned more 
police to the enclave (Vega, Núñez, and Pereira 2009).
The TROCO, like other oil companies in the Middle Magdalena, at-
tempted to construct sovereignty and regulate social life within its do-
main by issuing passes to workers and those settlers whose rights it 
recognized, granting them a form of pseudocitizenship, and then per-
secuting those who did not pass its test. Pedro Lozado, who grew up 
on the Texas Oil Company’s concession near the river port of Puerto 
Boyacá, vented his annoyance at foreigners to me one day as we chat-
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ted in his home in Barrancabermeja, some sixty years after the oil com-
pany displaced his family. “We needed permission from foreigners, 
even though we were Colombians, to travel in the territory,” Lozada 
recalled.6 “It [the permit] was a little piece of cardboard—like an iden-
tity card—that carried the signature of the company manager and 
the commander of the army battalion. . . . If you didn’t have this pase
[pass]—they called it a pase—they made problems for you.”7 Similarly, 
in the Shell Oil Company’s enclave of Yondó, across the river from Ba-
rrancabermeja, company passes had to be renewed every two months. 
One settler described the uncertainty of life on Shell’s concession for 
those not approved by the company: “It was prohibited to cut trees or 
to prepare a field for cultivation because right there they would grab 
you and throw you in jail. There were personnel from the company who 
patrolled the forest and whoever they caught working [the land], they 
threw him off. . . . The forest guards went and brought the law to take 
the people away. They went and informed that ‘[people] are cutting for-
est in such a place’ and the army and the police came and kicked you 
out” (qtd. in Murillo 1994: 190). And a Barrancabermeja resident, who 
disputed the TROCO’s land claim, described the corporate vigilance in 
El Centro, the locus of oil operations in the municipality of Barran-
cabermeja: “The lands in El Centro were public [baldios] . . . [but] the 
company, when it belonged to the gringos, didn’t permit settlers. For 
example, you arrived at El Centro and they gave you a permit for a cer-
tain amount of time. If you didn’t get work, they would not let you stay 
any longer” (qtd. in Archila 1978: 60). Like passports, the permits de-
termined who could enter the territory over which the TROCO claimed 
sovereign rights and how long they could remain, and they operated 
hand in hand with rigid forms of spatial segregation.
In the early twentieth century, segregation was the norm in U.S.-
based oil camps, and Barrancabermeja also developed clear spatial co-
ordinates based on deep class, race, and national divisions. As a rising 
wave of impoverished immigrants crashed over the enclave, the com-
pany strove mightily to separate the unwashed masses from a small 
group of company officials, supervisors, and their families, and two dis-
tinct urban centers arose: El Centro and Infantas, where the oil was 
pumped, and Barrancabermeja, the municipal headquarters and loca-
tion of the refinery. El Centro and Infantas, located twenty kilometers 
from the port town, contained a small, transient group of white U.S. 
and Canadian oil company managers, technicians, and their family 
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members who lived in the barrio staff (staff neighborhood). The bar-
rio staff was a clean, quiet redoubt that contained comfortable North 
American–style brick homes surrounded by shaded lawns. It was a 
place where foreign personnel found relief from the tropical heat in 
swimming pools and under covered verandas and enjoyed an array 
of services, including a hospital, a golf course, and a variety of sports 
facilities for their exclusive use. Fences separated the gilded ghettos of 
white, foreign personnel from impoverished, working-class encamp-
ments that grew up adjacent to them. In the work camps, basic services 
were nonexistent, and malaria, yellow fever, and intestinal disorders 
were pervasive. Rafael Nuñez described the residential layout: “There 
was an encampment that they called the ‘yumecas’ camp, and another 
encampment where the common worker lived. And another encamp-
ment for the office workers. So we had segregation” (qtd. in Archila 
1978: 45–46).
A segregated train connected El Centro and Infantas to Barranca-
bermeja, which was a collection of rudimentary huts, brothels, bars, 
and a few hotels in the 1920s. Although most of the oil workers lived in 
El Centro, more began to reside in the port after the opening of the re-
finery in 1926. Barrancabermeja also had a small fenced-in compound 
for foreign corporate personnel. The fences symbolized the hardening 
of race, class, and national boundaries that were dividing the enclave, 
which had no public services. The municipal government was unable to 
accommodate the health and housing needs of a growing population, 
which surged from nineteen hundred inhabitants in 1914 to more than 
twelve thousand in 1927, when Barrancabermeja acquired the largest 
concentration of urban proletarians in Colombia (Archila 1978: 44). 
Half of the urban residents worked for the TROCO, while most of the 
rest of the population was dependent on it in one way or another.
As the TROCO controlled social life through new forms of segrega-
tion, it also tried to exclude merchants from the enclave in order to mo-
nopolize commerce. The accumulation of labor in the municipality of 
Barrancabermeja had created a consumer market that stimulated new 
tastes and desires, which a multinational group of Syrian, Turkish, Pal-
estinian, and Colombian merchants wanted to nourish with a range 
of foreign and domestic goods. Independent merchants developed 
wide networks of customers that extended into rural villages, and they 
made money from the small portion of oil wealth that trickled down 
to workers in the form of wages. One oil worker explained that it was 
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possible to acquire a variety of exotic commodities: “Everyone here had 
clothing that was unavailable in the country: rubber ponchos . . . also 
bicycles, that’s to say a range of things that were unknown. They drank 
whiskey, smoked American cigarettes, [sipped] champagne, everything 
that American civilization imported” (qtd. in Archila 1978: 61). Yet the 
merchants had to contend with the hostility of the TROCO, which, in 
the 1920s, operated company stores that sold goods to a captive work-
force and controlled commerce well into the 1950s. Not surprisingly, 
relations between the retailers and the company were strained.
Amid the dance of consumer goods, sex was coveted more than any 
other commodity, and controlling workers’ access to it formed another 
piece of the corporation’s broader strategy to manage the lives of work-
ing people. The high concentration of single men with biweekly pay-
checks and few diversions created a market for sex workers, who came 
from around Colombia, the Caribbean, and Europe. Sexual fantasies 
based on the supposed exoticism and amorous qualities attributed to 
women of particular nationalities, races, and regional backgrounds 
were nurtured in the enclave, and when men returned from the work 
camps on Saturday night, the bars and brothels of the city came alive. 
Men and women drank, danced, fought, and had sex, as the oil workers 
escaped, albeit momentarily, from the repressive hierarchies of the oil 
fields, and it was not uncommon for long-term relationships to de-
velop between them and the enclave’s sex workers. Barrancabermeja 
thus acquired a special place in the imaginaries of corporate managers 
and governing elites, who viewed its plebeian, mixed-race population 
as promiscuous and ungovernable. The city became famous for putas, 
plata, y petróleo (whores, money, and oil), an identification that tended 
to associate all working women in the enclave with prostitution and 
provided the grist for several novels about the city (see Álvarez 1983; 
Jaramillo 1934; Restrepo 1999).
Colombian elites and foreign oil company managers created an as-
sociation between the sex trade and the moral degeneracy and undisci-
plined behavior that distinguished the Afro-Colombian and mestizo 
working class for them, and the TROCO’s medical department initially 
adopted a punitive approach to employees who contracted vene-
real disease. Although management allowed doctors to care for sick 
workers who were willing to pay for treatment, it docked the pay of 
absent workers with venereal disease and required them to pay a ten-
dollar-a-day fee for hospitalization. When rates of infection increased, 
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rather than decreased, the medical department reversed this policy 
and treated all sick workers equally, but to do so, it had to contend with 
strong arguments from within the company that the new dispensation 
would simply encourage men to go out and contract the illness (Gibb 
and Knowlton 1956). To improve the health and rectify the morals of 
a labor force viewed as degenerate, the TROCO and Royal Dutch Shell 
tried to control the time workers spent in Barrancabermeja. The TROCO 
restricted the workers of El Centro to Saturday night through Sunday 
morning. On the other side of the Magdalena, Shell limited its employ-
ees to Wednesday after work until early Thursday morning and Satur-
day until Sunday night, and it fired those who contravened this policy 
(Murillo 1994).
In contrast to the industrializing, highland city of Medellín, which 
Life magazine dubbed a “capitalist paradise” in 1947 (Farnsworth-
Alvear 2000: 39), class conflict in Barrancabermeja was pervasive, raw, 
and violent. Unlike Medellín, with its conservative, Catholic elite who 
related to subalterns through ties of deference, clientelism, and reli-
gious moralism (Farnsworth-Alvear 2000), there was no national bour-
geoisie that wielded moral authority and enmeshed working people in 
relationships of submission and obedience. An incipient elite of doc-
tors, merchants, and lawyers had still not distinguished itself from 
workers, and a self-described group of notable families (familias de-
centes), so prominent in other Colombian cities, did not exist (Ar-
chila 1978: 153). Moreover, the Catholic Church exerted little influence 
over workers and peasants because it had ignored the largely Afro-
Colombian and mestizo population of the Middle Magdalena and was 
therefore unable to broker conflicts effectively. In such a context, the 
TROCO field staff had difficulty developing cross-class relationships of 
respect and authority with workers. A relatively small, transient group 
of North American managers and supervisors translated oil company 
policy into daily practices, but these professionals and their families 
were unfamiliar with the cultural practices and social mores of Colom-
bian workers. They were cosseted foreigners tied to a wealthy corpora-
tion that working people increasingly described as “imperialist.” It is 
therefore not surprising that working people—oil workers, merchants, 
peasants, and sex workers—viewed corporate efforts to regulate their 
lives as arbitrary and heavy-handed.
Barrancabermeja’s militant working-class political culture arose 
from the stark contrast between Colombians engaged in hard, dirty, 
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dangerous work, housed in overcrowded work camps, and controlled 
by passes and North Americans involved in supervisory positions and 
sheltered within a residential setting that was unbelievably lavish for 
those beyond the perimeter. Despite the regional, racial, and gender 
differences that divided working people, and the different kinds of 
work—waged labor, subsistence agriculture, small-scale vending—
that engaged them, the distinction between Colombians and “gringos” 
became most important. Oil workers, peasants, sex workers, and petty 
merchants had no common traditions to draw on as they confronted 
the harsh realities of the enclave. Because of their diverse backgrounds 
and, in some cases, prior involvement in a transient labor force that 
had begun to move around the country, they had to build new re-
lationships and understandings among themselves. Archila argues 
that the mixing and mingling of migrants from all over the country 
in the crowded work camps of a foreign corporation and in the bars 
and brothels of the oil port generated an openness to different ways of 
life and to new ideas that laid the basis for a cosmopolitan culture to 
emerge in plebeian Barrancabermeja. As Luis Rojas, an early migrant, 
told him, “They never rejected me here; people from here were good. 
Better said, the people here are good because [Barranca] is a very cos-
mopolitan town. . . . A highlander [or] a Venezuelan comes here and 
nobody is rejected. Very cosmopolitan. That is why in a strike, nobody 
says ‘you, why are you getting involved here’ ” (qtd. in Archila 1978: 113). 
The acknowledgment and taken-for-grantedness of cultural differences 
and the general absence of kinfolk to perpetuate values and traditions 
made Barranca an experiment in working-class cosmopolitanism that 
was unusual in twentieth-century Colombia. In addition, the stark con-
trast between the power of foreign managers and the relative power-
lessness of Colombian workers nurtured forms of solidarity among oil 
workers and between them and the peasants and petty merchants who 
came to the enclave.
At the same time, new political discourses—socialism, anarchism, 
and communism—circulated among working people in the ports along 
the Magdalena River and provided concepts to understand corporate 
practices and interpret what was happening. “Imperialism,” for ex-
ample, was not an abstract concept in Colombia’s oil and banana en-
claves, as it likely was for artisans and peasants in the coffee zone, 
where the production and marketing of coffee was under national con-
trol; it was readily translated into the exploitation, indignities, and 
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forms of exclusion that arose from the omnipresence of the TROCO 
and that diverse working people experienced in their daily lives. Anti-
imperialist nationalism not only arose from authoritarian labor rela-
tions and bleak working conditions in the TROCO labor camps. It was 
also stimulated by the twenty-one-year U.S. occupation of Nicaragua 
(1912–33) and the 1903 loss of Panama to the United States, which 
prompted fears that the TROCO would steal Barrancabermeja and claim 
it as a U.S. possession. A 1928 banana strike and massacre of thousands 
of workers in the United Fruit Company–dominated enclave on the 
Atlantic coast further inflamed anti-imperialist sympathies, as the 
“banana zone” suffered from many of the same social and economic 
problems as Barrancabermeja. Anti-imperialist nationalism became a 
central tenet of the USO, Colombia’s most powerful union that orga-
nized in the 1920s, as workers, peasants, and merchants pushed back 
against the control and abuse of the foreign corporation.
For all its rebelliousness, however, the political culture created by 
the first generation of migrants in the enclave was intensely mascu-
line. Work in the oil fields—and the high pay relative to other occu-
pations and other parts of the country—was the purview of men, 
who expressed their opposition to the TROCO through an aggressive, 
brash masculinity. A small number of women migrants found less well-
remunerated work as cooks, laundresses, and domestic servants and 
gravitated to the underground economy of bars and brothels. Some 
of these women acquired a tenuous economic independence from 
men. Yet the nascent labor movement was mostly silent about these 
women in their capacity as workers because women’s place, it was be-
lieved, was in the home with children, even though such a domestic 
ideal was beyond the reach of most migrant women in Barrancaber-
meja. For example, when the Communist Party railed against the ex-
ploitation of women who labored as “servants” of the TROCO, it was 
because women’s work outside the home was perceived as dividing the 
proletarian family and leaving children abandoned (see Archila 1991: 
118n71). Much more than domestic service or other kinds of female 
labor, sex work received more attention from a number of intellectuals 
who wrote novels about early Barrancabermeja, but the authors tended 
to exoticize prostitution. They said little about how prostitution ex-
posed women to sexual violence, nor did they comment in great detail 
about the dearth of rights and protections that characterized sex work. 
In the prolific writings of Gonzalo Buenahora, for example, prostitutes 
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were repeatedly discussed, but less was written about either the con-
ditions in which they worked or the other kinds of female labor in the 
enclave. Like Buenahora, most novelists and commentators chose to 
mythologize the relationships between oil workers and prostitutes in 
which women’s unpaid domestic labor subsidized the oil economy.8
At this point, it is worth recalling E. P. Thompson’s point that classes 
“do not exist as separate entities, look around, find an enemy class, 
and then start to struggle” (1978: 149). On the contrary, people find 
themselves enmeshed in struggles that they cannot avoid, and out of 
these battles, which are multiple and complex and involve multiple 
ways of working, a sense of commonality may or may not emerge that 
defines them as a class. Thompson places great emphasis on the forma-
tive quality of struggle, as working people maneuver to build alliances 
and to define newly forged collectivities in opposition to more power-
ful groups. His emphasis is always on the making of connections and 
alliances over time, as well as their periodic undoing (Thompson 1963, 
1978). Thompson’s perspective helps us understand how a heteroge-
neous mix of working people in Barrancabermeja crafted new forms 
of solidarity through struggles to improve working conditions and end 
the suffocating strictures on daily life imposed by the TROCO. They did 
so by constructing new relationships that reached across their regional 
differences, by organizing a powerful union, and by reaching out to po-
litical parties and movements—the Partido Socialista Revolucionario 
(Revolutionary Socialist Party, PSR), the left wing of the Liberal Party, 
and the national popular movement spearheaded by Jorge Eliécer 
Gaitán—to channel their demands and to involve the Colombian state 
more directly in resolving conflicts with the oil company. In the pro-
cess, they would redefine the spatial configuration of the oil industry 
in Colombia.
Building Popular Power under Conservative Rule
During the 1920s—the fourth decade of Conservative Party rule in 
Colombia—economic liberalism and political authoritarianism set the 
narrow boundaries of Colombian democracy, which allowed men to 
vote but did not recognize the rights of workers to organize unions 
and to engage in strikes.9 Government officials and elites subscribed to 
the liberal dogma that the state should not intervene in social and eco-
nomic affairs and left the resolution of labor disputes up to employers 
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and workers. In Barrancabermeja, this policy meant that the TROCO 
enjoyed a free hand in disciplining and repressing its workforce, but 
if labor conflicts became too big for the corporation to control alone, 
they became “public order problems” that then involved the police and 
the military.
In 1926, the PSR formed independently of Liberal or Conservative 
Party control. A precursor to the Communist Party of Colombia, the 
PSR represented the most important expression of popular political 
organization with a national projection, and its rapid rise put it in 
competition with the Liberal Party for representation of the nascent 
labor movement. The PSR’s leaders—Raúl Eduardo Mahécha, Mario 
Cano, Tomás Uríbe, and Ignacio Torres Giraldo—adopted a nation-
alist stance and a vernacular form of socialism that was flexible and 
amenable to adopting the popular language of protest. They organized 
unions and led strikes up and down the Magdalena River, including Ba-
rrancabermeja. A lawyer by training, Raúl Eduardo Mahécha first came 
to Barrancabermeja in 1922, when he offered his services to resolve 
land and labor disputes with the TROCO and founded the Sociedad 
Unión Obrera, which operated in clandestinity for several years but 
eventually became the powerful oil workers union, the USO. Initially 
composed of peasant settlers whom Mahécha organized through the 
provision of low-cost basic necessities, the Sociedad Unión Obrera, in 
1923, counted three hundred peasants among its members, an early in-
dication of the close ties that were developing between peasant settlers 
and oil workers in the enclave. Mahécha then reached out to the oil 
workers through Vanguardia Obrera, a newspaper founded by him that 
denounced the TROCO and the deplorable working conditions and ex-
tolled the oil workers as the embodiment of the Colombian nation 
(Vega 2002: 250). Like Vanguardia Obrera, a vibrant alternative media 
of newspapers and broadsheets played an important part in the circu-
lation of new ideas that became part of Barranca’s emergent political 
culture.
The Sociedad Unión Obrera led two oil strikes in 1924 and 1927. These 
strikes defied a national ban on union activity, formed part of a larger 
strike wave that disrupted the oil and banana enclaves, swept through 
many of the port towns along the Magdalena River in the 1920s, and 
demonstrated the growing unity and organizational power of diverse 
working people in the enclave. The strikes confronted the TROCO with 
a series of worker demands that underscored the miserable conditions 
50 CHAPTER ONE
in the oil fields and challenged the company’s right to organize and 
control the enclave for the private accumulation of capital. Oil workers 
sought to ease the intense control that the TROCO exercised over their 
lives by asserting the right to read the press in the work camps and 
insisting on the distribution of meals in company facilities “without 
the presence of the national police, as is the practice, which humiliates 
Colombian workers and places them in the position of convicts in the 
work camps” (Vega 2002: 225). They also demanded recognition of their 
union, wage increases, improvements in food and hygiene, an eight-
hour workday, and Sunday as a day of rest. During the strikes, workers 
carried red flags emblazoned with three 8s that symbolized eight hours 
of work, eight hours of study, and eight hours of rest (Vega 2002: 226). 
Workers’ demands echoed those set out by labor movements in the 
industrializing countries of North America and Europe and reflected 
the concerns of nascent proletarians in Mexican and Venezuelan oil 
enclave economies (Santiago 2006; Tinker Salas 2009). They expressed 
an incipient internationalism that transcended the confines of the en-
clave and identified common problems shared with working people 
elsewhere.
The strikes did not focus only on winning higher wages and better 
working conditions, however. Even as former peasants identified 
themselves as “oil workers” and distinguished themselves from the di-
verse stew of laboring people who had settled in Barrancabermeja, they 
projected their growing power in support of petty merchants and peas-
ants and were, in turn, supported by them. Although scholarship and 
journalistic accounts about the enclave era in Barrancabermeja have 
focused on the oil workers and ignored other aspects of social life in 
the enclave, Colombian historians Renán Vega and Mauricio Archila 
drew on government documents, oral histories, and newspaper re-
ports to show that strikes cast in the language of labor united various 
groups within the enclave and did not just involve the oil workers. Oil 
workers supported the right of merchants to operate on company ter-
ritory and opposed the TROCO’s attempt to monopolize trade by exclud-
ing merchants from its compound. Some merchants, who depended 
on workers for business, repaid their solidarity with funds to support 
the oil strikes. In addition, because many oil workers were themselves 
semiproletarianized peasants, or recently dispossessed of their lands, 
backing the land claims of rural cultivators blended easily with de-
mands for better conditions in the oil fields.10 Peasants previously or-
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ganized by Mahécha, in turn, provided food—yuca, plantains, squash, 
and rice—to sustain strikers. Finally, the city’s numerous sex workers, 
who relied on oil workers’ salaries, operated soup kitchens in Barran-
cabermeja during labor protests, when the bordellos closed (Archila 
1978, 1991; Vega 2002).
The strikes also demonstrated an early effort to scale up demands 
and make common cause with working people in the port towns of the 
Middle Magdalena. When, in 1927, the protests of three thousand oil 
workers in Barrancabermeja provoked stevedores who shipped the oil 
and pipeline workers to declare sympathy strikes in other port towns, 
government officials reacted with alarm, as the protest wave surpassed 
the boundaries of the enclave. Minister of government Jorge Vélez told 
the Congress that “in the beginning the strike’s only object seemed to 
be stopping work, but then it acquired a more aggressive disposition . . . 
and lately its character is frankly riotous and subversive” (Government 
of Colombia 1927: 4). Because of the strike’s “vast projections,” the gov-
ernment imposed martial law in Barrancabermeja and four other mu-
nicipalities along the river. It also expelled Mahécha and other strike 
leaders from Barrancabermeja and imprisoned them for ninety days in 
the highland city of Tunja (Government of Colombia 1927). Contain-
ing resistance in the enclave, isolating leaders, and disrupting broader 
popular alliances were all means used by the government to discipline 
an increasingly restive working class and limit the scale of working-
class activism.
The 1927 strikes were followed, in 1929, by the PSR-led uprising 
known as the Revolution of the Bolsheviks, which united rural peas-
ants and urban workers in the Middle Magdalena towns of San Vicente 
de Chucurí and Puerto Wilches and the highland coffee center of El Lí-
bano in a revolt that envisioned the “total annihilation of capitalist 
society” (Sánchez 1976: 72). The peasant-worker alliances at the root 
of the uprisings differed from the more typically agrarian movements 
of the time and became a feature of popular struggles in Barrancaber-
meja during much of the twentieth century. Moreover, the stories and 
memories of the protagonists enhanced a rebellious, plebeian political 
culture that was distinguishing itself from both the fenced-in, expatri-
ate bastions of the TROCO, where corporate personnel tried to repro-
duce a tropical version of the “American way of life,” and the Catholic 
conservatism of Colombian elites, who embraced the church’s creation 
of labor unions as a bulwark against communism.11
52 CHAPTER ONE
The labor strikes in the multinational enclaves and the peasant un-
rest, most powerfully expressed in the Revolution of the Bolsheviks, 
created a crisis of hegemony for the Conservative Party and energized 
the revolutionary left. Yet working people in Barrancabermeja were 
still unable to pull themselves out from under the boot of the TROCO’s 
repressive rule. Calls for an eight-hour workday, which had become 
widespread in the industrializing countries of the global North, and 
anti-imperialist nationalism sounded esoteric in the overwhelmingly 
agrarian societies of Latin America, and they could not serve as a rally-
ing cry beyond the relatively circumscribed zones of multinational con-
trol.12 Yet as Charles Bergquist (1986) argues, the strikes and upheavals 
of the 1920s pushed the Liberal Party to change its approach to govern-
ing and to intervene in the management of “social problems” in order 
to block an upsurge of more revolutionary demands. With the fall of 
Conservative rule and the advent of the Liberal Republic (1930–46), 
working people developed a more favorable view of the institutional 
state, which they hoped would intervene in the arbitration of conflicts 
with the TROCO. A new phase of popular struggle developed as work-
ing people, who had reached beyond their differences to imagine them-
selves as Colombians and sometimes as workers (obreros), envisioned a 
larger role for the Colombian state in the administration of the coun-
try’s oil wealth and the regulation of working conditions.
The Advent of the Liberal Republic and Gaitanismo
As the Great Depression deepened poverty and raised new questions 
about laissez-faire capitalism, the advent of the Liberal Republic, 
marked by four presidential periods from 1930 to 1946, raised hopes 
about popular political participation and state arbitration of the class 
conflicts that roiled across Colombia. Working people in Barrancaber-
meja and along the Magdalena River thought that they had found an 
ally in the Liberal government, after the 1930 presidential election of 
Enrique Olaya Herrera ended thirty years of Conservative domination. 
Olaya Herrera (1930–34) and especially his successor, Alfonso López 
Pumarejo (1934–38), cultivated working-class support through the 
promulgation of reforms and a discourse of labor-capital harmony that 
sought to control and institutionalize the labor movement. Most of the 
important labor legislation, such as the recognition of labor unions 
and the right to unionize, the eight-hour workday, and the forty-eight-
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hour workweek, was enacted during López Pumarejo’s Revolution on 
the March, which aimed to modernize Colombia along the lines of 
Roosevelt’s New Deal. Moreover, Colombia’s first national-level labor 
federation—the Confederación de Trabajadores Colombianos (Confed-
eration of Colombian Workers, CTC) organized with Liberal, Commu-
nist, and Socialist participation but quickly confronted government 
attempts to make it a client of the Liberal Party. The left wing of the 
Liberal Party took over labor issues and prevented the formation of 
powerful left-wing parties, like those that emerged in Chile (Safford 
and Palacios 2002: 288–96). Yet despite its efforts to regulate and tame 
the labor movement, López’s pro-labor policies appealed to workers, 
while setting off alarms among Conservatives, who did not believe that 
workers should have rights or be protected by the state. Conservatives 
asserted that the president’s revolution was a front for communists, 
and even mainstream Liberals worried that López was selling out to 
leftist causes.
Barrancabermeja was a center of political effervescence in the 
1930s. The Middle Magdalena was a bastion of liberalism, but the Par-
tido Comunista de Colombia (Colombian Communist Party, PCC) was 
founded in 1930 with a majority membership of former PSR militants, 
and in 1933, labor lawyer Jorge Eliécer Gaitán briefly abandoned the 
Liberal Party to establish the Unión Izquierda Revolucionaria (Revolu-
tionary Left Union, UNIR), before returning to the Liberal fold in 1935. 
Although most of the oil workers in El Centro backed the López wing 
of the Liberal Party, the Communist Party extended its reach into the 
refinery (Almario 1984), and its members filled some leadership posi-
tions in the USO. In addition, Gaitán’s condemnation of the 1928 mas-
sacre of striking banana workers in the United Fruit Company enclave 
raised his profile in Barrancabermeja. In practice, little separated rank-
and-file communists, the Lopista wing of the Liberal Party, and gaita-
nistas, despite the ideological battles that often divided party leaders 
(W. J. Green 2000). According to Rafael Nuñez, a resident of Barran-
cabermeja at the time, “Here socialism and liberalism were confused. 
The socialist and the liberal had more in common than the socialist and 
the conservative. But this was without an understanding of the exact 
ideas, without a distinction between what was liberalism and what was 
socialism” (qtd. in Archila 1978: 151).
Many working people in Middle Magdalena believed that López and 
his administration stood for Colombian sovereignty, even though he 
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never developed a nationalist posture regarding the oil industry, and 
that he would back their conflicts with the oil companies, shipping 
firms, and other entrepreneurs (e.g., Arredondo 2005). In 1934, three 
years after the 1931 promulgation of Law 83, which legalized labor 
unions, the government recognized the Union Sindical Obrera. The 
USO, however, continued to operate clandestinely because the TROCO 
behaved as if national laws did not apply in its concession. Yet a widely 
shared sense that the government supported oil workers’ struggles 
moved more workers to join the union at a time when the Great De-
pression obliged the TROCO to make deep cuts in the workforce and re-
duce the wages of those who remained. Rising unemployment in the 
enclave created a crisis for small merchants, and it generated frustra-
tion among the jobless who often had little to return to in their regions 
of origin. The worsening economic context, the widespread view that 
the TROCO exploited its workforce, and the belief that the government 
was on their side fueled two major strikes, in 1935 and 1938, in which 
many of the workers’ demands focused on the TROCO’s refusal to abide 
by existing national labor laws (Vega, Núñez, and Pereira 2009).
The strikes of the 1930s had mixed, and mostly unfavorable, results. 
Some five thousand workers struck the TROCO in 1935, and, as in the 
past, merchants and peasants provided the strikers with money and 
food, while urban artisans, domestic servants, and urban transporters 
also allied with the USO. Barranqueños organized “union kitchens” to 
provide free meals to those no longer receiving a wage, and as more 
than one person observed, even the “muchachas,” or prostitutes, came 
out in solidarity. Julio Morón, who witnessed the strike, described the 
broad-based support: “The conditions in Barrancabermeja were unique. 
. . . To speak against the strike was to lose your business or to have to 
leave Barranca because in that moment . . . nobody could be a scab, the 
person who was a scab had to keep it to himself inside the company” 
(qtd. in Vega, Núñez, and Pereira 2009: 195). Such statements reflected 
the broad legitimacy of popular demands and the sense of empower-
ment felt at the time.
Although the government did not repress the 1935 strike and forced 
the TROCO to cede ground to workers for the first time, it denied the 
USO the right to negotiate directly with the company and sent minis-
ters to develop a solution to the conflict with TROCO representatives 
for which it then took credit. And when workers struck again in 1938, 
the national government had completely abandoned the practice of 
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intervening in labor conflicts, while the local and provincial govern-
ments actively repressed the strikers, making it easier for the com-
pany to manipulate workers through appeals to regional differences 
and by red-baiting labor leaders. The 1938 strike ended in complete fail-
ure with the USO divided and weakened, and it raised questions about 
future alliances with the Liberal Party. Relying on an elite-dominated 
political party to support its struggles and represent its concerns be-
yond the spatial confines of the oil enclave was proving problematic 
for the USO.
By the 1940s, the hopes inspired by the Liberal Republic were dead. 
In his second term as president (1942–45), López Pumarejo repealed 
the eight-hour day, and his successor, Liberal Alfonso Lleras Camargo, 
crushed a Communist-led port workers’ strike in Puerto Berrío and 
the union, the Federación Nacional del Transporte Marítimo, Fluvial, 
Portuario y Aéreo (National Federation of Maritime Transport, River, 
Port and Air, FEDENAL), which was the only Colombian labor federa-
tion to have won a closed shop. Elites, too, were less inclined to tolerate 
labor reforms and launched a new offensive against workers and radi-
cal peasants, while the USO entered a period of rebuilding. Despite an 
unusual level of solidarity and institutional power constructed in Ba-
rrancabermeja, working people had been unable to escape the Liberal 
Party’s move to incorporate and declaw the labor movement, and fol-
lowing the defeat of FEDENAL, they were isolated until the rise of gaita-
nismo offered the last and most significant chance to scale up popular 
demands and claim national power.
After the brief experience of UNIR and an electoral defeat in 1935, 
Gaitán returned to the Liberal Party and forged a national popular 
movement on its left flank that crossed class and ethnic lines. Gaita-
nismo brought a broad swath of peasants, artisans, workers, and sec-
tors of the middle class together in a movement that challenged Colom-
bia’s elites and was not afraid to talk about class struggle. The rise of 
Gaitán—a lawyer, senator, and mayor of Bogotá—within the Liberal 
Party represented the apogee of the left-Liberal tradition of popular 
organizing in the twentieth century. As the nation’s most famous labor 
lawyer whose condemnation of the 1928 massacre in the United Fruit 
Company’s banana zone propelled his rise to national prominence, 
Gaitán advocated the expansion of Liberal social and economic pro-
grams, such as agrarian reform, and his juxtaposition of the political 
nation (país político) and the real nation (país nacional) referenced the 
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divisions between a wealthy elite and “the people” that divided Colom-
bia (W. J. Green 2000). His independent run for the presidency be-
tween 1946 and 1948 carried the hopes of many peasants, artisans, and 
workers in the Middle Magdalena.
For people like Pedro Lozada, who was coming of age on a rural 
homestead upriver from Barrancabermeja, Gaitán embodied his dream 
of a different country. Lozada explained to me in 2007 how “Gaitán 
launched his presidential campaign around a program that was going 
to support the oppressed. That is to say poor people. He asked that the 
worker retain part of what he produced for a business and that peas-
ants should be landowners. The peasant who works the land [should 
own the land] and not those people who live in Bogotá in a three-story 
house . . . and don’t even visit their haciendas because they have people 
working on them.”13 Lozada’s comments illustrate how concerns about 
livelihood activities, from controlling the fruits of one’s labor to gain-
ing rights to land, connected peasants and workers and found politi-
cal expression in the movement led by Gaitán, whose ability to unify 
a broad, mass following and challenge property relations sent shock 
waves through establishment circles, including the Liberal Party itself.
Gaitanismo, however, was not strong enough to outlast Gaitán, who 
was shot dead by a gunman outside his Bogotá office on April 9, 1948. 
The end of gaitanismo forestalled the consolidation of a political move-
ment that connected working people in different parts of the coun-
try in united political action. Years later, the death of Gaitán would 
be widely remembered as the onset of La Violencia, a twelve-year 
period of extreme conservative reaction to the radical promise of gai-
tanismo in which thousands of Colombians died. Terror disorganized 
worker and radical peasant organizations and ensured that class and 
ethnic conflicts remained within the clientelistic political structures of 
Colombia’s two-party system (Hylton 2006: 39–50).
La Violencia and the Nationalization of the Oil Industry
After Gaitán’s assassination, riots devastated Bogota, while more orga-
nized and politically significant uprisings broke out in Barrancaber-
meja and other radical strongholds, where revolutionary juntas and 
worker-peasant militias briefly seized power (Arredondo 2005; Díaz 
1988; Sánchez 1983). Barrancabermeja experienced a brief, ten-day 
period of “popular power” that came on the heels of a fifty-day strike in 
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which the resurgent USO demanded the nationalization of the Colom-
bian oil industry. Barranqueños declared the Conservative-led central 
government illegitimate and set up a revolutionary junta composed 
of communists, liberals, and supporters of Gaitán. The junta named a 
new mayor—Rafael Rangel, a Liberal Party member influenced by com-
munist ideas (Díaz 1988). Rangel, in turn, authorized workers’ militias, 
armed with weapons seized from the police and the TROCO, to prevent 
pillage and maintain order, as enraged groups of mourners tried to kill 
Conservatives and oil company representatives and burn the churches. 
The oil workers made common cause with the junta by enforcing a ban 
on alcohol and seizing control of telephone and telegraph communica-
tion, the water supply, and the police. They also organized the defense 
of the city through the distribution of small arms manufactured in 
the TROCO’s workshops, the digging of trenches along the Magdalena 
River, and the mining of the port (Sánchez 1983: 129–37).
The so-called Barranca Commune, combined with uprisings up and 
down the Magdalena River, demonstrated the political power and the 
insurrectional leanings of a broad sector of the population inspired by 
Gaitán. It united oil workers, residents of Barrancabermeja, and peas-
ant leagues from the Opón River, who had long opposed the TROCO’s 
control over produce markets, against the TROCO, local clerics, and the 
Conservative-led government in Bogotá. Because of the strength of the 
labor movement and the predominance of Liberalism in the Middle 
Magdalena, the government was less able to manipulate partisan divi-
sions, as it did more successfully in areas where Liberal and Conserva-
tive networks competed for power (Roldán 2002: 112–14). Yet because 
popular power was dispersed in export enclaves and a few cities, the 
insurrections remained isolated occurrences and were quickly sup-
pressed by the military.
The city’s experiment with direct democracy came to an end at the 
negotiating table, after government planes threatened to bomb the 
city and workers vowed to blow up the refinery in retaliation. Yet after 
the negotiation of an agreement that allowed the military into the city, 
the accord was subsequently violated, and the provincial government 
backed a military crackdown. The repression dismantled popular power 
and pushed the mayor and others to join forces with newly forming 
Liberal guerrilla insurgencies that sought to overthrow the Conserva-
tive regime and return Colombia to Liberal Party rule (Sánchez 1983: 
129–37). The repression also targeted the labor movement. The Conser-
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vative government suppressed trade unions through restrictions on 
protest and freedom of association, and it banned the USO between 
1951 and 1957, when a company union was created to replace it; the 
oil workers would not strike again until 1963. Radical popular move-
ments like the Barranca Commune never became strong enough to 
transcend regional strongholds, make common cause with opposition 
movements elsewhere, and create an independent political party to 
champion the cause of radical nationalism and working-class politics 
on a national scale. The accumulated power of Colombian oil workers 
remained rooted in the Middle Magdalena, even as their demands reso-
nated well beyond the oil fields.
At a time when Third World nationalist struggles were rattling the 
chains of empire and striving to wrest greater national control over 
the resources exploited by multinational corporations, working people 
in Barrancabermeja created the conditions “from below” for the na-
tionalization of the oil industry. Decades of popular struggles against 
the TROCO had created a heterogeneous, contentious working-class 
political culture that was nationalist, anti-imperialist, and infused 
with socialist notions of the common good. Through the production, 
practice, and valuation of solidarity within both the oil enclave and 
the Middle Magdalena region, working people challenged the TROCO’s 
right to exploit labor, control national resources, and claim a series 
of rights and privileges for its foreign managers and supervisors that 
were not available to Colombian workers. In 2009, oil worker Ramón 
Rangel explained his understanding of the early labor struggles to me: 
“Maria Cano, Raúl Eduardo Mahécha, and the others created a con-
sciousness that, adding up everything that they overcame, cemented 
a very solid base [in Barrancabermeja]. That’s to say, to defend what is 
national above everything else. That is one of the legacies that they and 
the first generation of oil workers left us. . . . Little by little a political 
consciousness developed that has formed us here in Barranca and that 
we inherited. We inherited it because the struggle has been permanent, 
continuous, and without rest.”14
Oil workers, however, never became the symbol of the Colombian 
labor movement as they did in Venezuela. Oil production in Colom-
bia was overshadowed by the coffee economy and the conservative 
individualism associated with it, and demands for labor rights did 
not always resonate with Colombians elsewhere. Moreover, working 
people in Barrancabermeja were stigmatized for their rebelliousness, 
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and popular movements, most notably gaitanismo and the Barranca 
Commune, were disrupted and disorganized. Consequently, Barranca-
bermeja’s radical political culture remained isolated, even though the 
oil workers’ position within a prominent industry, and the alliances 
they built locally, compelled national elites and foreign corporations 
to contend with them.
Yet by the late 1930s, the tide had started to turn. Following the 
Mexican government’s 1938 expropriation of foreign oil compa-
nies and the nationalization of the oil industry, preventing “another 
Mexico” became an obsession among corporate executives (Santiago 
2006: 8). Colombian industrialists were forced to rethink how they 
wanted oil produced in Colombia, how they would deal with Colom-
bian oil workers, and how they would safeguard private property, if 
they wanted to avoid revolutionary upheavals at home (Bucheli 2006). 
Therefore, when the TROCO’s concession expired in 1951, a law estab-
lished that a new state oil company—ECOPETROL—would acquire it. 
This legal move soothed elite sensibilities because it avoided the dis-
ruptions of expropriation and sidestepped the kind of worker partici-
pation in the national oil company that had taken place in Mexico. It 
also addressed the oft-expressed desire of workers that oil production 
take place under national control. Although the TROCO did not im-
mediately hand over control of the Barrancabermeja refinery to ECO-
PETROL, growing nationalism, intensified union activity, and a govern-
ment search for more export revenue eventually persuaded the TROCO, 
in 1961, to relent and to cede control of the refinery to the Colombian 
government. The pillars of the enclave economy were crumbling.
The contests between labor and capital that gave birth to the en-
clave in the 1920s contributed to its demise in the mid-twentieth 
century, when power relations and patterns of capital accumulation 
were remapped. The era of the foreign-dominated export enclave was 
not ending only in Barrancabermeja; it was in decline everywhere. In 
Mexico and Venezuela, the governments nationalized the oil industries 
in 1938 and 1939, respectively. On Colombia’s north coast, the United 
Fruit Company relocated banana production from Santa Marta, where 
the company had owned land, hired workers, and run plantations 
since the early twentieth century, to Panama and the Colombian prov-
ince of Urabá, where it subcontracted production to a provincial elite 
(Chomsky 2008: 189). The United Fruit Company also pulled up stakes 
on Ecuador’s south coast, where peasants and workers had placed it 
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under siege and contract farming was replacing corporate-owned es-
tates (Striffler 2002).
The creation of ECOPETROL in 1948, the reversion of the TROCO’s 
concession to the Colombian state in 1951, and the nationalization of 
the refinery in 1961 inaugurated a shift in the relationship between oil 
workers, other working people in Barrancabermeja, and the Colom-
bian state. Nationalization marked the start of more direct state inter-
vention in the stewardship of the economy through the promotion of 
import-substitution policies and agricultural modernization (Safford 
and Palacios 2002), and Barrancabermeja changed from a foreign-
dominated enclave economy to a state-run oil town in which workers 
labored for the state. Although ECOPETROL represented a crowning 
achievement of decades of popular struggle for many barranqueños, 
the departure of the TROCO did less to end class conflicts than to shift 
them to a new register. The expansion of the Colombian state, the in-
tensification of capitalist development in the countryside, the influx 
of ruined peasants to Barrancabermeja who could not find work in the 
oil industry, and the narrowing space for political participation amid a 
deepening cold war reshaped the social geography of political struggle. 





By the middle of the twentieth century, Barrancabermeja had changed 
from a foreign-dominated export enclave to a “state-run company 
town,” and the creation of ECOPETROL represented the fulfillment of 
one of the oil workers’ principal demands: greater national control over 
and regulation of Colombia’s oil industry.1 Oil workers had achieved 
strong workplace bargaining power within an industry vulnerable to 
strikes and disruptions in the flow of oil, and they had transformed an 
arbitrary labor system in which foreign supervisors set the terms and 
conditions of work into a labor regime regulated by the state. Together 
with a heterogeneous mix of ruined peasants, petty merchants, and 
socialist labor organizers, oil workers had modified the rules on which 
contests over capital accumulation and class formation took place in 
Barrancabermeja. They had done so through the transformation of Ba-
rrancabermeja into a center of radical democratic political sensibilities 
and the organization of a powerful union, the USO.
Yet years of Conservative rule in the aftermath of Gaitán’s death and 
the Barranca Commune had forced them to pay a heavy political price. 
During the 1950s, the suppression of the USO, the persecution of labor 
leaders, and the creation of parallel unions tied to the Catholic Church 
debilitated the labor movement and ruptured Barranca’s culture of soli-
darity, but with the fall of the brief dictatorship of Rojas Pinilla (1953–
57), the labor movement inhaled once again and embarked on a pro-
cess of reorganization. As they emerged from a decade of Conservative 
Party power and repression, oil workers severed the imposed ties to 
clerical, parallel unions and began a new strike wave between 1959 and 
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1964, and a new generation of migrant workers, who clamored for jobs 
and public services, pushed into the city to join them.
But the ground had already shifted. As the lives of ordinary barran-
queños unfolded within a city freed from the yoke of corporate domi-
nation and Conservative Party rule, the National Front outlawed soli-
darity strikes in an effort to undermine the reemergence of regional 
worker solidarity, and it routinely resorted to anticommunism to dis-
credit leaders, workers, and organizations that did not abide by its poli-
cies. Moreover, the relationship between rural migrants and the state 
foundered over issues of urban development, labor rights, and state re-
pression. New hopes, concerns, and dangers emerged that people could 
not address in exactly the same ways as in the past. Oil workers and mi-
grants discovered that they had to develop new alliances, understand-
ings, and practices in order to advance their claims on the powerful, 
and over the course of the 1960s and 1970s, they remade their relation-
ships with each other, again.
Urban residents confronted the Colombian state and the national 
bourgeoisie much more directly than in the days of the TROCO. They 
did so at a time when the National Front government (1958–74) was 
pursuing a program of capitalist modernization through import-
substitution industrialization that did not open the political arena to 
greater working-class participation. Brokered in 1958 between the Lib-
erals and the Conservatives, the National Front was an institutional 
compromise to end La Violencia and establish a stable basis for capi-
talist development in which the parties divided legislative and high 
administrative positions equally, and the presidency rotated between 
Liberals and Conservatives. According to Marco Palacios (2006: 171), 
it represented “the golden age of gentlemen’s agreements between 
the leadership of the state and the quasi-corporative trade associa-
tions” of industrialists, landowners, merchants, and bankers. Spurred 
by the cold war, National Front governments initiated a limited pro-
gram of investment in public services that sought to co-opt a growing 
middle class through a set of policies that expanded and subsidized 
higher education, broadened access to health care and housing, and 
responded to pent-up consumer demands. Under the National Front, 
the public sector expanded, and unions among public sector employ-
ees—for example, teachers, health care workers, telecommunications 
employees—grew between 1959 and 1965 from 5.5 percent to 13.4 per-
cent of the economically active population (Palacios 2006: 179).
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Yet because peasants and working people in general had little po-
litical power, the National Front was less concerned with supporting 
small-scale agriculture and food production in the countryside or pro-
viding social services to the ruined peasants pouring into urban neigh-
borhoods than with using state policies to incorporate the middle class 
into an expanded sense of national citizenry. Although it never devel-
oped a Keynesian welfare state, its limited public investments and re-
forms were somewhat successful in broadening the notion of social 
citizenship and winning a tenuous legitimacy. The National Front also 
managed to integrate some working-class Colombians into its modern-
ization project through the creation of neighborhood action commit-
tees known as juntas de acción comunal (JACs), which channeled funds 
for community development through the creation of clientelistic re-
lationships with the Liberal and Conservative Parties, and which I dis-
cuss more in chapter 6. The National Front, however, did not offer a 
long-term solution to endemic poverty, political marginalization, and 
enduring violence. By consolidating institutional power in the hands 
of the ruling class, the National Front reasserted the exclusionary na-
ture of Colombian politics and delegitimized any expression of social 
conflict. It suppressed memories of La Violencia and continued a well-
established pattern of political marginalization in which reformist con-
cerns could only be raised on the left flank of the Liberal Party (Cher-
nick and Jiménez 1993; Palacios 2006).
In Barrancabermeja, tensions between the aspirations of urban mi-
grants and the National Front, as well as the continued repression of 
the labor movement, shaped urban conflicts in which demands for 
the provision of public services to poor urban neighborhoods inter-
twined with those of the increasingly radicalized USO. They periodically 
erupted into large-scale mobilizations known as “civic strikes” (paros 
cívicos), which brought the city to a standstill and became the arche-
typal form of protest in the mid-twentieth century.2 The civic strikes 
exposed how the National Front’s program of capitalist modernization 
was creating new forms of poverty and wealth, and they revealed the 
Colombian state’s inability to completely pacify working people or in-
corporate them as fully entitled citizens of the nation.
This chapter examines the remaking of class relations in Barranca-
bermeja from the era of civic strikes in the 1960s and 1970s to the ad-
vent of neoliberalism in the 1990s. During this period, amid the con-
trapuntal forces of the cold war, longtime residents and new arrivals 
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pushed against the seams of the National Front’s political straitjacket 
and that of successor governments over public services, labor rights, 
and the organization of political life. The juxtaposition of destitute im-
migrant neighborhoods and a profitable, state-owned company with 
its well-paid workforce laid bare the state’s role in the production of 
inequalities and the differential entitlements of citizenship that flowed 
from them. It also exposed the deepening divide between waged and 
unwaged workers. Diverse working people found common cause in 
the insistence that the state live up to its promises of development 
and modernization. As they constructed new networks, relationships, 
and organizations to advance their deeply felt concerns, they created 
a new configuration of class power that challenged the National Front 
as the sole source of legitimacy and that underscored the inadequacy 
of static categories, such as formal sector/informal sector or urban/
rural for understanding changing class relations. My history of Barran-
cabermeja in this period demonstrates how diverse working people—
peasants, unwaged urban immigrants, and wage laborers—built new 
alliances that updated earlier forms of class struggle created in the 
TROCO period. It points to the rising importance of neighborhood-
based livelihood struggles and their connections to oil worker protests 
over working conditions at the point of production, as barranqueños 
pushed the state to fulfill its promises of modernization, and conflicts 
over the organization of power and capital accumulation shifted gears.
Mid-twentieth-century capitalist modernization produced a range 
of new and remade relationships, and in Barrancabermeja, unwaged 
urban immigrants became more common than oil workers because 
violence and the expansion of agrarian capitalism destroyed peasant 
livelihoods and forced ruined rural dwellers to reconstruct their lives 
in the city. Destitute migrants raise new questions for scholars about 
the changing experiences of labor in Barrancabermeja and what they 
mean for processes of class formation. Migrants were not separated 
from capitalism or from the so-called formal economy, even though 
they were excluded from many of the rights of citizenship—for ex-
ample, health care and education—won by oil workers through social 
struggles with the oil company and taken for granted by elites. Their 
casual labor as part-time construction workers, domestic servants, 
itinerant vendors, and petty commodity producers generated value 
and kept the city running. They also played a key part in popular move-
ments that sought to reclaim some of the wealth produced in Barran-
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cabermeja and to assert their rights as citizens in what had become a 
state-run company town. This perspective runs counter to scholarly 
arguments that suggest that unwaged migrants are not “workers,” 
that their lives are shaped by “informality,” and that therefore their 
struggles are politically distinct (e.g., Fischer 2014).
Examining the experiences and the history of differently categorized 
workers is important as working people began to assess what they had 
in common and develop a common cause. As they pushed against the 
exclusionary practice of the National Front, the logic of anticommu-
nism increasingly framed urban militancy within a deepening cold war 
context, while growing militarization fueled repression and spurred 
the formation of guerrilla insurgencies that sought to overthrow the 
state. The polarizing dynamic of popular mobilization and repression 
generated rising levels of resentment that ignited extreme forms of 
state and paramilitary terror at the end of the twentieth century. The 
terror aimed to destroy the left, roll back the gains of working people, 
and deepen exclusion. It was closely connected to a radicalized alliance 
of nouveau-riche drug traffickers, the patrician agrarian bourgeoi-
sie, merchants, multinational corporations, and the military that was 
deeply threatened by the muscular flexing of popular power and that 
aimed to make the Middle Magdalena more hospitable to capital.
Agrarian Transformation, Urbanization, 
and the Accumulation of Labor
The contours of popular struggle in Barrancabermeja changed as a new 
generation of uprooted peasants streamed into the city and doubled 
the urban population between 1951 and 1964. Driven out of the 
countryside by violence, the expansion of agrarian capitalism, the ero-
sion of small-scale agriculture, and the failure of the Colombian state 
to enact significant agrarian reform, the migrants chased hopes of a job 
with ECOPETROL and dreams of comfortable urban lives. The National 
Front enacted a modest 1961 agrarian reform law that aimed to palli-
ate the class conflicts unleashed by La Violencia. The reform authorized 
the expropriation of unproductive estates and their redistribution to 
peasants who possessed little or no land. It received encouragement 
from the United States as a means to stamp out the revolutionary fires 
ignited by the Cuban Revolution of 1959. Yet few estates were broken 
up. Large landlords fended off calls for land redistribution by modern-
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izing their properties with development assistance from the Alliance 
for Progress, a social, economic, and military aid program inaugurated 
by President John F. Kennedy, in 1961, to vaccinate Latin Americans 
against communism (Bushnell 1993: 234). Credit and technological as-
sistance allowed them to increase productivity. Yet in some areas, it 
also allowed them to expand at the expense of smallholders, who re-
ceived less institutional support and were encouraged to migrate to 
frontier regions and stake out new claims to unsettled state lands (tie-
rras baldías), which were far from markets and good roads. As a result, 
the national share of foodstuffs produced by peasants declined from 
two-thirds in the 1960s to one-third in 1980 (Chernick and Jiménez 
1993).
The agrarian reform was particularly weak in the Middle Magdalena, 
where the agricultural frontier was closing. Unclaimed state lands were 
less available than in the past, and lands once colonized by Andean 
peasants fleeing La Violencia had been purchased or taken over by 
cattle ranchers and large landowners, who converted them to cotton, 
rice, and soybean production (Molano 2009: 37; Zamosc 1986: 28) and 
then employed displaced smallholders as seasonal wage laborers. When 
peasants received land titles, it was typically to lands that they already 
occupied. For example, one of the most important land transfers fol-
lowed the 1967 seizure of some 160,000 hectares that once belonged to 
the Shell concession, across the river from Barrancabermeja. As ECO-
PETROL prepared to nationalize the holding, peasants occupied it and 
declared the land public property, which the Colombian land reform 
institute was subsequently pressured to cede to them (Zamosc 1986: 
43). Yet this case was exceptional.
Even before the Alliance for Progress provided new impetus for 
the consolidation of large landholdings, landlords, local government 
officials, and oil companies in the Middle Magdalena had represented 
a source of pressure for peasant settlers struggling to carve produc-
tive farms from the heavily forested lands, and as early as the 1950s, 
the PCC had begun to organize peasants as a form of “self-defense.” 
Although best known for organizing self-defense movements in the 
coffee zones of Tolima and Cundinamarca that became “independent 
republics” and then bastions of FARC support, the PCC also had con-
siderable influence around the towns of Puerto Berrío and Puerto 
Boyacá to the south of Barrancabermeja and around Puerto Wilches 
to the north. The Communist attention to rural smallholders grew out 
COLD WAR CRUCIBLE 67
of a vision of radical agrarian democracy, articulated by rural people 
themselves, that focused on peasant land rights, participation in local 
organizations, control over the market, freedom from onerous labor 
obligations, and education and other rights of citizenship (Chernick 
and Jiménez 1993; Pizarro 1989). For young men like Pedro Lozada, the 
party changed their lives.
Lozada joined the PCC in 1953, after the Texas Petroleum Company 
forced his family off the land that his parents had settled in the 1930s. 
Nearly sixty years later, he remembered, as if it were yesterday, when 
the army jailed his father for challenging the multinational’s right to 
the family property. His father was heading to town, he recounted, 
when soldiers detained him and took him to an army base, where they 
forced him to sign a rental contract with the corporation. Texas Petro-
leum had become ever more mired in land conflicts with the growing 
number of settlers who generally did not recognize the multinational’s 
land claims, and it adopted a strategy in which it offered peasants the 
option of renting land in the hope of getting them to indirectly accept 
its right of ownership (C. Medina 1990). Its offers, however, were not 
always accepted voluntarily. Lozada described how the company’s in-
spector of forests came to the army base bearing the rental papers for 
his father to sign. “The contract was fictitious,” Lozada asserted, “but 
the company was claiming the land, and there was nothing fictitious 
about that. The same thing happened to [my father’s friend]. We be-
came the company’s tenants, rather than owners of the farm [finca].”3
Soon, however, even this tenuous arrangement collapsed, when a com-
pany manager gave his father a nominal fee for the improvements 
on the property and told him to vacate. The loss of the land broke up 
Lozada’s nuclear family: his brother left to work on an hacienda farther 
upstream; his father moved to Puerto Berrío; and Lozada moved to a 
village near Puerto Berrío, where he married and created a livelihood 
through fishing and seasonal agricultural labor. Neither Pedro, his 
father, nor his brother would ever possess their own land again, and 
many years later, Pedro would join a wave of displaced migrants flow-
ing into Barrancabermeja.
The anger and humiliation over the loss of the family land pushed 
Lozada into a life of politics and spurred a long affiliation with the PCC,
which, he explained, “told us that the company had no right to abuse 
the settlers.” The party encouraged peasants not to sign the rental con-
tracts, and according to Lozada, it “began to cut away the spiderwebs” 
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that clouded his understanding of the world. The party taught him “to 
value people, to support others, to be a humanist, and to understand 
what social class I belonged to. I didn’t know that Colombia was divided 
into social classes and that one powerful class—the rich—imposed its 
will on the rest of the people . . . so, the poor—peasants, workers, and 
fishermen—are the majority and the day that they organize, we can 
take power away from the oligarchy and form a country where there 
are equal conditions for everyone. . . . And it’s true, with time that is 
what we started to do.”4 Indeed, the PCC offered Lozada and other peas-
ant settlers a form of solidarity that rejected the notion of inequality 
as God-given and downplayed the intense partisan hostilities that di-
vided Liberals and Conservatives at the time. “They told us, look, the 
Conservatives kill the Liberals because they are red [the color of the 
Liberal Party], but the blood of Conservatives is also red,” Lozada ex-
plained.5 Through the PCC, Lozada found an alternative to the intimi-
dation and abuse of the oil company and developed a stronger sense of 
his own ability to analyze social life, to see beyond the mystifying veil 
of Catholic orthodoxy and the parochial confines of partisan hatreds, 
and to act on the world in order to change it. The party also helped him 
locate his own aspirations within an expanding network of national 
and international movements and to feel connected to them.6 “The ori-
entation went over well,” Lozada remembered about an early PCC meet-
ing that he attended. “We were already mad . . . and they explained to us 
why [all of this] was happening. I liked the party and very soon it was 
everywhere.”7 Although the Communist Party and its cadre of peas-
ant militants could not stem the expansion of agrarian capitalism and 
the rural-urban migration that were reworking both the countryside 
and the cities, the enthusiastic support that the party received from 
Pedro Lozada and other peasants spoke to the government’s failed 
agrarian policies and to the lack of support for the National Front in 
the countryside.
As peasants migrated to Barrancabermeja, where neither ECOPETROL 
nor the private sector could provide jobs to everyone who needed one, 
the PCC backed their struggles to create livable neighborhoods. Mi-
grants settled unoccupied lands on the city’s northeastern and south-
eastern fringes. They did so through large-scale occupations that could 
involve hundreds of people and that usually took place under cover of 
darkness. Labeled invasions (invasiones) by the state and land reclama-
tions (recuperaciones de tierra) by supporters, these settlements were 
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opposed by the municipal government, which on occasion sent secu-
rity forces to dislodge the immigrant occupiers. A longtime Communist 
Party activist recalled: “The Communist Party . . . was very strong in the 
northeast of Barrancabermeja. . . . It had a really good process of com-
munity and leadership formation, and it supported the immigrants [re-
cuperadores de tierra]. Several neighborhoods grew up with its support, 
which was aimed at organizing people, legalizing the settlements, and 
turning them into neighborhoods with basic services and municipal 
transport.”8 The peasants, fisherfolk, and casual laborers also received 
some organizational and material support from other political parties, 
such as the Frente de Izquierda Liberal Auténtica (Front of the Authen-
tic Liberal Left, FILA) and the socialist branch of the Alianza Nacional 
Popular (National Popular Alliance, ANAPO), which aimed to broaden 
their constituent bases in Barrancabermeja by appealing to the new ar-
rivals. In addition, the Catholic Church’s community outreach program 
(pastoral social) began to address the problems of immigrant neigh-
borhoods through new development projects, sustained engagement 
with local residents, and pressure on municipal officials. These political 
parties and the Catholic Church brought immigrants together and be-
came important referent points for them.
As the immigrant shantytowns exploded over the red clay hills and 
through the ravines that once constituted the city’s rural hinterland, 
wood and bamboo huts were separated from the city center of the re-
finery, the municipal government, and the USO by a railway line that 
ran like a sutured scar along what was once Barrancabermeja’s eastern 
boundary. Dusty, unpaved roads turned into quagmires in the rain and 
became dark at night; streams of black sewage flowed through open 
ditches; and mosquito-infested marshes were the only source of drink-
ing water, when the Magdalena River dropped below a certain level. The 
burgeoning warren of makeshift dwellings became known as “the other 
Barranca,” which was eventually connected to the urban center by an 
elevated bridge that arched over the railway. Much like the TROCO’s 
fence in an earlier era, the bridge symbolized the old and new forms of 
segregation and inequality in Barrancabermeja.
The state did nothing to alleviate deepening urban segregation. 
Rather, it aggravated the divisions with the construction, in 1969, of 
two new neighborhoods for oil workers. Galán and El Parnaso show-
cased a series of neat, two-story white houses connected to a sewer sys-
tem, an electrical grid, and a water main. Located near the city center, 
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they were only a short walk from the municipal stadium and the Club 
Infantas, a recreational center with swimming pools, athletic facili-
ties, and meeting rooms created for the exclusive use of ECOPETROL 
management, workers, and their families. The ECOPETROL managers 
and technicians had already moved into the residences once occupied 
by TROCO officials in the former barrio staff, and when the company 
expanded the refinery in the 1970s, it recruited more midlevel super-
visors and engineers to oversee the process. The arrival of the new hires 
drove up the price of urban land and expanded a small elite that had 
begun to distinguish itself from working people as early as the mid-
1940s, when institutions such as the Hotel Pipatón, the Chamber of 
Commerce, the Rotary Club, and the Fishing and Hunt Club were estab-
lished (Archila 1978: 158–59). For many poor barranqueños, it was be-
coming increasingly clear that the advent of the state was not living 
up to their expectations, as they remained excluded from its largesse.
Ninety percent of Barrancabermeja’s economic output came from 
ECOPETROL, but the oil company provided employment for only 2 per-
cent of the city’s residents (van Isschot 2015) at a time when Colombia 
was one of the most rapidly urbanizing countries in Latin America. Im-
migrants represented 70 percent of the urban population in 1970. They 
had come primarily from the Atlantic coast regions, the plains of Bolí-
var province, Antioquia, and other parts of Santander. Most were poor, 
displaced peasants and fisherfolk who either contented themselves 
FIG. 2.1 ECOPETROL’s oil refinery in Barrancabermeja.
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with periodic, temporary jobs with ECOPETROL, if they were lucky, or 
turned to unremunerative forms of petty commerce, which most did. 
An ECOPETROL-commissioned study of Barrancabermeja found that the 
city retained many of the characteristics of an enclave. Very few small 
and medium-size businesses had emerged to service the oil industry, 
and according to the report’s authors, ECOPETROL functionaries, who 
often maintained their primary residences in other cities, contributed 
to a profound apathy about urban problems, especially the lack of basic 
services and the woeful state of transportation (Contreras 1970: 65). 
In addition to this indifference, the report noted that “the conflictive 
fame of the human factor” (the oil workers) aggravated an already “not 
very positive investment environment” (Contreras 1970: 135).
Worries about the conflictive “human factor” were amplified through 
the lens of the cold war, which turned anticommunism into a much 
more lethal ideology. Anticommunism united diverse regional elites, 
who feared a return of the instability and class warfare of La Violen-
cia, and it justified the use of violence against critics of the status quo. 
It also bound Colombian elites to sectors of the middle class and tied 
them to North American and Latin American ruling classes elsewhere, 
as regional conflicts were absorbed in a global, U.S.-backed, anticom-
munist crusade (Safford and Palacios 2002). Yet with the exception of 
cities such as Santiago, Chile, where the Chilean Communist Party’s ties 
to residents and its skilled local leaders played a direct role in the politi-
cization and organization of some shantytowns (C. Schneider 1995), 
fears of urban radicalism were mostly exaggerated.9 But they were not 
misplaced in Barrancabermeja, where the development of new social 
and political networks in migrant neighborhoods, the looming pres-
ence of the USO, and the absence of right-wing political parties or social 
movements rooted anxieties about communist infiltration and rebel-
lion in firmer soil.
Elite paranoia about the radical inclinations of oil workers coexisted 
with a profound antirural bias that informed perceptions of peasant 
immigrants. Although rural prejudices were not new in Colombia, they 
gained traction at a time when modernization theory placed emphasis 
on the traditional backwardness of peasants and agrarian economies 
and located the fount of transformative growth in dynamic, industrial 
urban sectors, such as the oil industry. Evaluated through traditional/
modern or rural/urban analytic categories, migrants and shantytowns 
exemplified backwardness and traditionalism. Their poverty suppos-
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edly arose from the unchanging values, practices, and understandings 
that peasants brought with them from the countryside. A Ford Foun-
dation technician, for example, wrote about a shantytown (tugurio) on 
the outskirts of Bogotá as follows: “The living setting in the Barrio re-
sembles that of the living setting of the poor peasants’ ranchos and the 
complex of cultural norms of rancho life have essentially been trans-
posed into the tugurio’s urban setting and have been found inoperable.” 
He concluded that “the peasant’s dignity is buried in urban poverty’s 
abyss” (Schulman 1967: 191). Such prejudicial views of the peasantry 
informed the remedies that the Ford Foundation and other U.S. devel-
opment organizations prescribed for Colombia, remedies that focused 
less on ending economic inequality than on attacking the alleged back-
wardness of peasant culture.
Visions of rural backwardness and urban breakdown perceived 
through the lenses of static dichotomies could not account for the flu-
idity of changing class relationships. The families of many poor, urban 
working people had always been dependent on family members living 
in rural villages, small towns, and cities in order to survive.10 In addi-
tion, ties between the urban-based USO, left political parties and move-
ments, and rural peasant organizations had a long and continuing his-
tory. For example, a 1963 study of Barrancabermeja and its environs 
conducted by the University of Wisconsin’s Land Tenure Center noted 
the participation of rural settlers in a series of peasant leagues, influ-
enced by the left and in contact with the USO, that had arisen from 
settlers’ antipathy toward ECOPETROL and absentee hacienda owners. 
Peasant resentment emerged from a number of concerns. Much like 
the TROCO, ECOPETROL attempted to control the movement of people 
within the former TROCO concession by erecting barriers that hindered 
travel between rural villages and their urban, administrative centers. 
In addition, there were no clear distinctions between “industrial” and 
“rural” areas, and the company routinely evicted peasant settlers with-
out adequately compensating them for improvements to the land. 
Settlers also believed that ECOPETROL should provide health and edu-
cational services to them, and they resented large absentee landlords 
who operated in the interstices of the oil wells. These landlords paid low 
wages for clearing pasture and were known to push settlers off lands 
cleared for food cultivation in order to expand their holdings (Havens 
and Romieux 1966: 101–24).
The new political struggles and social movements that roiled across 
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the Middle Magdalena in the 1960s and 1970 reflected working people’s 
changing relationships to each other and their new engagement with 
the state. In addition to challenging how the nationalized oil company 
extracted profits from its workers, working people protested the ways 
that class power was organized in the living spaces of the city and chal-
lenged dominant assumptions about the relationship between citizens 
and the state. Sometimes waged and unwaged workers acted together; 
at other times, they moved along parallel tracks. Their shifting alliances 
were most visible in a series of labor and civic strikes that wracked Ba-
rrancabermeja in 1963, 1971, 1975, and 1977.
Building Popular Power and Confronting the State
In 1963, a two-day civic strike, prompted by the dearth of public ser-
vices, and a forty-three-day labor strike erupted in Barrancabermeja 
within the space of a few months. The protests were possible because 
of the already well-established radical democratic movements—trade 
unions, peasant leagues, and incipient urban civic groups—in the oil 
port. They laid bare the problems bedeviling residents who produced 
an enormous amount of the nation’s wealth but received very little of 
it in return. The strikes, and the state’s belligerent response to them, 
established the rudiments of future collaboration between labor, im-
migrants, and peasants. They punctured the consensual façade of the 
National Front by calling attention to the exclusion that it was creating 
and dismissing any pretense that it represented a democracy.
The 1963 civic strike was waged over a series of demands for better 
living conditions, such as paved roads, a new public hospital, a mu-
nicipal slaughterhouse, electricity, and especially potable water. It was 
the high degree of popular organization that enabled working people 
to direct their concerns to state officials. Although the involvement of 
urban squatters was less apparent than in years to come, the tradition 
of political organization and the vitality of political life in Barranca ex-
tended to the new arrivals, who, in many cases, had prior experience 
in rural peasant organizations. The city had also become “the worker 
capital of Colombia,” with unions representing a large percentage of 
its population, including peasants, construction workers, fishermen, 
painters, railroad workers, shoe shiners, teachers, and lottery ticket 
vendors, as well as the oil workers. There was even a union, the Sin-
dicato de Bares y Cantinas (Union of Bar and Cantina Workers), that 
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sought ways to improve the working conditions of the city’s prosti-
tutes, despite the state’s refusal to recognize their profession.11
A growing sense of entitlement among those people who were not 
included in the state’s modernizing agenda emerged from the 1963 civic 
strike, which received support from a cross-class coalition. The coordi-
nating committee that organized the strike included ex-functionaries 
of the municipal government; representatives of the church, com-
merce, and the radio; and local leaders from the Provivienda neigh-
borhood, an urban shantytown established with the help of the PCC in 
1960. It also counted among its participants militants from the left-
leaning Movimiento Revolutionario Liberal (Liberal Revolutionary 
Movement, MRL). Led by Alfonso López Michelsen (son of the former 
Liberal president), the MRL included intellectuals, former Commu-
nists, and veterans from Rafael Rangel’s Liberal guerrilla movement. 
The strike shut down the city. Stores closed, banks ceased operations, 
transportation ground to a halt, and the airport canceled flights. The 
government declared a state of siege, and the protest ended a day later 
in bloody confrontations between protesters and three thousand sol-
diers sent to Barrancabermeja to restore order.
The repression of the civic strike was a harbinger of what was to 
come three months later, when oil workers struck ECOPETROL during 
contract negotiations. The labor strike—the first under the National 
Front—did not erupt over contractual disagreements. Rather, ten-
sions and simmering dissension in the wake of the civic strike had been 
building between workers and ECOPETROL over a range of seemingly 
minor concerns, such as ECOPETROL’s denial of benefits to workers’ 
common-law wives, the suspension of a union member who sought 
medical care in the Soviet Union,12 and the use of dilapidated buses, 
provided by a subcontractor, to transport workers’ children to school 
(Vega, Núñez, and Pereira 2009). Workers also demanded the removal 
of corrupt ECOPETROL officials, especially general manager Luis Aure-
lio Díaz, whom the union accused of being bourgeois, displacing peas-
ant settlers to enlarge his own property, selling overpriced meat to the 
oil company, and a series of other offenses (Havens and Romieux 1966: 
43). The oil company was seemingly unable to manage these concerns 
because, according to University of Wisconsin researchers, its cumber-
some bureaucratic structure impeded communication between differ-
ent levels of management in Barrancabermeja and Bogotá. Moreover, 
local functionaries generally knew neither the oil workers nor the re-
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gion particularly well because they came from other parts of the coun-
try, and they made judgments about working people in accord with 
class-based stereotypes (Havens and Romieux 1966: 132).
The spark that ignited the forty-three-day standoff was the firing 
of several people accused of stealing from the company store. In re-
sponse, the USO shut down the refinery, and workers locked up the 
store manager. The strike then devolved into a violent confrontation 
between protesters and the state in which the labor politics of the Na-
tional Front were on full display. The governor of Santander sent troops 
to quell the protest and declared the USO illegal. The mayor imposed a 
curfew, suspended the sale of alcohol, and censored the press’s ability 
to report on events. Protest organizers, including all the leaders of the 
USO in Barrancabermeja, were arrested. Even though labor legislation 
enacted under the National Front prohibited sympathy strikes, oil 
workers from Shell in Casabe and Texas Petroleum in Puerto Boyacá 
went out in support of those in Barrancabermeja. It was, however, 
peasant solidarity that enabled the Barrancabermeja workers to en-
dure. As they had done in the past, peasants provided food to the pro-
testers throughout the strike. Their support arose from prior collabo-
ration with the USO, which had long insisted that ECOPETROL purchase 
peasant products through its company store and treat rural people in 
its clinic (Vega, Núñez, and Pereira 2009: 247). Yet government officials 
refused to see the protest as the outgrowth of valid concerns; the sin-
ister hand of “communist manipulation,” they insisted, lay at the root 
of the disorder. In this way, urban political dynamics were increasingly 
interpreted through the lens of the cold war.
Finally, in August 1963, a settlement was reached, and workers re-
turned to the refinery, but the strike—and the civic strike that pre-
ceded it—had left a legacy of bitterness. The military repression and 
the refusal of the state to recognize protests as a legitimate part of a 
democratic society soured relationships with the National Front, which 
many working people had once understood as a constructive attempt 
to restore peace and democracy in Colombia. Relationships between 
the popular organizations—the USO, peasant groups, and new urban 
associations—and state institutions, especially ECOPETROL and the 
security forces, took on a more hostile quality. The frustration, anger, 
and feelings of impotence left in the wake of the strikes were not re-
solved. They fueled a deepening polarization of social life and stoked 
the radicalization of some oil workers and urban activists, who began 
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to think that peaceful social change was impossible. Such sentiments 
fueled the formation of rural guerrilla insurgencies that advocated the 
overthrow of the state.
Social conflicts in the Middle Magdalena could not escape the grip 
of the cold war. The United States relentlessly opposed left-wing politi-
cal movements and leaders it assumed were connected to Cuba and 
the Soviet Union, even if no evidence existed to link them to these 
countries.13 The U.S. government took it as axiomatic that the Soviet 
Union and its Cuban ally were out to destabilize Colombia and the rest 
of Latin America and to spread communism throughout the Western 
Hemisphere, and local and regional tensions became defined within 
the context of the United States’ global campaign against communism. 
Yet in Colombia, the cold war was less a fight against Cuban and Soviet 
proxies than a concerted effort by Colombian elites to disrupt chal-
lenges to the placid veneer of the National Front and prevent them 
from spreading. As the military sought ways to quell rural unrest, it 
began to speak of the Middle Magdalena as a region that stretched 
along the river between La Honda in the south and Gamarra in the 
north (van Isschot 2015: 59), and, with U.S. support, it started to de-
velop counterinsurgency programs that combined military repression 
and development initiatives to eliminate dissent.14
Through the training, arming, and financing of Colombian security 
forces, the United States internationalized state-sponsored violence 
in the Middle Magdalena. It did so by working through the Colom-
bian state and integrating the national military into a repressive, hemi-
spheric security apparatus under its supervision (Gill 2004). The United 
States’ National Security Doctrine then assigned Colombian security 
forces the task of policing the national territory for alleged “subver-
sives,” while the United States assumed the role of shielding the hemi-
sphere from Soviet intrusion. In this way, the illusion of nation-state 
sovereignty was preserved, reinforcing the idea of the state as locus 
and container of claims and legitimizing powerful class interests, while 
silencing the marginalized voices of peasants, workers, and poor urban 
dwellers.
Although inspired in part by the Cuban Revolution, the emergence 
of an armed, conspiratorial left in the Middle Magdalena arose pri-
marily from simmering tensions over poverty and social exclusion in 
the aftermath of La Violencia and the National Front’s use of repres-
sion to contain them. The two largest insurgencies—the ELN and the 
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FARC—put down deep roots in the Middle Magdalena. Unlike the Lib-
eral guerrillas of La Violencia, who sought only to reestablish Liberal 
Party rule, the ELN set its sights on overthrowing the state and replac-
ing it with some variant of socialism. Founded a short distance from 
Barrancabermeja in 1964, the ELN drew inspiration from the Cuban 
Revolution, Christian humanism, and regional experiences of collec-
tive struggle, such as the Liberal guerrillas, the Barranca Commune, 
and the Bolshevik uprising. Many ELN founders had suffered perse-
cution during La Violencia, and members of their families had either 
belonged to the Liberal guerrillas, participated in the Bolshevik revolt, 
or arisen from the youth wing of the MRL. For example, ELN cofounder 
Fabio Vásquez had belonged to the MRL, and the father of another 
ELN cofounder, Nicolás Rodrígues Bautista, had taken part in the Bol-
shevik uprising. Several radicalized clergy, such as Camilo Torres and 
Manuel Pérez Martínez (Cura Pérez), came to the ELN from the Gol-
conda movement, which had arisen among Colombian Catholic clergy 
who began to question church teachings as a result of the Second Vati-
can Council (1962–65), a meeting of the world’s bishops that called for 
the renewal of the Catholic Church through more direct engagement 
with the “world.” The insurgency thus drew on various social and politi-
cal expressions of discontentment specific to the Middle Magdalena, as 
well as the energizing force of the Cuban Revolution and the new open-
ness of one sector of the Catholic Church.
The ELN chose the Middle Magdalena as a staging ground for its 
revolutionary struggle because of the tradition of popular resistance, 
especially the close ties between the oil workers and the peasantry 
around Barrancabermeja (C. Medina 2001: 78–79), and it built much of 
its strength in former strongholds of the 1950s era Liberal guerrillas.15
The ELN made alliances with students at the Universidad Industrial de 
Santander in Bucaramanga and with oil workers of the USO. Ricardo 
Lara Parada, leader of the ELN, was himself the son of a Barrancaber-
meja oil worker. A former guerrilla, who joined the insurgency in the 
late 1960s, described how Barrancabermeja trade unionists supported 
the rural guerrillas: “In addition to raising issues about imperialism 
and workers’ rights in their union struggles, they sent supplies to us 
and helped to organize actions, such as the theft of weapons, in the 
city. In a couple of cases, the entire union directorates supported us.”16
Yet during the 1960s and most of the 1970s, the ELN remained iso-
lated in the countryside, where it was consumed by internal divisions 
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and nearly annihilated by the army in 1973 (Broderick 2000). The in-
surgency made little effort to organize Barrancabermeja’s shantytowns 
until the 1980s, and, with the exception of the USO, it largely ignored 
the strategic importance of Barrancabermeja and its militant civic or-
ganizations and trade unions. It also eschewed the formation of a po-
litical party because of rigid adherence to the notion of an armed van-
guard (foco) borrowed from the Cuban Revolution. Middle-class ELN
leaders believed that revolution would begin in the countryside and 
that through their example of commitment and sacrifice, they could in-
spire support among the peasantry to overturn the old order and usher 
in a socialist transformation of Colombian society. In this vision of 
guerrilla strategists, urban working-class organizations, most promi-
nently the USO, would only operate as a support base for the rural in-
surgency, but such a strategic vision was seriously flawed. The expan-
sion of large-scale capitalist agriculture and the erosion of subsistence 
agriculture were evacuating the countryside. Peasants—the wellspring 
of insurgent visions of revolutionary change—were migrating to the 
cities, and Colombia was becoming one of the most urbanized coun-
tries in Latin America.17 Nevertheless, the importance of organizing 
the cities—especially a militant oil town like Barranca—was largely 
ignored until much later.
While the ELN drew much of its early support from middle-class 
university students and militant clerics, the FARC enjoyed a deep well 
of peasant sympathy in the frontier colonization zones of southwest 
Colombia (Chernick and Jiménez 1993), but at a 1966 conference, it des-
ignated the Middle Magdalena as a strategic growth area. Although it 
established the IV Front in 1968, its presence was limited to the organi-
zation of rural, self-defense communities until the 1980s, when it ex-
panded with an infusion of money derived from taxes levied on cocaine 
traffickers in its southern stronghold (Pizarro 1991). As the FARC’s power 
grew in the Middle Magdalena, the insurgents also financed an increas-
ing number of columns, or “fronts,” through the collection of “war 
taxes” from wealthy landowners whom they kidnapped and harassed. 
The practice of kidnapping, however, eventually extended to others who 
were less well-off, such as small shop owners, peasants, and street ven-
dors in the region’s small towns and villages, and turned many potential 
supporters against the guerrillas, with deadly consequences.
As the rise of rural insurgencies set off government alarms, a sec-
tor of the Catholic Church was reassessing the church’s historic ties to 
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the powerful. Catholic priests, nuns, and lay catechists influenced by 
the changing winds within the Catholic Church dedicated themselves 
to a new kind of pastoral work that focused less exclusively on reli-
gious training than on the development of neighborhood-based orga-
nizations that addressed the pressing needs of poor residents, espe-
cially women and youth. What came to be known as liberation theology 
reinterpreted scripture by focusing on the exploitation and suffering 
that poor people experienced in their daily lives. It found institutional 
expression in the Second Vatican Council and then took sharper politi-
cal form in the 1968 bishops’ conference in Medellín, where adherents 
to this political current called on the church to adopt a “preferential 
option for the poor” and dedicate more resources and services to poor 
neighborhoods and villages.
In Barrancabermeja, the new pastoral work was facilitated by the 
creation, in late 1962, of the Diocese of Barrancabermeja, which united 
fourteen municipalities in the provinces of Santander, Bolívar, and 
Antioquia. Newly graduated seminarians from the Pamplona seminary 
in North Santander province came to Barrancabermeja (van Isschot 
2015: 60) and began pastoral work in the emerging northeastern neigh-
borhoods, such as Primero de Mayo, Providencia, Miraflores, Versalles, 
and La Esperanza, where they affiliated with the Church of Nuestra 
Señora de los Milagros. The most influential priest was Eduardo Díaz, 
whose father was an ECOPETROL manager. During the early 1960s, Díaz 
had lived with his family in the barrio staff of El Centro before attend-
ing the Pamplona seminary. He then returned to Barrancabermeja in 
1970 to take up pastoral work. Díaz and another priest, Nel Beltrán, 
created a cadre of catechists known as the Unidad Dinamizadora del 
Programa to carry out the church’s grassroots pastoral work in Barran-
cabermeja’s emerging immigrant neighborhoods. Díaz not only played 
a key role as a community organizer when he led the parish of Nuestra 
Señora de los Milagros but also emerged as an important interlocutor 
between the government and the urban social movements in the 1970s.
Because of the almost complete absence of schools in the shanty-
towns, the church established the Colegio Camilo Torres, named after 
a prominent Colombian cleric who died fighting alongside the ELN, and 
a generation of young activists passed through it. One of them was a 
future trade union leader named William Mendoza. “I lived in a very 
poor neighborhood,” he explained, “and I got very involved with politi-
cal activism through a priest, who was the principal of my high school. 
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He believed in liberation theology, and we [students] used to go with 
him and other priests to their little farm, where they taught us about 
the ideas in Karl Marx’s Capital and about liberation theology.”18
Yolanda Becerra, an alumna who graduated in the late 1970s, de-
scribed how “in high school, we [students] were linked to all the social 
networks of the neighborhoods, and I became involved with a literacy 
program for adults. . . . The church has something that you don’t get in 
other kinds of political education: mística [mystique]. It is an education 
so solid that one remains committed for life.”19 Becerra, who was the 
daughter of peasant migrants, would go on to become the director of 
the Organización Femenina Popular (Popular Feminine Organization, 
OFP), which grew out of a series of church-sponsored mothers’ clubs in 
1972. The OFP was one of the most important fruits of the church’s en-
gagement with residents of the northeast, and it would soon become a 
key link in the network of grassroots organizations that were develop-
ing in immigrant neighborhoods. Becerra became politicized through 
involvement with the surge of destitute migrants who were rapidly 
transforming northeastern Barrancabermeja, where her family lived. 
“A strong housing movement developed in which women played an im-
portant role in the takeover of land,” she explained. “When the police 
and the army came to evict them, women and their children put up 
the resistance because, at the time, they were less likely to be harmed 
than men. All of this moved us and the parish of Nuestra Señora de 
los Milagros to start thinking about how to organize women.”20 The 
absence of water, electricity, and schools placed a heavier burden on 
women for whom the management of the household was the primary 
responsibility, and for Becerra and others, organizing women was a 
way to strengthen what they understood as “the popular movement.” 
More than an earlier generation of female migrants, shantytown 
women started to play leading roles in the popular protests that shook 
Barranca in the 1970s, and women’s work became a focus of organiz-
ing initiatives.
In the late 1960s and 1970s, a revolutionary tide washed over Barran-
cabermeja and the rest of Latin America, and the city became a hotbed 
of political projects and ideas of the left. Liberation theology and revo-
lutionary Marxism contributed to this upsurge of political organiza-
tion. Both emphasized structural injustice and the need to transform 
society, and both required commitment to a set of core beliefs. Look-
ing back, a retired high school chemistry teacher commented in 2010, 
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“I came to Barrancabermeja in 1971 because I thought that the revolu-
tion was going to happen here.”21 Eduardo Díaz noted how, in 1975, a 
social shift took place among the women of the OFP, who began to see 
themselves less as individuals learning a skill under the church’s tute-
lage than as participants in a popular movement with transformative 
political demands.22 Yolanda Becerra recalled that the OFP “participated 
in the coordination of the civic strikes and that [involvement] began 
to create some noise within the church. . . . We began speaking about 
autonomy and that the organization must be autonomous from the 
church. We had to create strong movements that were not at the ser-
vice of the church.”23 The politicization of a generation of young people 
like Yolanda Becerra generated a way of understanding the world and 
participating within it that animated hope and nurtured beliefs that 
immediate alternatives were available.
Many residents of Barrancabermeja understood the cold war as a 
pretext, elaborated by the United States and its Colombian allies, to 
repress efforts to expand social well-being and democratic processes. 
Their sense of possibility on a broad scale, along with the growing or-
ganizational muscle of oil workers and urban squatters, nurtured the 
basis of an astonishingly radical political culture that had emerged in 
the 1920s and 1930s and was reconfigured around new class alliances in 
the 1960s and 1970s. This political culture valued solidarity, held that 
social change was possible, and had the capacity to nurture collective 
action. A retired oil worker recalled how the 1970s civic strikes built 
on and intensified popular solidarity: “After every strike, in spite of 
the state repression, the consciousness of the oil workers and the con-
sciousness of the people became more powerful. The parallel develop-
ment of a city and a union as powerful as the USO created a very solid, 
very critical political consciousness that demanded improved public 
services.”24 The social movements—trade unions, women’s groups, stu-
dent organizations, and peasant leagues—insisted on equality, land re-
form, labor rights, and the rights of citizenship from the state, and the 
contour of collective politics took on a sharper edge during the 1970s.
The Civic Strikes of the 1970s
The USO and urban civic groups were the driving force behind two 
major civic strikes, in 1975 and 1977, that focused on the continuing 
absence of social services, especially the enduring problem of potable 
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water in a city where the average temperature hovered in the upper 
nineties. The oil industry had polluted rivers, streams, and marshes 
for decades, and water flowed through the taps for only a few hours 
of the day. What came out was putrid, malodorous, and unfit for bath-
ing. Even in the hotels, a room with or without a shower made little 
difference. People were forced to purchase mineral water for cooking, 
and not surprisingly, gastrointestinal infections were rampant (Vega, 
Núñez, and Pereira 2009).
Through the biannual agreements that it signed with ECOPETROL in 
the 1960s and 1970s, the USO not only secured more rights and benefits 
for union members but also obtained agreements from ECOPETROL to 
provide community services that included two public schools, health 
services, and sewerage. A longtime resident recalled that “there came 
a moment when Barranca and the USO became one. People felt a claim, 
a right, to ECOPETROL.”25 Many working people believed that the oil 
wealth produced by ECOPETROL belonged to the Colombian people 
and that, as Colombian citizens, they should receive a larger share of 
its profits in the form of public services. The USO responded to these 
yearnings. It aimed to fulfill the democratic promises of trade union-
ism enmeshed in society by addressing aspects of working-class experi-
ence not dealt with in the workplace. This was not a straightforward 
process, however.
In 1971, the USO suffered a bloody, devastating strike that sapped its 
power and weakened the leadership. Thirty-six workers, including the 
entire union directorate, were tried in a secret military court (consejo 
verbal de guerra) and sentenced to prison terms.26 For the next few years, 
the union had to regroup, a generational transition took place, and its 
politics grew more radical. A new group of young workers known as the 
Mechudos (Longhairs) moved into positions in the refinery. Influenced 
by the Cuban Revolution and the ELN, these youngsters were impatient 
with the pace of change and did not shy away from direct confrontation 
with the National Front. A member of this cohort told historian Renán 
Vega, “We had leftist thinking, that the country had to change defini-
tively, that we had to free ourselves from any imperialist yoke” (qtd. in 
Vega, Núñez, and Pereira 2009: 309). For the first time in its history, 
in 1976, the USO organized under the banner of a trade union confed-
eration—the Communist-dominated Confederación Sindical de Tra-
bajadores Colombianos (Union Confederation of Colombian Workers, 
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CSTC)—that was not connected to the Liberal Party, after President 
Alfonso López Michelsen legalized the CSTC.
The USO subsequently declared itself an alternative political project, 
one sustained by revolutionary nationalism and the defense of na-
tional resources for the entire population. This position enabled the 
USO to forge alliances with diverse working people and mobilize them 
(Vega, Núñez, and Pereira 2009). Doing so was a challenge. Oil workers 
viewed themselves as the product of capitalist modernity. They lived 
more comfortable urban lives than the founding generation of oil pro-
letarians, and they were better educated and enjoyed more social secu-
rity than the legions of ruined peasants settling the urban periphery, 
who they often characterized as less modern than themselves. Yet the 
oil workers also saw themselves as the defenders of an important natu-
ral resource and part of the pueblo (people). In addition, despite the 
differences between a full-time, well-paid oil proletariat linked to a 
strategic, global industry and the unemployed and underemployed im-
migrants of the urban periphery, a common thread linked both groups: 
the desire to control their work and the products of their labor and to 
reside in neighborhoods in which potable water, electricity, schools, 
health clinics, and paved roads were available to everyone.
The USO downplayed the differences between its members and urban 
squatters; indeed, some oil workers lived side by side with immigrants 
in the northeast sector, where they suffered from the same lack of ser-
vices along with the rest of the population. The union created unity 
through a political program that supported peasants affected by oil ex-
ploration; contributed union funds to the development of infrastruc-
ture in poor neighborhoods; advocated for the extension of benefits to 
temporary ECOPETROL workers; and backed the civic struggles of the 
urban poor (Delgado 2006). For example, one resident recalled how “in 
the northeast, the USO organized a kind of strike among brick makers. 
It propelled a whole movement to demand better working conditions 
for them. This was one way that people in the northeast became articu-
lated to the labor movement in Barranca.”27 The presence of unionized 
workers in immigrant neighborhoods, or their connections to friends 
and relatives in these settings, provided a core of established, politi-
cized individuals with ties to left political parties and movements. 
Activist priests resident in the northeast also facilitated relationships 
between the USO and barrio residents and helped to overcome some 
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of the social differences and political factionalism that divided activist 
groups with similar goals.
By 1975, the USO had recuperated from its 1971 defeat and became 
involved with a civic strike, which was actually two protests, held three 
weeks apart, that centered on water and demonstrated civic unity. 
A broad cross section of groups—women of the OFP, students, trade 
unionists, merchants, some professionals, and peasants from the Aso-
ciación Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos (National Association of 
Peasant Landholders, ANUC)—organized the events, which were even 
supported by the bishop, who proclaimed in a widely circulated state-
ment that the water in the city was too polluted to be any good for 
blessings. And even though water was the central focus of the strike, 
other demands—for example, streetlights and an end to peasant re-
pression in the countryside—reflected the diverse composition of the 
organizing committee. The strike ground the city to a halt. Daily as-
semblies in the Parque Infantil drew large crowds; neighborhood com-
mittees (comités de barrio) connected residents to the central strike 
committee; and civil guards ( guardias cívicas) organized residents, dis-
tributed leaflets, coordinated actions at the neighborhood level, and 
maintained order. Although the sustained power of grassroots orga-
nizing pushed the national government to commit to the improvement 
of the urban water supply and address other concerns, including the 
land claims of regional peasant groups, social unrest did not end with 
the strike. The governor named an army colonel mayor of the city, and 
even though the colonel did not remain in the position for long, his ap-
pointment was indicative of the unrest and growing militarization of 
Barrancabermeja (van Isschot 2015).
When the city erupted again, in 1977, the military response was 
brutal. A two-day civic strike, organized by the USO and urban civic 
groups, took place in solidarity with a sixty-five-day oil worker strike. 
Once again, the governor of Santander installed an army colonel in 
the mayor’s office, and thousands of soldiers descended on Barranca-
bermeja to put down the protests, just a few months after a national-
level civic strike had paralyzed the country, received huge support from 
residents of Barranca, and united the country’s three trade union con-
federations (Liberal, Catholic, and Communist). Few people escaped 
the repression, and anyone who even sympathized with the USO was 
thrown in jail.
Oscar Romero was a high school student at the time. He later re-
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called that he “couldn’t remember anything bigger. There was support 
from everywhere—even the merchants.” Oscar and other students 
collected food donations for striking workers, set up barricades, and 
picked out the spies, known as patevacas. They coordinated with the 
USO and supportive city council members who backed the protest, de-
spite the mayor’s opposition. One of the city council members was his 
father, a former USO leader who had been fired after the 1963 strike. 
Oscar recalled how his father left home every morning of the strike 
as if going to work. He would then meet secretly with strike leaders to 
plot strategy and publish a clandestine news bulletin. On at least one 
occasion, the police raided the family home and carried away items 
that they considered subversive, including Oscar’s Cuban flag. When 
the strike finally ended, some 277 ECOPETROL workers were fired; only 1 
was ever reinstated. One worker summed up a widely shared sense of 
what had happened: “We had prepared for a strike and had to confront 
a war.”28
Out of the protests of the 1970s, a series of coordinating committees 
(coordinadoras) formed to connect social and political groups in the city. 
These coalitions gave birth to the Coordinadora Popular de Barranca-
bermeja, which organized a civic strike in 1983 and became a model for 
similar organizations in other Colombian cities. Although the organiz-
ers were the same as those who had led earlier struggles, they conceived 
of the Coordinadora as a more permanent link between Barrancaber-
meja’s expanding immigrant neighborhoods, the USO, popular move-
ments, and political parties, a relationship that went beyond the epi-
sodic coordination of civic strikes. The Coordinadora included the USO, 
as well as left-wing political parties, unions, members of the Catholic 
Church, and representatives of women, peasant, and student organiza-
tions. It became the regional interlocutor with the government, which 
was forced to recognize it, and because of its deep popular roots and 
political clout, the Coordinadora also provided visibility and respect-
ability to peasant mobilizations that took place under its umbrella 
(Molano 2009: 56). The Coordinadora thus expanded the geography of 
working-class power by connecting peasants, oil workers, and migrants 
to a broader field of organization, struggle, and solidarity.
For many working-class barranqueños, the experience of solidarity 
through involvement with a network of grassroots organizations pro-
vided a sense of dignity and entitlement and a feeling that they were 
making history. Working people saw hope for change through the re-
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surgent power of popular protest in Barrancabermeja, as well as the 
1979 victory of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the possibility of an 
FMLN victory in El Salvador. The political work of numerous unions, 
squatter groups, student organizations, and peasant associations 
generated a strong sense of “altruism, commitment, and capacity to 
struggle” among the people affiliated with them (Vega, Núñez, and 
Pereira 2009: 309). It gave rise to what Greg Grandin (2004: 180–81) 
calls “insurgent individualism,” in which individuality and solidarity 
merged through collective politics. Individual men and women devel-
oped a new sense of self rooted in a larger social collectivity as they en-
gaged the state and linked personal aspirations to national and inter-
national concerns. Yet these new and remade relationships, as well as 
the sense of power and entitlement that emerged from them, would 
come under increasing strain.
In 1978, Liberal president Julio César Turbay (1978–82) enacted the 
National Security Statute, which imposed extreme restrictions on civil 
liberties, censored media coverage of armed conflicts with the insur-
gencies, and granted new powers to the military, which could detain 
anyone suspected of “subversive” activities. This hard-line policy fur-
ther narrowed the parameters of political action in the Middle Magda-
lena. Although it was directed at the growing power of the FARC, ELN, 
and other insurgencies, it served less to blunt the expansion of the 
guerrillas than to further polarize social life, as militarization closed 
off peaceful means of change and bolstered a feeling among many ba-
rranqueños that the insurgencies represented a legitimate political 
option and an alternative to the repressive Colombian state.
The 1970s represented the apogee of Barrancabermeja’s radical 
popular movements, which, despite the severity of repression, forced 
the Colombian state to grant concessions, but the lights began to dim 
in subsequent years. Political violence intensified and crashed over the 
Middle Magdalena like an endless cresting wave for the next two and 
half decades. Physical displacement, massacres, extrajudicial execu-
tions, extreme forms of torture, and disappearance set the tone of a 
prolonged dirty war that heated up in the 1980s and ravaged Barranca-
bermeja and the Middle Magdalena into the twenty-first century. Vio-
lence and the wholesale divestment of the social relations, property, 
and organizations through which working people crafted their liveli-
hoods and channeled their demands to the state were central to the 
defeat of a working class that had achieved considerable organizational 
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power. Escalating violence spread fear and insecurity; it fractured so-
cial networks and destroyed unions, peasant associations, and politi-
cal parties; and, most important, it disorganized social life and made 
working people available for incorporation into new relationships of 
inequality.
“They Killed People at Any Time of the Day”
Pedro Lozada was one of tens of thousands of peasants violently dis-
placed from their homes in the 1980s. Some thirty years after the 
Texas Petroleum Company had expelled his family from its home-
stead, a dirty war carried out by paramilitaries in collusion with the 
military, local entrepreneurs, and drug traffickers gathered steam in 
the Middle Magdalena. Communist Party militants like Lozada as well 
as anyone suspected of supporting the insurgencies were targeted and 
often killed. Lozada recalled a day when the local radio station an-
nounced a meeting at the army’s XIV Brigade headquarters to orga-
nize a response to guerrilla harassment. “The meeting,” he insisted, 
“was to form a death squad in Puerto Berrío and to organize merchants 
and ranchers.” Reports of extrajudicial executions and massacres up-
river around Puerto Boyacá were already circulating, and daily life in 
and around Puerto Berrío was growing more and more insecure. “They 
started to kill anyone who belonged to a civic organization, a union, 
or a neighborhood committee,” Lozada said. “They killed people at 
any time of the day and in any place.”29 Despite warnings from neigh-
bors that unidentified men had come looking for him, Lozada did not 
leave until a municipal official sent him a note that his name was on a 
paramilitary hit list. Then, dressed in a disguise, he, his wife, and their 
small children fled. Two older sons remained behind. The Lozada family 
would eventually settle in Barrancabermeja, along with other forcibly 
displaced peasants from the Cimitarra River valley, southern Bolívar 
province, and communities along the Opón River. The arrival of hun-
gry, traumatized peasants raised anew worries about political violence 
among urban residents, intensified animosity toward the state, and 
overwhelmed the city’s ability to cope with so many refugees.
The Middle Magdalena town of Puerto Boyacá became the epicenter 
of the dirty war. Around Puerto Boyacá and in much of the southern 
Middle Magdalena, drug traffickers had bought up large tracts of land 
to launder their profits and gain entrée into the blue-blooded Colom-
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bian oligarchy. Yet much like their old-guard counterparts, who viewed 
them with suspicion and referred to them disdainfully as the clase 
emergente, the drug-traffickers-turned-landlords became the subjects 
of guerrilla extortion demands and kidnapping attempts. Hatred of 
the insurgents solidified an alliance between a rising group of nouveau 
riche, narco-entrepreneurs, cattle ranchers, urban merchants, and 
the Texas Petroleum Company, a subsidiary of TEXACO. In 1983, the 
mayor of Puerto Boyacá and Liberal Party members created the Aso-
ciación Campesina de Ganaderos y Agricultores del Magdalena Medio 
(Association of Middle Magdalena Ranchers and Farmers, ACEDEGAM), 
with financial support from the Texas Petroleum Company, other busi-
nesses, and drug traffickers, to wrest peasant support from the guerril-
las. The association created some thirty “patriotic and anti-Communist 
schools,” as well as health clinics and peasant cooperatives (Dudley 
2004: 68), but it was essentially a façade for the recruiting, financing, 
and training of paramilitary groups with names like Muerte a Secues-
tradores (Death to Kidnappers) to combat the guerrillas (C. Medina 
1990). Unlike in the 1990s, when they operated as standing armies, 
the 1980s era paramilitaries acted like hit-and-run death squads that 
were integrated into military intelligence networks, which permitted 
the Colombian military to deny any knowledge about or connection to 
their activities and to deflect charges from international human rights 
organizations that state security forces violated the human rights of 
Colombian citizens. Military officials gave them free rein to engage in 
the unsavory acts of a dirty war. The mercenaries gathered informa-
tion on unions, opposition political parties, and peasant organizations 
and then carried out attacks on their leaders and supporters under di-
rection from the military. The repression did less damage to the guer-
rillas than to unarmed civilians, who were easier targets, and it even-
tually eliminated the left from the political playing field in the Middle 
Magdalena.
As counterinsurgent paramilitary violence unraveled social life in 
the rural Middle Magdalena, the government of Belisario Betancur 
(1982–86) broke with the hard-line strategies of his predecessors and 
negotiated a cease-fire with the FARC that ended with a peace agree-
ment in 1985. As part of the peace accord, the government agreed to de-
centralize certain governmental decision-making powers to provincial 
and municipal authorities and to allow the local election of governors 
and mayors. Although city councils and provincial assemblies had long 
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been directly elected, the Colombian president had appointed mayors 
and governors since the nineteenth century. Betancur’s decision to 
open up the political process was motivated by a strategic calculus that 
political decentralization would pacify the insurgents (Castro 1998). It 
was also a concession to the FARC, which had demanded political and 
economic decentralization for years in its periodic negotiations with 
the government.
Political decentralization served less to pacify the insurgents than 
to intensify regional tensions. The FARC had had some success orga-
nizing peasants, and with the devolution of political power, the in-
surgents demonstrated their political appeal through the formation 
of a new party—the Unión Patriótica (Patriotic Union, UP)—to mark 
their entry into electoral politics, even as they clandestinely armed for 
war. The UP candidates performed well in both national and local elec-
tions, and their success alarmed the regional bourgeoisie. The UP and 
the direct election of mayors and governors sharpened the concerns 
of the security forces, the bourgeoisie, and the Texas Petroleum Com-
pany that the balance of power would tip in favor of the guerrillas and 
their supporters. Old-guard ranchers claimed that the military was not 
doing enough to protect them from the predations of the FARC, and 
they suspected peasants of supporting the guerrillas. At the same time, 
the political opening raised the expectations of marginalized groups 
that their concerns about land reform, services, infrastructure, and 
public education would receive serious discussion (Romero 2003).
Political decentralization in the Middle Magdalena served only to 
aggravate armed competition in the context of a counterinsurgent 
war. Landowners had long claimed a right to “self-defense” in a re-
gion where the organization of private militias to protect property 
rights was established during La Violencia, and they backed a neofas-
cist political movement called Movimiento de Reconstrucción Nacional 
(Movement of National Reconstruction, MORENA), with ACEDEGAM at 
its core. With its close ties to the paramilitaries and the security forces, 
MORENA declared its support for “Christian values” but dedicated itself 
to the physical elimination of the UP.30 In the 1988 elections, MORENA
candidates gained control of the mayoralties in six small towns of the 
Middle Magdalena, including Puerto Boyacá, where a sign on the road 
into town proclaimed the river port “The Antisubversive Capital of 
Colombia.” At the same time, the intensification of U.S. counterinsur-
gency wars in Central America undermined any negotiated solution to 
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the Colombian conflict. The United States ignored paramilitary drug 
trafficking and alliances with the Colombian security forces and crimi-
nalized the FARC with the label “narco-guerrillas,” erroneously suggest-
ing that the insurgents were at the center of the illegal narcotics trade. 
“The war on drugs” then became the axis around which U.S.-Colombian 
relations turned. Counterinsurgency and political decentralization 
would, in time, facilitate the far-right capture of provincial and mu-
nicipal elected offices and lead to the privatization of the institutional 
state, as paramilitaries and their backers used public office to siphon 
off state funds, monopolize public contracts, and legalize their posses-
sion of stolen lands (see chapter 5).31
The escalating political violence transformed the countryside, which 
had become a center of peasant protest in Colombia. It displaced peas-
ants who had fled La Violencia and colonized the region in the 1940s, 
1950s, and 1960s, depopulating what had become guerrilla strong-
holds by the 1980s. As legions of traumatized refugees placed the ter-
ror on public display for urban residents, they were among the first 
to speak about human rights violations in Barrancabermeja. The in-
surgencies subsequently became urbanized, as the guerrillas followed 
their support bases into the city. In the 1980s, the ELN embarked on a 
period of expansion with funds obtained from the extortion of foreign 
oil companies along the Colombian-Venezuelan border, where new oil 
discoveries had been made. Similarly, the FARC was flush with money 
from the taxation of drug traffickers, who purchased coca paste—the 
basis of cocaine—from peasants in the FARC’s southern stronghold, 
and it expanded into numerous municipalities around the country. The 
ELN and the FARC, as well as smaller guerrilla groups like the Maoist 
Ejército Popular de Liberación (Popular Liberation Army, EPL) and the 
M-19, composed of FARC and Communist Party dissidents, organized 
urban militias (milicias urbanas) in the northeastern and southeastern 
districts of Barrancabermeja.32 Composed mostly of young people from 
the barrios, the militias supported the insurgencies with information 
about the movement of security forces, logistics, and the organiza-
tion of political activities. The militias represented a belated attempt 
to plant the insurgencies in urban soil (see chapter 3), but despite the 
sympathy for the guerrillas, especially the ELN, in Barrancabermeja, 
the insurgents never really abandoned the position that revolution 
would happen in the countryside.
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It should come as no surprise that the insurgencies found a well 
of popular support in Barrancabermeja. By the 1990s, the ELN’s iden-
tification with urban residents had become so complete that guerril-
las no longer adhered to the compartmentalized organizational struc-
ture that protected the identities of local cadres. A resident explained: 
“There was a time when you could walk into some of the neighborhoods 
of the Northeast and stand in the middle of the street and shout out, 
‘Who is the commander of the ELN in this neighborhood?’ and people 
would tell you. Everyone knew the guerrillas, and people trusted them 
and each other.”33 For urban people accustomed to repressive police 
and military tactics during the labor and civic strikes that rattled Ba-
rrancabermeja, the guerrillas offered a form of protection. Evangelina 
Marín, a member of the Coordinadora, explained that “many people 
considered the time of the guerrillas to be one of military accompa-
niment for them. . . . The fact that the militias were able to maintain 
a presence for thirteen years in such a small city is because people ac-
cepted them and supported them” (2006: 356). Such support was not 
universal, and it changed over time, but for much of the 1980s and 
early 1990s, the guerrillas were either welcomed or tolerated, and they 
became part of the social fabric of working-class Barrancabermeja.
The guerrillas’ daily presence in the barrios differed from other 
Colombian cities, where insurgents moved in and out of working-class 
communities but never established a permanent relationship with 
their inhabitants. One longtime resident of La Esperanza neighbor-
hood remembered that even if people were not involved with the guer-
rillas, the insurgents were their sons, daughters, husbands, friends, 
lovers, and acquaintances, and they were tolerated, if not always ac-
tively supported, for reasons of personal connection. Echoing these 
observations, a social movement leader said that “the culture of the 
guerrilla was part of the life of civil society. That doesn’t mean that all 
civilians were guerrillas, but the guerrillas were part of our lives, part 
of our culture. Everyone struggled and lived together in one way or 
another.”34 Another longtime political activist, who reflected on the 
period, insisted that “whether you were actually a guerrilla, a collabo-
rator, or simply a social movement member with no connection to the 
guerrillas, people more or less wanted the same things. This is not to 
say that everyone always agreed with the guerrillas; they [the guerril-
las] sometimes made decisions that hurt the popular movement. But 
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people in the Northeast were proud to have a guerrilla commander 
spend the night in their home, and they saw the insurgents as a politi-
cal alternative.”35
Relationships with the insurgents were not seamless. The ELN, for 
example, frequently backed the demands of labor, whether or not it 
was asked to do so, while extorting corporations, kidnapping man-
agers, and destroying physical plants when its demands were not sat-
isfied. A president of the USO addressed the awkward relationships be-
tween the union and the insurgencies when he acknowledged that his 
union shared political sympathies with the guerrillas: “This union, be-
sides engaging in collective bargaining, is political in nature. It openly 
confronts the oil policies of different governments. This concern of 
ours has led, in some way, to a certain coincidence with the insurgent 
movement. One of our rallying points is national sovereignty, and this 
has also been a rallying point for the insurgent movement . . . but this 
does not mean that we literally agree with all of the activities that the 
guerrilla develops in this country” (El Tiempo, January 29, 1997, qtd. in 
Delgado 2006: 143). Many oil workers did not support repeated guer-
rilla bombings of ECOPETROL’s oil and gas pipelines because they be-
lieved that the assaults posed a threat to their jobs. And when the in-
surgents publicly sided with workers during contract negotiations and 
labor strikes to legitimate their violent methods, newspaper pundits, 
public officials, and the security forces quickly condemned what they 
perceived as an unholy alliance between the unions and the guerrillas. 
These accusations were especially pernicious given the guerrillas’ deci-
sion to combine legal and illegal forms of struggle, known as the combi-
nación de todas las formas de lucha. The deeply controversial combinación
strategy had individuals acting on behalf of the insurgencies in trade 
unions, popular organizations, political parties, and Christian base 
communities.36 It lent credence to accusations that insurgents oper-
ated within legal community organizations, and it enabled the mili-
tary to justify targeting union and civic organizations and exposing 
unarmed civilians to state repression.
Moreover, although guerrilla involvement with unions, neighbor-
hood councils, and civic groups varied, it raised prickly questions about 
autonomy that caused friction. “They [the guerrillas] didn’t manage to 
understand that there were organizations capable of constructing au-
tonomy,” complained the head of one group to me in 2007.37 Others as-
serted that the guerrillas were simply trying to use the popular organi-
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zations as “echo chambers” for their views. Guerrilla encroachment on 
the autonomy of popular organizations almost certainly undermined 
the appeal of these groups to nonmembers and made the guerrillas 
themselves appear intrusive and disrespectful. Because of these ten-
sions, historian Álvaro Delgado (2006: 139) called the insurgents the 
“uncomfortable allies” of trade unionists in the Middle Magdalena, al-
though such discomfort extended beyond the unions to other groups 
as well.
The presence of three insurgencies in a city known for its mili-
tant social organizations made subduing Barrancabermeja, especially 
the USO, an important paramilitary objective, and during the 1980s 
and 1990s, the Middle Magdalena entered a spiraling vortex of vio-
lence that would eventually unravel working-class Barrancabermeja. 
Regional-based paramilitaries accrued enormous power and autonomy 
through ties to the cocaine traffic, and they federated, in 1997, under 
a national umbrella organization called the Autodefensas Unidas de 
Colombia (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, AUC), which at-
tempted to centralize under its command the various paramilitary 
groups that operated in the country. The FARC and the ELN grew mili-
tarily stronger from the rents extracted through extortion and kid-
napping and spread beyond their traditional strongholds, but military 
strength and territorial control did not translate into greater political 
support. In many cases, the insurgent expansion had less to do with 
their increasing popularity than with the heightened capacity to in-
timidate.
When an AUC affiliate—the Bloque Central Bolívar (Central Bolívar 
Bloc, BCB)—seized control of the city in the early twenty-first century, 
after years of massacres, threats, and extrajudicial executions, it drove 
the final nail into the coffin of a once vibrant, heterogeneous working 
class. The paramilitaries dismantled the ideological and institutional 
framework that tied residents to each other, and they stunted popular 
demands that the state care for its citizens through the provision of 
decent wages, safe and democratic working conditions, and public ser-
vices, and that it protect national resources from foreign despoliation. 
Barrancabermeja changed from a city that had long received displaced 
victims of the violence to one that became a source of displacement.
The brutal power of reactionary violence remade class relation-
ships. It lubricated the dispossession of working people, propelled the 
disorganization of their lives and organizations, and spread fear and 
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insecurity, all of which facilitated the incorporation of traumatized 
survivors into new relationships of power over which they had little 
control. Political terror made the Middle Magdalena governable in 
the interests of capital and opened the doors to foreign corporations 
eager to invest in the region’s abundant natural resources. It also trans-
formed how state power was organized, enacted, and understood. In 
the next chapters, we turn to a more detailed examination of the un-





May 16, 1998. It was Saturday night in Barrancabermeja, a weekend 
evening like many others. As the sun dipped below the western horizon 
and the torrid heat of the river valley slowly abated, the city began to 
shift gears. People spilled into corner bars and discos in the working-
class districts of the northeast and southeast, where a mix of salsa and 
vallenato music blared into the streets. Families gathered on patios 
or moved chairs onto the sidewalks to escape the accumulated heat 
of their homes, while young couples, friends, and relatives set out on 
strolls, taking in the social life that came alive after sunset. The Prot-
estant faithful, whose numbers had expanded over the last two de-
cades, attended services in storefront churches, where the exhorta-
tions of preachers and the entreaties of the repentant mixed with the 
rhythms of guitar music and floated to the heavens. Many residents 
of the southeastern Maria Eugenia, Divino Niño, and Campín neigh-
borhoods headed to a bazaar that local people had organized in a high 
school soccer field to raise funds for a Mother’s Day celebration.
Sixteen-year-old Yesid Peña was sitting in front of his home with 
other teenage members of a Bible study class, not far from the con-
gested bazaar. He was a quiet youth, a homebody according to his 
father, who preferred the company of a few friends to the commotion 
of the soccer field. At around 9:00 PM, two armed men approached 
from the street and forced Yesid and another boy to accompany them 
at gunpoint. A startled dog began to bark, alerting his father, who was 
inside watching television, that something was wrong. At first, the 
elder Peña recalled, he thought that the men were police checking the 
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youngsters’ identification, but he quickly realized that something more 
sinister was afoot. No sooner had he put on his shoes and gone out 
to the street than he saw a pickup truck carrying men in bulletproof 
vests. Yesid had vanished, and splayed on the street near the bazaar lay 
a corpse with its throat slit. Peña heard shots and yelling. A neighbor 
told him to get out of sight or he would be killed, too, and for the next 
half hour, Peña and his wife cowered in the neighbor’s home.
Despite what he had seen, Peña still thought that his son was in 
police custody. Yet when he and his wife made their way to police head-
quarters, the officer in charge denied any knowledge of Yesid’s where-
abouts and treated their requests for help with indifference, even 
though, according to Peña, “you could still hear shots being fired.” Dis-
gusted, the couple continued to the headquarters of the Departamento 
Administrativo de Seguridad (Department of Administrative Security, 
DAS), Colombia’s premiere security service, where the reception was 
even worse. “They [the DAS officials] were having sort of a party,” Peña 
remembered. “They were drinking and had women inside. . . . They 
laughed in our faces and didn’t offer any kind of help.” For the rest 
of the night, Peña and his wife searched for their son in a hired taxi 
amid a torrential rainstorm, but it was only over the next few days that 
the outlines of the tragedy became clear: a heavily armed paramilitary 
force had driven into the neighborhood in three pickup trucks, and 
it had killed seven people in the bazaar and disappeared twenty-five 
others, including Yesid Peña.1
In the aftermath of the massacre, Barrancabermeja exploded. The 
USO, together with other union, religious, and popular organizations, 
called a five-day civic strike to pressure the government to investi-
gate the attack and locate the missing people, and it denounced the 
military for allowing the paramilitary incursion to happen, despite 
having advanced warning. Schools, the oil refinery, and banks closed, 
and two days after the assault, ten thousand people accompanied the 
funeral procession for the seven murder victims, shouting antipara-
military slogans. The mercenaries reacted with threatening graffiti in 
several neighborhoods and declared the strike leaders “military tar-
gets.” A week later, Colombian president Ernesto Samper gave a speech 
in Barrancabermeja in which he said that the government knew who 
was responsible for the assault and that it was trying to determine the 
fate of the abducted. The commander of a regional paramilitary group, 
the Autodefensas de Santander y Sur de César (Self-Defense Forces of 
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Santander and South César), subsequently claimed responsibility in an 
interview granted to a national newsmagazine. He stated that, in addi-
tion to the seven people murdered at the time of the assault, his forces 
had killed all of the kidnapped victims in the days following the abduc-
tions because of their alleged ties to the guerrilla militias that operated 
in the city. He also vowed to continue the attacks (Amnesty Interna-
tional 1999).
Echoing Colombian writer Gabriel García Marquéz’s classic novel 
Chronicle of a Death Foretold, Jaime Peña and many other barranqueños
insisted that the paramilitary foray represented a massacre foretold 
(una masacre anunciada). Local military and police commanders had re-
ceived warning that the paramilitaries planned to carry out a massacre, 
and on the day of the incursion, an army officer ordered the establish-
ment of a twenty-four-hour checkpoint on the main access road to the 
city’s southeastern neighborhoods. Yet shortly before 9:00 PM, the 
military units returned to their barracks, and the checkpoint came 
down. The paramilitary forces then entered the city to begin the as-
sault on the southeastern districts (Amnesty International 1999).
The massacre initiated the paramilitary shift from targeted indi-
vidual assassinations, used against journalists and labor and civic 
leaders since the 1980s, to a full-scale invasion and occupation of Ba-
rrancabermeja in the early twenty-first century. Although many people 
had refused to believe that the paramilitaries would ever gain a foot-
hold in a city noted for its radical tradition, the disorganization of Ba-
rrancabermeja’s working class and the rise of an extreme form of neo-
liberal, “gangster” capitalism had been under way for several years. The 
massacre therefore constituted less a rupture with the recent past than 
an early indication that the long years of dirty war and neoliberal eco-
nomic restructuring were reaching a violent denouement. Yet because 
of its sensational impact, the carnage of May 16 indelibly marked popu-
lar memory. It divided the history of the dirty war into “before” and 
“after” May 16, 1998, and signified the initial consolidation of a new, 
neoliberal economic era characterized by radical insecurity, the tri-
umph of free-market policies, and the victory of the counterinsurgent 
right, which would take over the institutional state and much of civil 
society in the early years of the twenty-first century. It also demarcated 
the end of one period of urban history in which radical democratic 
movements clamored for labor rights and the rights of democratic citi-
zenship, and a rebellious political culture nurtured collective action.
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In this and subsequent chapters, we turn to an exploration of how 
political violence and neoliberalism unmade Barrancabermeja’s work-
ing class during the 1990s and early 2000s, a time when paramilitary 
armies seized control of small towns, urban neighborhoods, and rural 
hamlets across the country (e.g., Cívico 2012; Hylton 2010; Taussig 
2003), while burgeoning U.S. military aid made them stronger by shor-
ing up their allies in the army and the police. Violence and economic re-
structuring redefined the geography of power, tore people from social 
networks, refashioned political subjectivities around individual sur-
vival strategies, and reconfigured how working people advanced their 
claims on the state. Understanding the unmaking of the working class 
affords on important perspective on how the organization of capital 
accumulation changed and processes of state formation veered to the 
far right.
This chapter focuses on the paramilitary takeover of the city, espe-
cially the most violent period between 2000 and 2003, when the homi-
cide rate was among the highest in the world.2 Paramilitaries of the 
BCB, one of the largest and most lethal groups that operated in Colom-
bia, unleashed violence on behalf of an emergent narco-bourgeoisie 
to destroy unions, expel the guerrillas from the city, and dismantle 
Barranca’s scaffolding of working-class solidarity, and they did so with 
the knowledge and support of the state security forces. The chapter 
first discusses the intensification of violence amid the growing liber-
alization of the Colombian economy, which working people in Barran-
cabermeja opposed because of the multiple ways that it eroded their 
livelihoods. It then explores how the terror and impunity that defined 
the paramilitary occupation provoked a collective trauma for working 
people that enabled the mercenaries and those they served to weaken, 
disorganize, and, in some cases, obliterate working-class institutions, 
as well as the social relationships and understandings that undergirded 
them. It argues that the crisis-induced fragmentation of the social 
order “unmade” class by killing or displacing popular leaders, destroy-
ing networks of solidarity, and privatizing individual experiences of 
terror. The repression deprived people of the ability to talk about or 
do anything about what was happening, and it disrupted the ability of 
working people to reproduce the material and emotional relationships 
that were necessary to care for themselves and each other, that gave 
meaning to their lives, and that enabled them to imagine the future.
Poor urban residents became more vulnerable to the manipulation 
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and domination of the new masters of the city, who crushed opposition 
to subcontracting and the withdrawal of the state from social welfare 
activities. Chapter 4 takes up the specific example of Barrancabermeja’s 
Coca-Cola workers. It explores how political violence and neoliberal 
restructuring dismantled a “labor elite” that had begun to enjoy the 
rights and protections won in previous labor struggles, and that con-
stituted a small but vital part of Barrancabermeja’s activist political 
culture. Together, chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate how late twentieth-
century and early twenty-first-century paramilitary terror emerged as 
a consequence of working people’s opposition to free-market policies, 
their demands for public services, and their insistence that the state 
attend to the needs of its citizens. The wrath of the regional bourgeoisie 
drove political violence, which dismantled working-class power. Vio-
lence simultaneously created the conditions for neoliberal capitalism 
to prosper through the reorganization of social and economic life on 
more unequal and authoritarian terms.3
The Evil Twins: Neoliberalism and Political Violence
During the 1980s and 1990s, political violence and neoliberalism be-
came intertwined in the Middle Magdalena, and the future of Barran-
cabermeja’s working people unfolded within a vicious dialectic in which 
the resurgent power of popular movements and the accumulating force 
of reactionary violence generated rising levels of terror and despera-
tion. Peace talks with the guerrillas and the local election of mayors ini-
tiated by the Barco administration in the 1980s, and the convening of 
the National Constituent Assembly to rewrite the Colombian constitu-
tion in 1991, had spurred the renewed organization and unification of 
popular forces to take advantage of the possibilities offered by political 
decentralization and the democratic opening. The labor movement uni-
fied under the umbrella of the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (Uni-
tary Workers Central, CUT) in 1986, bringing the majority of unions 
from three competing federations, as well as a group of independent 
unions, together for the first time. New social movements—the Unión 
Patriótica and A Luchar, which were electoral fronts for the FARC and 
the ELN, respectively—formed from the commitment of guerrilla 
groups to lay down their arms and participate in the political process, 
and in the 1980s, they won control of a majority of union directorates.
In addition, the Constituent Assembly brought together a broad 
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spectrum of left political forces—indigenous, labor, religious, and de-
mobilized guerrillas from the M-19, EPL, and Quintín Lamé insurgen-
cies—to produce a new, more democratic and inclusive Colombian con-
stitution (Valencia and Celis 2012), even though the FARC and the ELN
refused to participate. The new constitution deepened the political de-
centralization initiated during the Betancur administration by devolv-
ing administrative and fiscal functions to the municipalities. The ratio-
nale was twofold: to make funds available to newly elected authorities 
so that they could respond to the needs of constituents for infrastruc-
ture development, water, trash collection, and other public services, 
and to pacify the insurgencies by incorporating them into the politi-
cal system (Ballvé 2012; Castro 1998). Yet as we saw in the previous 
chapter, the groundswell of popular organizing and rising expectations 
about addressing pent-up popular concerns through a more open po-
litical system radicalized right-wing regional power holders, who felt 
threatened by the growing popularity of the legal left and the chal-
lenge that decentralization posed to their vested interests. A resurgent 
left spurred closer alliances between regional elites and the security 
forces and fed the expansion of paramilitarism, which was financed by 
the explosion of the illegal cocaine traffic. Decentralization did less to 
tame the insurgencies and make the political field accessible to greater 
popular participation than to intensify regional conflict and facili-
tate the configuration of new, scale-spanning geographies of power 
under the control of paramilitaries and their civilian allies. Although it 
arose from particular Colombian circumstances, decentralization was 
fully compatible with the free-market policy reforms endorsed by the 
United States, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank 
that, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, drove more and more working 
people into poverty around Latin America and the world.
Unlike other countries forced by crushing international debt to adopt 
the free-market reforms that constituted what came to be known as 
the “Washington consensus,” Colombia did not carry a significant debt 
burden due, in part, to the massive, albeit illegal, profits of the cocaine 
industry that flowed into the country. The specter of default, the loss 
of global economic credibility, and the domestic consequences of be-
coming a “pariah” state in the eyes of global financial institutions were 
thus ineffective in leveraging the opening of the Colombian economy. 
The administration of César Gaviria (1990–94) agreed to implementing 
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a series of free-market policy reforms only after President George H. W. 
Bush offered a substantial cut of the $2.2 billion Andean Initiative to 
fight drug trafficking. In 1990, the government then passed a series of 
laws that legalized temporary labor contracts and made it easier for 
employers to hire and fire workers (Law 50), created a private pension 
system and expanded private health care and social security (Law 100), 
deregulated trade and lowered tariff barriers (Law 49), liberalized fi-
nancial institutions (Law 45), and decentralized public spending (Law 
49). In addition, between 1989 and 1994, the large-scale privatization 
of state-owned enterprises began. These policies were maintained and 
expanded throughout the 1990s and became key to the violent eco-
nomic strategies of the Uríbe administration (2002–10).
As President Gaviria opened the country to market forces, para-
military groups in the Middle Magdalena, the eastern plains, Córdoba 
province, and the Urabá region of northeast Antioquia province were 
already establishing the framework for a national-level counterinsur-
gent organization and a new concentration of power that united drug-
traffickers-turned-landlords, cattle ranchers, traditional politicians, 
and regional elites in a far-right alliance. With profits from the illegal 
cocaine traffic, these regional-based paramilitary entities, whose most 
important leaders came from the drug cartels, morphed from roving 
death squads into standing armies that outgrew their role as the mili-
tary’s clandestine enforcers. The majority of them federated, in 1997, 
under the umbrella of the AUC, but their power remained rooted in the 
regions, where they constructed new nodes of development centered 
on mineral extraction, African palm cultivation, and, most important, 
the cocaine traffic.
These new geographies of power were forged through predation and 
dispossession. Paramilitary commanders disputed territorial control 
with the guerrillas, murdered or displaced anyone alleged to sympa-
thize with the insurgents, and amassed an enormous amount of wealth 
and power for themselves and those they served through the theft of 
land and the displacement of the inhabitants. They did so as the United 
States’ Andean Initiative was followed, in 2001, by Plan Colombia, au-
thorized by President Bill Clinton and providing $1.3 billion in mostly 
military aid. Although officially described as a counternarcotics pro-
gram, Plan Colombia strengthened paramilitary power by channeling 
money and arms to its main ally, the Colombian security forces. It did 
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not target areas in northern Colombia where paramilitaries supervised 
the shipment of cocaine out of the country but fumigated the southern 
coca fields of peasant cultivators who supported the FARC.
At a moment when paramilitarism was gaining momentum and 
wrapping itself in the cloak of counterinsurgency, neoliberal reforms 
aimed to roll back the hard-won popular gains from earlier rounds of 
class struggle and make working people more “manageable.” Merce-
naries awash in drug profits stepped in to repress challenges to the 
emergent economic order, as conflicts over labor rights, landowner-
ship, the privatization of public enterprises, national sovereignty, and 
the control of decentralized municipal budgets ignited around the 
country. Paramilitary violence undergirded the opening of the econ-
omy through the repression of working people, labeled “subversives” 
for their opposition to neoliberal economic reforms, the theft of their 
lands, and the assassination of their leaders. It was the midwife of neo-
liberalism and fueled a new phase of territorial reconfiguration and 
capital accumulation.
The enactment of neoliberal economic policies prompted an in-
crease in unemployment, economic precariousness, and insecurity in 
Barrancabermeja, where state workers represented a substantial sector 
of the workforce. Workers in petroleum, telecommunications, educa-
tion, transportation, health care, and fertilizer manufacture all faced 
the threat of privatization and either job loss or new contracts on less 
favorable terms. With the partial privatization of ECOPETROL, for-
eign oil companies signed contracts with the government to provide 
specific services and operations. These contracts resembled the early 
twentieth-century TROCO concession but on even worse terms, that 
is, the contracts could be extended indefinitely, until the exhaustion of 
the oil field, with no requirement that the oil field eventually revert to 
state control. And as state entities were privatized, the cost of public 
services—telephone, electricity, health care, and so forth—increased. 
In addition, the rise of subcontracting diminished the power of the 
USO and other unions and opened the door for private contractors with 
ties to the paramilitaries to exert greater control over the labor force. 
In the midst of growing precariousness, new stores opened in the city 
center and in small regional towns displaying flashy imports, such as 
clothing, expensive sneakers, and electronic equipment, that became 
a way of laundering illegal drug profits. The dance of commodities tan-
talized working people, but the gaudy imports generally remained be-
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yond their grasp, as civil war and economic restructuring drove people 
deeper into poverty.
By the end of the 1990s, paramilitaries had weakened the ELN in 
the Middle Magdalena and, according to local activists, thoroughly in-
filtrated its forces in Barrancabermeja, but the paramilitary presence 
in the city was still limited and not pervasive enough to be considered 
an occupying force. This situation changed in late 2000, when a com-
mander of the BCB announced over the radio that the mercenaries in-
tended to take control of the city. Some one thousand fighters then laid 
siege to urban neighborhoods, starting with Miraflores in the north-
east and taking control of them one by one in an orgy of violence. 
Within only a few months, the BCB had expelled the guerrilla militias, 
and its commanders had become the new lords of the city. A report by 
the Center for International Policy, based on a March 2001 staff visit, 
found that, with the exception of the downtown and the area around 
the oil refinery, five and a half of Barrancabermeja’s seven districts (co-
munas) were under BCB control (Isacson 2001).
Impunity and the Paramilitary Takeover
When a journalist asked BCB leader Rodrigo Pérez Alzáte why taking 
Barrancabermeja was important, the paramilitary chief alluded to the 
disruptive power of organized labor, noting the capacity of the USO
to organize labor strikes that shut down the city and affected the en-
tire country. “This municipality is the biggest oil port in the country, 
the carburetor of Colombia. ECOPETROL, the state oil company, has a 
union, the USO, that was infiltrated by the ELN for a long time. When 
the subversives wanted to paralyze the country, the union organized 
a strike leaving Colombia without fuel, in only 48 hours” (Aranguren 
2001: 257). Crushing the USO and expelling the ELN guerrillas from a 
working-class stronghold represented an important victory for the 
BCB. The USO strongly opposed government plans to privatize the oil 
industry and objected to the national enactment of neoliberal policies. 
More important, the USO was a critical resource for working people 
because it had the power to inflict economic damage beyond Barran-
cabermeja. Because of the centrality of oil to the Colombian economy, 
an oil worker strike had national implications that increased the spa-
tial field of worker power, a fact that paramilitaries like Pérez Alzáte 
understood well.
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Impunity underwrote the BCB takeover of Barrancabermeja and 
gave form to the new political, economic, and social order that the mer-
cenaries set out to create. It constituted more than simply getting away 
with murder. Impunity was an aspect of both power and powerless-
ness forged within the clash of opposed, unequal political forces. Wide-
spread exemption from any form of accountability protected the per-
petrators of massive human rights violations who acted in the service 
of an emergent narco-bourgeoisie, while creating and maintaining ex-
clusion, disorganization, and fear among working people. In Barranca-
bermeja, impunity not only allowed paramilitaries to move unimpeded 
throughout the city and avoid accountability for their crimes; it also 
enabled them to abuse urban residents over and over again because 
residents could do nothing about what was happening. Brutal violence 
with no negative consequences for the instigators engendered chaos in 
people’s lives, severed them from their ties to each other, and created 
the conditions for the establishment of new, authoritarian relation-
ships that undergirded the further accretion of wealth and power.
The BCB takeover would have been impossible without the collabora-
tion of the security forces, who looked the other way as the mercenaries 
committed atrocities and rarely took action against them. Barranca-
bermeja had long been one of the most militarized cities in Colombia. 
The army based two battalions in Barrancabermeja: Nueva Granada 
and Heroes of Majagual; the navy monitored traffic on the Magda-
lena River from another base; the National Police had three bases, in-
cluding one in the northeast quarter; special intelligence arms of the 
police (Seccional de Policía Judicial e Investigación) and the military 
(B2) conducted surveillance operations; and a division of the Attorney 
General’s Office, the Cuerpo Técnico de Investigación (Technical Inves-
tigation Corps), oversaw police investigations. Yet despite the presence 
of multiple state security forces, these entities routinely denied any 
knowledge of the paramilitaries and their activities. In Barrancaber-
meja, as well as other conflicted Colombian regions, the paramilitaries 
formed such an integral part of the armed forces’ counterinsurgent 
strategy that Colombians referred to them as the army’s “Sixth Divi-
sion” (Human Rights Watch 2001).
Impunity was, in fact, an important strategy of the Colombian 
armed forces. Upholding the pretense of Colombian democracy would 
have been impossible with the army massacring, displacing, and tor-
turing other Colombians, but by outsourcing the disreputable aspects 
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of a dirty war to clandestine, illegal armies whose existence they de-
nied, the armed forces contained and ultimately crushed the insurgen-
cies and the radicalizing trajectory of popular democratic movements 
in Barrancabermeja and the Middle Magdalena. Impunity turned out 
to be the whitewash that obscured the relationship between the legiti-
mate, official state and its illegitimate, unofficial counterpart, and it 
played an important part in the radical right turn that processes of 
state formation were taking in the Middle Magdalena (see chapter 5).
As urban neighborhoods shifted from guerrilla to paramilitary con-
trol, residents found themselves immersed in a living hell. They began 
to notice hooded men walking through the streets at night and then 
discovering, or hearing about, mutilated corpses that appeared in pub-
lic places the next day. Mercenaries dressed in civilian clothing sta-
tioned themselves on street corners to monitor the comings and goings 
of local people, and the blep-blep sound of their two-way radios left no 
doubt that the menacing figures were integrated into a larger, partly 
invisible force. Walking down the street became fraught with peril for 
urban residents, as firefights could erupt out of nowhere at any time. 
Parents were afraid to send their children to school, and those who 
did worried about what would happen after they arrived. Traveling 
to work became an ordeal, too. Taxi and bus drivers refused to enter 
certain areas, forcing residents to walk. Fearing for their lives, many 
residents—especially those who had openly collaborated with the in-
surgents—sold their homes and fled to another city, but because the 
mayhem had driven down property values, they often earned little on 
home sales to begin anew. Other families did not have time to sell their 
property and simply abandoned their homes; still others were forcibly 
evicted by the paramilitaries. The BCB rented commandeered dwellings 
to collaborators who arrived from other areas under its control, or it 
used them as command centers or places to inflict torture.
Human rights defenders, armed only with cell phones, relayed ac-
counts of the paramilitary terror unfolding in Barrancabermeja’s 
working-class neighborhoods to local, national, and international 
human rights organizations. They represented Colombian organiza-
tions, such as the Corporación Regional para la Defensa de los Dere-
chos Humanos (Regional Corporation for the Defense of Human 
Rights, CREDHOS), that had organized, in the 1980s, in response to in-
tensifying state and paramilitary violence against the left. They also 
worked for internationally based NGOs, such as Peace Brigades and 
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Pax Christi, that established a presence in Barrancabermeja during the 
1990s, when human rights activism was gaining traction as a new form 
of international solidarity.
Despite the pressure of human rights activists on army and police 
commanders to stop the mayhem, the security forces either did not 
respond to the paramilitary incursion or delayed the deployment of 
forces, thus aiding and abetting the mercenary advance. Human rights 
organizations reported that even when police sent out patrols, sta-
tioned armored vehicles near poor neighborhoods, and searched 
houses, they avoided locations where the paramilitaries kept hos-
tages or conducted operations, and they ignored civilian pleas for help 
(Human Rights Watch 2001). As one individual explained, “When the 
paramilitaries came into Barranca, everyone knew that they stayed 
with the army battalion. And we knew what cars they used, where they 
ate, and even what prostitutes they had sex with. It was so obvious that 
sometimes we even told the authorities and gave them the addresses, 
but they didn’t do shit.”4
The experience of William Mendoza, a Coca-Cola worker, CREDHOS 
activist, and president of the local affiliate of SINALTRAINAL, illustrates 
the license that enabled the mercenaries to seize control of Barranca’s 
working-class neighborhoods and the corresponding inability of resi-
dents to stem the violence. On a January morning, Mendoza was 
showering on the back patio of his home in La Esperanza neighbor-
hood. It was still early. The sun had barely risen, as the northeast sec-
tor of the city stirred to life in the relative coolness of the morning. 
Luz, William’s wife, had sent their daughter to the corner store for eggs 
and bread, and the smell of coffee floated in the air. Mendoza rarely 
ate breakfast at home. On most days, he would have already left the 
house, but on this particular morning he was angry at Luz and wanted 
to reassert his domestic authority, so he insisted that she cook break-
fast for him.
He had just finished dressing when his daughter walked through the 
front door, looking ashen and distraught. The store was full of armed 
men, she reported, and there were others positioned all around the 
block. The news passed through Mendoza like an electric shock. Peer-
ing cautiously out the window, he saw male figures dressed in blue 
jeans and black T-shirts walking up and down the street. The young 
men were not local residents. Without wasting a minute, he grabbed 
his cell phone and began to call a network of human rights activists, 
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fearing that, as the armed men went door-to-door hunting down al-
leged “subversives,” they would discover his identity and kill him. “If 
those guys were going to come into my house, I was going to shoot with 
them [volar plomo con ellos],” he told me several years later. “I knew that 
they had come to kill . . . , Lesley, and if they got me alive, they would 
subject me to the worst torture imaginable.”5 Because of his long career 
as an outspoken trade union leader, and as a member of a prominent 
regional human rights organization, Mendoza had good reason to be 
afraid. The paramilitaries, as well as their shadowy supporters in gov-
ernment, in the security forces, and among regional elites, tended to 
lump any critic of the status quo together with the insurgents.
Yet despite repeated calls to the police by human rights activists, 
as well as assurances from the police that a helicopter would soon fly 
over the neighborhood, nothing happened. Mendoza and his family 
cowered in their home for over an hour and a half, fearing the worst. 
When the police finally arrived, an officer asked Mendoza if he knew 
a human rights defender whom, he claimed, the security forces were 
under instructions to extract from the neighborhood. Because Men-
doza suspected that the police were collaborating with the mercenaries 
and knew that the officer was referring to him, he denied knowledge 
of such a person and seized the opportunity to pile his wife and their 
children onto a motorcycle and leave along a route that the police had 
begun to cordon off. “I left,” he said, “like a soul that the devil takes.” 
But even though Mendoza survived, his life would never be the same 
again.
The BCB took over La Esperanza and began a reign of terror like that 
which had already engulfed other urban neighborhoods. Unlike many 
unionists and human rights activists, Mendoza did not leave Barran-
cabermeja. He slept in different places for several months and eventu-
ally sold his house and moved closer to the center of the city, where, 
he believed, the paramilitaries operated with less impunity than in 
the northeast. Two bodyguards began to accompany him everywhere 
he went. Coherence and predictability vanished from his life, and the 
routines and practices that once defined it became memories. Terror 
and the impunity that enabled it transformed his life into a recurrent 
nightmare as Mendoza, along with other labor leaders, became the tar-
gets of paramilitary fury because of their real or alleged ties to the in-
surgencies and leadership positions.
The BCB had become the most powerful mercenary force within the 
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AUC at a time when the distinction between drug trafficking and the 
counterinsurgent war had become irrevocably blurred. It controlled 
the narco-economy in much of the country, and seizing Barrancaber-
meja offered it an opportunity to expand its domination of the illegal 
cocaine traffic, a point I discuss further in chapter 5. Ever since the 
days of the TROCO, Barrancabermeja had been the nerve center of the 
Middle Magdalena with access to an Atlantic port, and it was located 
along major highways that crossed the country. As a vibrant commer-
cial center, Barranca offered mercenaries the opportunity to launder 
drug profits, control traffic on the river, and project themselves into 
the coca-growing zone of southern Bolívar province. In addition, its 
oil refinery produced 75 percent of the nation’s gasoline, which rep-
resented a lucrative source of rent for anyone who could organize the 
theft of the gasoline from ECOPETROL pipelines.
Although the collusion of the state security forces made the para-
military takeover possible, the BCB also took advantage of divisions and 
betrayals among the insurgents to wrest control of the city from them. 
For example, by the 1990s the EPL, a Maoist splinter group formed in 
1967, had been nearly decimated in Barrancabermeja and throughout 
the country by military and paramilitary attacks, which had killed its 
more left-wing leaders and leveraged the group’s political reorienta-
tion. As the reconfigured national leadership sought to negotiate ac-
cords with the paramilitaries, many of the EPL rank and file switched 
sides and exposed other guerrillas and their supporters to the BCB.6 
But the EPL was not alone. “Many from the FARC switched sides,” ex-
plained an elderly woman whose neighborhood had been under FARC
control, “and it wasn’t just the boys [muchachos]. It was the comman-
dants, too. This was the ugliest thing that happened at the time. It was 
really ugly. It was the worst environment that we saw [and] that’s why 
many people say that you can’t believe in anything. What happened 
is a disgrace.”7 The overwhelming violence and power of the paramili-
tary assault, strengthened by the collusion of state security forces, 
pushed many guerrillas to betray their support networks in order to 
save their own lives or for the benefits that collaboration with the para-
militaries appeared to offer.8 Their behavior sowed a sense of panic, as 
most people had some type of interaction with them through family or 
neighborhood ties, a business deal, school, a friendship or romance, or 
simply because they said hello to each other in the street. Few people 
were free from possible exposure.
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Not surprisingly, the desertions and betrayals created a deep reser-
voir of cynicism and disillusionment that erased the ability to hope, 
or to “believe in anything,” and they stoked feelings of revenge. After 
describing to me in considerable detail how a friend fingered him as a 
guerrilla, one individual said quietly, when I put my notebook down, 
that if he ever saw the man again, he would kill him. It was clear that 
the dirty war had not only created pervasive fear; it also taught people 
to hate.
The guerrilla betrayals of each other and their support networks 
only solidified popular resentment of the insurgents, which had been 
accumulating for a number of years. The insurgents’ righteous political 
demands that had unified, inspired, and politicized some urban resi-
dents over the years had devolved into little more than ossified slogans, 
as young milicianos behaved less like the vanguard of a political alterna-
tive—or even as Colombian Robin Hoods who robbed multinationals 
and redistributed the booty among the poor—than like arrogant de-
linquents who took advantage of people like themselves. One longtime 
urban resident, who had supported the insurgents in his youth, de-
scribed the gradual decomposition of the ELN guerrillas and their loss 
of legitimacy:
There was, first, the decade of the 1970s when the insurgencies were 
way out there in the mountains. That was a very romantic time, a 
moment of strong support. . . . The second moment came when the 
guerrilla arrives in Barrancabermeja and sets up its urban networks, 
more or less between 1985 and 2000 and with a strong, armed urban 
front. During the first ten years, 1985 to 1995, the guerrilla is close 
to the people, the guerrilla works with the neighborhoods, the guer-
rilla goes hand in hand with the social organizations, the guerrilla, 
in one way or the other, is seen by residents as part of themselves, of 
their daily life. But the third moment of the guerrilla is their degra-
dation, from 1995 to 2000. The insurgents become more like an oc-
cupying force and degenerate into common criminality. They start 
to assassinate people, to extort, to rob, and sectors of the FARC also 
decompose quickly. In their desire to grow, the ELN had let anyone 
join up and given them no political education, and this made mili-
tary infiltration much easier. Some business leaders went to visit the 
commandants in the middle of 2000 and told them what was hap-
pening. They told them that if the insurgents didn’t stop what was 
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going on, they were going to the paramilitaries. And those guerrilla 
chiefs did nothing.9
One elderly resident who had once collaborated with the FARC com-
mented that their “proposal had always been to change the state, for a 
substantial change for the Colombian people,” but “that was converted 
into a kind of common criminality. They killed a lot of innocent people 
and extorted a lot.”10
When the FARC demanded protection payments from multinational 
corporations, the practice did, at times, build popular support, but 
when onerous extortion demands—or requests for “contributions”—
were directed at the guerrillas’ own supporters, they eroded the insur-
gents’ legitimacy. Richani, for example, cites a case in Barrancabermeja 
in which three multinationals planned to build an electric plant in 1997. 
Operating through a neighborhood council with the support of local 
people, the FARC demanded that the companies pay $2 million for a 
vocational school and $150,000 for a jobs-creation program as a con-
dition for the right to operate (Richani 2002: 80). Yet so-called con-
tributions were also exacted from small merchants, the same group 
that once supported the labor struggles of the USO and the civic strikes 
of the 1970s. Much like the multinationals, these shop owners, whose 
margin of profit was not large, viewed their payments less as contri-
butions to a transformative social project than as protection from the 
guerrillas themselves. Neighborhood merchants complained, too, of 
milicianos who entered their establishments and refused to pay for ser-
vices rendered. Not surprisingly, many of these shopkeepers initially 
welcomed the arrival of the paramilitaries.11 The BCB’s commander, 
Rodrigo Pérez Alzáte, explained, “The best way to win territory from 
the subversion consisted in going block by block to win over people 
asphyxiated by the extortion. We started in Comuna 2, the commer-
cial center of the city. People there were ‘vaccinated’ from every side” 
(Aranguren 2001: 256). Yet the paramilitaries would soon become in-
famous for practicing their own form of extortion.
Guerrilla extortion and then increasing resort to kidnapping, selec-
tive assassinations, and bombings in heavily populated civilian areas 
raised questions about the political projects that the guerrillas claimed 
to represent. Attacks on banks, police stations, and other establish-
ments angered civilians affected by the mayhem, and the increasingly 
harsh and arbitrary “justice” meted out by the guerrillas to alleged in-
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formants and others who ran afoul of them served only to further alien-
ate the insurgencies from the population. One resident of La Esperanza 
neighborhood, for example, recounted how an ELN insurgent murdered 
his brother for smoking marijuana. “They killed him because . . . he 
was supposedly a drug addict who could influence other boys to smoke 
dope, too. But who are they to come and judge another person who 
has problems, especially when there are worse cases among [the insur-
gents].”12 By the late 1990s, the guerrillas were providing their urban 
militias with little political education about what they were supposedly 
fighting for, and they devolved into criminal protection rackets, essen-
tially abandoning the urban working class to the paramilitary right.13
Because of the inability or unwillingness of local commanders to con-
trol criminal behavior within their own ranks, thuggery overwhelmed 
any remaining vision of revolutionary transformation.
The understanding and practice of solidarity that had characterized 
Barrancabermeja’s working-class political culture was defeated by the 
degradation of the insurgencies and a paramilitary victory that rested 
on savage violence, and what remained of it was ravaged by neoliber-
alism. The dismantling or weakening of unions and civic organizations 
suppressed opposition to neoliberalism. A new generation of working-
class youth who came of age at the end of the twentieth century con-
fronted a stark world of limited job opportunities, on the one hand, and 
new forms of consumption and a lack of political alternatives, on the 
other hand. Although these youngsters had the benefits of some edu-
cation, the liberalization of the economy, the constriction of manufac-
turing, and the creeping privatization of public entities reduced legal 
employment opportunities, which had also grown less secure for mem-
bers of their parents’ generation, some of whom had found work—
albeit often part-time—in the oil industry and in the city’s small fac-
tories, businesses, and public sector (see chapter 4). Amid deepening 
economic insecurity, the explosion of the cocaine economy dangled the 
symbols of wealth and status before the eyes of young people.
The expansion of organized crime, tied to the export of cocaine, fed 
on the growing reserve of un- and underemployed youth in a city where 
the unemployment rate was 30 percent. Young men who toiled in the 
underground economy processing cocaine paste, selling small quanti-
ties of drugs, and harvesting coca leaves in the nearby mountains of 
southern Bolívar province earned more than their counterparts in the 
legal economy. The “easy money” from the drug traffic and the conspicu-
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ous consumption fueled by it clashed with notions of solidarity and 
Christian commitment that had once formed part of Barranca’s politi-
cal culture, and it nurtured a resentful individualism. In addition, the 
paramilitaries enticed recruits with cell phones and monthly salaries 
well above what they could earn from legal employment; indeed, the 
foot soldiers of paramilitarism generally lived better than rank-and-file
guerrillas because they were not persecuted by the state. Under these 
circumstances, “nothing,” Forrest Hylton notes, “could have been less 
likely to lead to armed insurrection than ‘popular militias,’ which often 
became indistinguishable from predatory youth gangs” (2014: 87).
Following the BCB takeover, the chaos that enveloped working-
class neighborhoods and the fissures that opened in people’s lives 
deepened a crisis that rendered daily life incoherent and unpredict-
able. Women and children bore the weight of this crisis with particu-
lar difficulty. Many young women found themselves widowed after 
the death or disappearance of husbands and companions. Forced to 
raise children alone without the support of a male breadwinner, they 
faced the prospect of falling deeper into poverty. Those who sought jus-
tice learned hard lessons about the nature of impunity. For example, 
Amelia González, a mother of two young children, lost her husband in 
a paramilitary massacre three years before the BCB took over the city. 
Together with five other women, whose husbands were murdered at 
the same time, González reported the crime to the police, and a suspect 
whom witnesses identified as one of the perpetrators was arrested and 
placed in jail. Then, after the BCB takeover, paramilitaries summoned 
the six widows to a meeting in an occupied neighborhood. As González 
recalled, “They told us that we had to gather in a park, and then they 
blindfolded us and put us in a taxi. They took us to a house . . . [and] 
then the commandant appeared. He was horrifying and I could not 
look at his face, which was hideous. He was surrounded by his boys and 
there were shovels and picks. I thought the worst.” Another man iden-
tified himself as a lawyer and instructed the women to withdraw their 
criminal complaint. Doing so would ensure that the case was dropped. 
“I was terrified for my girls,” recounted Amelia, “because they depended 
only on me.”14 Amelia González had no choice. If she wanted to ensure 
that her daughters had a mother to care for them, she had to decide be-
tween survival and the dim prospect of justice for her husband’s mur-
der. The brutal disorganization of the working class extended to the 
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rupture of intimate familial relationships. It not only placed a heavier 
economic burden on women like Amelia González; it obliged some of 
them to choose between life and death.
Impunity limited what people could do alone and with others. It 
created a crisis that gave rise to a new configuration of imperatives 
and possibilities over which working people had little control, and it 
destroyed any sense of stability that poor urban residents had estab-
lished in their lives, a stability that was necessary to organize their 
livelihoods, to do whatever was necessary to get through the day, and 
then to repeat it again and again. Claiming a modicum of stability and 
coherence had never been easy for most inhabitants of Barranca’s poor 
neighborhoods. Many residents had already suffered the trauma of 
forcible displacement once, and sometimes twice or even three times, 
losing all of their possessions, witnessing the deaths of loved ones, 
and having their ties to home severed. Moreover, some degree of un-
certainty and unpredictability had long been integral to the lives of 
people who had not yet been directly touched by the counterinsurgent 
war. Even before the advent of neoliberalism, unwaged workers in par-
ticular had to deal with chronic financial instability, inadequate health 
care, precarious housing, and political exclusion, which produced a 
state of constant apprehension about what was around the next cor-
ner. Violence and economic restructuring deepened that uncertainty, 
which spread to once relatively secure unionized workers, and it eroded 
the capacity of people to organize their lives and livelihoods in such a 
way that made social reproduction possible and that provided enough 
autonomy to allow them to shape the future. All of this was an essen-
tial part of the restructuring of class relationships in Barrancabermeja.
Although claiming an everyday life—and not just a daily existence 
of one thing after another—had always been a high-stakes struggle, 
some people had managed to create, or re-create, a relative sense of 
stability and continuity in which the horizon of their expectations for 
the present and the future could expand.15 This sense of security arose 
from the capacity of people who had suffered trauma and displace-
ment to forge new relationships of cooperation that congealed around 
making a living. These ties, and the expectations and obligations asso-
ciated with them, constituted a first step toward stitching together the 
tattered social fabric and generating a sense of hope that life could be 
lived on one’s own terms. Unfortunately, moments of relative stability 
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were too often short-lived, as remade alliances and forms of assistance 
were destroyed over and over again, and crisis became an integral part 
of visions of the future.16
Pedro Lozada and his family, for example, were among the first 
group of displaced peasants to seek refuge in Barrancabermeja in the 
early 1980s. Forced from Puerto Berrío by paramilitaries, the family 
fled downriver to a small mining town, where they settled for several 
months until the FARC kidnapped the mine owner and the army ar-
rived. “The displacement was really hard for me,” Lozada related years 
later. “And when the army came, it searched people going to the mine 
as well as returning to town. And because we were from Puerto Berrío, 
the army, of course, knew that we had fled. [The soldiers] were all over 
those of us from Puerto Berrío. They even came to our homes, investi-
gating and asking questions.” Feeling that their lives were in jeopardy, 
the family set out again, this time to Barrancabermeja. After traveling 
for three days on the river, they arrived hungry, tired, and with little 
but the clothes on their backs. “It was a real adventure,” Lozada said. “I 
really can’t explain how we dared to set out on the river without know-
ing what we were doing. We were going to Barranca but had no idea 
what we would do there. . . . The first few days [in the city] were really, 
really hard. In spite of the solidarity—we lived from the solidarity—
there were times that we went hungry.”17
Over time, however, the Lozada family gradually carved a place for 
itself and staked a precarious foothold. It did so with the solidarity of 
a number of groups and organizations, including the USO, the Com-
munist Party, and the Catholic Church, that found ways to assist those 
uprooted by the rural violence, and with the support of other dis-
placed peasants from the same region. Lozada’s wife found work as a 
laundress in a health clinic, and Lozada labored as a night watchman. 
They also laid claim to an urban lot through a land “recuperation” and 
constructed a home. Their sense of relative stability was short-lived, 
however, as the paramilitary takeover turned any sense of continuity 
upside down and ruptured many of Lozada’s newly established rela-
tionships in the port city. He fled once again, as the chaos and violence 
that so regularly intruded into his life reappeared. For Pedro Lozada 
and his family, crisis was less an exceptional situation—a brief inter-
ruption in an otherwise settled life—than a manifestation of the radi-
cal insecurity that, for more than half a century, had constantly under-
mined their ability to create a livable life.
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The disintegration of the social order gave rise to a new political 
subjectivity in which self-interested individualism replaced a more 
capacious understanding of self, one tied to solidarity with others 
through a “collective politics that looked to the state to dispense jus-
tice” (Grandin 2004: 14). This new sensibility grew out of the betrayals 
and divisions that the relentless violence had created in people’s lives. 
Trust evaporated. In 2007, one man explained to me: “When you walk 
past an unknown person, you always go on the defensive. It’s not the 
same anymore. If somebody comes around asking if you know so-and-
so, nobody will admit to knowing [the person] because you don’t know 
who is asking or why they are looking for him.”18 Social life grew more 
privatized and isolated as the left public sphere shrank and a welter 
of autocratic, personalized relationships became more important to 
the livelihood strategies of working people. People turned inward or to 
evangelical churches, and away from politics, to find solutions to their 
problems. They were increasingly remade as autonomous individuals, 
dispossessed from their relationships to each other, and felt bitter, pas-
sive, and in despair. Such mistrust arose not only from what had hap-
pened to people but also from what they had done—or been forced to 
do—to each other. Violence created unsustainable tensions for those 
in the line of paramilitary fire. It forced people to betray others like 
themselves, as they desperately sought ways to survive in a violent new 
social order that had still not fully emerged. Betrayal was the solvent 
of social solidarity, and its corrosive power was worse when inflicted 
by an acquaintance, a workmate, or a close friend. It violated the cer-
tainties and expectations that people held about each other, and it bred 
suspicion and feelings of isolation, diminishing their capacity to talk 
about what was happening and formulate a response. Rumors of para-
military hit lists, atrocities, and so-called social cleansing campaigns 
aggravated the sense of menace and created a climate of fear.
The Dynamics of Fear
Most barranqueños who resided in the northeastern and southeastern 
districts of the city experienced a deep sense of physical insecurity dur-
ing the most intense months of fighting in late 2000 and 2001, when 
the BCB routed the insurgencies. The rituals and routines of daily life 
became fraught activities, as firefights often erupted out of nowhere 
and political allegiances were in flux. People felt terrified. Yet once 
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the fighting abated and daily life became, in the words of one man, 
“normal between quotation marks,” fear—an emotion aroused by the 
real or imagined sense of imminent danger or harm—gripped some 
people much more tightly than others. Those who lived in former guer-
rilla strongholds, or who aided the guerrillas by stashing arms in their 
home or allowing an insurgent to spend the night, as well as those who 
participated in activist unions, human rights committees, or left politi-
cal movements, faced grave physical danger. It is important therefore 
to examine the circumstances that generated fear and connect them to 
the actual experience of it (or not) among different kinds of people.19
Unlike those individuals and institutions that expressed opposition 
to the paramilitaries, there were many people, such as the merchants 
discussed earlier, who welcomed the arrival of the BCB and the end of 
the abuses suffered under the guerrillas. And other men and women, if 
they did not actively support the BCB, accepted it as the lesser evil—the 
latest group of armed overlords to dominate their neighborhoods—
and found ways to adjust to life under BCB rule. One trade union leader, 
for example, observed that people had few difficulties with the para-
militaries as long as they “do what they say. That means going from 
home to work, agreeing to participate in their marches and meetings, 
showing up when [they] announce through the neighborhood coun-
cils that there will be a trash cleanup, not complaining about the high 
cost of electricity and the absence of public services, and, above all 
else, not organizing other people who might challenge the power of 
the paramilitaries.”20 Indeed, the paramilitaries rewarded supporters 
with jobs in construction, park maintenance, transportation, and, of 
course, a range of illegal activities (Loingsigh 2002). Some urban resi-
dents therefore benefited from paramilitary largesse. They made the 
accommodations and concessions that were necessary to carve a place 
for themselves within paramilitary-controlled patronage structures, 
which began to take shape under BCB control (see chapter 5), and which 
minimized, at least for a time, the fear that became “a way of life” for 
surviving members of the opposition.21
Residents of Barrancabermeja’s northeastern and southeastern 
districts were under constant surveillance. The paramilitaries trans-
gressed the boundaries that had once delineated guerrilla-controlled 
territory and that even the security forces had been hesitant to breech, 
unifying the city under their control and mapping new spaces of fear 
onto it. Paramilitaries clad in civilian clothing, or informers paid by 
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them, monitored the ebb and flow of social life in the barrios and kept 
tabs on the arrival and departure of passengers at the bus terminal, the 
river port, and the airport. Taxi drivers and young men with motor-
cycles were also recruited as informants and admonished to report on 
what they saw and heard as they moved about the city. They watched 
union activists, neighborhood leaders, human rights defenders, and 
members of left-wing political parties more closely than others, aiming 
to break any remaining links among the insurgencies, political parties, 
or social movements that challenged their power.
Trade union leader Juan Carlos Galvis, for example, often opened 
his home to me during my trips to Barrancabermeja because he, like 
other threatened activists, felt safer in the company of foreigners, 
especially North Americans and Europeans, who came to Barranca-
bermeja with international human rights organizations to accompany 
threatened leaders of urban popular organizations. Galvis had sur-
vived an attempted assassination, after hidden assailants ambushed 
his car as it was passing through a ravine, and his wife, Jackeline, had 
barely evaded a paramilitary attempt to murder her in a small river 
town where she traveled in her work as a human rights defender. Early 
one evening, I returned to their home—an apartment on the top floor 
of a three-story building—and found Jackeline distraught. The neigh-
bors had alerted her to a man standing in front of the building, she ex-
plained, and he had been there for quite some time. I had seen him—
an individual in his twenties, wearing blue jeans and a short-sleeved 
shirt—when I entered the building but had not paid special attention 
to what he was doing. “He shouldn’t be there. There is no reason for 
him to be hanging around on the street,” Jackeline insisted. Although 
she had already called the police, more than a half hour had passed 
with no response. I called again, and when a voice answered at the end 
of the line, I explained the situation in my foreign-accented Spanish 
and insisted that the police themselves had to understand the serious-
ness of the problem, as the family had been threatened before. Yet the 
police never came. Fortunately, the man on the street eventually de-
parted, but he left behind a sense of uneasiness and insecurity. Who 
was he? What was he doing on the street? Who, if anyone, told him to 
be there? This was how fear worked. It fed on uncertainty and anxiety 
and called forth past traumas. Impunity enabled fear to blossom and 
to envelop the Galvis household within a constant state of menace that 
would eventually become unbearable.22
118 CHAPTER THREE
Fear also enforced a deafening silence about what had happened and 
continued to happen, and only in exceptional cases, such as the Galvis 
family, did people find ways to fight back against it.23 More typical was 
the silence described to me by a female activist who discussed daily life 
in a northeastern neighborhood during 2007, after the BCB had offi-
cially demobilized. Although we talked in the privacy of her home, she 
made only oblique reference to “those people” (esa gente) when refer-
ring to the paramilitaries, and she repeatedly lowered her voice when 
describing the human rights violations perpetrated by them in her 
neighborhood. She explained that many of her neighbors maintained 
a resolute silence because of what might happen if they complained, 
and others had left for fear of paramilitary reprisals. A family across 
the street, she said in a hushed tone, lost a son; the paramilitaries dis-
appeared him because he was a guerrilla. But now, “they don’t say any-
thing,” she whispered, putting a finger to her lips and glancing toward 
the door.24 Silence divided people from each other, undermining their 
ability to understand what was happening and to devise strategies to 
deal with the social “order” created by the dirty war, and it opened the 
door for dominant explanations of the urban violence that placed the 
onus of responsibility for the mayhem on the guerrillas and the social 
movements to take root.
Those most targeted by the paramilitaries increasingly found that 
they had to depend on individuals known to the paramilitaries to prove 
their “innocence,” which meant no ties to the guerrillas or trade unions, 
popular organizations, human rights groups, or left-wing political 
parties. Much like Spaniards in the immediate aftermath of the Span-
ish Civil War described by Susana Narotzky and Gavin Smith (2006), 
working-class barranqueños needed a guarantor to remain alive, keep 
a home, maintain a job, and move about the city. Finding such a per-
son was not only a difficult task; it also created new vertical relations 
of power and dependency.
In the early days of the BCB occupation, for example, as the para-
militaries sought to consolidate their control, commanders typically 
sent emissaries to summon trade union leaders and others suspected 
of guerrilla entanglements to meetings in which they laid out new 
rules of social engagement and advised them to keep a low profile. 
Worried that they would never return from such meetings alive, some, 
like William Mendoza, refused to attend and then bore the full brunt 
of paramilitary oppression. Others, however, leaned on the support of 
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individuals known to the paramilitaries to negotiate the terms of new 
relationships with the occupiers. Andrés Mosquera, a state telecommu-
nications worker and union leader, agreed to meet with a commander 
who wanted to question him prior to the privatization of the telecom-
munications company. Because he “had nothing to hide from them,” 
and perhaps because he felt that the consequences of defiance were 
too severe to ignore, Mosquera decided that it was in his best interest 
to talk to the mercenaries. Emissaries took him to a home in an occu-
pied neighborhood of the northeast sector, where Mosquera met the 
local commander, who was accompanied by bodyguards and a woman 
known to Mosquera. Much to Mosquera’s horror, the paramilitary ac-
cused him and other telecommunication workers of plotting to sabo-
tage the company, of having ties to the guerrillas, and of belonging to a 
“bad union for the company,” one that publicly protested its impending 
privatization. As the charges and accusations mounted and the meet-
ing seemed to spiral out of control, the woman insisted that Mosquera 
had no ties to the insurgency and vouched for his upright behavior. He 
subsequently credited his survival to her intervention, which, in turn, 
facilitated the establishment of new ground rules for his union leader-
ship that included no protests, no strikes, and no public statements 
against the company.25 Such pressure on trade unionists points to how 
intimidation played a key part in the decline of working-class power, 
the privatization of state-controlled entities, and the rise of neoliber-
alism.
Finding a guarantor to negotiate the paramilitary occupation pre-
sented special problems for gay men and women. Homophobia was 
deeply ingrained in social life and officially condemned by both popu-
lar religious traditions—Catholic and evangelical Protestant—that 
competed for adherents in working-class districts. The BCB sought to 
reassert rigid gender, generational, and sexual hierarchies after years 
of violence, and the repression of homosexuality formed part of this 
agenda, which was quietly welcomed by some residents who saw homo-
sexuals as the purveyors of sexually transmitted diseases. The paramili-
taries lumped homosexuals, prostitutes, and the always expandable 
group of “communists” (i.e., social justice advocates; peasant, labor, 
and student activists; and critics of the status quo) into one category—
the disposable ones (los desechables)—which then facilitated the use of 
lethal violence against them. Many gay-friendly venues and nightspots 
shut down in the wake of the occupation, and gays and lesbians, includ-
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ing those who had already endured painful coming-out experiences 
within their families, churches, schools, and workplaces, found them-
selves forced to negotiate their very existence with a violent group of 
armed mercenaries.26
Carmen Villamizar, for example, was a lesbian in her thirties who 
lived in the Miraflores neighborhood, one of the first places occupied 
by the paramilitaries after they entered the city. Villamizar lived on 
a narrow street in a small home that, like other houses in the north-
east, shared a wall with the dwellings on either side. She had operated 
a beauty parlor and a small dry goods store from the front of her home 
for more than a decade, and she was well known to her neighbors, most 
of whom were aware of her homosexuality. At the time of the para-
military incursion, she lived openly with her young lover but worried 
about their safety. Paramilitaries clad in civilian clothing constantly 
passed along the street in front of her home, and sentries monitored 
the comings and goings of residents from every street corner. One of 
the men directing the offensive was a former ELN guerrilla-turned-
paramilitary named Wolman Said Sepúlveda, known to residents by 
the alias Don Oscar. Sepúlveda had installed himself in a house down 
the street from Carmen’s home, where he lived with a woman named 
Dora who was reputed to be his lover.
Dora and Villamizar were friends, and Dora had urged Carmen to 
speak directly with Sepúlveda about the relationship with her partner, 
assuring her that all would be well. Carmen hesitated for some time be-
fore seizing the opportunity one day after catching a glimpse of him on 
the street, as she and her companion passed on a bus. “One day, with-
out planning,” she said,
I had the opportunity to meet Wolman down the street where he 
maintained himself. I saw him down there, and it was easy to just 
get off the bus. He was with his bodyguards but stepped away from 
them to talk to me. So I said, “Don Oscar, I come to talk to you be-
cause the truth is that there are rumors around that you don’t like 
gays and lesbians. And I know that you have heard about me. People 
in the neighborhood call me Carmencita [little Carmen]. I am Car-
mencita to everyone in Miraflores. And what’s more, you can ask 
Doña Dora about me.” . . . What he told me was “Look, Carmencita, 
what I don’t like are these dikes who entice men to sleep with them 
and then rob them. . . . That is what I am not going to permit. And 
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yes, I will punish that. But if you live your life behind the doors of 
your home, nobody is going to bother you.” And that’s how it was.27
By drawing on her friendship with his lover Dora, and displaying 
subservience through the use of the honorific “Don” to refer to Sepúl-
veda and the diminutive of her own name, Carmen managed to clarify 
a set of ground rules for her coexistence with the paramilitaries. These 
rules prohibited any public displays of lesbian sexuality, which had to 
remain concealed behind the walls of her home, and they left unchal-
lenged Sepúlveda’s characterization of lesbians as women who abuse 
and rob men. During the months that followed, Villamizar said that 
she “had [her] parties and meetings behind closed doors [de la puerta 
para adentro]. And when we went out at night in a taxi—taxis still 
had to keep their interior lights on—they [the paramilitaries] always 
stopped the taxis, but when they saw that it was me, they said, ‘It’s Car-
mencita, let her pass.’ . . . They communicated from block to block [on 
walkie-talkies] and said, ‘Here in the taxi is Carmencita,’ and they let 
me pass because they knew that it was me.”28 The search for guarantors 
was one way that men and women tried to ensure their survival and 
renegotiate the terms of daily existence after the paramilitary take-
over. Although it worked as an individual tactic for some people, the 
recourse to guarantors forced men and women to swallow their dignity, 
endure humiliation, and deal with new, unsettling dependencies and 
power dynamics, as their individual security turned on the willingness 
of another to vouchsafe their political credentials and good names to 
the new urban lords.
The collective politics that had once sustained individual lives 
through the experience of social solidarity was fractured by the com-
bined force of paramilitary and state violence, which severed social re-
lationships and created fertile ground for neoliberalism. The dirty war 
dismantled the network of trade unions, civic organizations, left politi-
cal parties, and guerrilla insurgencies that had shaped and given mean-
ing to working-class life for many years and protected some people 
from the full impact of the market. Impunity-driven violence ruptured 
social solidarities and remade men and women as autonomous indi-
viduals, who had to confront new, life-threatening vulnerabilities on 
their own. Yet the fear, betrayals, and lack of trust that arose amid the 
chaos generated by paramilitary domination made it nearly impossible 
for working people to do anything about what was happening to them. 
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With notable exceptions, working people turned away from collective 
politics and demands that the state provide them with decent jobs and 
livable neighborhoods and dedicated themselves to individual survival 
strategies. In these ways, Barrancabermeja’s working class was unmade 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and the conditions were created for 
the incorporation of working people into new, authoritarian relation-
ships on terms that accommodated the accumulation strategies of an 
emergent alliance of paramilitaries, drug traffickers, traditional politi-




In late December 1996, paramilitaries shot SINALTRAINAL leader Isidro 
Gil dead. He was standing in the entrance to the Coca-Cola bottling 
plant in Carepa, a small town in a region of vast banana plantations 
and cattle ranches that hugs the Panamanian border and the Caribbean 
sea known as Urabá. Another Coca-Cola worker, Osvaldo Torres, was 
having breakfast in a kiosk outside the plant at the time and saw two 
men drive past on a high-powered motorcycle. The individuals circled 
back and forth several times before pausing briefly to exchange words 
with a man standing nearby. Torres grew worried. Since 1994, he had 
borne witness to the rising arc of violence across Urabá and had lost 
his brother, who also worked for Coca-Cola, to paramilitary assailants. 
“When I had to leave town and make a delivery,” he told me, “I saw a 
lot of things. The paramilitaries would stop the trucks carrying workers 
to the banana plantations and leave fifteen or twenty dead bodies on 
the road. They would cut off their faces.”1 Not surprisingly, when Torres 
noticed the men on the motorcycle, he had no doubt who they were and 
went into the plant to express his worries to Gil. The two men talked for 
a moment, but then as a large metal gate opened for a delivery truck to 
leave, the assassins seized the moment to pump two bullets into Gil, 
who died immediately.
In the aftermath of the killing, the paramilitaries persecuted other 
members of the SINALTRAINAL directorate, forcing them to write let-
ters of resignation from the union on company stationery, and then 
faxing the coerced statements to headquarters in Bogotá. Fearing 
for their lives, union leaders fled Carepa, and the SINALTRAINAL local 
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ceased to exist. The men insisted that the decimation of the local took 
place with the complicity of company managers, whom workers had 
observed talking to paramilitary leaders in the plant cafeteria prior to 
the attack on Isidro Gil. Many rank-and-file trade unionists, who con-
stituted the plant’s approximately ninety full-time workers, were fired; 
most had logged more than ten years with the Coca-Cola Company and 
had received a range of benefits, such as health care and paid vacations. 
Average wages in the plant dropped from $380 a month to $130, and 
new hires received short-term contracts of three to four months with 
few, if any, benefits.
Displaced workers faced hard times in the months and years that 
followed. Union directorate member Adolfo Cardona tried to lose him-
self and his family in the sprawling working-class communities of 
southern Bogotá, where war refugees from all over the country had 
settled, but his search for peace and anonymity was short-lived. After 
neighbors told him that strange men had been asking about him, he 
entered a government protection program and then applied for asylum 
in the United States, where he resettled and found a job cleaning toi-
lets at a Chicago airport. Like Cardona, Osvaldo Torres fled to southern 
Bogotá, but after being hunted down and accosted on a bus, he and his 
family moved again. Some fired rank-and-file Coca-Cola workers who 
did not leave Carepa secured temporary jobs on the banana planta-
tions; others tried to set up small business; and still others purchased 
trucks from the Coca-Cola Company to become independent distribu-
tors, until the corporation cut back their routes and they could not 
make enough money to pay off the trucks.
The dramatic events in Carepa mirrored the setbacks of other work-
ing people across Colombia, especially in Barrancabermeja. Disposses-
sion, the production of precariousness, displacement, and insecurity 
formed part of a violent strategy of wealth accumulation that David 
Harvey (2003) calls “accumulation by dispossession.” Harvey (2005) 
uses the concept primarily to refer to the privatization of public as-
sets, but it can be extended to include the loss of employment, the 
rupture of ties to other working people, and the denial of the social 
wages paid by employers, such as health care, pensions, education, and 
vacations, that workers won through prior struggles and that shielded 
them from some of the ravages of capitalism. Accumulation by dispos-
session was key to neoliberalism, a political project that aimed to re-
vitalize the conditions of capital accumulation worldwide and redis-
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tribute wealth upward and that, in Colombia, enhanced the wealth and 
power of an emergent right-wing alliance that used unrestrained vio-
lence to accomplish political and economic goals.
In Barrancabermeja, paramilitary terror substantially dismantled a 
“labor elite,” one that had played a leading role in linking the demands 
of waged laborers to the democratic aspirations of peasants and un-
waged workers for land, public services, and the rights of citizenship. 
It also created a social and political environment in which neoliberal-
ism could develop by silencing opposition to free-market policies and 
underwriting the spread of insecurity and vulnerability, a process that 
was closely interwoven with the lives of all working people. Although 
the oil industry was the most dramatic example of the unraveling of 
a relatively privileged sector of the working class, it was not alone. 
Workers in other branches of the economy, such as soft drink produc-
tion, telecommunications, transportation, health care, education, and 
palm oil manufacture, saw their unions weakened, leaders attacked and 
assassinated, and working conditions deteriorate.
This chapter explores how the dismantling of a “labor elite” con-
stituted part of a corporate profit-seeking strategy that became inter-
twined with the political dynamics of the Middle Magdalena. It does 
so by examining the reconfiguration of Coca-Cola production in Ba-
rrancabermeja, as the counterinsurgent war intensified and Colombia 
embraced free-market policies. Unlike ECOPETROL, the Coca-Cola Com-
pany did not play an outsized role in the economic life of Barrancaber-
meja, and its workforce was small by comparison. Yet like the more 
prominent USO, its activist union—SINALTRAINAL—formed part of 
the infrastructure of popular solidarity, communication, and politi-
cal sympathy that connected labor unions, left political movements, 
urban neighborhood groups, and peasant organizations in Barranca-
bermeja and the surrounding region. And like the USO, it was directly 
targeted by resurgent paramilitarism. The case of Coca-Cola demon-
strates how the violent dispossession of workers operated through 
spatial dispersal, subcontracting, and physical attacks on trade union-
ists. It also illustrates how the unmaking of class remapped social rela-
tions onto new geographies of power that weakened the organizational 
strength of working people in Barrancabermeja, bolstered the position 
of a multinational corporation, and created widespread vulnerability.
After briefly discussing the intensification of antilabor violence 
amid the growing liberalization of the Colombian economy, the chap-
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ter first considers how corporate restructuring and political violence 
weakened the national power of SINALTRAINAL and disrupted its ability 
to coordinate member activities across the country. Paramilitary ter-
ror enabled Coca-Cola, as well as other multinational corporations in 
Colombia, to remap the spatial coordinates of capital accumulation in 
ways that would have been more difficult had the corporations acted 
alone (e.g., Romero and Torres 2011). The chapter then examines how 
the growth of insecurity, through the closure or downgrading of the 
bottling plants, the subcontracting of labor, and the production of fear, 
was lived and understood by workers themselves. The case of Coca-Cola 
shows how different mixes of fear and labor exploitation shape chang-
ing forms of capital accumulation and become intertwined in the lives 
of ordinary people. It also demonstrates how the dispossession of a 
relatively privileged group of laborers, who had enjoyed a brief period 
of relative prosperity and broadened alliances, represented less the end 
of “class” than a new shift in the dialectic of solidarity and fragmenta-
tion that has been at the heart of the making and unmaking of class 
relations.
The Most Dangerous Country in the  
World to Be a Trade Unionist
Beginning in the 1990s, Colombia acquired the dubious reputation of 
being the most violent country in the world to be a trade unionist. 
Some four thousand trade unionists of the CUT died between the orga-
nization’s formation in 1986 and 2003, including all the CUT founders. 
Human rights groups held paramilitaries responsible for the vast ma-
jority of trade union deaths. Most of the rights violations were con-
nected to specific labor conflicts, such as contract negotiations, pro-
tests, and strikes, in which selective assassinations, arbitrary arrests, 
detentions, unlawful raids, and anonymous threats were used to disci-
pline labor. Yet labor issues were not the only reason that trade unions 
suffered such atrocious violence. Many unions were deeply involved in 
democratic struggles beyond the workplace, and in some cases their 
concerns and initiatives overlapped with those of the guerrillas, who 
advanced their political programs through both war and peace—known 
as the combination of all forms of struggle (combinación de todas las for-
mas de lucha).2 Although the presence of guerrillas in popular organi-
zations was common in the Central American civil wars, the practice 
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was adopted as a dogmatic theoretical proposition for all revolutionary 
struggle only in Colombia. And not even in El Salvador, Guatemala, or 
Peru, where the state security forces were always in charge, did para-
militaries achieve the autonomy that they profited from in Colombia. 
The result was catastrophic: unarmed activists, radicals, and communi-
ties were publicly identified as subversives and labeled enemies of the 
nation and then attacked by heavily armed private armies, allied with 
the security forces.
Targeted and discriminate violence led to the death, exile, and dis-
placement of hundreds of Colombian workers and contributed to a cli-
mate of antiunionism. Union membership fell from 12 percent of the 
national workforce in the mid-1990s to 3.2 percent in 2004 (ENS 2002). 
To be a union leader, commented Adolfo Cardona, meant having “one 
foot in the street and the other in the cemetery.”3 Indeed, many people 
believed that affiliating with a union would only bring them threats, 
harassment, and charges of collaborating with the guerrillas.
Labor unions throughout the Middle Magdalena, including those 
in oil, cement, African palm, soft drinks, education, and transporta-
tion, fought to retain rights and benefits won in earlier periods of class 
struggle. They opposed economic deregulation, the privatization of 
state entities, especially ECOPETROL, and labor legislation that weak-
ened unions and permitted the subcontracting of labor to so-called co-
operativas de trabajo asociados (associated work cooperatives), which 
allowed employers to unburden themselves of labor unions. An in-
creasingly radicalized right-wing alliance opposed any concessions to 
labor, and paramilitaries imposed a gruesome form of labor discipline 
on behalf of the multinationals, landlords, and entrepreneurs that 
they served. Nazih Richani (2005: 130) has argued that an “affinity” 
existed between paramilitaries and foreign corporations, especially 
those operating in areas of intense conflict. What this “affinity” meant 
was not always clear, but journalist Steven Dudley (2004: 201) noted 
that paramilitary commanders repeatedly told him that they protected 
the business interests of foreign corporations and had built bases near 
Coca-Cola bottling plants.
The remapping of the geography of Coca-Cola production and the 
dispossession of Coca-Cola workers took place amid intensifying mili-
tarization and social polarization. Anxiety about the resurgent power 
of popular movements and a burning anger that sought to “cleanse” 
society of trade unionists, human rights defenders, guerrillas, critical 
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journalists, and left political parties and movements stoked the vio-
lence of the far right. The desire of regional elites to roll back or elimi-
nate grassroots challenges found common cause with the agendas of 
multinationals, like Coca-Cola, to discipline restive labor forces and to 
restructure corporate operations in the aftermath of the collapse of 
Eastern European and Soviet communism and the freeing of markets 
around the world. The violent clashes of contending social forces were 
neither abstract nor undescribable for Coca-Cola workers and others 
like them: they were examples of the brute force and terror deployed 
by state security forces and paramilitaries who, they believed, operated 
in collusion with company officials to roll back their rights and create a 
social order in which they would enjoy fewer protections.
Coca-Cola and the Remapping of Class
In 1993, when SINALTRAINAL leader William Mendoza started his job at 
Coca-Cola, the Barrancabermeja local represented 115 of the 125 full-
time workers who labored in the plant; there were also about 150 tem-
porary workers, some of whom were completing a three-month trial 
period before signing full-time work contracts with the soft drink 
bottler. Everyone, whether full-time or temporary, was employed di-
rectly by the Coca-Cola franchise in Barrancabermeja. A decade later, 
in 2003, production operations had ceased, and the plant operated as 
a warehouse and distribution facility. The number of full-time, union-
ized workers had dropped below 30, a 74 percent decline, threatening 
the continued viability of the union local, and the plant operator had 
subcontracted hiring to a so-called worker cooperative, ridding itself 
of the responsibility to pay union wages and benefits to a workforce 
that had lost considerable control over the labor process. Nationwide, 
SINALTRAINAL’s membership plummeted from a peak of approximately 
five thousand members in the 1990s to barely fourteen hundred mem-
bers in 2004.4
The situation in Barrancabermeja reflected changes sweeping across 
Coca-Cola’s Colombian bottling plants. In 2003, production lines closed 
in ten other facilities. The corporation then concentrated the manufac-
ture of Coca-Cola products for the domestic market in “megaplants” 
that operated in five large cities—Bogotá, Barranquilla, Bucaramanga, 
Medellín, and Calí. These moves led to the firing or forced retirement of 
approximately three thousand workers. Combined with new antilabor 
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laws, they fragmented Coca-Cola workforces and limited the ability of 
the national union to coordinate member activities across the country. 
All of this served to discipline a union and its membership, which had 
become better organized and more radical since the 1980s, and to con-
strict worker understandings of what was possible. To grasp how these 
dramatic transformations came about, and to appreciate what it meant 
to working people, it is useful to briefly revisit the heady days of capi-
talist triumphalism in the 1990s, when the Coca-Cola Company set out 
to restructure its worldwide operations.
The Coca-Cola corporation sold soft drinks to millions of people in 
some two hundred countries, where it franchised production to bot-
tling plants owned by national elites who, in turn, hired workers to 
bottle and distribute Coca-Cola where the beverage was consumed. 
The limited autonomy of the company’s bottling franchises had long 
frustrated Atlanta-based corporate executives who wanted uniform 
policies and strategies to guide the corporation’s global operations. In 
Colombia, for example, the Coca-Cola corporation began operations 
after World War II, and by the late twentieth century, it had to con-
tend with a network of twenty franchises that were managed by differ-
ent operators and scattered across the country. The end of the cold war 
presented the company with new global possibilities for consolidation 
and expansion. The collapse of Soviet and Eastern European commu-
nism and the reorientation of the Chinese economy opened vast new 
swaths of territory for corporate expansion, while falling trade barriers 
and government deregulation in Latin America, Asia, and Africa per-
mitted higher prices, reduced taxes on the imported brown syrup that 
forms the basis of the soft drink, and larger bottles. And in Colombia, 
the government’s openness to foreign investment, the weak regulatory 
framework, and the autonomy to define security arrangements made 
investment attractive, despite a polarized labor environment and grave 
security concerns.5
In the 1990s, Coca-Cola launched an aggressive campaign against 
Colombian bottlers in an effort to create greater efficiency and boost 
profitability. It began by granting the Miami-based bottler PANAMCO 
control of the Colombian market and assigned it the task of bring-
ing local franchises under its control. Initially, PANAMCO acquired 
seventeen of the twenty Colombian franchises by purchasing family-
operated bottling plants or driving them out of business, and it 
then merged with a large Mexican bottler, FEMSA, in 2002. The new 
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FEMSA-PANAMCO hybrid became the Coca-Cola Company’s “anchor 
bottler” for Latin America, where it controlled 40 percent of sales, and 
it moved quickly to reconfigure the geography of Coca-Cola produc-
tion in Colombia, closing production lines and restructuring soft drink 
manufacture around a smaller number of megaplants that would theo-
retically churn out carbonated beverages at lower cost.6
The remapping of Coca-Cola production in Colombia constitutes 
what David Harvey (1996) calls a “spatial fix,” that is, the reorganiza-
tion of place around new territorial divisions of labor, concentrations 
of power, and physical infrastructures and transportation systems, all 
of which disrupt prior social arrangements and institutional forms.7
This contentious process is closely tied to the organization and disorga-
nization of labor. In Colombia, the reconfiguration of space and place 
was the outcome of intense class struggles that arose at a moment 
when workers were reaping the rewards of previous victories and link-
ing their struggles in the bottling plant to wider political movements.
Coca-Cola workers from around the country, including Barranca-
bermeja, affiliated with SINALTRAINAL in 1993, when SINALTRAINAL 
merged with an older union called SINTRAINDRASCOL, which then dis-
solved. Although it never represented a majority of Coca-Cola workers, 
much less those in the industry as a whole, SINALTRAINAL exempli-
fied the growing restlessness of one sector of the Colombia labor force. 
Created in 1982 by Nestlé workers, SINALTRAINAL represented an at-
tempt to create an industry-level union in which workers from the food 
and beverage industry would negotiate contracts together, instead of 
on a plant-by-plant basis. It built ties to the peasantry and advanced 
workers’ claims more vigorously than any other union in the food and 
beverage industry by promoting a working-class public linked through 
a network of union locals embedded in the social and political life of the 
cities and small towns where they operated. Early activists envisioned 
a union that would take an aggressive stance toward the labor politics 
of the state and corporations, and that would “politicize the rank-and-
file about the need to build a more just society in which workers are 
the central actors in their own destiny” (SINALTRAINAL, n.d.). They set 
out to build worker power, as the Colombian labor movement unified 
under the umbrella of the CUT, through vigorous rank-and-file orga-
nizing, popular education, and ties to domestic social movements and 
international unions.
Barrancabermeja workers voted to join SINALTRAINAL after a younger 
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and more radical generation of local labor leaders became dissatisfied 
with the SINTRAINDRASCOL leadership. The younger generation re-
ferred to themselves as the clasistas. In the opinion of the youngsters, 
the problem with the national leadership of SINTRAINDRASCOL was 
its timidity and unwillingness to fight for better wages and benefits, 
despite the higher pay enjoyed by workers in other cities where the 
cost of living was lower than in Barrancabermeja. As one explained, 
the union’s old-guard members, who worked for the Pepsi bottler, 
POSTOBON, “kept the union from advancing and had no vision of the 
future.” He recalled that these leaders “were happy to sign any con-
tract. [They] were comfortable; they only cared about getting a good 
retirement deal and dying as potbellied old men.”8 He and others of 
his generation had grown up in Barrancabermeja’s politicized north-
eastern neighborhoods and were not just union activists: all belonged 
to a variety of left-wing political parties and movements, including A 
Luchar and the Unión Patriotica, which were legal fronts for the insur-
gencies, and the Frente Amplio del Magdalena Medio, led by a former 
ELN militant and Barrancabermeja native, Ricardo Lara Parada. They 
wanted to see the union expand, as one of them put it, “beyond the 
four walls of the factory.” Tensions between the Coca-Cola clasistas and 
the POSTOBON old guard intensified throughout the 1980s. The latter 
accused the youngsters of intransigence and feared that their radical-
ism would get others killed. The militant vision of social transforma-
tion held by SINALTRAINAL represented a bid to scale-up working-class 
power by linking workers in Coca-Cola bottling plants to each other, as 
well as to workers in other sectors of the food and beverage industry, 
and by connecting the union to political movements seeking funda-
mental changes in Colombian society. By building ties of solidarity be-
yond particular localities, SINALTRAINAL started to address the dialectic 
of universalism versus localism that Raymond Williams (1989) called 
“militant particularism.” The stumbling block for working-class power 
is, according to Williams, the challenge of connecting the unique char-
acter of class-based organization in particular places to a more general 
movement for social transformation. This is because working people 
must demonstrate that the defense and advancement of interests that 
appear to be tied to a specific group are, in fact, of broader concern.
Although SINALTRAINAL made little headway in negotiations with 
Coca-Cola, its members were active beyond “the four walls of the bot-
tling plants” throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. The union sup-
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ported initiatives to use art as an alternative form of expression and 
as a means of supporting “the ideas, values and cultural concepts per-
tinent to the popular movement” (SINALTRAINAL, n.d.: 17). It also took 
steps to involve the spouses and children of workers in sporting activi-
ties and other social events as a means to both strengthen the union 
and convert it into the “first-line political actor and the axis of social 
life” in the municipalities where it operated (SINALTRAINAL, n.d.: 17). In 
addition, the national union committed activists and union resources 
to support peasant agrarian struggles in César, Antioquia, Guajíra, and 
Magdalena provinces. It also joined civic strikes in various cities to de-
mand better public services and supported public school students who 
sought to improve their educational experiences. Finally, SINALTRAINAL 
sought ways to build international solidarity with other Latin Ameri-
can trade unions. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, for example, na-
tional union leaders participated in a number of international meet-
ings that brought together trade unionists from around Latin America. 
A 1986 gathering in Montevideo, Uruguay, supported by the Federación 
Sindical Mundial (World Union Federation), focused on “the unity of 
food workers in Latin America and of all those of other multinational 
corporations, as the only guarantee for the defense of their undeniable 
rights and the national sovereignties seriously threatened by [U.S.] im-
perialism” (SINALTRAINAL, n.d.: 18).9 Two years later, another meeting 
convened in Caracas, Venezuela, addressed the enactment of neolib-
eral, antilabor policies across Latin America and called for the unifica-
tion of collective bargaining initiatives.
By the early 1990s, it was not difficult for Colombian Coca-Cola 
workers to conclude that capitalism presented a fundamental prob-
lem, as free-market policies had already devastated working classes 
in Chile and Bolivia, and Coca-Cola was beginning to take advantage 
of antilabor laws to fire people and to erode the rights and benefits 
of those who remained. Backed by the national office in Bogotá, the 
SINALTRAINAL locals in Barrancabermeja and other Colombian cities 
repeatedly challenged aggressive, antilabor corporate policies with 
street demonstrations, hunger strikes, and legal maneuvers, which be-
came intertwined with regional political dynamics.
They did so as the ELN waged an offensive against multinationals 
and state-operated companies in the process of privatization, blew up 
roads, bridges, and oil pipelines, and expressed its support for labor 
and civic strikes. Media accounts from the period fretted about the 
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growth and spread of urban guerrilla militias and channeled the inten-
sifying anger and frustration of businessmen and the security forces 
who seemed unable to stop the insurgent advance. At a 1992 meeting 
of some 130 oil company contractors and military generals in Barranca-
bermeja, for example, General Harold Bedoya told the assembled entre-
preneurs not to give in to extortion demands. “Nowadays,” he lectured 
them, “we see the full pockets and coffers of the guerrillas. You should 
not be their whores. We have enriched the insurgents by giving them 
money to buy arms [and] dynamite.” The plaintive response of the con-
tractors was to ask who would protect them from guerrilla reprisals, if 
they refused to pay (El Tiempo 1992). Two years later, the situation had 
hardly improved. Leaders of the beer and soft drink industries com-
plained about incessant insurgent attacks on their delivery trucks. “The 
businessmen are frantic,” cried El Tiempo, Colombia’s leading conserva-
tive daily, because law enforcement’s efforts to stop the assaults “have 
not produced the desired results” (El Tiempo 1994). Not surprisingly, 
entrepreneurs found hope in the rising power of paramilitarism.
The media increasingly identified labor leaders as allies of the guer-
rillas, while mounting insurgent attacks on police stations in heavily 
populated areas of northeast Barranca served to alienate the insur-
gents from popular support. The SINALTRAINAL leaders endured ar-
bitrary arrests and detentions, and they confronted an onslaught of 
threats, assassination attempts, and harassment from paramilitary 
FIG. 4.1 Trade unionists defy threats and terror.
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groups. In Cartagena, a paramilitary called the home of a unionist and 
spoke to the individual’s ten-year-old daughter when she answered 
the telephone. He told the little girl that if her father did not leave 
town, the paramilitaries would murder him. The labor leader esti-
mated that the Cartagena local denounced at least eleven additional 
threats over the next two years. In Barrancabermeja, SINALTRAINAL 
leader Juan Carlos Galvis narrowly escaped death when hidden assail-
ants shot at his car as it passed through a densely foliaged ravine, and 
in Bogotá, police raided SINALTRAINAL’s national office on several occa-
sions. The state security forces and the paramilitaries always operated 
in tandem. The complaints that SINALTRAINAL locals and the national 
office filed with authorities grew more numerous, but perpetrators 
were rarely arrested, and the security situation did not improve. The 
legal system deprived workers of rights that were enshrined in law, 
but it would not adequately address grievances related to death threats 
and murder, thereby facilitating the disorganization of working-class 
power. As impunity-fueled attacks weakened local union power, the re-
lationships and alliances that connected union locals to each other and 
to wider social movements gave way.
Coca-Cola Company officials explained away the violence as a prod-
uct of Colombia’s intractable civil war. Although they issued vague state-
ments that deplored the harmful effects of the violence on all Colom-
bians, they never specifically denounced the paramilitary attacks and 
threats against workers in company plants and demanded that they 
stop. Unionists argued that murdered workers were not the product of 
random violence. The deaths, they said, were the result of a calculated 
and selective strategy carried out by sectors of the state, allied para-
militaries, and the Coca-Cola Company to weaken and eliminate trade 
unions. Workers in various plants described to me how, on repeated 
occasions, they observed supervisors talking with known paramili-
taries. Like Coca-Cola, the Drummond Corporation, British Petroleum, 
and Occidental Petroleum were among those linked to paramilitary or-
ganizations (see Richani 2005: 130). Chiquita Brands paid a fine of $25 
million in 2007, after confessing in U.S. court that it channeled $1.7 
million and weapons to paramilitary forces in Colombia’s northern 
banana zone between 1997 and 2004. When multinational criminality 
became public, as in the case of Chiquita, the corporation claimed that 
it had no other option because it was a victim caught in the crossfire 
of warring groups. There was, however, a difference between collud-
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ing with one group or the other. When Chiquita supported right-wing 
mercenaries, it increased the violence and harassment directed against 
banana workers, peasants, and anyone labeled a “guerrilla,” while chan-
neling money to the insurgents meant more guns and firepower to ha-
rass the corporations themselves (Romero and Torres 2011). By help-
ing multinationals like Chiquita and Coca-Cola weaken the social and 
organizational integument of organized labor and end relentless guer-
rilla extortion, paramilitaries enabled them to break the back of labor 
and popular struggles and reassert their power. The paramilitaries were 
white knights in shining armor for the corporations, which would have 
faced more trouble had they not been rescued by them.
The violence, and the widespread impunity that facilitated it, ac-
complished two things: it undermined the ability of SINALTRAINAL to 
build ties of solidarity beyond the bottling plants and either eroded 
or destroyed connections between union locals, and it fractured the 
social relationships, institutions, and everyday lives of workers in the 
places where they lived. In this way, the violent restructuring of Coca-
Cola production in Colombia was contingent on the disorganization of 
FIG. 4.2 Defaced Coca-Cola logo.
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working people’s ties to each other, and on the rupture of connections 
between unions and working-class neighborhoods. It set in motion the 
dispossession of workers and the development of widespread insecu-
rity and precariousness.
The Manufacture of Precariousness and Insecurity
As the Coca-Cola Company set out to reconfigure soft drink production 
in Colombia and to restructure its workforce, it jettisoned paternalist 
managerial practices that had once included company-organized soc-
cer matches, Mother’s Day celebrations, and waterskiing competitions 
on the Magdalena River. It made little effort to negotiate with its work-
force and adopted the take-no-prisoners strategy of labor management 
already made infamous in Guatemala (Levenson-Estrada 1994). Long-
time worker Gustavo Contreras described how “we [the workers] would 
go into contract negotiations and instead of giving things to us, all the 
company wanted was to take things from us.”10 Ridding the company of 
full-time workers, doing away with contractual obligations like health 
care, and redefining the labor-management relationship were funda-
mental to reshaping the landscape of Coca-Cola manufacture. These 
changes created a more vulnerable workforce and eroded the ability of 
workers to resist the directives of company managers.
Longtime workers who had entered the Barrancabermeja plant in 
the 1970s secured their jobs through the connections of fathers or 
other male relatives who preceded them, and after a three-month trial 
period, most signed indefinite term contracts (contratos de termino in-
definido) that entitled them to health, vacation, and retirement bene-
fits. Although several of these men recalled that, even though a job 
with Coca-Cola was less desirable than one with ECOPETROL, the finan-
cial stability offered by a regular wage and benefits was far superior to 
temporary work in the oil industry or self-employment in the growing 
unwaged, informal economy. Heriberto Gutiérrez, for example, started 
his job at Coca-Cola in 1978, when decent working-class jobs were still 
available for urban-born young men with a high school education. 
Gutiérrez explained that workers were not eager to work for Coca-Cola 
because of hopes for better jobs with ECOPETROL, which was expanding 
its refinery. Coca-Cola advertised jobs on the radio in the late 1970s be-
cause “workers were not arriving. People said, ‘no, not Coca-Cola, better 
to work for the oil company because the money is better,’ ” according to 
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Gutiérrez.11 Gutiérrez, like other young men in Barrancabermeja, was 
never able to land a full-time job with ECOPETROL, but he found Coca-
Cola to be an acceptable alternative at a time when the multinational 
actively courted workers. William Mendoza started his job a decade 
after Gutiérrez, following a series of part-time jobs cleaning oil pipe-
lines that had taken him away from home for six years. Mendoza had to 
grapple with episodes of financial uncertainty between contracts, and 
the company that employed him did not pay union wages, even though 
the collective bargaining agreement between ECOPETROL and its work-
force stipulated that any firm that provided services to the oil indus-
try had to do so. Discontentment over the pay disparity fueled a strike, 
and although workers won their demand for equivalent pay, Mendoza, 
one of the strike leaders, was fired. A cousin helped him get a job with 
Coca-Cola, where he began as a janitor and then secured a position on 
the bottling line. He worked a standard eight-hour shift, from 6:00 AM
to 2:00 PM, and the consistent pay and the benefits were a welcome 
change that enabled him to have a more stable family life.
By the late 1990s, however, the Coca-Cola corporation had virtually 
stopped hiring full-time workers; it filled positions with subcontracted, 
temporary workers from so-called cooperatives. The company also 
started to ignore collective bargaining agreements with its unionized 
workforce that it had previously respected. “I would take complaints 
to management,” recalled former union local president Efraín Zurmay, 
“and the company would simply deny what it had already agreed to and 
what was written in the contract. . . . They would say, if you don’t agree, 
take us to court. They could say this because they knew that the justice 
system, the Ministry of Social Protection, and the judges all favored the 
multinational.”12 The ability of the corporation to ride roughshod over 
collective bargaining agreements highlighted the fragility and contin-
gency of past labor victories in which workers largely succeeded in im-
proving wages, winning benefits, and controlling the pace and organi-
zation of work.
Such arrogant corporate behavior erupted into a generalized crisis 
when the company decided, in 2003, to close the production line and 
downgrade the Barrancabermeja plant to a warehouse and distribution 
center. On September 8, a supervisor ordered workers to cease all bot-
tling operations and read a statement from the national president of 
Coca-Cola that required everyone to attend a training seminar on “pro-
ductivity and competitiveness” the following day in a hotel. By the next 
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morning, however, workers sensed that the training seminar was a di-
version; something more sinister was afoot. Ruben Muñoz knew that 
all was not well as he entered the hotel lobby. “I saw that the company 
had taken precautions against us by placing security personnel around 
the meeting room, that is to say, armed personnel, who didn’t have 
any kind of identification. They observed us in a way that didn’t corre-
spond to a company calling its workers together for a so-called train-
ing seminar,” he said. He then described what followed as a lockdown 
(encerrona), in which company officials coerced workers to sign buyout 
deals and prevented them from leaving until they complied. Human re-
sources personnel tried to put a happy face on the occasion by offering 
guidance on how to set up a microenterprise. “Everything was focused 
around how we could supposedly earn more money if we gave up our 
jobs and worked independently,” Muñoz explained, but the union had 
educated men like him well. “All of the supposed training was an effort 
to persuade us to renounce the labor rights that we had,” he said. “The 
union always oriented us to never accept this type of arrangement, . . . 
[even though] they made us offers that frightened me when I thought 
about such large quantities of money, because it was really, really, really 
a lot of money.”13
Yet despite the generous offers, few Coca-Cola workers signed buy-
out agreements voluntarily. With the exception of those already close 
to retirement, most were not eager to sacrifice their jobs for the risks 
and uncertainties of self-employment, especially at a time when public 
sector jobs were threatened by the specter of privatization, and private 
firms were going down the same path as Coca-Cola. Everyone knew of 
former workmates who had been fired or accepted buyout deals, and 
who had lost everything in bad investments. The men also understood 
that their reemployment prospects with another company were dim 
in a changing economy, and they knew that few businesses would hire 
people in their thirties, forties, and fifties with a history of trade union 
militancy.
Coca-Cola’s human resource department likely appreciated that 
workers would balk at leaving. Because convincing them to give up 
good jobs and try their luck as microentrepreneurs was a hard sell, the 
human resource personnel targeted not just the men but also their 
families, using scare tactics to panic wives and children. Efraín Zurmay 
remembered that “the company knew that it couldn’t easily pressure 
the workers with most seniority, so they decided to go to their homes 
UNRAVELING 139
and grab the families and tell them: ‘Look, if your husband or father 
doesn’t sign, you are all going to be left in the street with nothing, be-
cause the negotiations are ending.’ So the company not only pressured 
the compañeros but their families, too. Many accepted the deals be-
cause their wives and children became frightened and convinced them 
to take the money.”14
The corporate bullying enraged workers. Home visits by company 
personnel not only violated the privacy of their homes but also un-
settled a deep-seated sense of masculinity that informed how male 
workers understood themselves as the protectors of wives and chil-
dren. The browbeating of families came at a moment when workers 
were increasingly unable to shield their loved ones from harm because 
of threats to their own lives. All of this strained family relations. Some-
times, wives faulted their husbands and SINALTRAINAL for the harass-
ment, murder, or kidnapping of relatives, the inability of children to 
enjoy normal childhoods, and the severe restrictions that the threat of 
violence placed on their social activities. By 2003, paramilitary threats, 
attacks, and the occupation of the city had substantially eroded the in-
formal union and neighborhood networks through which women had 
understood and helped to sustain a capacity for collective struggle. Be-
cause wives and female companions neither worked for Coca-Cola nor 
participated in the daily negotiation of labor politics, they were cut off 
from union efforts to fight corporate policies and tended to understand 
the labor militancy of their husbands in individual and family-centered 
ways. Women worried that their husbands and companions would be 
killed or forced out of work, leaving them to fend alone for the chil-
dren. There were, of course, women who maintained a broader sense 
of what was happening to their families, but the unrelenting corporate 
and paramilitary pressure isolated union families, who increasingly 
found themselves dealing with the constant fear, uncertainty, and cor-
porate strong-arm tactics alone.
Most workers eventually signed the buyout agreements and retired. 
In some cases, they were in debt and viewed a seemingly large payout 
as a windfall, but in most cases, as a former union official explained, 
“they were tired of the corporate pressure. They said that they couldn’t 
take the stress anymore; that their lives had become chaotic; and that 
they didn’t want to end their days in jail or worse. That’s why they ac-
cepted the company’s proposals.”15 A small group of six trade unionists 
in Barrancabermeja, however, refused to leave and insisted that Coca-
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Cola respect their contracts and relocate them to other bottling plants; 
one of them was SINALTRAINAL leader William Mendoza. Coca-Cola, 
he said, presented him with an especially attractive buyout plan, but 
it depended upon his willingness to convince rank-and-file members 
to leave the company along with him. After greeting the offer with a 
series of expletives, Mendoza claimed that the company, which had 
profiled him as a womanizer, enlisted an attractive woman to convince 
him to change his mind, but he never did. The trade unionists’ case 
wound up in court, and while lawyers for both sides argued back and 
forth, the company obliged the six dissidents to present themselves 
at the bottling plant every day. It did not, however, let them work. For 
six months, the men sat in a kiosk for the duration of their eight-hour 
shifts with little to do except read the newspaper and talk with each 
other under the watchful eyes of the security guards. They eventu-
ally prevailed in court and kept their jobs, but their case was unusual. 
Moreover, workers’ reliance on a judicial system that typically upheld 
the claims of Coca-Cola and other multinationals pointed to the gen-
eral weakness of the Colombian labor movement. Most workers had to 
face a stark new reality in which deepening insecurity and economic 
instability created new imperatives.
Forced retirements and firings obliged former Coca-Cola workers 
to devise alternative economic arrangements to support themselves 
and their families. Becoming so-called microentrepreneurs was not the 
first choice of most of the men; indeed, entrepreneurialism was forced 
upon them because stable working-class jobs, like the ones they lost at 
Coca-Cola, did not exist. The transformation from Coca-Cola workers 
to microentrepreneurs, or what Jan Breman (1994) has more accu-
rately called “wage hunters and gatherers,” typically severed their ties 
to each other. Downsized Coca-Cola workers ended up laboring as taxi 
drivers, vendors, and part-time contractors and in a myriad of other ac-
tivities in which rights, regulations, and bargaining power did not exist 
and where invisible, exploitative networks shaped relationships of in-
equality (see chapter 5). Together with cast-off public sector employees, 
they formed a generation of newly dispossessed workers who expanded 
the ranks of the so-called informal economy that was already bursting 
with displaced peasants from the countryside. They typically worked 
alone in an ever more competitive environment in which existing work 
was fragmented, incomes grew more precarious, and their identities 
were reworked around autonomous individuality.
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For many years, Javier Garcia, for example, drove a truck for Coca-
Cola, delivering crates of soft drinks to merchants in Barrancabermeja 
and the Middle Magdalena region. The job was not easy; it required 
loading and unloading heavy crates of bottled soda, and it came with 
considerable perils. As the Coca-Cola Company and its workers became 
enmeshed in an ever more polarized civil war, the multinational—a 
global icon of U.S.-led corporate capitalism and Americanization—
became an obvious target for guerrilla groups who opposed the pres-
ence of foreign multinationals and the loss of national sovereignty that 
they represented. Traveling the Middle Magdalena’s back roads posed 
considerable risk for any driver of a big red truck with the Coca-Cola 
logo splashed across the side. Garcia had to contend with assailants—
sometimes guerrillas, sometimes common criminals—who stole the 
soft drinks and made off with the money that he had collected from 
merchants along the route. “Once,” he recalled, “we were traveling to 
Antioquia when a group of guerrillas appeared on the road and made 
us stop and get out of the truck. Then they dumped all the soft drinks 
and burned the truck. . . . The same thing happened when drivers went 
to the northeastern neighborhoods. They [the guerrillas] told them to 
get lost, . . . and then they gave away the soft drinks to the people and 
burned the trucks.” Back at the plant, however, Garcia and his fellow 
drivers faced distrustful supervisors who suspected that they partici-
pated in the robberies and offered little in the way of protection. This 
was the dilemma that the insurgencies and the combinación strategy 
created for organized labor.
In 2002, Garcia was forced to sign a buyout agreement, which he 
still referred to years later as the “kick out” (la echada), and purchased 
a taxicab to support his family. Yet despite the dangers and the sus-
picious supervisors, Garcia missed his job and the social life that he 
had once enjoyed with his workmates and their families, which was 
one casualty of the broader process of dispossession that Coca-Cola 
workers endured. Economic restructuring dispersed workers and cast 
them adrift in family and kin networks that could not fill the void of co-
operative labor and collective action. “Back in the 1980s,” he recollected 
in 2007, “the compañeros shared a lot together. It’s not the same today. 
Nowadays, the company is doing away with everything.”16 Moreover, 
driving a taxicab in the already taxi-saturated city simply could not 
compare to a steady job at Coca-Cola. Erratic and unpredictable daily 
earnings replaced a regular wage, forcing Garcia to work as many as 
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sixteen hours a day to cover his household’s basic expenses, while the 
proliferation of illegal motorcycle taxis undercut the rates charged by 
registered cabbies and made work more stressful and difficult. Some-
times even sixteen-hour workdays were not enough, and the economic 
pressure obliged his family to make difficult decisions: an elder daugh-
ter, for example, opted out of attending the local university so that she 
could help support her younger siblings. His wife tried and failed to 
augment the household income through the sale of vitamin supple-
ments to neighbors, friends, and relatives and then decided to rent 
out a bedroom, making it necessary for other family members to share 
less space.
The Garcia family was not only economically vulnerable; the loss 
of the Coca-Cola Company’s relatively generous health insurance plan 
was a particularly worrisome development, Garcia explained, because 
of the threat posed by what he referred to as the delincuencia, a gloss 
for common crime and the continuing menace of paramilitaries, to 
people like himself. “There is a lot of common crime [in the city],” he 
told me, “and you never know when they are going to use you or when 
they might see you [with the wrong person] and think that you are 
collaborating with the guerrillas.”17 Garcia had good reason to be wor-
ried, as paramilitaries were known to use taxi drivers to supply them 
with intelligence. The crisis provoked by corporate downsizing, which 
entailed the loss of both steady waged work and the social wage, amid 
the violent turbulence of Barrancabermeja, provoked a breakdown in 
what social scientists call “social reproduction,” that is, the material 
and emotional possibilities of organizing viable livelihood strategies in 
the present and projecting them into the future (Narotzky and Besnier 
2014; Sider 2008). It signaled a rupture between older forms of work, 
cooperation, and the expectations associated with them and a new con-
figuration of possibilities and pitfalls that was more unstable, individu-
alistic, and uncertain, one that Garcia had not chosen but to which he 
had to accommodate.
With the departure of Garcia and unionized workers like him, newly 
hired, subcontracted employees represented a generation of younger 
laborers, as well as previously downsized workers obliged by economic 
circumstances to return to the Coca-Cola workforce under new con-
ditions. Garcia’s younger brother became a temporary worker in the 
Coca-Cola plant. “One day he works, the next day he doesn’t,” Garcia 
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explained. “When they want him, they call him.”18 The new labor 
regime was not unique to Barrancabermeja. Alejandro Nieto, a tempo-
rary worker in the Bucaramanga megaplant, described an exploitative 
regime in which workers like himself had no control over working con-
ditions and in which waiting signified a new form of domination and 
relationship to power:
When I started work at Coca-Cola, the human resources head ex-
plained the system of pay. I was going to earn 706,000 pesos a 
month, but this amount depended on the number of hours I worked 
every month. So, I worked Monday for fourteen hours, but then I 
went home and waited, glued to the telephone on Tuesday, for the 
boss to call me at six, seven, eight, nine, ten—at any time. It’s really 
demoralizing. I worked for fourteen hours on Monday; I didn’t work 
on Tuesday, just sat in the house all day. Then, they called me on 
Wednesday, and I worked from 9:00 AM to 11:00 AM and then went 
home, after spending money on lunch and transportation. . . . Some-
times you get to the plant and change into your uniform and then 
wait in the temporary workers’ locker room, which is grimy and 
damp. That’s where they keep you. You can wait all morning until 
the boss sends someone to get you. They give you a couple of hours 
of work, after you spend the entire day sitting around, waiting for 
the boss to call you.19
Nieto’s account of the hopes and frustrations associated with wait-
ing expresses in poignant detail the new terms that structure labor-
management relations in the Coca-Cola bottling plants. The connection 
between time and domination has been noted by Javier Auyero (2009: 
109–29; see also Auyero 2012), who has documented how endless wait-
ing shapes forms of submission in an Argentine shantytown, where 
impoverished residents with little sense of personal agency must con-
stantly wait for more powerful people—lawyers, corporate officials, 
politicians—to make decisions about their lives. In the case of Alejan-
dro Nieto and other temporary Coca-Cola workers like him, waiting 
for bosses to call or to assign them to a shift signals the loss of worker 
power in neoliberal Colombia, as the decline of trade unions and the 
rise of subcontracting and temporary work have undercut the eight-
hour shift, the assignment of tasks, and the pace of labor on the shop 
floor. The hopes and the frustrations that waiting elicits in temporary 
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workers constitute part of the more generalized uncertainty of their 
lives and the difficulty that they, as individuals, face in exercising a 
modicum of control over working conditions.
Not surprisingly, the two-tiered structure of the workforce has 
eroded ties of familiarity that once bound workers to each other. New 
divisions have emerged between an emergent majority of “flexible” 
workers with no union representation or benefits and a dwindling 
number of older, unionized workers who have managed to hold onto 
their jobs. Indeed, for temporary hires, the possibility of acquiring a 
short-term assignment often depends on the absence of full-time em-
ployees. As Nieto explains:
When a person who is full-time [termino indefinido] has a dentist 
or a doctor appointment at, say, 8:00 AM, temporary personnel are 
allowed to replace him. As long as the person is gone—and we say, 
“Oooh take your time”—then we get a few more little hours. But 
then, [the boss says] OK, brother, the person has returned. Change 
your clothes and wait until we call you again. . . . So, you see, we 
work for miserable wages, for the leftovers of the full-time person-
nel. That’s what it is: the hours that they leave us because they have 
medical appointments or vacations. That’s what temporary people 
pick up for their salary.20
The downward pressure on working-class livelihoods extends well 
beyond the Coca-Cola plant, and as the income of a large cross sec-
tion of working people has eroded, those who still have full-time posi-
tions with a multinational like Coca-Cola experience more requests 
from family members for assistance. Efraín Zurmay, for example, still 
worked for Coca-Cola in 2006, after more than twenty years of service 
to the corporation, and he had become the economic pillar of his family. 
He explained, “I pay all of my mother’s expenses—food, medications, 
everything—because my brothers and sister do not have steady work. 
I am like the rich person of the family [laughs], the family potentate, 
because I have a stable job, because I have an income. The others live 
from hand to mouth. They go out to work for a while, but then they are 
unemployed. That’s how it is.”21
The dispossession of workers and the emergence of a two-tiered 
labor force have diminished the familiarity and common routines 
that once shaped workers’ ties to each other and have intensified the 
worries of longtime workers like Zurmay that paramilitaries operate 
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in their midst. These fears were well-founded. Despite tight security 
and an extensive surveillance system in the bottling plants, paramili-
tary graffiti frequently appeared on plant walls after the BCB takeover, 
and signed death threats materialized in workers’ lockers, but verify-
ing fears about suspicious workmates was extremely difficult. Union-
ists had no way of resolving gnawing doubts and anxieties, which lim-
ited their ability to organize opposition to company policies. Trade 
union leaders found themselves caught in a social “order” that had 
come unhinged, and there were few workers who had any desire to re-
place them. “Today, nobody in Colombia wants to be a union leader,” 
explained Zurmay in 2007. “I’ve spent over twenty years in the union 
and am fifty-one years old. I should be in the reserves by now. There 
should be younger people replacing me, but they are too afraid. . . . No-
body wants to expose themselves to the possibility of being killed and 
put in jail. They understand the power that the government and the 
multinationals have to commit any kind of abuse.”22
The violence against trade unionists has undermined the ability of 
working people to reproduce a class culture. It has severed the relation-
ships in the workplace and in the neighborhoods where people live that 
once made it possible to develop collective struggles and act together. 
It has also limited the ability of labor leaders to reach out to temporary 
workers and the unemployed. William Mendoza’s life, before and after 
the BCB forced him out of his home (see chapter 3), illustrates how a 
new, more constricted sense of what was possible, personally and po-
litically, arose from the social ruptures and betrayals that disorganized 
working-class power. Terror cheapened labor and narrowed the politi-
cal horizons of working people, as it opened the floodgates for a new 
wave of capital accumulation to sweep into the city.
Betrayal and the Erosion of Trust
Mendoza had been at the center of the gathering storm in Barrancaber-
meja for many years, because of his work as a human rights defender 
and as an outspoken union leader, but before the BCB assault, he had 
still managed to enjoy time with friends when he was not working in 
the Coca-Cola bottling plant, and he moved about the city freely. Yet 
his life started to change in 2000, amid mounting disquietude about 
the accumulating strength of paramilitarism in the Middle Magda-
lena. Sometime at the beginning of the year, his close friend Edilberto 
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Araújo, a fellow trade unionist who worked for the Pepsi bottler, pur-
chased a beat-up, red Renault.23 The car was somewhat of a novelty 
for Mendoza and his circle of friends, who were accustomed to getting 
about on motorcycles or bicycles, and it soon became the preferred 
means of weekend transportation for Mendoza, Araújo, and two other 
workers, who spent time together on their days off. “Because we were 
such good friends,” Mendoza said, “[the other guys] called us ‘the Red 
Car Band’ [and] as we barhopped and went from party to party, we met 
up with other friends. Life seemed really good from our perspective.”24
As the paramilitary noose tightened, Mendoza began to notice that 
when they arrived at a bar or restaurant, friends who used to join them 
at their table began to leave. And it was not long before the so-called 
Red Car Band itself dissolved. One of the four men decided to stop par-
ticipating on the weekend outings, and then another broke off ties with 
Mendoza. According to Mendoza, he “told me without blushing and 
with all possible crudeness that ‘you know old man, I am not going to 
hang out with you anymore. They are going to kill you and hanging out 
with you is like having a gravestone overhead. I’m sorry, but don’t even 
come to my house anymore.’ ” Mendoza was devastated. “I was really 
FIG. 4.3 SINALTRAINAL leader 
William Mendoza.
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hurt,” he said. “That guy was more than a friend. We were buddies [com-
pinches], companions [compañeros]. He was my best friend. I felt really 
alone and distressed that day. And then compañeros from the union 
started distancing themselves from me. To them, it was as if a plague 
had arrived. . . . Luckily, there were compañeros who continued with 
me and gave me hope, but the Red Car Band ended forever.”
Mendoza’s troubles worsened after the BCB takeover. Not only was 
he forced from his home, but a fellow worker at the Coca-Cola plant 
named Saul Ramírez exposed him to paramilitary retribution.25 Dur-
ing the late 1980s and 1990s, Ramírez belonged to SINALTRAINAL and 
worked as a night watchman. Mendoza was the president of SINALTRAI-
NAL in Barrancabermeja and had long served on the union’s national 
board of directors. When corporate restructuring threatened Ramírez’s 
job in the mid-1990s, the union placed him on its local directorate to 
give him more job security, but Ramírez eventually accepted a buyout 
offer and quit. He then purchased a taxicab, which he drove to support 
himself and his family. Mendoza recalled that Ramírez “wasn’t the kind 
of compañero who could lead the union, [but] he was very good when 
it came to protests, even though you couldn’t assign him a task or ex-
pect him to propose anything.” Ramírez lived in La Esperanza neigh-
borhood, close to Mendoza, whose wife often assisted him with injec-
tions for a back problem and sometimes even bought groceries for his 
family. According to Mendoza, Ramírez liked to brag to his workmates 
that he collaborated with the guerrillas who controlled the neighbor-
hood in the 1990s. He also boasted that he allowed them to store guns 
in his home and that he transported commanders around the city in 
his taxicab. In 1998, he availed himself as a courier to the EPL insur-
gents after they burned four Coca-Cola trucks and detonated a bomb 
in the company’s bottling plant that temporarily shut it down. Ramí-
rez purportedly carried messages from the guerrillas to company rep-
resentatives, as the two sides sought to renegotiate a relationship that 
both could accept.
When the BCB moved into his neighborhood, Ramírez knew that 
he was in trouble. Like Mendoza, the paramilitaries allegedly had his 
name on a hit list, and Ramírez was desperate to get out of the city. He 
contacted Mendoza in the hope that his neighbor and former work-
mate would use his ties to human rights organizations to clear a path 
for him to leave and resettle, at least for a time, in Bogotá. Mendoza, 
who was living his own nightmare, managed to raise money to cover 
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a plane ticket for Ramírez, and SINALTRAINAL contributed money for 
living expenses in the capital. Mendoza and a team of human rights 
defenders then accompanied him to the airport and saw him off to 
Bogotá. Over the next several months, both the Barrancabermeja local 
and the Bogotá-based national office of SINALTRAINAL maintained 
contact with Ramírez, and when Mendoza traveled to the capital, he 
shared his per diem travel allowance with him. Yet Ramírez’s money 
eventually ran low, and his family was struggling to make ends meet in 
Barrancabermeja without him. Ramírez began to consider going back. 
Perhaps he did not want to live apart from his family, or perhaps the 
cold, dreary mountain capital was too inhospitable for a man used to 
the tropical heat of the Magdalena River valley. Whatever the reason, 
Ramírez contacted the paramilitaries to negotiate his return to Barran-
cabermeja, and as he later told Mendoza, he received assurances that 
he could go back. But there was one condition: he had to work for them.
Ramírez subsequently resurfaced in Barrancabermeja, driving a 
white Mazda and carrying out low-level tasks for the BCB, who identi-
fied him as “Coca-Cola.” The BCB considered Mendoza a “military tar-
get” because of his outspoken leadership of SINALTRAINAL during a 
period of corporate restructuring, job loss, and outsourcing, and his 
recent charges that the Coca-Cola corporation colluded with the para-
militaries to terrorize trade unionists. Ramírez contacted Mendoza 
and urged him to meet with the BCB to discuss the situation. Believing 
that he stood no chance with the mercenaries, and citing official union 
policy that prohibited communication with any of the so-called armed 
actors, Mendoza refused. The pressure then intensified, when the para-
militaries tried, and failed, to kidnap Mendoza’s four-year-old daugh-
ter in a public park. As Mendoza recounted, “He [Ramírez] started to 
pressure me really hard, saying that the paramilitaries had sent him to 
tell me that I had to talk with them because I was speaking out against 
Coca-Cola and the alliance between Coca-Cola and the paramilitaries 
in Barrancabermeja.” Mendoza flew into a rage and told Ramírez that 
he would denounce him as a paramilitary if the harassment continued. 
“From then on,” Mendoza said, “he swore that he was going to split my 
head open, that’s the expression that he used. He accused me of belong-
ing to the FARC and claimed that the union didn’t do anything, nothing 
moved, without my authorization.” Such accusations further deepened 
Mendoza’s troubles.
Mendoza was not the only Coca-Cola worker to run afoul of Ramí-
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rez. As word circulated among SINALTRAINAL members that Ramírez 
was aiding the BCB, Juan Carlos Galvis, another SINALTRAINAL leader, 
saw him at the Coca-Cola plant with a policeman. He observed the two 
men conversing with a plant supervisor whom he then confronted, de-
manding to know how the company could claim to have no dealings 
with the paramilitaries when, in fact, the man had just spoken to one 
of them. Soon thereafter, Galvis also began to receive death threats, 
confirming for SINALTRAINAL leaders what they had long suspected 
about the corporation’s involvement with the paramilitaries. Although 
neither Galvis nor Mendoza would see Ramírez again, their difficulties 
with him would continue.26
Ramírez’s betrayal exposed the private recesses of two trade union-
ists’ lives to the calculated brutality of the BCB and created new vulnera-
bilities that they had not previously experienced. The betrayal imper-
iled Mendoza’s life to a degree that would have been nearly impossible 
for a stranger, because Ramírez was familiar with Mendoza’s daily rou-
tine, and he knew, or could identify, many of Mendoza’s friends, family 
members, and trade union confidants. This knowledge undercut Men-
doza’s feelings of safety, jeopardized the security of those around him, 
and challenged his capacity to protect and care for his family. In addi-
tion, Ramírez could unveil the inner workings of SINALTRAINAL and 
make the activities of its members available for paramilitary scrutiny. 
Ramírez’s behavior also revealed to Mendoza that his basic assump-
tions about their relationship were false, and it raised questions about 
his ability to judge people at a time when the city was in turmoil and 
the balance of power was rapidly shifting. As Mendoza explained years 
later, “Saul Ramírez wasn’t alone. A lot of people that we managed to 
get out and save their lives returned; some of them started working 
for the paramilitaries. Of course, now we are very mistrustful about 
extending solidarity to anyone. . . . You first have to figure out who you 
are dealing with, and we check people out in depth so that there are no 
surprises.”27
We can appreciate from Mendoza’s experiences how the political 
crisis placed him in new danger and forced him to deal with radical un-
certainty. As the betrayal of a fellow worker plunged his life and the 
union into turmoil, Mendoza became more vulnerable to the full force 
of BCB terror. The paramilitary threat also opened a cleavage between 
him and some of the rank and file, who feared that associating too 
closely with a marked leader put their own lives at risk. All of this ag-
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gravated mistrust and fueled suspicions about workmates, friends, and 
associates, dividing them from each other and isolating union leaders 
from the rank and file.
Meetings in public places became more difficult because of the con-
stant fear of attack, which transformed the spaces where workers could 
gather. Unrelenting threats and harassment against Mendoza and 
other union leaders cast a halo of danger around the SINALTRAINAL 
union hall, which is located behind a thick, bulletproof glass window 
and entered through a steel door with multiple locks and reinforce-
ments that give it the appearance of a bunker. Although it sits across 
the street from the Coca-Cola plant, the union headquarters was not 
a place that most workers chose to congregate after work. Even arriv-
ing at SINALTRAINAL headquarters was a fraught experience for union 
leaders.
For Juan Carlos Galvis, the enduring paramilitary menace struc-
tured every aspect of his waking life, in which security was organized 
down to the smallest detail. En route to the office one day in 2007, 
Galvis telephoned from his SUV that he was about to arrive. The body-
guard at the wheel pulled up to the building, bounced the heavy vehicle 
over the curb, and stopped under a small tree that shaded the union’s 
headquarters. Both guards then drew their guns, jumped out of the 
car, and scanned the street in each direction, before opening the back 
door next to Galvis, who got out and quickly walked a few paces into 
the building through the door that someone had already opened. The 
entire ritual, repeated every time he came to the office, took only a few 
seconds. Even more disturbing, it was not unusual for Galvis and other 
local leaders to receive threatening telephone calls immediately after 
their arrival, suggesting the building was under surveillance. The sense 
of peril that enveloped the union hall was indicative of how the elimi-
nation or the constriction of the spaces for sociality undermined the 
vitality of working-class culture.
The creation of vulnerability and insecurity has been key to the un-
making of a privileged sector of the working class and the weakening 
of working-class power more generally. This process has not happened 
all at once, and even though now far advanced, it is still not complete, 
as the continued existence of SINALTRAINAL attests. The disposses-
sion, disorganization, and terror that shaped the erosion of privilege 
began with the spatial fix that reconfigured the geography of Coca-
Cola production in Colombia and was closely intertwined with the 
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lives of Coca-Cola workers in Barrancabermeja. The Colombian state 
facilitated the process through the enactment of antilabor laws and 
lower tariff barriers, and it promoted a favorable investment climate 
for multinationals, which facilitated the conversion of the Barranca-
bermeja plant into a warehouse and distribution center, the firing or 
forced retirement of longtime workers, and the subcontracting of tem-
porary personnel. These moves were enforced by paramilitary violence, 
which provided the solvent that eroded social solidarity and created 
the grounding for neoliberalism to flourish. What the dispossession of 
a relatively privileged group of Coca-Cola workers and the disorganiza-
tion of their lives meant was that the contours of class were changing. 
More and more people were forced to compete with each other for un-
stable, low-paid work over which they had less control, and the political 
space for opposing these transformations was closing. Working people 
had to take stock of their situation once again and create new rela-
tionships and institutions that allowed them to act together and press 
their claims on the powerful, which they had done at different times 
in the past. The homicidal forces allied against them were more capri-
cious and unrestrained than anything they had previously confronted. 
How they negotiated their way across the changing political landscape 
shaped, and was shaped by, the emergence of a new geography of power 





By the early twenty-first century, the counterinsurgent war and the ad-
vent of neoliberalism had ignited a highly combustible process of state 
formation in Colombia, especially in regions deemed “ungovernable” 
because of the presence of the guerrillas. The war aimed to extend the 
power of the institutional state more deeply into contested regions via 
the expulsion of the insurgencies, the repression of labor, and the im-
position of the rule of law, a strategy referred to as “clear, hold, and 
build” that dated to the 1960s and aimed to open “pacified” regions to 
capitalist investment (Hylton 2010). It depended upon the formation 
and support of paramilitary organizations, which had initially operated 
as adjuncts to the security forces but subsequently formed regionally 
based “armed authoritarian enclaves” that acquired their own violent 
dynamics (Bonilla 2007). Paramilitarism and counterinsurgency fused 
with politics to reconfigure the geography of power across scales, en-
abling the mercenaries and those they served to reorganize their ties to 
the institutional state at the local, regional, and national levels.
In the Middle Magdalena and elsewhere, the intertwining of para-
militarism and counterinsurgency destabilized and then reconfigured 
relationships and alliances within places and across space. The pri-
vate violence of paramilitarism was key to the control of territory, the 
capture of elected political office, and the privatization of state func-
tions as they were being decentralized to municipal and provincial 
authorities (Ballvé 2012). It undergirded a new public order based on 
corruption, intimidation, and dispossession in which the distinction 
between paramilitarism and the institutional state blurred. The con-
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vergence of political violence and the economic and administrative re-
forms mandated by neoliberal economic policies within the context of 
a counterinsurgent war reconfigured the geography of political power 
in the Middle Magdalena. They did so by strengthening a violent, 
right-wing power bloc that achieved a high level of interregional con-
nection, control of electoral processes, and representation in national 
political office (Ávila 2010; López 2010) and that used elected office 
to siphon public funds toward private coffers and legitimize ill-gotten 
wealth. Private terror and economic reform simultaneously disorga-
nized, destroyed, or vastly weakened the capacity of the insurgencies 
and unions, peasant organizations, and neighborhood associations to 
build scale-spanning solidarities and create spaces of power through 
the development of alliances and common political projects. My analy-
sis demonstrates how neoliberal restructuring, state formation, and 
the unmaking of class were shaped by paramilitarism and counter-
insurgent war.
The emergence of armed authoritarian enclaves that carried out 
some of the functions assigned to the institutional state diminished 
a vision of the state as the guardian of the public interest, deepened a 
particularly pernicious form of armed neoliberalism, and forced work-
ing people to reconsider how to advance their claims on the powerful. 
Yet the violent push by a far-right power bloc to secure property rights, 
undermine the power of labor, subvert democracy, accumulate wealth, 
and suffer no consequences for massive human rights violations and 
drug trafficking created a weak basis for legitimizing the new order in 
the Middle Magdalena.1 The BCB faced the difficult task of establishing 
legitimacy among people whom it had terrorized. Several years after 
the BCB takeover of Barrancabermeja, barranqueños who initially either 
welcomed or were indifferent to the paramilitary incursion told me on 
numerous occasions that “they were worse than the guerrillas.”
This chapter examines the formation of a violent, new power-laden 
geography of capitalist power in Barrancabermeja, beginning with BCB
seizure of the city in 2000 and ending with the paramilitary demobi-
lization of 2006. It does so by exploring how one mercenary army—
the BCB—remapped the geography of power through the violent sup-
pression of democratic alternatives, the control of electoral office, and 
the incorporation of working people into new relations of inequality. 
The BCB operated alongside or in place of the institutional state. For a 
period of four years, it blurred the boundaries between public/private 
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and legal/illegal, as it created strategic networks, exercised the power 
to regulate social, political, and economic life, and killed with im-
punity.2 The cumulative result of these strategies and actions was the 
reterritorialization of power and the creation of manageable spaces for 
the attraction of foreign capital. Like other Colombian regions where 
inhabitants were confronted with competing political projects (Ballvé 
2012; Ramírez 2011; Tate 2015), the BCB occupation raises questions 
about what the state is, where it is located, and who has the legitimate 
right to act in its name.3 The chapter argues that the BCB was one of sev-
eral groups contending for power in the Middle Magdalena that sought 
to normalize different configurations of social relations and legitimize 
them as the state. My analysis builds on research that envisions the 
state less as a thing or container for political, social, and economic ac-
tivities than as a contradictory and conflicted process in which actors 
and entities not understood as “the state” play a central part in shaping 
how “it” is organized, understood, and legitimized.4
For six years (2000–2006), the BCB ruled in alliance with sectors of 
the institutional state, which itself was not a unitary phenomenon, 
and stifled the language of class as a form of claims making. Yet after 
pacifying the region with “blood and fire” and securing the rights of 
capital, the BCB and the violent “gangster capitalism” associated with 
it became a liability for the institutional state, which initiated a “peace 
process” with the mercenaries in 2003 that led to their demobilization 
three years later. The institutional state then reasserted its legitimacy 
by locating paramilitarism in the past, even as neoparamilitaries re-
grouped in the same territory once occupied by the BCB. The organiza-
tion, decomposition, and reassembly of claims to legitimate rule were 
central to the violent process of state formation.
The chapter first describes how the BCB created a realm of de facto 
sovereignty in Barrancabermeja, where it incorporated working people 
into new forms of labor discipline, rent extraction, and political sub-
jugation through intimidation, predation, and the erection of armed, 
clientelistic relationships. It then considers how conflicting claims to 
legitimate rule shaped the efforts of paramilitary avengers to regulate 
social life and how barranqueños negotiated a vast gray area in which 
it was difficult to understand where the paramilitaries and the insti-
tutional state began and ended. Finally, the chapter explores how the 
paramilitary demobilization, which culminated in 2006, and the so-
called parapolitics (parapolítica) scandal, which exposed the connec-
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tions between paramilitaries and political leaders, allowed the insti-
tutional state to reaffirm its lawfulness and legitimacy. “The state” 
reemerges less as an object “akin to a human ear” than as a claim to the 
legitimate right to rule (Abrams 1988: 76), a right that was grounded 
in the separation of the violent, paramilitary past from the still un-
settled present in which, government officials asserted, illegal armed 
groups no longer used ties to politicians and the security forces to 
amass wealth illegally and kill with impunity. The long-term durability 
of the resurgent state’s legitimacy, however, remains uncertain, as the 
current neoliberal order rests on a foundation of disorder, displace-
ment, exclusion, and economic distress created by decades of war and 
economic restructuring.
A New Node of Power: The BCB
Like counterinsurgent Colombian paramilitaries, numerous semi-
clandestine groups operated during the cold war to annihilate left-
leaning political movements and suppress democratic politics, and 
they effectively muddied the distinction between institutional states 
and criminal networks. The Sicilian Mafia, for example, assisted in the 
suppression of peasant insurgencies and supported the expansion of 
anticommunist political parties after World War II. It then took con-
trol of urban construction and drug trafficking networks and utilized 
money-laundering channels created by the cold war to amass wealth 
and reestablish control of politics (J. Schneider and Schneider 2003). In 
addition, some Islamic terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda, were 
either cultivated by the United States during the cold war or tolerated 
as alternative poles of legitimacy to secular nationalist and communist 
movements (Saull 2006), and Salvadoran and Guatemalan death squads 
that fought counterinsurgency wars backed by the United States in the 
1970s and 1980s operated as extensions of state security forces. Yet 
unlike Central American death squads, which remained under the con-
trol of the Salvadoran and Guatemalan armies, or the Nicaraguan con-
tras who received support from the United States, Colombian paramili-
taries became standing armies that conquered and held territory and 
financed their own expansion through drug trafficking and a variety 
of legal and illegal activities. They did so within the broader context 
of a counterinsurgent war in which the United States channeled mil-
lions of dollars to the state security forces to wage a “war on drugs” in 
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which coca eradication programs targeted the peasant support base of 
the guerrillas.
The Colombian state facilitated the large-scale expansion of para-
militarism when, in 1994, the administration of César Gaviria autho-
rized the creation of legal self-defense groups, known as the Coopera-
tivas de Vigilancia y Seguridad Privada (Cooperatives for Vigilance and 
Private Security, CONVIVIRs), that provided legal cover for paramili-
tary organizations and guaranteed impunity. The CONVIVIRs main-
tained close connections to the police and military commanders and 
received financial backing from wealthy cattle ranchers and other 
sectors of the elite in the regions where they operated. During their 
four-year existence, the CONVIVIRs grew to include more than 120,000 
members and spread throughout Colombia. They became particu-
larly well established in Antioquia province, where then governor and 
future president Álvaro Uríbe Vélez vigorously promoted them. When 
the Colombian court declared the CONVIVIRs unconstitutional in 1998, 
the paramilitaries lost their façade of legitimacy, but they had already 
begun to expand clandestinely with the creation of the AUC in 1997. 
Former CONVIVIR operatives who had roots in the Medellín and Calí 
drug cartels passed into the leadership of the AUC (Ávila 2010: 113–
18), which attempted, but ultimately failed, to unite disparate regional 
paramilitary entities under one umbrella.
By the mid-1990s, the paramilitaries had outgrown their role as so-
called self-defense forces, even though ties to state agents—politicians 
and military officers—remained a crucial factor in their rapid ex-
pansion. They had become armies complete with uniforms, insignia, 
hymns, and doctrine, and they bristled with sophisticated weapons 
(Duncan 2006). According to Colombian analysts León Valencia and 
Juan Carlos Celis, “By 1999, these forces configured themselves as a 
veritable irregular army with a particularly offensive quality. . . . The 
war acquired a new face: the occupation of territory with blood and fire, 
the massive connection of drug traffickers to the paramilitary business 
and a strategy to capture local power and influence national power” 
(2012: 15). A number of factors accounted for the rapid paramilitary 
expansion, including well-developed networks of local, regional, and 
national political support, a strong military structure, the support of 
a significant number of military officers, and control of the enormous 
profits of the illegal cocaine traffic, which allowed them to operate 
autonomously from the institutional state. Moreover, their counter-
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insurgent discourse drew sectors of the middle class to the paramili-
tary project who might have otherwise been repelled by the extreme 
violence and criminality (Ávila 2010).
Paramilitary commanders amassed wealth and power at the head of 
regional armies, or blocs. The mercenaries conquered territory by forc-
ing guerrillas and other paramilitary competitors to either join forces 
with them and abandon areas that they claimed or face annihilation, 
and by expelling or massacring civilians perceived to belong to the sup-
port base of the insurgencies. They not only used threats and bribes 
to force their way into the political system; they were also sought out 
by right-wing politicians who approached them about forming elec-
toral alliances as the power of paramilitarism grew (López 2010). Ac-
cess to the institutional state enabled them to legalize stolen assets and 
guarantee immunity from prosecution for human rights violations and 
extradition to the United States on drug trafficking charges.
Paramilitary expansion turned on the ability to extract resources 
in areas under the mercenaries’ control, and those who dominated the 
cocaine economy became the most powerful within the loosely orga-
nized AUC federation. After the collapse of the Medellín cartel in the 
early 1990s, the AUC’s public spokesperson and former cartel hit man 
Carlos Castaño dedicated himself to the formation of the Autodefensas 
Campesinas de Córdoba y Urabá (Peasant Self-Defense Forces of Cór-
doba and Urabá), which was basically coterminous with a CONVIVIR and 
drew on the experiences of the Middle Magdalena prototype—Muerte 
a Secuestradores—of the 1980s. He then built alliances to other re-
gional paramilitaries to create the AUC.5 Castaño, his brothers, and 
workers from his estate received military training from the army in 
Puerto Berrío, upriver from Barrancabermeja. Like the Middle Magda-
lena, trade unions were strong in Urabá, where the banana worker 
unions had won the right to represent laborers on an industry-wide 
basis, rather than on individual plantations. In addition, land take-
overs on the outskirts of towns and on the plantations expressed the 
desire of banana workers for housing, land, and public services and 
gave rise to a high level of social organization through cooperatives, 
producer associations, and community groups, as well as support from 
the guerrillas. In a preview of what would unfold in Barrancabermeja, 
Castaño’s forces devastated popular organizations in Urabá or reconfig-
ured them in accord with neoliberal principles (Chomsky 2008; Romero 
2003: 159–220).
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Despite Castaño’s efforts to organize diverse paramilitary blocs 
under the banner of the AUC and present a unified public front, the 
AUC never articulated a national political vision nor did it manage to 
solidify alliances among all regional commanders, who were divided 
by personal rivalries, suspicion, and competition over control of the 
drug economy. The BCB grew out of the dissolution and consolidation 
of other paramilitary entities, in 2002, with the vision of capturing Ba-
rrancabermeja and in reaction to President Andrés Pastrana’s proposal 
to create a demilitarized zone in the Middle Magdalena for the ELN in 
order to negotiate peace. Carlos Castaño created it from the remnants 
of the Self-Defense Forces of Santander and South Cesar, whose leader, 
Camilo Morantes, was murdered on Castaño’s orders, after orchestrat-
ing the infamous May 16, 1998, massacre of thirty-five people in Ba-
rrancabermeja, and from the amalgamation of other groups, including 
the South Bolívar front, which Castaño “franchised” to Carlos Mario 
Jiménez, alias Macaco, a drug trafficker associated with the defunct 
North Valle cartel. The sale of “franchises” to drug traffickers turbo-
charged the growth of the BCB in other parts of the country, including 
key coca-producing regions such as Putumayo province (Ávila 2010). 
As Vicente Castaño, an AUC leader and brother of Carlos Castaño, ex-
plained: “In the last phase of the expansion, some very difficult zones 
remained that the self-defense forces could not reach. So a national 
discussion was opened to figure out who could take charge of these 
regions” (qtd. in Ávila 2010: 134). The distinction between paramili-
taries who waged counterinsurgent warfare and drug traffickers who 
used violence to protect their illegal operations became largely mean-
ingless within the AUC. Proceeds from the drug traffic enabled the 
paramilitaries to buy the weapons, vehicles, and even helicopters that 
facilitated their military buildup in former guerrilla strongholds rich 
in natural resources and stoked the repression and subjugation of the 
people who fell under their long shadow.
With its close ties to the cocaine traffic, the BCB became the largest 
and most powerful paramilitary bloc in the country. It amassed a fight-
ing force of more than seven thousand men, operated in eight prov-
inces that spanned the length and breadth of Colombia, and main-
tained several fronts, one of which, the Fidel Castaño front, took over 
Barrancabermeja. Like most paramilitary strongmen, the three major 
leaders of the BCB came from modest social and economic backgrounds 
(Richani 2007). Ironically, Supreme Commander Carlos Mario Jiménez 
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was the son of a butcher. Military strategist Rodrigo Pérez Alzáte, alias 
Julián Bolívar, had tried his hand at the sale of fast food and ice cream, 
but when these failed, he became a cattle trader in Antioquia prov-
ince and teamed up with ranchers to form the Grupo Pérez, a “self-
defense” organization dedicated to ending guerrilla extortion. Iván 
Roberto Duque Gaviria, alias Ernesto Báez, the BCB political boss, was 
a lawyer who began his career as a Liberal Party member and who, in 
1982, was a founder of ACEDEGAM, which had acted as a shield for the 
formation of paramilitary groups in the Puerto Boyacá region. As the 
BCB consolidated its grip over more territory, it organized new fields 
of power that sprang from the connection of preexisting regional so-
cial relations and structures of criminality and counterinsurgency 
with new national and international networks of capital accumula-
tion and political domination. These connections are what Don Kalb 
and Herman Tak (2005: 2) call “critical junctures,” power-laden sets of 
interconnected social relations that extend across space and through 
time and connect nominally different spheres of activity, such as legal, 
illegal, political, and economic. They help us to understand the con-
tested politics through which landscapes of organized power emerge 
and shape the actions, visions, resources, and territory-making capa-
bilities of different people.
Paramilitaries supported a particular kind of undemocratic state 
and a form of capital accumulation without limits, and their ability 
to build ties to regional elites, politicians, and the security forces en-
abled them to control the electoral process in many parts of the coun-
try, place individuals sympathetic to their agenda in municipal, depart-
mental, and national office, and manipulate political institutions to 
further their particular agendas. These relationships and practices were 
instrumental to the national extension of an emergent right-wing alli-
ance that used unrestrained violence to break the power of popular 
organizations and drive the guerrillas from resource-rich areas under 
their control. Such connections set the paramilitaries apart from the 
insurgents, whose political base was rooted in the peasantry and the 
working class. The guerrillas were critical of capitalism and, for many 
years, sought to replace it, but their power never transcended the mu-
nicipal level, where they controlled neighborhood committees, ex-
torted mayors, cut deals with corrupt ECOPETROL officials, and threat-
ened politicians.6 As Winifred Tate (2011: 193) notes, one of the most 
controversial issues raised by the expansion of paramilitarism for so-
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cial science analysts was the extent to which they were able to assume 
the regulatory power of a state and control social life in areas under 
their control, especially given the volatile and dynamic nature of the 
new configurations of paramilitary, guerrilla, and popular power that 
existed across Colombia. A closer examination of the forms of politi-
cal subjugation, labor exploitation, and rent extraction that emerged 
in Barrancabermeja between 2000 and 2006 can begin to address this 
concern.
“Who Has the Arms Has Power”: 
Narco-paramilitarism and Political Power
The BCB crushed reformist and revolutionary projects of political 
change, and it mobilized private power to create a new political order, 
based in the repression of labor, the suppression of democracy, and 
unrestricted capital accumulation. It also reorganized the geography 
of power and deepened an extreme form of armed neoliberalism, as 
decentralization enabled paramilitaries and individuals associated 
with them to secure public contracts and develop ties to the state sec-
tor that facilitated the theft of public resources. At the same time, the 
retrenchment of social welfare services, the weakening of labor laws, 
and growing immiseration were already heightening the importance of 
clientelism for working people as a means of acquiring housing, jobs, 
medicine, food, and solutions to problems. The BCB took advantage of 
these vulnerabilities, which it had helped to create, and incorporated 
working people who sympathized and collaborated with it into new 
forms of authoritarian clientelism, while excluding others because of 
presumed political sympathies and associations.7 Such a strategy was 
instrumental in fracturing the remaining power of the left in Barranca-
bermeja and dismantling networks of popular solidarity.
The ability of the paramilitaries to capture state institutions began, 
in the 1990s, with the emergence of new political parties and move-
ments, such as Convergencia Ciudadana, Colombia Viva, Cambio Radi-
cal, and Alas, and the decline of the traditional Liberal and Conservative 
Parties. The alignment of these new parties with regional paramilitary 
groups during key electoral competitions, especially those in the first 
decade of the 2000s, redrew Colombia’s national political map (López 
2010). Regional-based paramilitary blocs used violence and threats to 
force candidates out of races and create a single electoral option, as well 
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as to pressure voters to cast their ballots for politicians approved by 
the mercenaries. When I asked residents of northeast Barranca about 
the experiences of their neighborhoods, I repeatedly heard the same 
refrain: “Whoever has the arms has power” (Quien tiene las armas tiene 
poder). As power flowed from the barrel of a gun, candidates associated 
with the paramilitary blocs won municipal, departmental, and national 
political office, especially in northern and northeastern Colombia, 
where paramilitarism was strongest. These developments moved para-
military commander Salvatore Mancuso to boast, after the 2002 elec-
tions, that the AUC controlled 35 percent of the Colombian Congress.
In Santander province, where Barrancabermeja is located, the back-
ing of the BCB was crucial to the rise and expansion of Convergencia 
Ciudadana. Luis Alberto Gil founded Convergencia in 1997 and then 
crafted an alliance with the BCB during the 2002 parliamentary elec-
tions and the 2003 departmental elections, exchanging the promise of 
political favors, if elected, for paramilitary support. The BCB, in turn, 
pressured voters to support Convergencia candidates, leading to Gil’s 
election to the Colombian Senate. Two other Convergencia candidates 
won seats in the House of Representatives in 2002. In 2003, the party 
capitalized on these national gains to expand in Santander province, 
where it captured the governor’s office and elected fourteen deputies, 
fourteen mayors, and numerous city council members, including four 
in Barrancabermeja. A few years later, in 2006 and 2007, respectively, 
the party won additional victories in electoral races across the coun-
try. The consolidation of Convergencia in Santander took place at the 
expense of the Liberal Party, whose networks of clients collapsed, and 
whose key figures joined Convergencia. In addition, a left-wing faction 
of the Liberal Party, known as “El Sindicato,” which had been strong 
in the municipality of Barrancabermeja, was debilitated and marginal-
ized, as a new configuration of alliances that included former Liberals 
and Conservatives, well-known political bosses, some independent 
groups, and the armed right rose to prominence within Convergencia 
(Ávila and Acevedo 2010).
The control of political office was key to acquiring access to pub-
lic funds and contracts, as the decentralization of fiscal and adminis-
trative activities opened the door for private entrepreneurs to com-
pete in the provision of a wide range of services and for public officials 
to steer contracts to front companies controlled by the paramilitaries 
or those associated with them. With the reorganization of the health 
162 CHAPTER FIVE
care sector, in 1993, and the weakening of labor legislation, for ex-
ample, hospitals and clinics no longer hired workers directly. They uti-
lized so-called job agencies (bolsas de empleo) that negotiated tempo-
rary contracts between people seeking employment and prospective 
employers. Provisioning workers to the health services sector created 
the possibility for regional political leaders, who often controlled these 
agencies, to receive the constitutionally mandated budgetary transfers 
assigned to municipalities for the provision of health care. It also en-
abled them to offer jobs to supporters—jobs that came with wage de-
ductions charged by the agencies and without significant benefits or 
union representation—and to charge the health service providers a fee 
for the employees. Gil was one such health care entrepreneur who used 
his businesses to acquire public contracts and to build clientelistic net-
works by rewarding supporters with jobs. Rather than contributing to 
a more efficient, effective health care system, however, these practices 
strengthened paramilitary front businesses and the enterprises of the 
politicians or families allied with the mercenaries, weakened the power 
of organized labor, and created troubling, new public-private business 
ventures in which the paramilitaries acted as handmaidens for the con-
figuration of a new geography of power that extended from the towns 
of Santander to the halls of state power in Bogotá.8 This new organiza-
tion of social, political, and economic relations was undergirded by the 
coercive power of the BCB.
Predation, Intimidation, and Authoritarian  
Clientelism in the Barrios of Barranca
Although residents in Barranca’s working-class neighborhoods were 
pressured by paramilitaries to vote for particular candidates, includ-
ing those of Convergencia Ciudadana, the city’s strong leftist tradition 
presented the BCB with a more complicated challenge than other re-
gional towns that were more easily subdued. The left-wing Democratic 
Alternative Pole enjoyed strong support in Barrancabermeja, and in 
the 2004 mayoral election, its candidate, Edgar Cote, ran for office and 
won the election without any identifiable links to the BCB. Only a week 
after winning office, however, Cote began to fill municipal positions 
with individuals tied to the paramilitaries, and it was later revealed 
that he was taking orders from Ivan Roberto Duque, who demanded 
the submission of municipal budgets for his approval. Duque, it turned 
FRAGMENTED SOVEREIGNTY 163
out, was related to Cote, and he played a major role in orchestrating the 
BCB’s political project in Barrancabermeja.9
While the BCB made pacts with politicians and supported the ex-
pansion of new political parties, it also developed a system of control 
and exploitation in Barrancabermeja’s poor neighborhoods based on 
predation, intimidation, and authoritarian clientelism. Clientelistic re-
lationships had long been a source of political power and jobs in a city 
with a chronically high unemployment rate. The creation of JACs by 
the National Front in 1958, for example, was one way in which the gov-
ernment tried to co-opt the urban poor through the creation of new 
clientelist networks and to avoid the emergence of alternative orga-
nizational forms. The JACs had a dual character: they were simulta-
neously community organizations in which ordinary citizens were em-
powered to resolve neighborhood problems, and they depended on the 
government for legal recognition and financial support. Clientelism 
operated primarily at election time when state officials channeled pub-
lic resources and the promise of services to poor urban residents in ex-
change for votes (Leal and Dávila 1990). Under the paramilitaries, how-
ever, threats and intimidation played a more important role in getting 
out the vote, and clientelistic relations tied people less to public offi-
cials than to predatory mercenaries who controlled a broad swath of 
the popular economy. By the twenty-first century, the privatization of 
public entities and resources, the restructuring of labor relations, and 
the violent displacement of peasants to the urban periphery created 
new vulnerabilities in the lives of many barranqueños and provided 
fertile soil for the flowering of authoritarian clientelism under the BCB.
Although guerrilla groups had also erected clientelistic networks in 
Barrancabermeja’s poor neighborhoods, significant differences distin-
guished the ability of the insurgencies and the paramilitaries to har-
ness clientelism to the advancement of political and economic projects. 
Although the ELN was the dominant insurgency, no single guerrilla 
group had ever controlled the entire city, or even all of the northeast-
ern district, where three guerrilla organizations—the FARC, ELN, and 
EPL—had alternately cooperated and competed with each other. In 
contrast, the BCB took over the entire city and laid claim to a broad 
swath of economic activities through the control of subcontracting, the 
provision of credit, and a variety of illegal activities, while the security 
forces either turned a blind eye to what was happening or received a cut 
of the action. By eliminating the competition and developing more per-
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vasive, brutal forms of social control, the paramilitaries were in a com-
manding position to distribute favors and accumulate wealth. To gain 
access to vital goods and services, working people had to surrender 
the right to associate with their equals in unions, political parties, and 
neighborhood associations that retained enough autonomy to allow 
them to pursue common class interests, while the language of class as 
a form of claims making was suppressed. This was the biggest differ-
ence between the periods of guerrilla and paramilitary rule. Those who 
refused to give in to the paramilitaries, or who were stigmatized be-
cause of their place of residence or perceived affiliations, were violently 
excluded from the new clientelistic relations that sprouted like mush-
rooms under neoliberalism.
The job agencies that multiplied with the passage of Law 100, which 
weakened labor regulations, provide a case in point. These legal entities 
provided workers to state agencies and private firms that no longer 
hired directly, and as we saw earlier with the experience of Luis Alberto 
Gil, they enabled the paramilitaries and those tied to the paramilitaries 
to manipulate the labor force and build ties to both the state and the 
private sector. A former oil worker whom I shall call Luis watched the 
development of job agencies in Barrancabermeja and described their 
impact on workers:
After the paramilitary incursion, [the paramilitaries] created their 
job agencies. They opened an office and recruited individuals who 
had once been involved with associations of the unemployed and 
who did not support the union. Those people started saying that they 
were going to interface with the employers in order to give opportu-
nities to the workers, and leaders like us were not recognized. And 
at the same time, the paramilitary goes and “dialogues,” between 
quotation marks, with the manager or the administrator of the busi-
ness, and lays out the rules of the game: any person that agrees to 
work for the business has to first pass through the job agency. The 
manager can’t hire anyone that [the paramilitary] doesn’t approve. 
Everyone who gets a job is on the paramilitary’s list. And the para-
military gathers information about you and your family from your 
vita. . . . That’s how it worked and continues to work.10
Although Luis was unemployed at the time of our interview, he had 
never sought work through a job agency. “I am afraid,” he said. “It is 
better to prevent than to cure.” People with a trade union background, 
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a prior history of collaboration with the guerrillas, or residence in a 
neighborhood stigmatized for its guerrilla sympathies were forced 
to either keep their distance from the job agencies that operated as 
fronts for paramilitaries and their supporters or remain silent and risk 
physical harm, if their personal histories were revealed. Luis explained, 
“The victimization of many people [by the paramilitaries] has been be-
cause of the information that [they] have obtained about people in the 
job agencies, often through rumors and innuendo, like the unguarded 
comments of someone who says unknowingly in the presence of a para-
military informant that ‘ah, that guy was a guerrilla, or a guerrilla sup-
porter.’ So, you see, there is this kind of indicating [señalamiento], even 
though indirect, and the information gets back to them.”11 The threat 
posed by rumor and gossip aggravated fear, and like Luis, many other 
people found that their employment opportunities narrowed, which 
intensified the imperative to find work. Access to jobs and benefits be-
came gifts or favors instead of social rights, which Barranca’s popular 
organizations had long demanded; as Luis noted, “At some point, they 
[the paramilitaries] are going to come to you and say, ‘Do me this favor.’ 
That is what you fear.”12 The rigid patterns of inclusion and exclusion 
that characterized paramilitary clientelism were a central part of the 
BCB’s effort to break the back of the left in Barrancabermeja.
Yet the job agencies were more than a tool to marginalize the left. 
They provided an opportunity to extract exorbitant discounts from 
workers’ wages—10 percent for the privilege to associate with the job 
agency, 10 percent for each wage payment, 10 percent of any bonuses, 
and 10 percent of settlement payments at the end of a contract—as 
well as the fees (or the extortion) charged to the firms. As Luis ex-
plained, “All the money that they amassed through the job agencies 
and the drug traffic was used to create loan offices in which people 
could borrow money. But unfortunately, because of the difficult em-
ployment situation, people can’t always repay the loans. The paramili-
taries then take their possessions, and if they have nothing to take, 
the paramilitaries kill them.”13 Under the control of the paramilitaries, 
the job agencies operated as a tool for controlling and dispossessing 
workers and accumulating wealth. They arose from the Colombian gov-
ernment’s neoliberal labor reforms, which paramilitarism then deep-
ened by eliminating opposition to them and incorporating working 
people into new forms of inclusion and exclusion that weakened the 
power of organized labor.
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The job agencies represented one of a variety of businesses and front 
organizations operated by the paramilitaries, such as the lottery, trans-
portation enterprises, private security firms, discos, brothels, gas sta-
tions, hotels, and clothing stores, through which the mercenaries dis-
tributed jobs and other rewards to supporters, laundered drug money, 
extended their political domination, and redistributed wealth upward. 
Avoiding their clutch was not easy. Juan Sebastián Sánchez recalled his 
family’s trauma when the BCB moved against independent subcontrac-
tors who provided services to ECOPETROL.14 Sánchez had operated a 
small business that performed maintenance functions for ECOPETROL. 
Even though he had been losing contracts to larger firms, the BCB kid-
napped him and his entire family, in 2005, because he had not acceded 
to its extortion demands. He was shocked when an individual, seated 
before a local commander, pulled up his past contract information on a 
computer screen, cited his earnings, and quoted an amount that he had 
to pay in order to leave alive. Such predation and extortion victimized 
individuals, like Sánchez, who competed with the paramilitary front 
companies that also provided services to the oil industry.
The brutal labor discipline developed at the same time as the pri-
vatization of public enterprises limited poor residents’ access to basic 
services and forced them to pay higher fees. For example, telephone 
and electricity rates became more expensive in the aftermath of pri-
vatization, which cost additional jobs, and water rates shot through 
the roof, spiking to 60 percent in 2007. Yet when hundreds of residents 
protested usurious electricity rates after newly installed meters mal-
functioned in their homes, the paramilitaries threatened them and 
the president of a consumer protection group that oversaw the cost of 
public services. The erosion of well-being pushed some people into co-
ercive debt relationships with the paramilitaries, after a health crisis 
or a financial emergency overwhelmed their ability to cope. Many resi-
dents told how flyers offering generous credit started to appear in their 
neighborhoods after the arrival of the BCB. To access the money, one 
had only to call a cell phone number, and a young man would appear 
on a motorcycle to negotiate the deal and provide the funds, which 
usually required payment at 20 percent interest. The arrangement built 
on older forms of quasi-legal credit known as drip by drip ( gota a gota),
but it required no guarantors, collateral, or signed documents, and it 
turned on fear.
One woman explained that after surviving a traffic accident with 
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a bus, she faced the task of paying for expensive repairs to the ve-
hicle because the owner—a suspected paramilitary—insisted that she 
bore responsibility for the accident. Her husband had lost his job with 
ECOPETROL, and the family of five depended on her wages as a nurse 
for basic necessities. Fearing what might happen if they neglected the 
damaged bus, husband and wife borrowed money from a local lender 
whom they suspected of paramilitary ties and then began to repay the 
funds immediately. When they fell into arrears, two men came to their 
home and threatened them with harm if the payments did not con-
tinue on schedule. As the woman later explained, “I didn’t know what 
to do. I could borrow from another paramilitary to pay off the first 
one, or I could plead with my relatives to lend me the money which 
they don’t have.”15 The paramilitaries used intimidation to weave ex-
ploitative relationships of credit and debt out of the vulnerabilities 
of residents. Debtors faced the impossible situation of living with the 
imminent threat of violence or squeezing their social networks to the 
breaking point.
Although using personalistic relations to make a living, advance po-
litical claims, or weather a personal setback was not new, the intimida-
tion, predation, and authoritarian clientelism that emerged under the 
BCB created a sense of radical uncertainty for many working people 
that structured fear into the fabric of their lives. Such unpredictability 
meant that people were always physically, emotionally, and economi-
cally vulnerable. By incorporating working people into autocratic, hier-
archical relationships, and excluding or murdering those they defined 
as “enemies,” the paramilitaries used menace and threats, rather than 
the law or notions of legality, to regulate social life in a context in which 
the despotic power of the BCB was premised on the ability and the will-
ingness to unleash horrific violence, and to do so with impunity.16
Yet as the BCB consolidated its military control of Barrancabermeja, 
the use of exemplary, spectacular violence was increasingly unneces-
sary to control a population that had been traumatized and disorga-
nized, and BCB commanders set out to legitimize their rule over a social 
landscape that they had largely destroyed. As one mercenary asserted, 
“We realized that arbitrary murders and terrorist-like collective assas-
sinations generated rejection among the civilian population” (qtd. in 
González and Jiménez 2008: 160). His recognition that a system of rule 
based on terror was unsustainable constituted the first step in para-
military attempts to reconstruct the social order “from the bottom 
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up,” a process that would unfold through “social and political work.” 
To legitimate their domination, the paramilitaries had to contend with 
the tensions at the heart of their relationships with local residents: 
either win followers by improving the lives of residents or maintain 
control through the naked exercise of force. It was a tall order, given 
the drive to amass wealth and the volatility of the BCB project in which 
violence was the primary form of conflict resolution among paramili-
taries and between them and others.
Paramilitary Social Work: Discipline and Manipulation
Shortly after the takeover of Barrancabermeja’s northeast neighbor-
hoods, the BCB circulated manuals that spelled out the new rules of 
coexistence (normas de convivencia) between the BCB and the civilian 
population. These regulations sought to discipline working people 
through the reaffirmation of rigid gender, generational, and sexual 
hierarchies disrupted by years of violence and economic restructur-
ing, and to regulate the use of space. They included a Monday through 
Friday evening curfew for young people that was extended slightly on 
Saturdays and Sundays. Youth caught out beyond the curfew faced a 
twelve-hour detention, during which time the paramilitaries forced 
them to work. In addition, the BCB prohibited young men from wearing 
long hair and earrings and forbade women from dressing in miniskirts; 
those caught violating the dress code risked apprehension, confiscation 
of the offending articles, and expulsion from the city. Moreover, “pub-
lic scandals” were resolved by the paramilitaries, who humiliated those 
accused of “scandalous behavior” (e.g., prostitutes) by forcing them to 
wear signs around their necks and engage in public work projects, such 
as picking up trash or sweeping parks.17
The code of conduct envisioned a fortified patriarchal order in which 
the BCB itself would regulate women and youth whose dependence on 
husbands, partners, and fathers had increased during the long years 
of political violence and neoliberal reform, even as men were less able 
to care for their families. The death, disappearance, and flight of men, 
who were the primary targets of paramilitary violence, had left more 
women to head households and raise children alone. And the erosion of 
full-time, waged employment—a domain of the economy dominated 
by men—weighed heavily on women and children who had always de-
pended on male wages. Shoring up patriarchy was a bid to control some 
FRAGMENTED SOVEREIGNTY 169
of the social chaos created to a considerable degree by the paramili-
taries themselves and to incorporate gender and generational hierar-
chies into class rule.
The paramilitaries also claimed to provide “protection” to local resi-
dents. They set up rackets in which payments were extorted from resi-
dents in exchange for “security.” One resident described how a local 
commander called his neighborhood to a meeting in a public school, 
where the individual explained that the BCB had entered the city at the 
request of local citizens to deal with the “security problem” caused by 
the guerrillas. He then offered the services of his men to the commu-
nity. Shortly thereafter, young enforcers began to visit residents on 
Saturday afternoons, requesting weekly payments of two thousand 
pesos for the protection of their homes.18 Such demands did not en-
dear the paramilitaries to local residents, however. They were widely 
resented and did little more than guarantee protection—for a time—
from the paramilitaries themselves. Other paramilitary practices, how-
ever, were quietly welcomed by many urban residents.
The BCB aimed to purge the urban environment of drug users, pros-
titutes, homosexuals, trade unionists, and alleged “subversives,” whom 
it defined as dangerous, dirty, and immoral. It did so through periodic, 
selective assassinations that sent a message to everyone about what 
awaited nonconformists. The quiet assent of some residents to extra-
judicial executions expressed wider anxieties about the spread of HIV/
AIDS, the presence of unknown men on the streets, and the crime and 
score settling associated with the drug traffic in some neighborhoods. 
A young man from the northeast recounted how he and a group of 
friends used to congregate on a street corner in the evening to talk and 
smoke marijuana, until a paramilitary threatened them and then shot 
one of his friends in the face. After noting the hypocrisy of drug traf-
fickers enforcing a ban on marijuana consumption, he lamented that 
some residents did not object to what was widely referred to as “social 
cleansing,” because “seeing young men on the corner [smoking pot] 
makes them uncomfortable.”19 Because the paramilitaries represented 
the de facto urban power, residents increasingly had to turn to them 
to resolve problems, including domestic disputes, conflicts with neigh-
bors, and problems with teenagers. By so doing, they inadvertently 
legitimized the power of the mercenaries and the social order that the 
latter sought to create and, at the same time, abetted the unraveling of 
working-class culture.
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Barrancabermeja’s neighborhood councils—the JACs—were key in-
stitutions through which the paramilitaries tried to naturalize their 
power, much like the guerrillas before them, and they illustrated the 
tensions between problem solving and violence that shaped the BCB’s 
bid for legitimation. They carried out neighborhood development 
projects with municipal funds and sometimes grants from NGOs, such 
as the construction of schools and health centers, paving roads, and 
the creation of soccer fields, designed to improve the quality of life in 
urban neighborhoods. The BCB saw the JACs as local-level structures 
that would act as echo chambers for their views and allow them to 
reach out to and connect with the concerns of urban residents.
Unlike the paramilitary Bloque Norte, which imposed new leaders 
on the councils in the areas under its control, the BCB tended to work 
through preexisting leadership structures, while making it clear that 
council leaders were subjected to its rules (Ávila 2010: 131–32). As one 
resident explained, “The council leaders were subdued with money, 
and others with force. Some of them just looked the other way when 
the paras did something. Others sympathized with the paras.”20 His 
statements suggest that both support for the BCB project and fear-
induced corruption moved council presidents to work with the merce-
naries. Through these individuals, the BCB then appealed to neighbor-
hood residents with acts of benevolence, such as the sponsorship of 
bingo events, Mother’s Day celebrations, fiestas, the creation of parks 
and holiday gift handouts, or in some cases, the initiation of develop-
ment projects.21 The largesse was often appreciated, but crafting legiti-
macy meant building a safety net for urban residents that would pro-
tect them from the erosion of social well-being that was taking place 
all around them and help them resolve daily problems. It depended 
on enduring, daily personal interactions that required constant culti-
vation and updating and the trust that flowed from them.22 The case 
of Leonardo Páez illustrates some of the conflicts and tensions that 
shaped the BCB’s efforts to normalize its rule and build a supportive 
political base in the barrios of northeast Barranca.23
Páez had been the president of a large, northeastern neighborhood 
council under guerrilla rule, and he continued to serve after the BCB
arrived. Páez had lived in the community since the 1970s, when his 
family migrated to Barrancabermeja from Bolívar province, and after 
the departure of his siblings, he continued to reside with his mother in 
the family home, an unpretentious green house on a shady street cor-
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ner. Residents constantly sought him out for advice, information, and 
assistance. His disarming sense of humor put them at ease, and his 
tips, suggestions, and occasional material support, such as access to a 
subsidized lunch program for young children, communicated to people 
that he cared about them and could help them contend with some of 
their problems. It was impossible to sit in his living room, visit him at 
the community center, or walk down the street with him alone. Some-
one was always asking for a moment of his time, and his cell phone 
never seemed to stop ringing.
One day in a private room of the community center with his phone 
turned off, Páez explained to me the difference between guerrilla and 
paramilitary domination of the neighborhood. “The neighborhood 
councils,” he began, “had operated in alignment with the guerrillas, 
but the guerrillas didn’t interfere with their decisions; they monitored 
them, but they did not oblige them to do anything.” Despite underlying 
friction with the insurgents over the question of council autonomy, 
Páez and other elected officials had “more political space to move in” 
than would subsequently be the case under the BCB. Indeed, Páez re-
counted how, in 1999, he stood for his first election at a time when the 
FARC garnered little legitimacy in the northeast. The insurgency fielded 
its own list of candidates, which lost to Páez and his electoral slate, but 
then permitted Páez to assume the presidency of the neighborhood 
body. With the expulsion of the FARC two years later, Páez’s relations 
with the new overlords grew much more fraught.
Almost immediately after the BCB seized control of his neighbor-
hood, a guerrilla-turned-paramilitary named Eduardo began to inves-
tigate Páez. He first went to the home of the council treasurer to de-
mand that she open the books for his review and asked her a series of 
menacing questions about Páez, whom he referred to as a “faggot.” Was 
he embezzling money? Was he collaborating with guerrillas? And who 
were his friends? The treasurer, who was Páez’s close confidante, feared 
that Eduardo planned to murder him. She had known Eduardo since he 
was a child and drew on their relationship to insist that Páez was an 
honorable person who had always carried out his duties in an upright 
and honest fashion. Her intervention may have saved Páez’s life, but 
he was then left in the unenviable position of negotiating paramilitary 
claims, on the one hand, and responding to the needs of his constitu-
ents, on the other hand, within a lopsided balance of power.
Páez explained how, in the immediate aftermath of the BCB takeover, 
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rank-and-file troops went door-to-door summoning residents to an as-
sembly in a local park, where men dressed in civilian clothing intro-
duced themselves as members of the BCB of the AUC. The men spoke 
with paisa accents that identified Colombians from Antioquia prov-
ince. They announced that they had come to clean out the neighbor-
hood and provide jobs for local residents and instructed those people 
in need of employment to provide the junta president with their vitae 
so that he could find work for them. Páez, who stood in the middle of 
the gathering, was mortified. He understood the announcement as an 
opening gambit to involve and compromise key neighborhood leaders 
in the BCB move to establish a social base and to use it as a source of so-
cial, economic, and political power. It was also, he believed, a gesture to 
him and other council presidents to indicate that they operated under 
paramilitary supervision. Páez knew that he could not provide jobs for 
everyone who needed them; the mercenaries were, he felt, placing the 
onus of job creation on him and directing any blame for future eco-
nomic hardship away from themselves. He thus found himself in an 
untenable situation in which failure to accommodate to the paramili-
taries posed risks to his safety, but appeasing them exposed him to 
the wrath and rejection of his constituents, who would remain unem-
ployed. At great personal risk, Páez spoke up. He identified himself as 
the neighborhood council president, told the men that he did not know 
who they were, and informed residents that he was not in a position to 
locate employment for them.
On another occasion, as the end-of-the-year holidays approached, 
the paramilitaries assembled a number of council presidents, includ-
ing Páez, and instructed them to hand over lists of the children in their 
jurisdictions, allegedly so the BCB could distribute Christmas gifts to 
the youngsters. Páez informed the paramilitary commander that he did 
not have such a list, nor did he know the names of all the children who 
lived in his populous neighborhood. He understood the implications of 
handing a list of names to the mercenaries and doubted their sincerity. 
The offer of gifts was, he believed, a move to soften the brutal image 
of the BCB by demonstrating its concern for children. The next day, a 
local radio station announced that the BCB would hand out presents to 
neighborhood youngsters on Christmas Eve, and it broadcast a sched-
ule of the times and locations where the gifts would be distributed. 
Shaking his head, Páez described how groups of parents and children 
moved en masse from one distribution site to another, only to be dis-
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appointed at every turn. Finally, he said, the radio announced that the 
truck bearing the presents had been turned back, but there was no 
mention of who had interfered with its journey. Even though there 
would be no Christmas presents for the children, the paramilitaries 
had demonstrated their good intentions and placed the failure of their 
plan on forces operating outside the city. Given the total impunity that 
undergirded paramilitary rule, Páez’s timorous refusal to collude with 
the BCB was notable, but it was not widely imitated. One resident in-
sisted that Páez was unique: “He is very loyal to the principle of nonvio-
lence. He was one of the few [council presidents] with the balls to take 
on the guerrillas and the paras equally.”24 Although it is likely that Páez 
made accommodations with the mercenaries that he was not comfort-
able talking about with me, the resident’s sentiment was widely shared 
by others. For Páez and other council presidents like him, clientelism 
had grown much more unpredictable in northeast Barranca, where raw 
intimidation frequently displaced the more benign exchange of public 
resources for votes.
In the case of the neighborhood council, the BCB drive to win broad 
popular acceptance ran up against a local leader who had been en-
meshed in long-term, regular interactions with neighborhood people. 
Páez’s close personal bonds with many people underwrote his au-
thority as council president and moved those most closely tied to his 
personal networks to understand that he cared about their welfare. 
To the extent that such individuals and their networks represented an 
alternative way to access resources and a legitimate claim to look out 
for the well-being of the community, they posed a threat to paramili-
tary power; Páez was therefore exceptional in his ability to negotiate 
paramilitary demands and remain alive. What his case suggests is that 
after the violent conquest of Barrancabermeja, the BCB attempted to 
co-opt council presidents like Páez and then use their dense social ties 
as a basis for sanctioning paramilitary authority. This was an important 
move because in Páez’s neighborhood, residents viewed the BCB’s paisa 
commanders as outsiders, and young foot soldiers like Eduardo did not 
inspire confidence. In addition, the BCB was itself a volatile organiza-
tion riven by competing interests and personal rivalries. Even though 
paramilitary bosses could distribute jobs and favors to a web of clients 
and sympathizers, those incorporated into the BCB’s authoritarian net-
works had to deal with the constant threat of violence for perceived 
missteps, the inability to repay a debt, or the refusal to respond to the 
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request for a favor. None of this constituted fertile ground for the con-
struction of legitimacy, and it further shredded the tattered fabric of 
working-class Barranca.
The BCB’s efforts to sanitize its sanguinary image met with uneven 
results elsewhere in the city as well. The creation of a social fund with 
proceeds from the massive theft of gasoline from ECOPETROL’s pipe-
lines enabled it to finance a range of good works, including the com-
pletion of a park in the Ninth of April neighborhood that had begun 
under the guerrillas. Council leaders remained silent about the project 
as it unfolded, but when the park was named the Fidel Castaño Gil 
Park—after the BCB front that took control of the city—amid a public 
ceremony replete with firecrackers and a speech by “Jhony,” the para-
military commander, word of the “para park” spread, and a tenacious 
group of human rights activists raised an outcry.25 One activist ex-
plained how, after the inauguration, “we found out about it and began 
the most ferocious denouncement and pressure so that the munici-
pal authorities, who were complicit in the project, would have to tear 
it down. The protest was so great that they had to take down the bust 
and the plaque that had been installed in honor of that sociopath called 
Fidel.”26 By sounding the alarm with the mayor’s office, the activists 
called attention to the clandestine connections that linked the mu-
nicipal officials and neighborhood council to the paramilitaries. They 
also signaled that legitimizing the paramilitary project would be much 
more difficult in Barrancabermeja than in surrounding towns and ham-
lets because the remnants of a shattered opposition remained a signifi-
cant, albeit vastly reduced, counterweight to the emergent status quo.
Unlike victorious revolutionary armies that face the task of address-
ing popular demands and incorporating them into new state struc-
tures, the BCB never sought to replace the institutional state; rather, it 
worked with and through the JACs, the mayor’s office, and state insti-
tutions at the local, provincial, and national levels by corrupting and 
coercing state personnel, placing sympathizers in positions of power, 
and murdering competitors. By using the juntas as vehicles to natu-
ralize their power, the paramilitaries aggravated enduring concerns 
about the stated autonomy of these bodies and raised questions about 
whether they protected the well-being of residents or undermined 
their security. Such worries pointed to the ongoing struggle over the 
right to rule that was woven into the fabric of daily life and continued 
after the paramilitary takeover. They reflected both the hopes and the 
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fears that embodied popular perceptions of the state, whose institu-
tions themselves were rife with conflicting logics of rule.
An Undeclared Death Penalty
Hopes and fears about the state emerged in a conversation that I had 
with Pedro Lozada, as we chatted one day on the patio behind his 
home. “Do you know that in Colombia they use the death penalty?” he 
asked. Lozada straddled a hammock and paused for a moment to judge 
my reaction before continuing: “I don’t believe that I have ever heard 
anyone use that expression. It is not a death penalty written in the 
constitution. . . . [It’s] an undeclared death penalty; the government 
can kill anyone. That’s what has happened in Colombia.”27 His notion 
of an undeclared death penalty evinced an understanding of an out-
law state—violent, predatory, unpredictable, and criminal—that acted 
outside the constitutional bounds of legality. Such fears were amplified 
in Barrancabermeja, where the webs of power that connected the insti-
tutional state to the “parastate” were not only unclear; their very ambi-
guity expressed how powerful actors were reconfiguring the state and 
the ways it was understood. Fears were further aggravated by a strong 
belief that powerful individuals manipulated violent events behind the 
scenes and escaped responsibility for their actions. The struggle be-
tween fear and hope emerged in sharpest relief among those men and 
women who participated in a state-sponsored protection program that 
placed their physical security in the hands of the Ministry of Interior 
and the highly suspect DAS. Their worries that the institutional state 
left them unprotected—even targeted them for death—and their in-
sistence that it operate within the law, provide for their needs, and 
protect them influenced how they negotiated a relationship with it and 
illustrated how few options were available.
Since 1997, the Colombian Ministry of Interior has operated a pro-
tection program called the Program for the Protection of Human 
Rights Defenders, Members of Social Organizations and Witnesses of 
Human Rights Violations and Breaches of International Humanitarian 
Law, which is implemented by the state security forces. The program 
arose at a moment when the Colombian government was under in-
tense pressure from other governments, primarily the United States, 
Canada, and the European Union, and international organizations, 
such as the International Labor Organization, to address the abys-
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mal human rights record of its security forces. Shaped by the train-
ing, finance, and advice of transnational NGOs and Western govern-
ments, it was part of a much broader initiative that began in the 1990s 
to create new state human rights agencies to monitor other Colombian 
state institutions, primarily the military and the judiciary, and to fund 
new human rights programs within preexisting state bureaucracies.28
It purported to safeguard the lives of threatened activists from union, 
civic, human rights, and peasant organizations, and, between 2001 and 
2006, the initiative received financial support from the United States.
More than six thousand Colombians participated in the program in 
2006; more than a third of these individuals were either trade union 
leaders or members of human rights organizations. The program pro-
vided them with a series of “hard” and “soft” forms of support, de-
pending on the level of risk established by either the police or, prior 
to 2011, the DAS.29 The hard support for the most gravely threatened 
individuals included armored vehicles, bodyguards, bulletproof vests, 
and weapons, while the soft support consisted of communication de-
vices that linked activists to an early warning system and financial as-
sistance to move to safer locations. In Barrancabermeja, a number of 
trade unionists and other activists received a full range of hard secu-
rity measures from the DAS, but the protection program was a constant 
source of tension, mistrust, and suspicion, as DAS officials and program 
beneficiaries became enmeshed in a series of conflicting demands.
Trade unionists and human rights leaders insisted that state offi-
cials do their duty and protect citizens from paramilitary violence, and 
they embraced the security measures provided by the state. Yet by par-
ticipating in the protection program, they placed themselves in the dif-
ficult position of turning to the security forces, whom they had long 
regarded as paramilitary collaborators, and asking them to safeguard 
the very people whom the security forces regarded as “subversives,” a 
label that legitimized the use of lethal violence against them. Their di-
lemma highlighted both the grave threats to which they were exposed 
and the absence of alternatives for dealing with them. Much of the 
conflict turned on the issue of bodyguards. The DAS oversaw the hiring 
and performance of all bodyguards in the Colombian state’s protec-
tion program, but the agency was profoundly mistrusted because of 
widespread belief that it maintained close ties to paramilitary organi-
zations. The respected Colombian newsweekly Semana confirmed these 
fears in 2006, when it revealed that the DAS had drawn up a list of trade 
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union leaders, academics, and government opponents and given it to 
a paramilitary bloc that operated on the north coast. The individuals 
on the list were then threatened, and several were either murdered or 
disappeared.
The tussle between endangered social movement leaders and the 
security forces began with a risk evaluation that either the DAS or the 
police conducted before assigning protective security measures. Those 
under evaluation complained that the risk assessment routinely under-
estimated the threat level and resulted in the provision of inadequate 
security or none at all. According to one trade unionist, “Over the years, 
there are people who died in the protection program. There are also 
people who have been shot at and who have had to leave town on the 
run. Then the DAS or the police do a study of the risk level, and they 
assign an average level that doesn’t come with bodyguards. And what is 
really idiotic is that sometimes they will give you a bulletproof vest, but 
the city is full of paramilitaries who shoot at your head.”30 Yet a gov-
ernment official who oversaw the protection program insisted that be-
cause of the widespread mistrust of the DAS, individuals did not always 
provide enough information to complete an accurate evaluation.31 The 
program director dismissed the complaints and argued that “every-
one wants to have an armored car because [the cars] are status sym-
bols.” He claimed that this was especially true for men who were accus-
tomed to riding motorcycles and bicycles.32 And like other officials in 
the Uribe administration, he harbored suspicions that trade unionists 
and human rights workers were linked to the insurgencies.
Even when the DAS assigned a bodyguard to protect a vulnerable 
individual, many trade union leaders did not accept personnel from the 
DAS because they believed that the agency ordered the guards to collect 
intelligence and then used the information to murder them or their 
family members. The protection program, however, permitted partici-
pants to nominate their own bodyguards, and if the nominees passed 
muster with the DAS, the agency extended them a contract that lasted 
approximately six to eight months. Nevertheless, there were constant 
complaints that the DAS canceled these contracts without due cause, 
that it periodically refused to provide airline tickets for bodyguards 
to travel on official business with their charges, and that it left endan-
gered individuals without protection. Indeed, when the DAS refused 
to provide transportation for a bodyguard, threatened activists were 
placed in the uncomfortable position of accepting an unknown and 
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untrusted guard from the DAS or traveling alone. A trade union leader 
who had been in the DAS protection program for several years ex-
pressed his frustration:
Our guards are fired on the slightest pretext. The DAS kicked out my 
two bodyguards in 2006, even though I complained. It maintained 
the position that I had to accept the guards that the agency sent me, 
but the union has a very clear policy that we do not take any body-
guard that we do not know, because the DAS tries to use the guards 
to gather intelligence on us. Many times, but really very often, we 
have to travel alone because the DAS will not give the boys tickets. 
It says that there is no money for the tickets. You call up the Minis-
try of Interior, and they tell you, “Oh, what a pity, we’ve run out of 
money. We can’t. But if you want, we’ll send you a man from the DAS
as soon as you arrive in the airport.” Obviously, we say no. . . . So we 
have to travel alone, and we have to stay in other cities without pro-
tection because the DAS says that there isn’t money for the tickets.33
The struggle over bodyguards points to the uncertainty and the 
chaos that arise from the violent social order that the private power of 
paramilitarism has created, a social order in which the Ministry of In-
terior emerges as a contradictory site of both arbitrary, ruthless force 
and citizen protection. Such contradictions arise from the competing 
social forces, both foreign and domestic, that shape state institutions 
and their programs within wider fields of force and mold how contra-
dictory claims to rule emerge within government institutions, as well 
as outside of them, and shape how people understand their encoun-
ters with “the state.”34 The contest over security also underscores how 
the institutional state acts in ways that, by its own definition, are ille-
gal, and demonstrates how impunity massages the tensions between 
legality and illegality, which shape the process of governance; indeed, 
as Philip Abrams (1988) reminds us, “legitimizing the illegitimate” is 
one of the central features of state formation. This view of the state 
forces us to move beyond the institutions of the state and grasp how 
the aggregation of power-laden social relationships, both public and 
private, coalesce around conflicting political projects that seek to natu-
ralize relationships of inequality into a concept of the state and trans-
late them into a common understanding of citizenship.
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The Resurgence of the Institutional State:  
Legitimizing the Illegitimate
Although the BCB managed to subdue Barrancabermeja and pump 
wealth out of the city through the incorporation of working people 
into new, militarized relationships of exploitation, its attempts to 
legitimate paramilitary rule were uneven and incomplete, and it even-
tually became a threat to the domestic and international legitimacy 
of the official state. Once the BCB and other paramilitary armies had 
converted vast extensions of rural Colombia—including the Middle 
Magdalena region—into zones of resource extraction, megaprojects, 
and export agriculture for themselves and those they served, they be-
came a liability and an embarrassment for a government that claimed 
to represent South America’s oldest democracy. The presence of mer-
cenary armies that massacred civilians, destroyed reformist political 
projects, trafficked cocaine, and amassed private fortunes after seizing 
control of huge extensions of land, portions of the state apparatus, and 
an array of legal businesses finally became untenable. Forced to con-
tain the violence that it unleashed to defeat the insurgencies and no 
longer able to deny the existence of paramilitaries, the right-wing gov-
ernment of Álvaro Uríbe announced a “peace process” in 2003. Nego-
tiations between the Uribe administration and paramilitary chieftains 
lasted until 2006, when some seven thousand BCB troops officially de-
mobilized in media-saturated demobilization ceremonies that featured 
news footage of young fighters surrendering weapons and speeches by 
commanders and government officials extolling the end of hostilities.
Because the government had never been at war with armed, right-
wing groups, however, the so-called peace process was a negotiation 
between two sectors of the Colombian state: the official state and 
its illegal, regional counterparts (Hristov 2010); the guerrillas of the 
FARC and the ELN did not participate. The result was a government-
brokered amnesty program, condemned by human rights groups for 
institutionalizing impunity, that sought to incorporate the paramili-
taries into politics and society, while dismantling their armies. A new 
2005 law—the Justice and Peace Law—made no effort to expose the 
official state’s responsibility for creating, consolidating, and expanding 
paramilitary organizations, nor did it provide mechanisms for seizing 
paramilitary assets and dismantling the political and economic foun-
dations of their power. In exchange for demobilizing their troops, con-
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fessing their crimes, and dismantling their criminal operations, the law 
granted minimal prison sentences of five to eight years to commanders 
who had committed crimes against humanity. Such leniency was not 
enough for some individuals, who balked at the prospect of spending 
any time in jail and who threatened to withdraw from the peace process 
and expose their dealings with government officials. The boundary be-
tween the official state, which claimed legitimacy, and its violent, un-
official offshoots then began to erode.
A perilous moment for government officials then ensued. In 2006, 
a public scandal over revelations about the connections between para-
militaries and politicians, known as the parapolítica, began to unfold 
when a few paramilitary leaders revealed some of their dealings and 
alliances with government officials in public testimony. These revela-
tions led to the jailing or investigation of more than one hundred mem-
bers of Congress and governors, including several politicians from San-
tander province, such as Convergencia Ciudadana founder and Senator 
Luis Alberto Gil, Representative Luis Alfonso Riaño, Senator Oscar 
Josué Reyes, and Governor Hugo Aguilar, who received seven- to nine-
year jail terms for their ties to the BCB. In addition, the former national 
DAS director, Jorge Noguera, was convicted of collaborating with the 
AUC to murder trade unionists and other political opponents. In 2008, 
in an effort to prevent the scandal from reaching into the presidential 
office, then president Álvaro Uríbe extradited fourteen top paramilitary 
commanders—including jailed BCB leaders Carlos Mario Jiménez and 
Ivan Roberto Duque—to the United States, where they were wanted on 
drug trafficking charges and where they were less likely to face ques-
tioning about their connections to high-ranking government officials 
in Colombia. Over the next two years, more details of the paramilitary-
state relationship were revealed through a series of shocking scandals, 
but as Jasmine Hristov (2010) notes, what all the scandals had in com-
mon was the location of paramilitarism in the past, implying a rupture 
with the present in which paramilitarism officially no longer existed.
Neither the government nor the major media acknowledged the 
emergence of neoparamilitary groups, such as Águilas Negras and Los 
Rastrojos, which continued to use violence to suppress dissent, dis-
possess working people, and accumulate capital on behalf of a retooled 
right-wing alliance purged of its most noxious elements. Similarly, 
they ignored how parties tainted by the parapolítica scandal reorga-
nized under new names to guarantee the continued influence and local 
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political power of the scandal’s heirs. A new designation—bandas crimi-
nales (BACRIM)—disappeared new paramilitary groups into the realm 
of common thieves and youth gangs; “emergent bands of criminals” 
became responsible for continuing violence, according to the govern-
ment. Such linguistic sleight of hand severed the connection between 
those who used violence to accumulate capital, political leaders, and 
the security forces, and it reestablished the illusion of separation be-
tween the official state and the paramilitaries. By locating paramili-
tarism in the past, ridding themselves of former allies who had be-
come a liability, and denying any connection to violent, illegal forms 
of capital accumulation and dispossession in the present, government 
officials reasserted their claim to rule by legitimizing the illegitimate 
(Hristov 2010).
The capacity to obscure historical connections, select and naturalize 
certain beliefs about the past, and obfuscate violent forms of inequality 
was part of a deepening rightward shift in processes of state formation 
in which the vision of a state that took care of its citizens’ basic needs 
was diminished. In the Middle Magdalena, state formation turned on 
the control of the drug traffic, the consolidation of landownership, the 
command of space, and the unmaking of Barrancabermeja’s working 
class, whose demands for better working conditions, land, public ser-
vices, and democracy were silenced. The spaces that the institutional 
state had once filled or never occupied were taken over by new authori-
tarian, paramilitary networks, which frequently blurred with the insti-
tutional state and generated new worries about who acted in the state’s 
name. Regulating a fragmented assemblage of authoritarian, clientelis-
tic relations and normalizing BCB rule proved difficult, as reproducing 
a social order through fear and terror, with limited moral legitimacy, 
posed serious long-term problems.
The BCB was responsible for creating much of the disorder that it 
had to subsequently control. To the extent that paramilitary networks 
incorporated men and women into new relations of criminalized labor 
and indebtedness, they tended to further stigmatize and marginalize 
destitute people, who had no legal protections against threats or the 
arbitrary use of force meted out by individual commanders, and then 
eroded the relationships and understandings that had once consti-
tuted a vibrant working-class culture. These mercenary networks were 
not based on long-term, face-to-face interactions with neighborhood 
residents that inspired trust; they were undergirded by fear and intimi-
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dation. What emerged in Barrancabermeja between 2002 and 2006 was 
a highly unstable, violent configuration of private and public power 
that succumbed to the weight of its own murderous behavior. Yet after 
the most discredited paramilitary leaders were extradited to the United 
States, the mercenary blocs demobilized, and the numerous scandals 
involving government officials and paramilitaries had run their course, 
a newly sanitized institutional state reemerged in defense of a neolib-
eral social order that had been created by paramilitary violence and 
counterinsurgency and that was undemocratic to the core. How long 
this new order can continue to reproduce itself remains uncertain, 
as chronic insecurity, economic marginalization, and continuing fear 






On a steamy morning in February 2007, the Espacio de Trabajadores 
y Trabajadoras de Derechos Humanos (Workers’ Space for Human 
Rights) convened an emergency meeting to respond to the attempted 
kidnapping of a street vendor. The Espacio had arisen in 2000 from 
the deepening violence of Barrancabermeja’s dirty war to model itself 
after the defunct Coordinadora Popular. After years of state and para-
military attacks against Barranca’s popular organizations, it united 
a loosely knit coalition of surviving unions, neighborhood organiza-
tions, and human rights defenders. Although the Espacio lacked the 
depth, breadth, and organizational power of the Coordinadora, it con-
vened every week to discuss problems, especially human rights con-
cerns, and to propose solutions and bring popular pressure to bear on 
state officials. There was, however, nothing routine about this meeting.
Representatives from the teachers’ union, a displaced persons or-
ganization, two international-based human rights groups, a regional 
human rights organization, the Juanist religious order, SINALTRAINAL, 
the USO, and the state’s human rights office—the Defensoría del 
Pueblo—were among those crowded around a table in the second-
floor headquarters of the OFP, which hosted Espacio meetings. Alfredo 
Arango hunched over the table.1 A slightly built, middle-aged man with 
a thin mustache and gray-flecked hair that flowed away from his fore-
head, Arango cast nervous glances around the room. He was no stranger 
to Barrancabermeja. He had worked in the municipal slaughterhouse 
for nearly two decades before the BCB occupied the city and system-
atically murdered members of his union. Driven by fears of persecu-
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tion and economic necessity, he spent the next several years on the 
move, never remaining in one place very long, and for the last sixteen 
months, he and his family had lived in the departmental capital, Buca-
ramanga, where Arango sold fast food on the street, and his wife took 
in laundry. His return to Barrancabermeja two days earlier had been 
terrifying and unexpected. He now hoped to get out of town again as 
soon as possible.
In a halting voice, Arango explained to the assembled audience how 
three soldiers dressed as civilians had kidnapped him off the street and 
accused him of controlling the FARC’s financial resources for the con-
flicted region of southern Bolívar province, located upriver from Ba-
rrancabermeja on the Magdalena’s western bank. “They thought that 
they caught a big fish,” he said. Flashing a taut smile and stroking his 
chin, he wondered aloud how the armed forces could believe that he 
was the FARC’s finance chief, given that he had so little formal educa-
tion. “How could someone like me manage all the FARC’s money,” he 
asked rhetorically, and “why would I be so poor, if it were true?” These 
facts were apparently of little concern to his kidnappers, who stuffed 
him into the back of a car and threatened to kill him if he refused to co-
operate. Because denying their charges seemed futile, Arango decided 
to string them along and buy time for himself by promising to lead the 
men to a large arms cache in Barrancabermeja, where he hoped that 
someone might help him.
Pausing frequently to hold back tears, Arango described how the 
soldiers drove down the mountainous road from Bucaramanga to the 
tropical plains of the Middle Magdalena and on to the barrio Bos-
ton, arriving at the place, on the edge of a field, where he indicated 
the weapons were buried. Because the hard-packed earth had clearly 
not been disturbed in a long time, his tormentors immediately became 
suspicious. They ordered him to dig up the alleged stockpile but lost 
patience when his efforts yielded only a large hole in the ground. The 
terrified street vendor insisted that he had made a mistake and con-
vinced them to go to another neighborhood, where his relatives lived. 
After a short drive, they parked near his sister’s house and started 
walking toward it. Arango recognized several local residents, but he 
did not greet them or even act like he recognized anyone. When Arango 
realized that his sister’s front door was open, he made a bold, spur-of-
the-moment decision to escape. Bolting into the house, he screamed 
at his shocked sister that men were trying to kill him and then dis-
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appeared out the back door and into a deep ravine. He made his way 
to his mother-in-law’s home, where he hid until his sister contacted 
the OFP, which employed her. The organization was currently providing 
him with temporary sanctuary.
As the men and women seated around the table took in Arango’s 
dramatic story, the OFP’s director, Yolanda Becerra, entered the room 
and recounted the details of a two-hour meeting in the office of the 
public prosecutor (fiscalía), where she had filed a public denouncement 
(denuncia) against the army for violating Arango’s human rights. The 
ensuing discussion focused on two concerns: how to protect Arango, 
and how to safeguard his family in Bucaramanga and Barrancabermeja. 
The group decided to ask the fiscalía to provide the Arango family with 
protective measures and to notify the Office of the Inspector General 
(Procuraduría), a public institution charged with investigating miscon-
duct by state offices, of the kidnapping. To place additional pressure on 
municipal, departmental, and national state officials, each represen-
tative signed an urgent action alert that was e-mailed to other human 
rights organizations, religious groups, trade unions, and popular orga-
nizations, both in Colombia and abroad, asking recipients to immedi-
ately protest the army’s treatment of Arango by telephoning, faxing, 
and e-mailing various government offices.
As an older vision of dealing with the state, based in collective claims 
to labor protections, social citizenship and national sovereignty, suc-
cumbed to the dirty war, human rights became a new form of claims 
making and political practice. Beginning in the late 1970s and acceler-
ating in the 1990s, the global politics of “rights” sought to protect per-
secuted individuals from the overwhelming violence of the state and 
uphold new developments in international law. Rooted in liberalism, 
especially in the primacy accorded to the individual, and advocated by 
liberal elites, global human rights frameworks focused on empowering 
individuals and the socially excluded. “Rights talk,” however, concerned 
itself less with class politics than with transcending politics and the re-
strictions of the territorially bounded nation-state. Human rights ap-
pealed to a moral vision of a global community that was not hemmed 
in by any political system. It represented a form of internationalism 
that replaced anticolonialism and communism, that emphasized col-
lective self-determination and national sovereignty, rather than indi-
vidual privilege, and that underscored the importance of the state, 
rather than the supremacy of international law (Chandler 2002; Moyn 
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2010). As Samuel Moyn observes, “It was not only the loss of faith 
in the nation-state but also the desertion of the stage by alternative 
promises to transcend the nation-state that accounts for the relevance 
of human rights in the last three decades” (2010: 212–13). Yet in Latin 
America, “alternative promises,” such as socialism, anti-imperialist na-
tionalism, social democracy, and liberation theology–inspired Chris-
tian humanism, were less deserters of the scene than crushed under 
the boot of authoritarian regimes that came to power in the middle de-
cades of the twentieth century. Leftist activists in the Southern Cone, 
for example, adopted the language of human rights in the 1970s and 
1980s, as repressive military dictatorships threatened their lives, dis-
mantled left political projects, and forced them into exile in search of 
new allies. Neither political liberalism nor individualistic notions of 
human rights, they believed, addressed the social and economic prob-
lems that afflicted their societies, but they adopted the human rights 
frame to end state repression against people like themselves and to 
establish minimal rules for political participation. In this way, the left 
used global rights discourse to formulate its own opposition to cold 
war repression (Markarian 2005; Stites 2013).
Like these activists, many people in Barrancabermeja would not 
have framed their struggles in terms of human rights, if the ferocious 
repression had not shattered their world, torn individuals from rela-
tionships of solidarity, and forced them to build new alliances and sup-
port networks. And they did not adopt global human rights discourse 
whole cloth or see it as a replacement for the social and economic 
equality that they had long demanded from the state. Rather, I argue, 
the emergence of a new politics of human rights in Barrancabermeja 
was the by-product of decades of repression that narrowed political 
visions of a different world and blocked avenues of political practice. 
Making credible human rights claims took place within a constricted 
sense of political possibilities in which rights activists depended upon 
the appearance of objectivity and separation from left politics and 
could do little more than appeal to international law. Human rights 
then further hindered the development of progressive politics, because 
of its growing detachment from collective notions of liberation and 
social transformation.2
Activists in Barrancabermeja adopted the language and practice of 
human rights at a moment when the vibrant tradition of radical trade 
unionism and civic activism was in decline, and political violence was 
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tearing apart older relationships of solidarity. They did so to challenge 
the assertion that the institutional state was the locus of rule and that 
its bureaucracies and shadowy allies could dispense violence with im-
punity.3 The prioritization of human rights concerns gave rise to new 
institutions, networks, alliances, and international funding, as ascen-
dant neoliberalism, with its narrow vision of legal equality and per-
sonal freedom, threatened to absorb a growing global human rights 
movement. In Barrancabermeja, human rights became an organizing 
concept and a political demand that brought together a diverse spec-
trum of people, who were often deeply divided, to act on the basis of 
what they did share: stopping the repression against them and regain-
ing control over their lives and neighborhoods. To what extent, this 
chapter asks, was human rights activism able to suture together the 
fragments of Barrancabermeja’s devastated social movements and 
transcend the individualism embedded in liberal notions of human 
rights and deepened by economic restructuring?
Human rights became part of the “language of contention” in Ba-
rrancabermeja and the Middle Magdalena, that is, “a common ma-
terial and meaningful framework for talking about and acting upon 
social orders characterized by domination” (Roseberry 1994: 361), as 
working people were confronted again with the challenge of organiza-
tion, institution building, and self-education that they had faced in the 
past but not in exactly the same way. Nongovernmental organizations 
dedicated to the defense of human rights arose from the shreds of Ba-
rrancabermeja’s mutilated social fabric and arrived from elsewhere. 
The Barrancabermeja-based organization CREDHOS was founded, in 
1987, by the Coordinadora Popular and supported by the Bogotá-based 
Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (Center for Research and 
Popular Education, CINEP), a Jesuit-operated human rights organiza-
tion. It was later joined by European-based and North American–based 
NGOs, such as Peace Brigades, Pax Christi, and Christian Peacemaker 
Teams, whose young “internationalists” provided protective accompa-
niment to threatened social leaders. Human Rights Watch, Amnesty 
International, Witness for Peace, and the Center for International 
Policy, among others, also monitored local events and reported on 
them from headquarters in Europe and the United States. The growth 
of human rights organizing opened new kinds of political possibilities 
and engagements when radical uncertainty was the central experience 
of working people in Barrancabermeja.
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My analysis demonstrates how human rights also infused vener-
able popular organizations with a different language and form of prac-
tice. Unions, popular organizations, and development projects, such as 
the USO, the OFP, and the World Bank–funded Development and Peace 
Program for the Middle Magdalena, which began in 1995, integrated 
human rights concerns into the ways that they addressed labor con-
flicts, advocated for poor women, and approached development issues, 
respectively. And in a variation of Bourdieu’s metaphor of “the left 
hand and the right hand of the state,”4 new bureaucratic government 
agencies—the Defensoría del Pueblo—championed the protection of 
human rights to legitimize government support of an idealized vision 
of the modern, law-abiding state, while the army incorporated human 
rights into its military strategy (Tate 2007: 256–89). As Greg Grandin 
observed, the strength of the idea of human rights was “that we as-
sume that everyone means the same thing, when in fact the mean-
ing is keenly contested. Not only is the context of the idea unsettled 
(do human rights entail social and economic rights or just individual 
rights?), but the application of the idea has been two edged, used either 
at the service of or in opposition to power” (2007: 194). Human rights 
were open to interpretation from different political perspectives, be-
coming the ultimate “empty signifier” (Cmiel 1999: 1248). The con-
cept allowed disparate groups with unequal access to power to infuse 
the notion with their own understandings and shape it in accord with 
changing political agendas (Markarian 2005; Tate 2007).
For social justice advocates and survivors of Barrancabermeja’s 
unfolding dirty war, human rights activism straddled their fears and 
hopes about the institutional state. While the violence of state secu-
rity forces and their long-standing collusion with paramilitaries had 
generated views of the state as predatory, murderous, unaccountable, 
and impenetrable, the practice of human rights held out the promise 
of holding the state accountable and making its institutions responsive 
to the law, which would, in turn, broaden the scope of liberal democ-
racy. This chapter closely examines how a diverse group of social justice 
advocates drew on the idea and practice of human rights to challenge 
the legitimacy of the institutional state and to reconstruct a popular 
movement, as they maneuvered to stay alive amid the ferocious repres-
sion targeted against them. Their various efforts were at times a class 
struggle and at times a struggle that moved on the edges of other cate-
gories. What sorts of political possibilities did rights activism open and 
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foreclose? Rather than juxtaposing a period of class-based struggles to 
an era of legalistic human rights activism, I paint a more complicated 
picture of continuities and discontinuities between the past and the 
present, as I explore the kind of social justice project that human rights 
activism represented in Barrancabermeja.
First, I examine how human rights activism emerged from earlier 
forms of class-based political organizing and claims making, and I take 
stock of the connections and the breaks with older forms of opposi-
tional politics. The discussion then explores the contentious politics 
that surrounded efforts to incorporate the concerns of women and gays 
into the new alliances and forms of claims making created by human 
rights activism, as the tradition of class-based militancy was under 
siege. Finally, I consider how unarmed “accompaniment” by interna-
tional human rights volunteers reshaped the understanding of inter-
national solidarity in Barrancabermeja in a period when the state could 
not provide basic security and the left could not protect its own people. 
Human rights activism, I argue, was a defensive move that arose in 
Barrancabermeja from the violent destruction of class-based forms of 
political protest and the discrediting of older utopian visions of social-
ism. Because of how political terror dismantled social movements into 
individual survival strategies and, together with neoliberalism, recon-
figured the relationship between self and society, paramilitary repres-
sion and economic restructuring created the kind of vulnerable indi-
viduals about whom human rights claims could be made.5 Although the 
idea and practice of human rights opened a new space for politics to 
emerge from the ashes of the dirty war, they simultaneously narrowed 
the parameters of what was both politically possible and imaginable 
and contributed to the deepening impoverishment of politics.
The Rise of Human Rights and the Defense of Life
Human rights activism developed in Barrancabermeja in the 1980s as 
a form of political organization and claims making to address state 
violence against the left, and it grew out of earlier forms of radical 
politics in Colombia (Tate 2007) and other Latin American countries 
that aimed to end the nightmare of military dictatorship (Markarian 
2005). As the violence intensified in Barrancabermeja, a debate arose 
within the city’s trade unions about the very notion of “rights,” a con-
ceptual category that had not figured prominently in workers’ under-
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standing of the world and how to change it. The United States had 
used the notion of human rights to attack the Soviet Union, and when 
the Carter administration adopted human rights rhetoric in its policy 
toward Central America, many trade unionists viewed the concept as a 
thin cover for escalating U.S. militarism in Nicaragua, Honduras, and El 
Salvador in the name of these rights. They also felt uncomfortable with 
the way that human rights discourse pushed political struggles into 
the legal realm and handed them over to lawyers, distracting attention 
from the strikes, meetings, popular assemblies, and other concrete ac-
tions associated with class struggle. As retired oil worker and longtime 
USO member Ramón Rangel observed, “The USO was a union charac-
terized by concrete actions [acciones de hecho]. If anything happened, 
we organized a civic strike, a labor strike, or a meeting right away. We 
were formed that way as trade unionists, and that’s how we were. We 
didn’t value legal struggles, and we didn’t think that anything would 
be solved through legalistic discussion with the state.”6 Similarly, SI-
NALTRAINAL initially saw little value in human rights; the national di-
rectorate even opposed William Mendoza’s participation in CREDHOS. 
According to Mendoza, the union directorate “debated whether or not 
to give me permission to attend CREDHOS events and to cover my ex-
penses on these occasions. . . . There wasn’t one [SINALTRAINAL] local 
that addressed the issue of human rights. I was the first person to start. 
Later, the union policy changed when [the directorate] came to under-
stand that addressing human rights was part of what it meant to be 
an integral union leader, and they stopped screwing around with me.”7
Although some Colombian unionists initially viewed human rights 
organizing as “bourgeois,” the violent dismantling of the left moved 
them to embrace human rights as both an immediate problem and a 
strategy to build political support. Ramón Rangel explained how it be-
came impossible for the USO to engage in collective bargaining with 
ECOPETROL, much less support the broader social struggles of peas-
ant and urban popular organizations, because of the assassinations 
of the union’s most prominent leaders and the sense of menace that 
hovered over their lives: “The death of Manuel Gustavo Chacón [a char-
ismatic leader of the USO] is significant in the sense that it marked the 
beginning of the extermination of the union by the Colombian state, 
and from there we can say that since 1989, more than ninety-five com-
pañeros have been killed inside the company. . . . We could not en-
gage in collective bargaining because we had to defend our lives.” He 
NARROWING POLITICAL OPTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 191
then emphasized that “life is not negotiated.”8 By the early 1990s, the 
USO and ECOPETROL had created a joint human rights commission to 
address the grave security risks faced by oil workers, and Rangel was 
one of its members. Members of SINALTRAINAL, too, began to partici-
pate in Permanent Peoples’ Tribunals, convened in Bogotá and mod-
eled after the Russell Tribunals on Vietnam, that addressed collective 
rights violations through an alternative judicial system—the people’s 
tribunal—and heard evidence collected by unions, NGOs, legal schol-
ars, and others about the crimes of the Colombian state and multi-
national corporations operating on Colombian territory. The tribunals’ 
findings were presented in public ceremonies and then published in the 
hope of raising national and international awareness of political vio-
lence in Colombia.
In the late 1980s, human rights received national impetus with the 
creation of a Constitutional Assembly, which brought together a broad 
array of political forces, including indigenous groups, trade unionists, 
former guerrillas, religious organizations, and representatives of the 
traditional political parties. It presented an opportunity to relegitimize 
the state and served as a vehicle for demobilized guerrillas to partici-
pate in national political life, and the 1991 Constitution that emerged 
from its deliberations specified that the state would “adopt measures 
to protect groups who are discriminated against or marginalized,” such 
as indigenous peoples and Afro-Colombians whose lands were being 
usurped by paramilitaries and threatened by development projects.9
By displaying a new recognition of marginalized groups within Colom-
bian society, the Constitution ceded certain rights to these groups and 
opened political space for talking about “diversity” and “inclusion,” yet 
it remained silent about institutional racism, homophobia, and class 
inequality. It encouraged certain working people to demonstrate their 
membership in identity-based groups (indigenous, afro-descendant, 
gay/lesbian, etc.) at a time when the privatization of public entities, 
the retrenchment of state-supported social welfare services, free-trade 
policies, and new antilabor laws were driving more people into poverty. 
In this way, the state drew on notions of what Hale calls “neoliberal 
multiculturalism” to grant rights to disenfranchised groups and steer 
protest away from the deepening economic inequalities that were driv-
ing more and more people into poverty, but even these modest reforms 
failed because there was no political force strong enough to guarantee 
their enactment.10
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The Constitution also created a new legal framework that estab-
lished a state human rights agency—the Defensoría del Pueblo—
assigned the task of helping victims of political violence. Yet it granted 
little investigative or enforcement power to the Defensoría, and, even 
more ominously, the Constitution had very little to say about the secu-
rity forces (Tate 2007: 61). It should come as no surprise, therefore, 
that the rights and guarantees elaborated by the 1991 Constitution ar-
rived stillborn. The FARC and the ELN had opted out of the Constituent 
Assembly, distrusting any agreement with the government after the 
annihilation of the Patriotic Union, and rededicated themselves to war 
through the embrace of kidnapping, drug trafficking, and extortion. 
The ensuing political and military centralization of regional paramili-
tary groups not only aimed to wipe out the ELN and the FARC, which 
had grown more powerful, but also took aim at the legal left, which had 
been legitimized by the Constituent Assembly and the new constitution 
(Valencia and Celis 2012: 77–78). Because of the escalating violence, de-
fending the right to life superseded the popular struggles around labor, 
social citizenship, and national sovereignty that had defined an earlier 
era. Between 1990 and 2001, 87 percent of the strikes that occurred in 
the Middle Magdalena region addressed human rights violations, in-
cluding the assassination or disappearance of labor leaders and com-
munity activists, illegal arrests, and generalized threats and political 
insecurity (Delgado 2006: 103).
From its office in Barrancabermeja, the working-class human rights 
activists of CREDHOS reached out to a membership in the small towns 
along the Magdalena River. They documented and denounced abuses 
by the security forces and the paramilitaries, and in conjunction with 
CINEP, they offered workshops and organizational support to local 
groups that were forming at the time and provided participants with 
the language of rights that was subsequently used to address state offi-
cials (Tate 2007). William Mendoza observed that, during his early in-
volvement with CREDHOS, “our initial purpose was to conduct work 
around civil and political rights, but we never imagined that, after a 
short time, the struggle would be concentrated on the defense of life.”11
Activists’ primary weapon was the denuncia—a public report that typi-
cally focused on paramilitary threats, assassinations, kidnapping, dis-
appearances, and torture. It was directed at government officials in a 
high-risk effort to breach the alliance between them and paramilitaries. 
Human rights defenders demanded that the police and the military 
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hold paramilitary perpetrators accountable for human rights viola-
tions and then denounced them for complicity when they failed to act. 
Not surprisingly, they increasingly found their own lives under threat.
If, as scholars have noted, the production of bureaucratic docu-
ments was one way that state agents and their interlocutors created 
the reality of the state and the proof of state power (e.g., Folch 2013; 
Hetherington 2011), Barrancabermeja’s activists used the ritualistic 
prose of the denuncia to paint a dark picture of the Colombian state, 
and they amassed information that defied official representations of 
events and underscored denials and evasions. This “information game,” 
Kregg Hetherington noted in the Paraguayan context, was “all about 
commanding the authority to represent the real” (2011: 159). Colombian 
human rights defenders not only aimed their denuncias at state offi-
cials but also sent them to other human rights organizations, unions, 
religious groups, and supporters, nationally and internationally, to gar-
ner support in pushing state officials to act morally and to uphold the 
law. In this way, they sought to “command the authority to represent 
the real,” that is, to claim that their representations of human rights 
violations were truthful, by documenting abuses, shaming the security 
forces and government bureaucrats for their alleged complicity with 
the paramilitaries, and drawing on international connections and an 
evolving body of human rights law to bolster their claims.
By so doing, they expressed a vision of an accountable, law-abiding 
state, one that Winifred Tate (2015) calls an “aspirational state.” Cre-
ating such a state depended on the reconstruction of a vibrant net-
work of grassroots solidarity that could push demands for change, yet 
paradoxically, the practice of human rights required no social base. 
As human rights became increasingly professionalized and less about 
movement building, a major objective of human rights organizations 
became the compilation of objective information and the public dis-
semination of this information. Grassroots organizing and mass mobi-
lizations were not necessary. And in order for the denuncias and claims 
of abuses to be “credible,” activists had to separate themselves from 
any appearance of being “political,” such as being tied to the political 
projects of victims and pressing an agenda for organizing society in a 
different way. Human rights activism, which emerged at a moment of 
narrowing political possibilities, thus ran the risk of further shrinking 
the space for politics by distancing itself from an agenda for transfor-
mative social change.
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From the USO to the OFP: Continuities and Discontinuities
Between the 1980s and the early twenty-first century, human rights 
activists in Barrancabermeja belonged to a generation, a social class, 
and a political culture that viewed collective struggle as an important 
means to achieve social well-being and eradicate injustice. Yet while 
leadership and alliances in the 1970s and 1980s had depended on 
unions, peasants, students, neighborhood organizations, left political 
parties, and the Catholic Church, the old allegiances no longer held, 
and international financial aid flowed to organizations that promoted 
human rights. These organizations became important reference points 
for what remained of the urban popular movements. Although the 
Espacio—like the 1980s era Coordinadora Popular—united the sur-
viving fragments of Barrancabermeja’s trade unions and civic groups 
under one umbrella, decades of violence had weakened its popular base 
and political power. The outsized presence of the USO had substantially 
declined. Assassinations had claimed the USO’s most dynamic leaders; 
factionalism had divided those leaders who remained; subcontracting 
and paramilitary infiltration had weakened the union’s negotiating 
power; violence had disrupted its ties to rural social movements and 
poor urban neighborhoods; and the central office had moved to Bogotá. 
By the dawn of the twenty-first century, the women of the OFP had as-
sumed leadership of the traumatized, diminished, but still-struggling 
popular movement. Human rights had replaced references to el pueblo
and the language of class as the privileged political category, and the 
rights of women and sexual minorities had found a niche on activists’ 
agendas.
The OFP had severed its ties to the Catholic Church in the late 1980s 
and was one of the only popular organizations in Barrancabermeja that 
managed to expand in the middle of the war, even though many of its 
leaders were harassed by the paramilitaries and its offices attacked. The 
OFP grew in part because it shifted from a church-based, neighborhood 
group to an independent, NGO that developed regional, national, and 
international connections. Financial support from European develop-
ment agencies enabled the OFP to construct a solid institutional struc-
ture with several paid staff members and to offer courses on female 
reproductive health, domestic violence, nutrition, and human rights 
to poor women in Barrancabermeja and several small towns along the 
Magdalena River. The organization also operated soup kitchens and 
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provided a range of services to residents of the northeast through its 
“Casa de la Mujer.” Yet as political violence engulfed every facet of daily 
life, the OFP became known less as a social service provider than as a 
human rights organization because of its leadership of the Espacio and 
its origins in the liberation theology–inspired Catholic Church of the 
1970s.
The OFP became a refuge and a reference point for those experienc-
ing political persecution, and it coordinated much of the public oppo-
sition to political violence after the paramilitary takeover of the city. 
The OFP articulated an antiwar political program around the slogan 
“Women do not give birth to sons and daughters and raise them for 
FIG. 6.1 OFP women symbolically reweave the social fabric with brightly 
colored ribbons and burn military clothing.
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war” (Las mujeres no parimos ni forjamos hijos y hijas para la guerra) that 
condemned the violence perpetrated by “armed actors”—the guerril-
las, the paramilitaries, and the state security forces—against “civil so-
ciety.” Yet even as the OFP attracted international financial support and 
won recognition for its defense of human rights, it restricted the range 
of interpretations through which the dirty war, past and present, was 
understood. It did so by creating a polarity between so-called armed 
actors and civil society, a distinction that was being widely adopted 
by human rights organizations, some academics, and government 
officials. At one extreme, the armed actors (e.g., the guerrillas, para-
militaries, and state security forces) were understood as the perpetra-
tors of violence, but their political programs, constituencies, tactics, 
and relative power became conflated, even though the OFP held the 
paramilitaries responsible for the vast majority of rights violations 
and rarely denounced the guerrillas. At the other extreme, an amor-
phous civil society encompassed the individual victims of political vio-
lence who were usually portrayed as passive, despite their activism and 
participation in social movement organizations. This nomenclature 
obscured histories of class conflict and mobilization and reified vio-
lence in the present. It also did a disservice to the history of insurgent-
pueblo relationships that were in fact supportive of the broad-based 
labor and civic demands of the progressive movement. The silencing of 
past forms of contentious politics complicated discussions about the 
social, political, and economic cleavages and diverse forms of political 
mobilization that continued to drive the conflict, while the liberal dis-
course of human rights addressed the abuses suffered by decontextu-
alized victims.12
The OFP’s articulation of a critical stance to all forms of violence 
in the 1990s came at a time when many unions and popular organi-
zations were distancing themselves from the insurgencies and ques-
tioning the combinación strategy, which was increasingly perceived as 
a threat to them and their leaders. And it arose at a moment of ex-
treme terror, when the scaffolding of Barrancabermeja’s social move-
ments was being disassembled and alternative analyses muzzled. The 
OFP’s opposition to all forms of violence expressed the exhaustion of 
many urban residents worn down by the dirty war, and it enabled the 
organization to strengthen its institutional base with foreign financial 
support and to then garner political capital and legitimacy through its 
association with the “international community,” that is, major West-
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ern organizations that funded development projects and supported 
human rights in the global South. “We could bring a thousand people 
out for a march because we had acquired a lot of credibility and inter-
national recognition,” explained Yolanda Becerra. “We were the ones 
making the denuncias, and the international community responded 
with a lot of solidarity.”13 In contrast, human rights organizations and 
Western development agencies generally did not concern themselves 
with labor struggles. Neither the notion of class solidarity nor worka-
day conceptualizations of trade unionism occupied a central place in 
human rights discourse, which addressed working people only after 
they became victims of violence, and they were not encompassed by 
neoliberal concepts of “development,” which sought to free up the cre-
ative energies of so-called microentrepreneurs.
The OFP was unlike many professionalized human rights organi-
zations that limited themselves to filing denuncias and engaging in 
legal battles, and that had no use for a political base in the traditional 
sense. It organized street demonstrations to pressure municipal au-
thorities to uphold the law and understood its network of programs 
and projects as part of its political base. Only a few days after the Espa-
cio confronted the plight of Alfredo Arango, the OFP was again in crisis 
mode, following the early morning kidnapping of the twenty-year-old
sister of one of the organization’s leaders. Several unions and popular 
organizations, including the OFP, had recently received death threats 
that mentioned family members of activist leaders as possible targets. 
Such individuals were easier marks than their more politically promi-
nent relatives, who often benefited from the protection of bodyguards 
and other security measures, and their death or disappearance could 
extract a high emotional price from family members and reverberate 
beyond particular institutions. While the kidnapping was an enormous 
shock to the women of the OFP, it came as no surprise; attacks on OFP
leaders and their family members had happened before.
The Espacio hastily organized a caravan of protesters to focus public 
attention on the crime. The plan was to travel through key urban neigh-
borhoods under paramilitary control and then stage a street demon-
stration that would block rush hour traffic on the highway leading out 
of town. Despite the short notice, by three o’clock a crowd of more 
than a hundred people had gathered in front of the OFP’s headquar-
ters, where they congregated in dispersed pools of shade under a row 
of trees that shielded the sidewalk from the blistering afternoon sun. 
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The caravan set off on a circuitous route through some of the most con-
flicted areas of Barranca with a red pickup truck in the lead. The OFP’s 
director, a trade unionist from the USO, the state’s human rights om-
budsman, and the kidnapped woman’s sister huddled inside the cab. 
A contingent of lumbering SUVs followed like a herd of docile bulls. In 
the backseats behind darkened windows sat trade union leaders, while 
their armed bodyguards piloted the vehicles. A swarm of motorbikes 
brought up the rear. Guided by students, rank-and-file trade unionists, 
NGO employees, nuns from the Juanist religious order, foreign human 
rights volunteers, and OFP project beneficiaries, they buzzed in and out 
of the throng of buses and taxis like bees on a mission.
As the caravan entered Barranca’s poor neighborhoods, protest 
leaders spoke out over two loudspeakers strapped in the back of the 
pickup, addressing an invisible paramilitary audience as well as the 
merchants and residents who handed over a portion of their income to 
the mercenaries for “protection.” They demanded that the kidnapped 
woman be returned alive and in good health; they condemned the ex-
tortion; and they lambasted the security forces for their indifference. 
The protest paused briefly in the desperately poor Arenales neighbor-
hood on the river’s sandy floodplain, where, people said, killers had dis-
membered their victims during the paramilitary takeover and thrown 
severed limbs into the river. As the procession moved along the water-
front, it passed a marketplace where fishermen were gutting and clean-
ing a fresh catch, and the smell of fish hung in the air. The men watched 
the protest in silence, betraying neither support nor opposition. Once 
again, the march leaders called for the immediate release of the kid-
napped woman, condemned the security forces for inaction, and in-
sisted to curious onlookers that Barrancabermeja was not at peace, de-
spite the highly touted paramilitary demobilization. The exhortations 
and demands were repeated at every stop.
The march wound down in a candlelight vigil at the As de Copa, a site 
charged with the symbolism of past labor protests, where demonstra-
tors stopped traffic into and out of the city for more than two hours. 
Groups of women from the OFP, dressed in black smocks, periodically 
chanted, “Women do not give birth to boys and girls and raise them for 
war,” and the protest music of Victor Jara and Mercedes Sosa was inter-
spersed with speeches that denounced paramilitarism, the kidnapping 
of innocent people, and the impunity that reigned in the city. The vigil 
and the march that preceded it demonstrated how human rights claims 
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united, at least temporarily, a variety of individuals and organizations 
because it cut across diverse sectoral agendas. The protest also dis-
played the boldness and tenacity of the surviving social justice advo-
cates in Barrancabermeja, where, unlike in the other small towns and 
hamlets of the Middle Magdalena, the embers of resistance had not 
been snuffed out. Yet the size of the protest was considerably dimin-
ished from the past, when the USO still had the organizational power 
to mobilize thousands of demonstrators to protest the deaths of labor 
leaders and the victims of paramilitary massacres. Despite Becerra’s 
claims of bringing out a thousand people, demonstrators at human 
rights protests in the first decade of the twenty-first century typically 
numbered in the hundreds, or even less. Several people lamented the 
callousness and indifference toward human rights crimes that seemed 
to have settled over the city in comparison to the past, when every 
death and disappearance was marked with a much larger outpouring 
of rage. As one exasperated activist observed, “Nowadays there is a sort 
of culture of death in the sense that if there are not twenty deaths, no-
body cares. There is no pain.”14 Such apparent apathy was tied both to 
the weakening of working-class institutions and relations and to the 
professionalization of human rights activism in which legitimacy in 
the eyes of foreign funders rested on separation from broader, alterna-
tive political agendas.
Although the goal of the OFP march was the immediate return of the 
kidnapped woman and, more generally, the rule of law, the end of im-
punity, and justice, there were continuities between the protests of the 
present and the past, and it would be an error to sharply differentiate 
the rights-based demonstrations of the present and the class-based 
mobilizations of the past. The USO and other trade unionists partici-
pated in the OFP protest, and one OFP member was married to a labor 
leader. As OFP director Yolanda Becerra explained the history of col-
laboration:
The USO became an important referent [in the twentieth century], 
and anything that happened in the city passed through [it]. If some-
body needed to bury a relative, the USO accompanied them; if you 
needed to fight for water in Barranca, the USO was there. The USO
provided security in some ways—to be in a place with the USO, one 
felt secure. . . . But with the OFP, many compañeros from the USO
created a very strong relationship of solidarity. The USO always pro-
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vided space for the OFP . . . we were always available to each other. 
We walk hand in hand with the USO on many occasions.15
Even when they disagreed, trade unionists and OFP activists, who had 
often grown up in the same neighborhoods, suffered persecution be-
cause they advocated for a variety of deeply felt class concerns, such 
as fair wages, health care, community services, housing, and human 
dignity.
Most of the activists who participated in the OFP, CREDHOS, and 
the Espacio more generally started their political careers in organiza-
tions that represented both the radical and reformist left, such as the 
Communist Party, Catholic-influenced neighborhood organizations, 
and trade unions, and they were formed politically by the revolution-
ary politics and tumultuous civic strikes that defined the 1970s and 
1980s. Yet the political passions nurtured and unleashed by these orga-
nizations and experiences exposed new fault lines that affected women 
and gay activists in contradictory ways. Mariana Menacho, a demobi-
lized ELN guerrilla who had connected with the insurgency in the 1980s 
through the student movement in Bucaramanga, was harshly critical of 
the sexism in the USO. She condemned male oil workers for whom the 
practice of having multiple illegitimate children was a sign of virility 
and, even worse, meant that these children did not have access to the 
generous health care and education benefits available to the legitimate 
offspring of oil workers.
Similarly, the Stalinist homophobia of the Communist Party and 
the patriarchal morality of the Catholic Church reinforced tradi-
tional notions among leftists that women’s role was to serve men and 
that homosexuality was counterrevolutionary and depraved. Yet the 
groundswell of political organizing that characterized Barrancaber-
meja’s working-class neighborhoods in the 1970s and 1980s served as a 
training ground for a generation of women and gay activists who began 
to chafe at the deep-seated sexism and homophobia within the orga-
nized left. What developed from the new political possibilities opened 
by human rights activism was neither cohesion nor conformity but 
“politics,” which, as Frederick Cooper (2000: 65) observes, is about 
getting people who disagree to act on the basis of what they have in 
common.16
Yolanda Becerra’s midlife recognition of the debilitating effect of 
sexism on women built on her earlier political formation within a left-
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ist, working-class political culture in which the rights of women were 
inextricably linked to the expansion of social and economic equality. 
Although organizing women was initially a way to strengthen urban 
popular movements, Becerra, the OFP director, explained that “the de-
bates [in the 1970s and 1980s] were about politics and not gender. I 
didn’t understand why women had to organize apart from men. I be-
longed to the civic movements and the youth movements, which were 
mixed. The OFP was a social organization, not a feminist one, and so 
there wasn’t a lot of debate about gender. . . . but after I got married, I 
began to see the world differently and understand why women needed 
their own organizations.”17 Her new gender awareness also arose from 
greater domestic and international travel, which exposed her to femi-
nist thinking in large Colombian cities, as well as Europe and the 
United States.
A new gender consciousness was also awakening among urban gays 
and lesbians. The rise of the Internet in the mid-1990s allowed for the 
development of transnational networks and connections that helped 
propel the emergence of an unevenly imagined, global understanding 
of “gay” that was differently shaped within particular social and po-
litical contexts. This vision took “gay” to mean men who had sex with 
other men, and it privileged a broad agenda of inclusiveness based 
on the right to marry, parental rights, and ending employment dis-
crimination, issues that were key to gay rights debates in the United 
States and Europe. In Colombia, it was articulated most forcefully by 
upper-middle-class men in Bogotá, Medellín, and other large cities. Yet 
in the working-class neighborhoods of Barrancabermeja, not all men 
who had sex with other men were considered homosexuals, nor were 
they equally stigmatized for their behavior. Only the passive partner 
in a same-sex relationship was derided as effeminate and viewed as 
a source of amusement and contempt. The active partner was neither 
disgraced nor defined as a homosexual, and he could even enhance 
his macho credentials by sleeping with numerous passive men.18 In-
deed, based on his fieldwork in the working-class neighborhoods of 
Managua, Nicaragua, Roger Lancaster argues that “the nature of the 
homosexual transaction . . . is that the act makes one man a machista 
and the other a cochón [effeminate man]. The machista’s honor and the 
cochón’s shame are opposite sides of the same coin. The line that this 
transaction draws is not between those who practice homosexual inter-
course and those who do not (for this is not a meaningful distinction at 
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all in Nicaragua’s popular classes) but between two standardized roles 
in that intercourse” (1992: 243).
As in Managua, Western understandings of gay and homosexual 
did not graft neatly onto the sexual practices and understandings 
of working-class Barrancabermeja. Yet some working-class activists 
seized on Western notions of gay and the methods associated with 
North American and European gay rights movements to advance their 
concerns in Barrancabermeja and establish their own organizations. 
They did so at a moment in the 1990s when metropolitan, upper-
middle-class Colombians who identified as gay started to successfully 
advance a political agenda that played out in the legal sphere, where 
the Colombian Constitutional Court began handing down a series of 
rulings that validated the rights of Colombian sexual minorities. In 
1995, for example, it recognized the rights of same-sex couples to en-
gage in civil unions, a right it had granted to heterosexuals in 1990; in 
1998, it ruled that public school teachers could not be fired for disclos-
ing their sexual identity; and in 2007 and 2008, three decisions granted 
same-sex couples the pension, social security, and property rights ac-
corded to heterosexuals.
For beleaguered working-class activists in Barrancabermeja, em-
bracing a Western vision of gay rights seemed to offer a way to con-
nect to international human rights organizations and the resources 
and protection they offered at a time when violence was crashing over 
their city. Indeed, two recently arrived human rights groups—Peace 
Brigades and Christian Peacemaker Teams, which began operations in 
1995 and 2001, respectively—incorporated a Western understanding 
of gay identity into their conceptualization of human rights. They also 
provided legitimacy for gay rights struggles in a city that existed be-
yond the political radar of big city, upper-middle-class Colombian gays, 
who enjoyed better access to security and benefited from vibrant gay 
subcultures. They did so by attending events organized by gay activists, 
denouncing paramilitary threats and abuses of them, and occasionally 
providing emergency financial support.
Yet not only was the Anglo-American understanding of “gay” in-
commensurate with the range of sexual practices and understandings 
in working-class Barrancabermeja; the activism associated with it had 
little to say about the material needs of sexual minorities who suffered 
from the numerous problems—insecure employment, exorbitant rents, 
and lack of public services—experienced by working people in the city. 
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In addition, placing the specific concerns of Barrancabermeja’s sexual 
nonconformists under the same human rights tent as women, peas-
ants, and trade unionists was a complex affair. How the practice of 
human rights would integrate these groups remained a source of ten-
sion that is well illustrated by Enrique Jaraba’s efforts, beginning in 
the twenty-first century, to use a fundamentally middle-class, Anglo-
American notion of homosexuality to incorporate Barrancabermeja’s 
sexual minorities into the fight for human rights.
Human Rights for Whom?
Enrique Jaraba, like Yolanda Becerra, formed a deeper understanding 
of exploitation and a more secure understanding of himself as an effec-
tive working-class activist through collective action associated with the 
left.19 Jaraba, who spearheaded the struggle for lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
and transgender (LGBT) rights at the beginning of the twenty-first cen-
tury, was too young to remember the 1970s, but he came from a family 
that he described as “very revolutionary.” When he was a child, his par-
ents immigrated to Barrancabermeja from the rural hinterland, after 
his father decided to cast his lot with other impoverished peasants who 
left the countryside in search of jobs in the oil industry. Under cover 
of darkness, the family acquired an urban lot through one of the orga-
nized land seizures that were taking place on Barrancabermeja’s periph-
ery. “People populated these spaces,” he told me in 2010, “with a lot of 
struggle . . . and that is how I was formed politically around groups of 
neighbors, community leaders, and political groups that were active at 
that time.”20 As a young boy in the 1980s, he attended civic strikes with 
his aunts and imbibed the political discussions that constantly took 
place among relatives in his household. He credited an exiled uncle 
with teaching him “how to organize an operation.”21 Generally speak-
ing, he noted, “The left strengthened Barrancabermeja, and logically 
one is influenced while growing up by the political forces that exist at 
any particular moment. Our thinking—a little to the left—was born 
that way. From the ideas of rights, from the idea of revolution, to pro-
testing if something isn’t correct, the spirit of defending things began 
there.”22
Not surprisingly, however, many men and women who desired 
same-sex relationships eschewed left politics because the Catholic 
Church condemned homosexuality as perverse and immoral, and the 
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Communist Party defined it as a form of “bourgeois decadence.” They 
carved out spaces in bars, discos, and other semipublic venues where 
they could develop romantic attachments and create supportive social 
networks away from the prying eyes of disapproving family members 
and the wider society. Within this semipublic world of same-sex eroti-
cism, known as the ambiente (environment), a variety of suppressed 
sexualities flourished. Lesbians and transvestites, who symbolized 
homosexuality for many heterosexuals, occupied one extreme, and 
married men who maintained heterosexual relationships but also had 
sex with other men occupied another. Transvestites organized beauty 
pageants for which they sold tickets to anyone interested in watching 
them parade in elegant gowns and swimsuits, and lesbians gathered in 
the Barrio El Cerro to play tejo, a popular game that involves throwing 
a metal puck at small, explosive targets filled with gunpowder and em-
bedded in moist clay. In addition, sexual behavior modeled along the 
traditional active/passive dichotomy existed alongside the decision of 
some men to embrace the word “gay” to define themselves and to in-
dicate that both partners in a sexual relationship were homosexual.23
For Enrique Jaraba, embracing the human rights frame enabled 
him to adopt a usable category at a desperate moment when intensify-
ing violence was closing down the ambiente and eviscerating the lim-
ited political spaces once available for the expression of stigmatized 
sexualities and the sharing of experiences. He did so as international 
human rights organizations with offices in Barrancabermeja tied the 
metropolitan notion of gay rights to human rights, and as individual 
activists who either worked for these institutions or visited the city on 
delegations sponsored by them expressed support for his struggles. 
Turning to human rights was thus a political move to advance particu-
lar claims and create new tactical alliances. Yet Jaraba’s struggle would 
follow a long, torturous, and lonely path.
As a young man newly awakened to sexual desire, he had initially 
turned to an evangelical church in the hope of redirecting his sexual 
feelings toward women. “I heard that God could change you, that God 
liberated, that God gave, and that he could change the life of a person 
in many ways. So I started attending the church with the objective of 
changing my life,” he explained. For a while, he almost succeeded. His 
pursuit of a pure relationship with God gave him a plausible excuse to 
spurn the attentions of women, and his personal charisma helped him 
establish a successful ministry in the northeast. Because of his skills 
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as an orator and his ability to sing, his star began to rise among Ba-
rrancabermeja’s evangelicals, and invitations to visit other congrega-
tions testified to his growing success. But it all came to an end after 
his sexual orientation was disclosed to a church elder, and a panel of 
deacons expelled him from the church and prohibited him from ever 
preaching again.
Sometime thereafter, in the late 1990s, Jaraba decided to dedicate 
himself to the cause of gay rights. The notion of human rights and the 
defense of the right to life had taken hold in Barranca’s popular organi-
zations, but the idea that sexual minorities had rights was only begin-
ning to be expressed by activists in a few international organizations; 
it was not part of the conversation in most human rights organiza-
tions, trade unions, neighborhood groups, and social movement as-
sociations in the Middle Magdalena. “The only space available to me 
was with human rights,” he explained, “but even there [in Colombian 
human rights and popular organizations] it was a joke. I was afraid of 
these organizations . . . but they talked a lot about the right to life, so I 
thought, OK, I could also be in those spaces.” Breaking in was not easy. 
Jaraba’s eyes welled with tears as he described to me how a Colombian 
human rights defender had beaten him up after a meeting in which 
he had raised the issue of paramilitary attacks against gay men. He in-
sisted that, with few exceptions, Barranca’s social movement organiza-
tions had difficulty recognizing that sexual minorities had rights, too. 
“Human rights for whom?” he asked rhetorically.24
Jaraba had good reason to be disgusted. During my visits to Barran-
cabermeja, trade unionists that I knew well often told me that “my 
friend” was in fact a child molester. Despite my efforts to defend Ja-
raba, one unionist, who had visited the United States, maintained that 
“homosexuals in the U.S. are not like the ones in Colombia,” whom I 
could presumably never understand. Indeed, the stories that trade 
unionists told me about the paramilitary assault on Barrancabermeja 
were usually silent about the intentional targeting of effeminate men 
and transvestites, who suffered less for their political beliefs than for 
their sexual orientations. Homophobia also appeared to have intensi-
fied with the spread of HIV/AIDS, which placed men who had sex with 
other men in the spotlight and complicated understandings of soli-
darity with them. Most of the male trade unionists I encountered in 
Barrancabermeja expressed this homophobia through the casual use 
of the term maricón (effeminate man) as an offhand insult or form of 
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one-upmanship between heterosexual men, as well as a more direct 
denigration of the passive partner in same-sex relationships. Such un-
mediated discrimination made developing alliances between gay activ-
ists like Jaraba and the labor movement very difficult.
Because of this rejection, Jaraba created, in 2000, an organization 
called People in Action to advocate for the rights of LGBT people and to 
shield the organization behind the public promotion of “human diver-
sity.” This proved an exceptionally hard task, as the notion of human 
diversity proved to be an inadequate bulwark against the growing re-
pression. On the eve of the BCB takeover, Jaraba organized a gather-
ing of teenagers to discuss the notion of rights, and as the meeting 
got under way, two unknown men on a motorcycle came looking for 
him. Jaraba denied that he was the person they were seeking, but in 
the days, months, and years that followed, he became the target of 
continual death threats, harassing phone calls, and, on one occasion, a 
botched kidnapping. After the BCB takeover, when many locales in the 
ambiente closed, paramilitaries targeted effeminate men and transves-
tites in so-called social cleansing campaigns. Yet the repression cracked 
open the door for new alliances, as BCB mercenaries declared homo-
sexuals, trade unionists, and a broad swath of the legal left “military 
targets.”
The persecution and the climate of fear that existed in Barrancaber-
meja forced People in Action to become less a social movement than 
a one-man campaign that projected a broader institutional existence 
through a web page that Jaraba established in 2011. But the repres-
sion was not the only hindrance to the development of a social move-
ment. Building an activist group of LGBT barranqueños proved difficult 
for a number of reasons. Gays, lesbians, and bisexual and transgender 
peoples held various political views and understandings about them-
selves, their sexuality, and the sexual desires of others. Metropolitan 
classifications obscured sexual identifications in Barrancabermeja and 
had little to say about the growing economic precariousness that af-
fected all working people in the city. Some sexual minorities had col-
luded with the paramilitaries. Others occasionally supported Jaraba’s 
work but chose neither to disclose their sexuality nor to associate too 
closely with a threatened activist. Jaraba frequently expressed his ex-
asperation with gays who “spent all their time gossiping and criticiz-
ing others” as opposed to transvestites who were “more unified.” Not 
surprisingly, he had difficulty inspiring sexual nonconformists to be-
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come involved with activities that risked their public exposure, placed 
them in physical danger, and did little to address their economic vul-
nerability.
Yet Jaraba persisted. He organized seminars for young people who 
were just discovering their sexuality; he provided aid and comfort to 
AIDS patients, who had difficulty acquiring medications and endured 
social stigmatization and the rejection of family members; he coun-
seled transvestites who wanted to change their names; and he brought 
gay-themed theater productions to Barrancabermeja. Moreover, he 
regularly denounced the murder, harassment, and torture of homo-
sexuals through his regular participation in the Espacio. The ability to 
withstand repression and abuse was part of the heroic imaginary of 
the left, in which militants identified with suffering and self-sacrifice 
(Markarian 2005; Tate 2007), and he won grudging admiration from 
some straight human rights defenders because of his tenacity. The OFP
helped him temporarily relocate to Bogotá, after a death threat forced 
him to leave town, and one trade unionist conceded, in 2012, that “he’s 
gay but he is more macho than anybody. He’s a guy with firm convic-
tions, and I respect him because he knows his work. . . . He is the one 
who positioned gay rights in Barrancabermeja.”25
Sexual minorities and straight human rights defenders needed each 
other, but even though Jaraba made some inroads with human rights 
organizations, he faced considerable problems articulating an LGBT
agenda to heterosexual audiences. For example, several of the city’s 
social organizations convened a public forum to commemorate the 
Colombian bicentennial in the Club Infantas, the venerable ECOPETROL 
social and recreation center.26 While the heroes of the nineteenth-
century war of independence against Spain were commemorated on 
national television and in speeches by government officials, Barranca-
bermeja’s popular organizations used the opportunity to discuss what 
was wrong with the present and gathered representatives from peas-
ant, union, neighborhood, and human rights organizations through-
out the Middle Magdalena region to denounce the rights violations 
plaguing their communities and neighborhoods.
A panel entitled “Human Rights and Victims” convened on the 
last day of the event and drew an audience of well over one hundred 
people, many of whom were peasants who had suffered displacement 
and threats to their livelihoods over the years. It was chaired by a 
former human rights ombudsman, and the panelists included repre-
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sentatives from displaced peoples’ organizations, the Catholic Church, 
and CREDHOS. Although not officially on the program, Jaraba had given 
the CREDHOS representative a copy of a flyer that described his orga-
nization, and the individual, whom Jaraba knew well, offered him the 
opportunity to speak at the end of the event.
Jaraba and I sat next to each other as one speaker after another de-
nounced ongoing human rights violations in the Middle Magdalena, 
especially the intimidation faced by displaced peasants who sought to 
reclaim their stolen lands. As his time to speak approached, Jaraba told 
me that he was going to lay out the crimes against LGBTs in Barranca-
bermeja in detail—the extrajudicial executions, the torture, and the 
constant harassment—and drive home the persistent discrimination 
that defined their daily lives. Yet after ascending the stage and taking 
the microphone, he equivocated. During his ten-minute presentation, 
Jaraba never mentioned the words “gay,” “lesbian,” or “transgender,” 
nor did he say anything about the persecution and discrimination suf-
fered by them, choosing instead to reference the “sexual diversity” that 
characterized Colombia’s heterogeneous population and to call on the 
audience to respect it. Afterward, I asked him to explain. Jaraba said 
that, as he looked out over the audience, the large number of peas-
ants in attendance had intimidated him and made him worry about 
his own safety. “They come from a very patriarchal culture,” he told me, 
and “they have a very provincial way of thinking [muy de pueblo].”27 He 
felt that the rural people would not have understood words like “gay,” 
which was not used in the countryside; more important, he feared 
that, if they fully grasped the kinds of sexual identities and relation-
ships that he was asking them to respect and accept as normal, the 
tone of the meeting might have changed. Even though his presence 
on the stage testified to the partial success of his efforts to elevate the 
concerns of Barrancabermeja’s LGBTs, Jaraba still felt the need to use 
coded language among would-be allies for fear of reprisals, and his fear 
about discussing the paramilitary persecution, murder, and disappear-
ance of gays foreclosed an opportunity to link one aspect of the experi-
ences of LGBT barranqueños to those of peasants, who were primarily 
concerned with the theft of their lands and physical displacement.
Enrique Jaraba’s efforts to connect the rights of LGBT barran-
queños to the struggle for human rights proceeded in fits and starts. 
Sometimes, the looming threat of murder, kidnapping, or torture was 
enough to unite working people across their differences; but at other 
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times, deep-seated prejudices and different agendas kept sexual non-
conformists and heterosexuals apart. Moreover, some attempts to ad-
vance the cause of LGBT barranqueños steered a careful path away from 
human rights, which, because of its leftist roots and the persecution 
suffered by activists, was viewed as too controversial and dangerous 
(see chapter 7). The Polo de Rosa (Pink Pole), for example, arose in 2005 
within the Polo Democrático Alternativo (Democratic Alternative Pole) 
political party to encourage greater LGBT electoral participation and to 
support LGBT candidates, but its Barrancabermeja representative did 
not participate in Espacio meetings or publicly denounce the human 
rights violations committed against LGBT residents, preferring to keep 
a lower public profile.
Jaraba’s activism illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of the 
turn to a politics of human rights. Human rights opened a limited po-
litical space for the articulation of “gay” concerns that was marginally 
more amenable to Jaraba’s agenda than the unions, and it offered the 
possibility of building alliances with other persecuted groups. Yet being 
gay was the basis of Jaraba’s political organizing. It represented a claim 
to rights and recognition that spoke less to the understandings and 
concerns of Barrancabermeja’s working-class sexual minorities than to 
the political sensibilities and identifications of well-heeled, big-city gay 
urbanites and the international human rights activists who legitimized 
his struggles locally. Such a vision might have inspired more people had 
the paramilitaries not had a stranglehold on the city, but it neverthe-
less raised questions about the nature of political action. There was a 
difference between, on the one hand, grafting a new identity onto the 
already established leftist ideas and practices of human rights asso-
ciated with the city’s social movements and, on the other hand, har-
nessing this identity to the remnants of an older, class-based politics 
in order to articulate a new vision of progressive politics that sought 
to change the world and lay claim to the future. Human rights activism 
lacked a political vision that could address working-class experience in 
the neighborhoods and workplaces of the city, as the USO and the Co-
ordinadora Popular had done in the past, and that could link this ex-
perience to the lives of sexual minorities and peasants struggling to 
hold onto or to recover their lands and their livelihoods. Amid the vio-
lence and social decomposition of the late twentieth and early twenty-
first centuries, creatively fusing gay rights and class politics into a new 
form of claims making and an alternative vision of society was a tall 
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order, not least because of the homophobia of the Old Left itself and 
the limited political resources that middle-class notions of gayness 
offered to activists like Enrique Jaraba in Barrancabermeja.
The Politics of Human Rights Accompaniment
While social contact with international human rights volunteers facili-
tated the development of Western models of sexuality, the influx of 
internationals, mostly from North America and Europe, also provided 
an assist to Barrancabermeja’s beleaguered human rights defenders 
and social movement leaders by offering them unarmed “accompa-
niment.” Colombian activists believed that having an “international” 
escort raised the cost of violent attacks for the perpetrators, and al-
though daily life was more complicated and uncertain than this under-
standing suggests, many leaders of popular organizations embraced 
international accompaniment in response to a pressing need and in 
the hope that, because it connected them to a broader network of con-
cerned citizens, international NGOs, and interstate organizations, any 
aggressive act against them would be met by an international outcry. 
Indeed, my long association with Enrique Jaraba arose, in part, be-
cause of his wish “to be seen in the presence of foreigners.” Whenever I 
was in town, we would display our relationship by walking around the 
northeast and the port area on weekends, when the ebb and flow of 
urban life subsided and he felt most vulnerable. Yet even as accompani-
ment validated social struggles that were condemned by broad sectors 
of society, connected activists to a broader national and international 
network, and offered threatened leaders a sense of safety, it under-
scored the dependency of social movement militants on foreigners at 
a time when the social relations that had once sustained leaders and 
popular movements were being demolished, impunity was rampant, 
and the Colombian state was not providing security.
As political violence ripped through the Middle Magdalena, some 
European-based and North American–based human rights organiza-
tions, which were small and underfunded, began to provide unarmed 
volunteers to go along with persecuted social movement leaders during 
their daily activities and to stake out a visible presence during the pub-
lic events of imperiled groups. Peace Brigades pioneered the strategy 
in Barrancabermeja. It was followed by other groups, such as Chris-
tian Peacemaker Teams, Pax Christi, and Witness for Peace, which 
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offered occasional accompaniment when staff members or a delega-
tion of North Americans visited the city. Volunteers clad in T-shirts, 
vests, and hats that identified them as human rights defenders made 
it known that they were prepared to report on abuses to their interna-
tional support base and to intervene in a nonviolent fashion, if forced 
to do so. Through their physical presence, the internationals sought to 
reassure members of popular organizations that they were not alone, 
even though their nationality, race, and class usually made them safer 
than the Colombians.
The rationale behind accompaniment was that because of the po-
litical relationships that the Colombian state maintained with other 
powerful states, especially the United States and Western European 
democracies, and because of the economic aid that it received from 
them, government officials wanted to minimize the political fall-
out from gross human rights violations and avoid the sanctions that 
might result if a foreigner witnessed a human rights crime. Similarly, 
the reasoning was that paramilitary leaders allied with the Colombian 
security forces did not want to draw international attention by com-
mitting atrocities in the presence of international observers. Conse-
quently, those activists accompanied by foreigners—especially North 
Americans and Europeans—were arguably less vulnerable to assault 
than others.28
One longtime Colombian activist recalled how unviable the notion 
of unarmed accompaniment seemed in the 1990s. “The international-
ists,” she explained, “came from a different culture” and did not under-
stand the nature of the dirty war that was gaining momentum. “What 
were they going to defend me with?” she asked rhetorically. “People at 
the time thought that the guerrillas would protect them. Even with-
out asking them, the guerrillas were not going to let us get killed. So 
[the idea of unarmed international accompaniment] was a big concep-
tual change.”29 Her understanding reflected a benevolent view of the 
guerrillas, who were seen as allies of working people, and it expressed 
dismay that young, unarmed strangers could offer any protection, a 
notion that stuck many other people as preposterous, too. These views 
changed, however, as the paramilitary stranglehold on Barrancaber-
meja’s working-class neighborhoods intensified, and insurgents could 
not defend unarmed civilians and became complicit in their abuse, by 
switching sides and fingering their supporters. As the dirty war degen-
erated and working people found themselves at the mercy of the BCB,
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international human rights organizations and their young volunteers 
became new, highly visible participants in the struggle for social justice 
in Barrancabermeja. Accompaniment became a different way of doing 
politics, one that was rooted in a fervent claim to neutrality and that 
based itself in the principles of international law. It rested on the race 
and class privileges of foreigners and the universalism of human rights 
law. It also required no political base and threatened to become a kind 
of philanthropy on behalf of threatened Colombian activists that could 
not substitute for older forms of solidarity in which working people 
struggled together to advance political agendas that envisioned a re-
ordering of society.
I appreciated the strengths and limits of international accompani-
ment when, in 2007, Jackeline Rojas, a member of the OFP, asked me 
to accompany her on a day trip to Cantagallo, a small river port north 
of Barrancabermeja where the organization operated a soup kitchen. 
Rojas always felt apprehensive in Cantagallo because several years 
earlier, paramilitaries had encircled her on a street and threatened to 
kill her, and the mayor had told her that he could not guarantee her 
safety. Although she had since returned a number of times and the BCB
had demobilized, a sense of foreboding overcame her every time she 
made the journey because of widespread evidence that much remained 
unchanged as neoparamilitary groups arose in the same territory once 
claimed by the disbanded BCB. She invited me to accompany her in the 
hope that my presence would provide her with a modicum of security 
and peace of mind while she conducted a series of workshops. Although 
I neither worked for a human rights organization nor had any training 
in the practice of accompaniment, everyone who knew me assumed 
that I “worked in human rights.” My nationality, fair complexion, and 
foreign-accented Spanish also sent a clear signal that I was an interna-
tional, just like other human rights defenders who, in some cases, were 
my friends. This unofficially qualified me as a sort of second-string pro-
tection plan, which indicated the level of anxiety felt by activists at the 
time. I received frequent requests to hang around with people as they 
went about their daily lives and had to constantly explain that I had 
nothing to offer in the event of an emergency. Rojas understood my 
limitations but insisted that I come along anyway.
As we waited on the dock for the boat to take us downriver, the 
neoparamilitaries were hard to ignore. Rojas pointed out several men, 
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dressed in civilian clothing, who appeared to be monitoring the river 
traffic not far from where we were seated. “They are paramilitaries,” 
she told me, “but don’t look at them.” I focused my gaze on the crew 
loading packages and a refrigerator onto our vessel, which we finally 
boarded, along with some fifteen other passengers, and sat swaddled 
in life vests on hard, wooden benches. The captain eased the boat away 
from the shore and into the swift current. Globs of brownish foam ex-
creted from the oil refinery bobbed along the surface of the water, and 
a moist breeze blew through the cabin.
Before reaching our destination, we stopped briefly in Puerto 
Wilches, a center of African palm cultivation across the river from Can-
tagallo. Several travelers disembarked, and new ones took their place. 
Dockworkers pulled cargo off the roof and hoisted up new bundles, 
causing the boat to rock back and forth and nauseating some continu-
ing travelers who sought firmer footing on the dock. Rojas called my 
attention to a young man surveying the hustle and bustle. He, too, was 
a paramilitary, she whispered, and he was known by the alias Iguano. 
Iguano appeared to be a young man in his late twenties. He was rail 
thin with closely cropped hair and a large pendant dangling around 
his neck. A pair of tight blue jeans clung to his legs, and a T-shirt em-
blazoned with the image of an action hero fell loosely below his waist. 
From behind a pair of dark sunglasses, Iguano chatted casually with 
people on the dock until the boat was ready to leave.
Several hours later in Cantagallo, Iguano reappeared. Rojas and I 
were having lunch in the OFP’s soup kitchen, after a long morning of 
workshops with local women. As we chatted about the organization’s 
work, I watched the cooks serve up bowls of soup and plates of rice, 
fried bananas, cassava, and stewed chicken and place these offerings 
in the kitchen window, where diners picked up their orders. Suddenly 
Rojas stopped talking. Her expression changed, and she focused an in-
tense stare on a space behind me. Something was obviously wrong, but 
I did not appreciate what was happening until Iguano and three com-
panions approached from behind and sat down next to us. As the group 
talked loudly among themselves and appeared to ignore us, Rojas got 
up, walked to the kitchen window, and instructed the staff not to serve 
them. Fastening a withering glare on Iguano, she then returned to her 
seat. Soon thereafter, one of the men attempted to place an order, but 
the cook told him that the food had run out. He reported this infor-
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mation to his companions, who then departed as quickly as they had 
arrived. I was stunned; poor women had just refused to feed aggres-
sive men.
According to Rojas, the symbolism of my presence that day, as well 
as the numerous other international ties developed by the OFP, helped 
to empower the women and create more political space in a small town 
where paramilitarism had established a firm foothold and remained 
dug in despite the demobilization. But even though the OFP women 
had prevailed that particular day, the confrontation with Iguano van-
ished into a void of public silence. When workshop participants had re-
turned from their homes and Rojas reconvened the afternoon session, 
no discussion of what had happened took place. And at the end of the 
day, Rojas and I departed, leaving local women to deal with any conse-
quences from the encounter with Iguano alone. Had the presence of an 
international restrained the paramilitaries from harming the women, 
or had it helped to create a situation that jeopardized their security 
after Rojas and I were gone? The answer was not clear.
My visit to Cantagallo provides a disturbing commentary on the ex-
tent of the left’s defeat in the Middle Magdalena and a statement about 
what international solidarity has become. Faced with neoparamilitary 
groups and an institutional state that do not hesitate to unleash vio-
lence against any critic of the status quo and unable to protect their 
own, the activist survivors of Colombia’s dirty war must dedicate an 
inordinate amount of time and energy to ensuring their basic secu-
rity. Although some of them, like Rojas, can turn to a few small, under-
financed international organizations for accompaniment, these groups 
cannot come even close to addressing the full extent of the need. So an 
untrained international like me can become a prospect for accompa-
niment, because I, too, have a foreign body and am therefore not that 
different from my better-trained compatriots in human rights organi-
zations. Human rights accompaniment is a symptom of both the crisis 
of security in the Middle Magdalena and the debilitation of the rela-
tionships, networks, and institutions that once sheltered people and 
defined their self-understanding.
Although human rights activism forged new connections among 
activists and between them and national and international constitu-
encies, the class concerns that had animated an earlier era of popu-
lar struggle were pushed to the margins or silenced. Disparate human 
rights agendas never coalesced into a political force that was powerful 
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enough to reunite the fragmented pieces of Barrancabermeja’s trauma-
tized working class in a way that could articulate a vision of rights that 
encompassed justice, economic equality, and the guarantees of citizen-
ship. Persistent violence ensured that the idea and practice of human 
rights remained focused on the right to life and survival, while perva-
sive fear made overcoming difference difficult and undermined the ar-
ticulation of a vision of the future that went beyond what was wrong 
with the present.
Despite the limitations of contemporary human rights activism and 
practice, the struggle over rights and universal principles has certainly 
not ended. Building new understandings of rights and forms of soli-
darity to replace the heterogeneous working-class formation of the 
mid-twentieth century remains a work in progress. Whether and how 
people accomplish this task in the “aftermath of counterinsurgency” 
is far from clear.
SEVEN
THE AFTERMATH OF 
COUNTERINSURGENCY
. . .
“I am afraid that we are becoming more isolated,” commented William 
Mendoza, as we finished our Cuban sandwiches in the overpriced food 
court of the San Silvestre shopping mall. Upscale clothing stores sur-
rounded us. Sleek escalators escorted shoppers to the mall’s multiple 
floors, and ATMs spit cash into the hands of eager consumers. Air-
conditioning offered welcome relief from the sweltering streets out-
side. The mall epitomized the new geography of exclusion in Barranca-
bermeja. Although the steamy neighborhoods of the northeast, where 
Mendoza spent much of his life until the paramilitaries arrived, were 
only a ten-minute drive away, the distance felt much greater. We could 
have been in Miami.
It was July 2013, and the irony of meeting in this glass-encased cita-
del of consumption, disconnected from the popular matrix of urban 
life, was hard to escape. The vision of democracy that forty-eight-year-
old Mendoza had spent much of his life fighting for—a vision that em-
braced equality through living wages, public services, and agrarian re-
form—was buried under the condominiums and office buildings that 
were sprouting up in the vicinity of the mall. Decades of political terror 
had converted Barrancabermeja and its surrounding hinterland into a 
mecca for capitalist investment that was secured by the continual use 
of violence against people like Mendoza and anyone who questioned 
the status quo. Drug money and the anticipated expansion of the oil 
refinery for biofuel production had energized a construction boom, but 
Barranca’s overcrowded, working-class neighborhoods were decaying. 
Chronically high unemployment rates refused to budge because large 
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national and international oil industry contractors shunned skilled, 
local workers with a reputation for militancy and instead imported 
cheaper, foreign laborers to conduct routine maintenance and repair 
operations. Local contractors complained that they could no longer 
compete. Rents were expensive and the quality of basic services poor. 
Mendoza could not afford the clothes and the techno-gadgetry on dis-
play around us, but he felt safe within the closely monitored, authori-
tarian space of the mall, where private security guards prowled the 
passageways and guarded the entrances, and throngs of buyers and 
gawking window-shoppers calmed his feelings of vulnerability.
The new political order remains hostile to democratic practices 
and opposed to any challenge from below. Although Barrancaber-
meja’s radical tradition survives as a more influential minority politi-
cal current than in other Colombian cities, this long-established way of 
thinking and relating to others totters on ever-weaker legs. There is no 
common memory about the past, just competing and opposed stories 
about the city’s violent history. Nowadays, human rights activism has 
diminished, and working people chart crooked pathways through a dis-
ordered, unstable present in which the violence of the past is not over, 
and fears and anxieties obscure the future. Holding perpetrators to 
account has been a slow, uneven process, and impunity remains ram-
pant. In the aftermath of the terror of the paramilitary takeover and 
subsequent demobilization, the city is characterized less by peace than 
by a low-intensity disorder, a term I use to denote social conditions 
that block the emergence of shared understandings about the past and 
about intensifying vulnerability in the present, and that kicks open 
the door for those in power to define the problems and pose solutions.
Because of the persistent threat and reality of violence and because 
of the ways that dispossession, physical displacement, disorganization, 
and social fragmentation have disrupted the lives of working people 
over and over again, crafting lives that are truly “theirs” is a major chal-
lenge for people who have been forced to live in extremis. How to claim 
an everyday life—and not just a daily existence of one thing after an-
other—raises issue of control over the material, social, and emotional 
realities that make a dignified life and a sense of the future possible. 
As Gerald Sider observes: “People ordinarily try to make and to claim 
some kind of ordinary—some stability to today, some continuity be-
tween yesterday and tomorrow, in some parts of their lives at least. In 
this sense . . . what we call everyday life does not name a feature or an 
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aspect of social existence . . . but a high-stakes struggle” (2008: 124–25). 
It is a struggle that many barranqueños are losing.
How can working people in Barrancabermeja create a peaceful co-
existence and imagine a better future when they hold different memo-
ries about what happened and continues to happen? This chapter 
explores how fragmented memories, disempowerment, and radical 
uncertainty, engendered by years of political violence and neoliberal 
restructuring, affect people’s capacity to establish a modicum of con-
trol over their lives, workplaces, and neighborhoods. The dirty war has 
torn apart social solidarities, forcing men and women to find their way 
through the violent netherworld of capitalist modernization alone. 
War-related immigrants are cut off from rural life, while many long-
time residents have fled to other cities. Scores of popular leaders who 
once challenged the power of the state, the oil company managers, and 
the agrarian bourgeoisie have lost their lives, and the infrastructure of 
human rights organizations is ill equipped to address the predations 
of neoliberalism, from the erosion of social services for the urban poor 
to the precarious conditions of employment. Reconfigured neopara-
military groups contend with each other for control of drug traffick-
ing corridors, land, and illegal enterprises and monopolize the popular 
economy of Barrancabermeja, while threatening anyone who questions 
the established order.
Far from ending, the war has entered a new phase. By focusing on 
radical uncertainty and the centrality of disempowerment in the lives 
of different people, we can better appreciate the chaos-producing con-
sequences of past political violence. We can also better understand how 
the corrosive power of continuing violence shapes the limits of politi-
cal possibility. The first part of the chapter analyzes the decline of the 
human rights movement and the fractured memories about Barran-
cabermeja’s conflicted past that inform understandings of its still un-
stable present. The discussion then focuses on how radical uncertainty 
persists because of the social fragmentation and disempowerment that 
have reconfigured social life in working-class districts of the city. For 
many working people, the central concern is how to endure chronic un-
certainty, rather than how to change it.
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Contradictory Memories of Violence
There is little agreement among urban residents about what happened 
in the past and about how to understand the present. For a great 
many barranqueños, the paramilitary takeover ended a period of vio-
lent turmoil for which the guerrillas were responsible, even though 
some of these same people eventually came to see the paramilitaries 
as “worse than the guerrillas.” For many others, it fragmented their 
lives and brought continuing persecution and economic hardship that 
made stitching the pieces back together nearly impossible. And for still 
others, it was only the most recent of a string of displacements and up-
heavals that had plagued their lives for years.
Barrancabermeja’s human rights defenders, trade union leaders, 
former peasants, and civic activists remember the early twenty-first-
century paramilitary takeover of the city as either the continuation 
or the beginning of a long period of persecution, rupture, and some-
times forced displacement that has still not ended. Their memories 
form what Steve Stern (2004: 105–6) calls “emblematic memory,” a 
schema that organizes meaning, selects what is truthful about the 
past, and poses arguments about countermemories, while connecting 
personal experiences, or the stories told by friends, relatives, and ac-
quaintances to individuals, into a larger, collective account. According 
to Stern, memories become emblematic when they manage to “capture 
an essential truth about the collective experience of society” (113). Yet 
the deaths of dynamic leaders, persistent threats and harassment from 
neoparamilitary groups, and the diminished vitality of working-class 
institutions have undermined explanations that connect past terror to 
the political nature of contemporary violence.
In 2013, many of the trade unionists and activists that I had met 
or interviewed in Barrancabermeja, since 2004, no longer lived in the 
city because of physical attacks and persistent threats to their lives, 
and deep feelings of foreboding had pushed others to question their 
commitment to social justice struggles. Assaults, death threats, and 
the invasion of their homes had forced the OFP’s two most charismatic 
leaders, Yolanda Becerra and Jackeline Rojas, into internal exile; Rojas’s 
husband, Juan Carlos Galvis of SINALTRAINAL, had left, too; David 
Ravelo, the former head of CREDHOS, was serving a long prison sen-
tence for conspiring with the FARC to murder a politician linked to the 
paramilitaries at a time when Barrancabermeja was under siege; and 
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Enrique Jaraba spent long periods away from the city, as death threats 
made life in Barrancabermeja ever more untenable for him. Jaraba was 
also considering leaving the Espacio because, in his dismal assessment, 
it no longer had an impact on anything except provoking more death 
threats against its participants.
For many residents of the city, human rights had also become a toxic 
concept, one that they associated with the Espacio, CREDHOS, the OFP,
and the USO, which had been stigmatized by the government for years 
as havens for guerrillas. Associating with these organizations, they be-
lieved, would do less to enhance their security than to threaten it. For 
example, when high school student Efraín Garcia led a student protest 
against the misuse of municipal education funds allocated for the con-
struction of a new school, he began to receive death threats. Rather 
than report the threats to a human rights organization, however, his 
terrified parents pulled him out of school and started asking around 
about how to change their names. Garcia’s mother fretted about her 
family becoming associated with the USO, which had supported the 
student demonstration. “What’s wrong with the USO?” I asked, as we 
talked on a street corner. “Oh, nothing,” she replied, looking away from 
me and changing the subject. “We just sell tamales. We have never been 
involved with anything.” She quickly mounted her motorcycle and 
started the engine. I did not pursue the matter and waved as she sped 
off. Our brief interchange spoke loudly about the deep divisions that 
had fragmented a once-powerful, organized working class. The USO no 
longer represented a source of community support or a champion of 
the rights of working people for her frightened family. It had become 
part of the problem, and even the appearance of affiliation with it could 
be dangerous. She and her family turned instead to their evangelical 
faith for emotional sustenance.
In addition, the Espacio’s capacity to coordinate and advance human 
rights claims had clearly diminished. At a meeting convened in the 
USO’s library in July 2013 to discuss recent threats against several so-
cial justice advocates, the scant attendance was a departure from the 
packed gatherings of the past. Housed in a 1920s-era brick building 
that once contained the administrative offices of the Tropical Oil Com-
pany, the library’s faded collection recalled a time when education for 
the legions of illiterate migrant workers who crowded into Barranca-
bermeja counted among the priorities of the budding labor movement. 
But not one of the eight people seated around a small conference table 
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represented the USO. I recognized familiar faces from years past but 
slowly realized that some of the people were essentially there on their 
own behalf. The organizations that they had once led either barely 
functioned or existed in name only.
Over the previous month, several Espacio members and others had 
received manila envelopes with warnings of imminent annihilation 
from groups calling themselves Los Rastrojos, Los Urabeños, and the 
Ejército Anti-Restitución del Magdalena Medio, and two people had 
reported telephone calls in which a muffled voice warned them that 
they would be killed if they did not leave town. There was a lot of dis-
cussion about who was making these threats, how serious they were, 
and what should be done about them. Several people also complained 
about the failure of the police to investigate. The Espacio coordinator 
laid out a series of questions that no one seemed prepared to answer: 
“How do we continue defending human rights? What is happening with 
the social movement in the city? What can we do to regenerate it?” Luz 
Molina, a representative of the families of the paramilitary massacre 
of May 16, 1998, reported that jailed paramilitary boss Wolman Sepúl-
veda would be released from jail soon. He would likely move back to 
the city, she said.
Seven years after media-saturated ceremonies of mercenaries hand-
ing over their guns concluded the paramilitary demobilization process, 
targeted activists could be excused for thinking that the more things 
changed, the more they seemed to stay the same. Yet the situation 
was not identical to the past. The aftermath of the dirty war had given 
rise to new ways of fighting an old conflict. Neoparamilitary organi-
zational structures were less cohesive than those of the former BCB:
commanders no longer dictated orders from the occupied homes of 
urban residents, nor did they call entire neighborhoods to meetings in 
public plazas; the activities of the so-called gasoline cartel had visibly 
faded; and mercenaries wearing paramilitary insignia had ceased to 
conduct military drills in poor neighborhoods. Nevertheless, demobi-
lized rank-and-file paramilitaries had filtered back into the city and 
taken up residence in the same neighborhoods that they had terror-
ized, while reconfigured paramilitary groups fought among themselves 
for the control of territory and each other’s foot soldiers. Reports of 
mysterious armed men recruiting youth or patrolling the streets of 
some neighborhoods after dark circulated in the city’s working-class 
districts, where neoliberal austerity policies had provided the armed 
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right with legions of disillusioned, unemployed youth. Selective assas-
sinations periodically punctuated the apparent calm.
Safety remains a constant worry for Espacio members, trade union 
leaders, and other social justice advocates, and many people still ad-
here to a range of security precautions that, years ago, they thought 
would be temporary. Furthermore, they are periodically stigmatized 
as “subversives” or “guerrilla auxiliaries,” a practice that isolates them 
from others, tarnishes their reputations, and justifies the use of vio-
lence against them. Unlike the residents of the Southern Cone, Peru, 
and Central America who struggled with the legacy of dirty wars after 
the fall of military rulers or the official signing of peace accords, Colom-
bians have wrestled with the trauma of collective violence as the gov-
ernment negotiated the incorporation of the armed right into society, 
while continuing to wage war against the depleted insurgencies in iso-
lated frontier strongholds. All this informs how Espacio members and 
threatened activists understand the present as defined less by peace 
than by lasting rupture and enduring assaults on their lives and liveli-
hoods. Although some acknowledge past “mistakes” made by the guer-
rillas, and others refer to contemporary insurgents as “terrorists,” the 
behavior of the guerrillas, past and present, is of less concern to these 
individuals than the terror of the paramilitaries and their successors.
In contrast, some working people in Barrancabermeja dismiss the 
threats against human rights activists as self-manufactured propa-
ganda designed to exaggerate the danger they face and to guaran-
tee the continuation of government-authorized protective measures. 
These residents believe that the BCB brought peace to the city. Casi-
mira Santos, for example, is a young hairstylist who works in a north-
east beauty salon, just over the bridge that separates the immigrant 
neighborhoods from the city center. She insists that, when the BCB ar-
rived in full force a decade ago, it ended years of guerrilla extortion 
and violence, and she maintains that barranqueños are much better off 
today because of its intervention. Although Santos did not work in the 
northeast when it was under guerrilla control, she claims to know a lot 
about the period of insurgent rule because of what another stylist, her 
friend Raisa, has told her. She tells me that the guerrillas extorted all 
the store owners. It was impossible, she says, for anyone to operate a 
business because of the constant pressure. And to make matters worse, 
the police turned potential customers back at the bridge because cross-
ing into guerrilla territory was too dangerous. “Nice cars could not 
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circulate in the northeast because of the guerrillas,” she notes, “but 
thankfully, all that has changed” because the paramilitaries broke the 
invisible barrier, symbolized by the bridge, that delineated guerrilla-
controlled, northeast Barrancabermeja from the urban center. In her 
estimation, they effectively unified the city and made daily life livable.
Like Santos, Rosalba Castillo, a small-scale merchant, believes that 
the paramilitaries pacified Barrancabermeja. Castillo lives in a neigh-
borhood that was formerly a stronghold of the ELN and emphasizes 
that “now we are living in heaven” (ahora estamos viviendo la gloria),
compared with the mayhem of the past. The turmoil that she describes 
took place during the BCB takeover of the northeast, when it was rout-
ing guerrilla militias from the city with the tacit support of state secu-
rity forces. She describes how a stray bullet hit her husband in the leg 
while he was sitting on the patio of their home. And firefights broke out 
everywhere, she says, making it impossible for children to walk to and 
from school. Her daughter agrees. Once, she says, guerrillas, fleeing the 
paramilitaries, took refuge in her school. Mother and daughter blame 
this period of chaos on the insurgencies and insist that life got much 
better after they were gone, when the violence abated.
The accounts of Casimira and Rosalba form another memory frame-
work for understanding the past, one that is shared by many other ba-
rranqueños. Memories of “the paramilitary takeover as peace” began 
to crystallize after 2002, when the BCB began to consolidate its control 
of the northeast. Media accounts of guerrilla atrocities burnished their 
truth value, as did the guerrillas’ violent betrayal of each other. Yet in 
subsequent years, the “paramilitary takeover as peace” framework lost 
some of its explanatory power, as day-to-day experiences with the new 
overlords moved more people to conclude that the paramilitaries did 
not bring improvements to their lives. Nevertheless, it has remained 
an important way of understanding the past and imparting meaning 
to current events.
An official report on the dirty war, mandated by the 2005 Justice 
and Peace Law, has not adequately addressed conflicting memories of 
the past, ignoring the passions, shifting alliances, and interests that 
drove the conflict to a bloody climax in the early twenty-first century. 
Although it demonstrates that the paramilitaries committed the vast 
majority of massacres and extrajudicial executions, the account is pri-
marily descriptive. It does not sufficiently explain why the dirty war 
happened and leaves important questions unaddressed, for example, 
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what was at stake for different groups, what kinds of ideologies and op-
posing visions shaped the confrontation, why was the fighting more in-
tense at some times and not at others, and how did violence arise from 
the clash of opposed forces? It also surrenders analytic clarity through 
the adoption of categories such as “armed actors” and “civil society.”1
These categories muddy the fault lines of the conflict and obscure the 
historical unfolding of the dirty war in which social life was repeatedly 
transformed through political action that arose from extreme social 
polarization (Grupo de Memoria Histórica 2013).
Making memories count is intertwined with whose voices matter. 
Contemporary memory battles are deeply embedded in struggles over 
power and legitimacy, and they may bubble to the surface on key dates 
and anniversaries, when organized groups or networks of individuals 
focus attention on the past in ways that push forgetfulness and conten-
tious claims to the forefront of public debate. Stern (2004: 120–24) calls 
such moments of heightened consciousness, when the everyday flow 
of dominant ideas and beliefs is challenged and interrupted, “mem-
ory knots.” One such moment of charged memory skirmishes arose 
in July 2010, when Colombia celebrated the bicentennial of its birth 
as a nation. The symbolically powerful date offered an opportunity to 
organize publicly and project historical interpretations into the public 
sphere. Hundreds of people from peasant organizations, student asso-
ciations, labor unions, and human rights groups gathered in Barran-
cabermeja. Unlike government leaders who dominated official cele-
brations in Bogotá with paeans to the heroes of nineteenth-century 
independence wars, they engaged and updated a historical memory 
rooted in the labor and popular struggles of the Middle Magdalena 
and asserted that Colombians were still not independent.
During two days of human rights forums, cultural presentations, 
and commemorative events billed as the Bicentenary of the Peoples of 
the Northeast, they celebrated the region’s radical democratic history. 
In one evening event called “Historical Referents,” the lives of labor 
organizers Raúl Eduardo Mahécha and Maria Cano, assassinated oil 
workers Manual Chacón, Leonardo Pozada, and Orlando Higuita, and 
the revolutionary priest Camilo Torres, among others, were honored. 
These powerful referents allowed a series of speakers to ground a dis-
sident emblematic memory in the struggles of the past. The speakers 
not only extolled their lives but also denounced the state for murder-
ing them. They did so in a small plaza, located along the busy Avenida 
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Ferrocarril, a place that evoked their connection to the past and whose 
name had been the source of controversy for years.
In 1996, the USO and other popular organizations had planned to 
name the plaza after Camilo Torres, a popular Catholic cleric who had 
joined the ELN and been killed by the army during his first foray into 
combat. They intended to do so in a commemorative ceremony on the 
thirtieth anniversary of Torres’s death. One day prior to the event, 
organizers placed a veiled bust of Torres in the plaza, but it was de-
stroyed by a squad of paramilitaries who blew it apart with a high-
powered rifle, in full view of the patrons at a nearby bar. For years 
thereafter, the plaza was known as the Parque del Descabezado (Park 
of the Headless One), but in 2010, those gathered in the plaza hoped 
that would change. Activists held a ceremony that had been delayed for 
fourteen years. After the speeches ended, they placed a wreath at the 
base of a statue, which held a new bust of Camilo Torres, and renamed 
the plaza Parque Camilo Torres (Camilo Torres Park). Yet death threats 
directed against them, before and after the commemoration, suggested 
that the park’s identity was far from settled, and that activists’ capacity 
to circulate and project dissident memories in the public sphere would 
remain limited.
How the past is remembered shapes understandings of the turbu-
lence and disorder that continue to plague working-class neighbor-
hoods. Ever since the paramilitary demobilization, considerable debate 
has surrounded a rising number of homicides that became a widespread 
concern in 2009, when some fifty killings took place in the first few 
months of the year. Were the murders the politically motivated work 
of reconfigured neoparamilitary groups, or were they purely criminal 
and opportunistic, as the mayor’s office claimed? Colombian human 
rights organizations and the United Nations high commissioner for 
human rights had already sounded the alarm about the emergence of 
a new generation of “neoparamilitaries” and “successor groups.” The 
government, however, insisted that the criminal violence of common 
thieves and youth gangs accounted for urban insecurity and that so-
called criminal bands, or BACRIM, were an expected and transitory as-
pect of postconflict Colombia. As we saw in chapter 6, this sleight of 
hand was an effort to reestablish the illusion of a separation between 
government officials and those who used illegal violence to accumu-
late wealth and power, but it also built on a half-truth: like other Latin 
American cities in which crime waves followed the conclusion of civil 
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wars and the enactment of neoliberal economic restructuring pro-
grams, common crime was a concern in Barrancabermeja’s working-
class precincts. It was both entangled with and separate from the re-
configuration of paramilitary entities.
Official assertions that paramilitarism no longer existed did little 
to calm activists’ fears about the political motives behind the homi-
cides of early 2009. The debate about the political or criminal nature 
of the deaths formed the backdrop of a conversation that I had with 
Viki, a Juanist nun who resided in northeast Barrancabermeja, about 
what had changed and what had remained the same in the northeast 
since the demobilization. Dressed in a flowing habit that covered her 
body from head to foot, the diminutive young woman greeted me at 
the door of a residence she shared with several other religious from the 
same Catholic order. She escorted me to a wicker rocking chair under 
a ceiling fan and brought out a pitcher of lemonade. As we sipped our 
drinks, she described how two young men had robbed her as she was 
walking home from the market a few days earlier. The individuals had 
approached from behind, snatched her purse, and fled. Neighborhood 
security was a serious problem, Viki said, because it was harder for 
people to make a living than in the past and because youth, in particu-
lar, had few opportunities after high school. She then moved quickly 
from describing her experience as a victim of petty crime to detailing 
the continuing paramilitary menace. For years, Viki and other Juanist 
religious had received death threats from the AUC for their support of 
African palm worker unions in the port towns north of the city, and 
the intimidation had not stopped with the demobilization. She under-
scored the political nature of the threats, past and present, that arose 
from her alleged support of the guerrillas, from being a “communist,” 
and from purportedly bringing shame to the church, and she scoffed 
at the government’s insistence that “criminal bands” were responsible 
for them. She also insisted that the spate of urban homicides, which 
were on everyone’s lips, arose both from the competition and score 
settling among neoparamilitary groups in some cases and from the 
continued targeting of social justice advocates by these same entities 
in others. Political violence and criminal violence had become inter-
twined, making it easier to dismiss the deaths of social justice advo-
cates as “nonpolitical” and thus ignore them.
Several days after this conversation, I sat down with Jairo, a young 
man who advised the mayor on human rights, in the hope of under-
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standing how municipal authorities explained Barrancabermeja’s en-
during turbulence. The mayor’s office was controlled by the centrist 
political movement—the Movimiento Alianza Social Indígena—whose 
homegrown candidate, Carlos Contreras, had won the mayoralty in 
elections the previous years with 31 percent of the vote. After taking 
my business card, Jairo peppered me with questions about the purpose 
of my visit and then launched into a long, vague monologue about the 
city’s violent history that circled around and around but went nowhere. 
Finally, after much circumlocution, Jairo cut to the chase. “It is my per-
sonal opinion that trade unionists and human rights defenders are no 
longer at risk,” he said. He insisted that criminals and mafiosi were the 
fundamental public security concerns and explained that most of the 
recent homicide victims were either hapless passersby in the wrong 
place at the wrong time or delinquents who bore responsibility for 
what happened to them.
Such views indicated that war continued in Barrancabermeja, but 
with new weapons. As government officials disappeared political vio-
lence into the realm of criminality, they blocked discussions of urban 
insecurity that were at odds with the peaceful image of Barrancaber-
meja they wanted to project. Three years after my meeting with Jairo, 
a new administration took the reins of the municipal government, and 
in a city council meeting the new mayor discouraged worried trade 
unionists from publicly complaining about the continuing violence. 
“The mayor told us that we shouldn’t denounce all the assassinations, 
robberies, threats, and disappearances,” an exasperated union leader 
told me, “because it will scare away foreign investment.”2
Attracting foreign investment was a high priority for municipal offi-
cials. The Middle Magdalena had become a center for multinational 
investment in mining, African palm plantations, and hydroelectric 
projects, and the economic effervescence was evident in the new hotels 
that had sprouted in central Barrancabermeja; in the Avianca Airlines 
decision to include more flights on its Bogotá-to-Barrancabermeja 
route; and in an airport expansion project that had remade the old 
structure into a glittering symbol of the cosmopolitan city imagined 
by urban boosters. Although the power of the most notorious para-
military bosses, such as Ernesto Báez, Julián Bolívar, and Macaco, had 
declined, their legacy lived on, as the booming economy expanded on 
the graves of thousands of people. Private political violence had cre-
ated the conditions for a reinvigorated capitalism to flourish in the 
228 CHAPTER SEVEN
city center, while working-class neighborhoods remained integrated 
into neoparamilitary networks that controlled labor, commerce, trans-
portation, drug trafficking, and protection and periodically surfaced to 
suppress challenges to the new order. As the municipal government—
like its neoliberal counterparts in other Colombian cities and else-
where—limited the definition of security to crime and excluded both 
politically motivated violence and the decline of well-being brought on 
by neoliberalism, working people felt more vulnerable and exposed to 
invisible forces beyond their control.
Daily Life and Radical Insecurity
“The big question,” according to neighborhood council president Pablo 
Lucerna, “is who can you trust.”3 Lucerna posed this rhetorical ques-
tion at a time when he faced an impossible dilemma. His terrified sister 
had arrived on his doorstep to inform him that men she presumed to 
be paramilitaries had threatened to kill her and an aunt if Lucerna did 
not hand over community development funds earmarked for a new soc-
cer field. Too frightened to take the matter to the police, whom he dis-
trusted, Lucerna consulted other council presidents, who reported that 
they, too, had experienced extortion demands and that, out of fear for 
their lives, they had surrendered the money. Lucerna then decided to 
approach the “politico” who was threatening him in the hope of resolv-
ing the problem. At the meeting, he sat next to a teenage hit man who 
described himself as “the business’s best killer” and who bragged about 
the recent murder of the leader of a fisherman’s association. Lucerna 
explained to the young man’s boss that the funds were for community 
development projects, that he did not have access to them, and that 
the budget at his disposal was smaller than the politico believed. None 
of this convinced his tormentors, who gave him a few days to come 
up with the cash. Terrified about the consequences of refusal, Lucerna 
delivered the money but then faced a series of new problems. Paying 
off the extortionists was no guarantee that they would not return and 
threaten him again. Furthermore, Lucerna’s long tenure as council 
president raised the possibility that he had already made concessions 
and accommodations with the shadow powers to keep his position and 
guarantee his relative safety. His more immediate concern, however, 
was that he could neither complete the construction of the soccer field 
nor account for the funds to local residents and the mayor’s office. His 
THE AFTERMATH OF COUNTERINSURGENCY 229
only recourse was to explain to the mayor what had happened, but to 
his consternation, the mayor did not believe him. He accused Lucerna 
of embezzling the money and demanded that he repay it.
All of this raises disturbing questions about the ways that fear, un-
certainty, and the absence of trust have become embedded into so-
cial life. Why, we might ask, did the mayor refuse to believe Lucerna’s 
story, given a long history of paramilitary and guerrilla extortion in 
the city? Could the mayor’s silence reflect pressure that he, too, was 
under? Was he also colluding with restructured paramilitary groups? 
In light of the city’s past, such collaboration, either voluntary or co-
erced, was entirely within the realm of possibility. But had Lucerna 
actually stolen the money? The mayor’s charges had the ring of plau-
sibility, especially because Lucerna was unemployed. Municipal posi-
tions that provide access to public funds beckoned urban residents like 
ATMs, given the high level of unemployment and underemployment 
in the city. They not only allowed occupants to pilfer public coffers but 
also enabled the distribution of jobs and favors to friends. As one local 
resident complained, “Nobody talks about corruption because every-
one is either stealing or hoping to steal when it is their turn to control 
the public till.”
Answering these questions is nearly impossible. Lucerna’s case, 
however, highlights how uncertainty and threats of violence infuse 
opaque, authoritarian relationships of inequality that remain too dan-
gerous to openly challenge. These relationships are not only crucial for 
the survival of poor people; they pose economic and personal risks to 
those who try to separate from them. Lucerna’s concerns about trust 
underscore the difficulty faced by ordinary people in creating a sense of 
social, economic, and emotional well-being over time and projecting it 
into the future. The violent unraveling of social relationships and popu-
lar organizations, and the loss of the trust, social connections, and rela-
tive stability that these relationships and organizations provided have 
vastly diminished the ability of people to create effective and endur-
ing livelihood strategies. The explosion of competition in the absence 
of labor rights and regulations has made it very difficult for working 
people to reconfigure self-help networks and forms of mutual assis-
tance. Everything is for sale—from a spot on the street to sell avocados 
to the “right” to work—and bribes and extortion undergird new hier-
archies and forms of exploitation. People have to make do with fewer 
social, material, and emotional resources than in the past, and they 
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have to find ways to remake their lives in the midst of circumstances 
that are mostly beyond their control. As they increasingly confront the 
world as autonomous individuals, it should come as no surprise that 
they focus less on challenging the power of those who are responsible 
for the precarious conditions that hem in their lives than on checking 
and channeling the activities of other people like themselves, in efforts 
to make their own lives more tolerable.
Human rights advocate Osvaldo Jiménez, for example, took money 
from his bodyguards on a monthly basis until the guards finally had 
enough and denounced him.4 According to Jiménez, the two men—
one of whom was a childhood friend—willingly gave him the gov-
ernment funds, allocated for their per diem expenses and to feed the 
government-owned, gas-guzzling SUV that transported him around 
town, when some of the money remained unspent at the end of the 
month. Jiménez asked for the money because of the intermittent and 
irregular nature of his work, which lurched from one short-term con-
tract to another. These “contracts,” which in most cases involved little 
more than unenforceable verbal agreements, ranged from providing 
the sound system for public events or private gatherings to leading 
human rights workshops for municipal and private sector employees. 
Even when Jiménez managed to arrange a deal, he was not always paid 
on time and sometimes was not paid at all. His precarious situation was 
a constant irritant in his relationship with his mother, who struggled, 
usually with minimal success, to sell natural health care products in 
order to cover the approximately $375 of monthly expenses for the 
house that she shared with her son. The unused funds from the body-
guards’ expense account provided him with a very modest economic 
cushion that offset some of the uncertainty about paying his monthly 
bills, and they assuaged his tense relationship with his mother.
Yet for the bodyguards, there was nothing voluntary about the sur-
render of this money, which they would have preferred to keep for 
themselves and their own households. They understood Jiménez’s re-
quest as payment for the right to continue working for him; it was, they 
believed, extortion in every respect. The conflict points to the fragile, 
impoverished economy of Barrancabermeja’s working-class neighbor-
hoods, where intense competition pits people against each other, cre-
ating new understandings of “income” and fragmenting the diminish-
ing resources still available to residents. The pressures to pay one’s bills, 
find work, put food on the table, and live a dignified life beyond mere 
THE AFTERMATH OF COUNTERINSURGENCY 231
survival are not new for residents of Barranca’s working-class neigh-
borhoods, but they have intensified. Working people have little choice 
but to fall back on each other—people like themselves who are equally 
hard-pressed.
Engaging in petty extortion and other illegal activities feeds domi-
nant views of a criminal underclass on the urban periphery, even though 
these economic pursuits are often the requirement for survival in the 
absence of viable alternatives. Carola Goméz, for example, is a sporadi-
cally contracted ECOPETROL worker.5 Single and in her thirties, Goméz 
makes good money—about a thousand dollars a month—when ECO-
PETROL hires her to perform quality control work in the refinery, and 
the accoutrements of her episodic prosperity, which include a large re-
frigerator, three overstuffed armchairs arranged around a glass-topped 
coffee table, and a five-piece dining room furniture set, ornament her 
small home. Goméz’s relatively high wages allow her to weather periods 
between contracts—but not always. Sometimes, months pass with no 
word from ECOPETROL. During these tight economic times, she turns 
to illegal work as a motorcycle taxi driver (mototaxista) and sometimes 
sells hot dogs to prostitutes and their clients in the city’s red-light dis-
trict, where she must hand over a portion of her earnings to a local 
enforcer. The police have fined her on several occasions for both activi-
ties, but she views the fines as the cost of putting food on her table. 
Economic necessity creates “criminals,” like Goméz, who are also mis-
construed as “entrepreneurs.” They have neither rights nor protections 
and are thus more vulnerable to manipulation, coercion, and police ha-
rassment.
The unease and social decomposition that have arisen from years of 
violence and economic restructuring are not completely controlled by 
the municipal authorities, the neoparamilitaries, or the private sector, 
which are unwilling and unable to incorporate poor urban residents 
into the neoliberal order in ways that guarantee their social reproduc-
tion. Indicative of the social restiveness were the tensions that shaped 
relations between unlicensed motorcycle taxi drivers and the licensed 
drivers of taxicabs. The ranks of both groups swelled with the downsiz-
ing, labor outsourcing, and trade union decline that accompanied the 
enactment of neoliberal policies in the city and the massive displace-
ment of peasants from the countryside. In 2000, some 1,123,764 motor-
cycles circulated in Colombia, but by 2004 this figure had increased by 
more than 500,000, and sales of motorcycles increased 65 percent be-
232 CHAPTER SEVEN
tween 2003 and 2004 (Hurtado 2007). Discontentment among Barran-
cabermeja’s urban transporters then deepened in the wake of the para-
military demobilization, after hundreds of rank-and-file mercenaries 
took to the city’s streets on motorcycles to offer their services as unoffi-
cial drivers, along with other young men who found themselves mar-
ginalized from legal forms of employment. Unlike the city buses, which 
were desperately slow and made numerous stops, the mototaxistas 
took passengers directly to their destinations for approximately the 
same fare as a city bus, one that undercut by 50 percent the fare that 
licensed cabbies charged.
The licensed cabbies, many of whom had been downsized from 
once-stable jobs and who worked extremely long hours to put food on 
their families’ tables and to pay expensive licensing fees, felt threat-
ened. “They [the mototaxistas] are criminals who steal money from 
people and abuse women,” explained one exasperated driver. The moto-
taxistas not only operated illegally, which bolstered understandings of 
their presumed criminality, but some were also controlled by neopara-
military groups, which obliged them to hand over a percentage of their 
income for the right to operate and used them to collect intelligence 
on the ebb and flow of life in the city. All of this made it relatively easy 
to stigmatize all mototaxistas, even as notions of legality and illegality 
divided working people from each other.
Worried about the erosion of their income by the mototaxistas, the 
licensed cabbies demanded that the municipal government do more to 
control the proliferation of the unlicensed drivers, and they staged a 
series of protests to this end. The mayor’s office subsequently emitted 
a decree that excluded the mototaxistas from the crowded center of 
town, where prospective passengers were abundant, but did nothing 
to address the economic issues at the root of the problem. This, in turn, 
sparked counterprotests by the mototaxistas, who argued that public 
space could not be restricted in this way. Municipal officials then re-
sorted to force to control the so-called dangerous classes who were dis-
rupting the new urban order these officials hoped to preserve.
These conflicts illustrate how downsizing and dispossession on 
the one hand and the production of difference (illegality/legality) on 
the other hand are closely related processes. Together, they demon-
strate how working people have to constantly struggle from within, 
and against, these divisions in order to develop a shared sense of pur-
pose and identity. They highlight the unevenness and unpredictability 
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of class formation in which popular struggles may generate new forms 
of exclusion and difference, rather than new relations of solidarity. 
All of this is very fluid, and none of it is predictable. And at a moment 
when strong leaders are needed to reconnect working people around a 
common purpose, these individuals face overpowering challenges of 
their own.
War as Peace Process
One of the notable features of the “postconflict” era is the readiness 
of state prosecutors to investigate accusations of misconduct against 
human rights defenders, trade unionists, and social movement leaders. 
This eagerness contrasts to their hesitance or failure to inquire about 
attacks, threats, and harassment directed at the same people. The in-
vestigations, which often result in spurious criminal charges, are often 
based on false information contained in intelligence reports and on 
allegations by demobilized paramilitaries and ex-guerrillas who have 
received financial support from the state as a means to entice them 
to demobilize and reintegrate into society (Human Rights First 2009). 
The 2005 Justice and Peace Law offered health benefits, protection and 
security, economic support, and reduced prison sentences (as little as 
eight years) to ex-combatants—mostly demobilized paramilitaries. In 
exchange for these benefits, individuals were required to confess their 
crimes in voluntary depositions (versiones libres) given in judicial hear-
ings convened to establish the facts of particular cases, and to return 
stolen property to victims.
Yet the paramilitary “confessions” have done less to close the door 
on the violent past and lay the basis for reconciliation than to open up 
a new phase of conflict, recrimination, and revenge, demonstrated by 
the sensational parapolítica scandal that erupted in the aftermath of 
the demobilization in which mercenaries identified dozens of legisla-
tors who collaborated with them (see also Payne 2009). The “truths” 
related by the paramilitaries are selective and at best partial, in both 
senses of the word. The mercenaries have implicated some politicians, 
former guerrillas, and ordinary citizens in their murderous activities 
but have remained silent about other key supporters and alliances, 
especially the networks that connected them to entrepreneurs and 
businesses in the private sector. Sometimes they have offered details 
about their activities; at other times, they are intentionally obscure. 
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Viewing them and their testimonies with critical suspicion is impera-
tive, but as Human Rights First reports, this “testimony is frequently 
neither properly evaluated nor corroborated, and many regional prose-
cutors assume that it is reliable and credible” (2009: 13), especially 
in cases involving human rights defenders. Indeed, for OFP director 
Yolanda Becerra, what is known as the peace process has served only to 
revictimize the victims. “In their depositions,” she says,
the paramilitaries have fingered us [as guerrilla collaborators]; they 
have stigmatized us, and they have said that we even worked with 
them, which is a very serious claim. . . . They have made our work 
more difficult, because of this ideological assault. . . . The last depo-
sition nearly killed me. They have accused me of belonging to the 
FARC, the ELN, and the EPL, which I am prepared for, but when one 
of them said that I talked with the paramilitaries, that I met with 
them, it was something that I never expected. It was really hard for 
me. Of all the things that I have lived through, [this accusation] was 
the worst. It’s a way of killing you morally and politically, and we feel 
that it is part of their strategy.6
When ex-BCB leader Rodrigo Pérez Alzáte, alias Julián Bolívar, was 
scheduled to testify in a Medellín courtroom, his appearance was anx-
iously anticipated by the BCB’s victims and survivors in Barrancaber-
meja, some of whom watched his deposition on closed-circuit tele-
vision. Sporting a buzz cut, the bespectacled, fair-haired mercenary 
confessed to at least twenty massacres in various municipalities of 
Santander province between 2000 and 2004 in which seventy-seven 
people died. He described one of the earliest slaughters in Barrancaber-
meja, in November 2000, when his men commandeered a city bus to 
facilitate their work. Accompanied by two deserters from the ELN, the 
paramilitaries drove through Barranca’s working-class neighborhoods, 
stopping at the homes of ELN milicianos identified by the ex-guerrillas 
and then executing them. “The bodies were embarked in taxis and sent 
to the funeral homes,” related Pérez Alzáte, “to impact and to demon-
strate that the domination of Barrancabermeja remained in our hands” 
(Verdad Abierta 2009).7
Pérez Alzáte also used the public forum to target Yolanda Becerra 
and other activists whom the BCB had not killed. Juan Carlos Galvis 
and William Mendoza of SINALTRAINAL were two of those singled out 
by Pérez Alzáte. After asserting that he had never threatened the trade 
THE AFTERMATH OF COUNTERINSURGENCY 235
unionists, as they had claimed in a denuncia, the jailed paramilitary 
leader blamed Mendoza’s ex-wife for the threats. More ominously, he 
then asserted that Galvis and Mendoza had provided information to 
a guerrilla group that enabled it to enter the Coca-Cola factory in the 
late 1990s and plant a bomb, which wreaked major destruction on 
the installation and paralyzed production for several months (Verdad 
Abierta 2008). His allegations could not be directly challenged by the 
victims, who could neither cross-examine nor interrogate Alzáte, and 
they ignited a prolonged period of intense anxiety for the labor leaders 
and others fingered by the paramilitary leader. Galvis, Mendoza, and 
Becerra worried that the state prosecutor would initiate an open-
ended criminal investigation of them and feared the prospect of pro-
longed, arbitrary detention as the investigation took its course.8 The 
public charges raised the real possibility of imprisonment, separation 
from their homes and families, and severe financial hardship. And they 
forced the two men to spend time and money defending themselves.
Although Galvis and Mendoza received support from SINALTRAINAL, 
they could no longer count on the backing of a strong popular move-
ment in the same way as in the past, a movement that would protest 
their possible imprisonment, raise funds to support them and their 
families if necessary, and keep pressure on government officials. Torn 
from networks of popular solidarity, which had then disintegrated 
around them, the men organized their defense alone with their law-
yers. Whatever the veracity of the charges and countercharges, there 
was no room for justifying violence as a legitimate form of social jus-
tice, even though many Coca-Cola workers believed in the late 1990s 
that management was actively colluding with the paramilitaries to 
murder and terrorize them. Times had changed. Human rights and lib-
eral democracy had displaced the revolutionary use of violence as a 
means to obtain justice and as a tool of social transformation, even 
as the government, with support from the United States, waged a war 
by any means necessary against the remaining redoubts of insurgent 
power, which the middle and upper classes widely viewed as accept-
able violence.9 But even worse, the Coca-Cola plant bombing had ap-
parently little to do with revolutionary values; it was, according to the 
trade unionists, a guerrilla reprisal for the corporation’s failure to ac-
cede to an extortion demand and reflected the transformation of the 
insurgencies into criminal enterprises. In a time of popular defeat, dis-
illusionment, and fragmented memories, when coherent alternatives 
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to neoliberalism remained beyond the horizon of hope and expecta-
tion, defending themselves as the innocent victims of Pérez Alzáte, a 
deceitful sociopath, was the only option for Galvis and Mendoza.
Radical insecurity—political, social, economic—is the outcome of 
the defeat of a decades-old, working-class political culture and the 
fragmentation of an infrastructure of grassroots solidarity that sus-
tained an understanding of how to act on the world, a broad sense of 
political purpose, and the hope that animated resistance. And it is the 
product of the impunity-based violence that made the defeat possible. 
Although Barrancabermeja is an extreme example of the violent “un-
making” of class and the enactment of a particularly severe form of 
neoliberalism, it is not the only place where working people have ex-
perienced periods of setback. The dismantling of once-powerful work-
ing classes has happened before, in other places and at other times, 
and spawned new labor relations and forms of struggle (Mason 2007). 
The fragmentation, vulnerability, and latent fear that characterize Ba-
rrancabermeja’s neighborhoods are neither unique nor an end in them-
selves. The current situation of urban residents demonstrates how un-
resolved and contentious the process of class formation is when viewed 
up close in the present. Indeed, the present moment is best concep-
tualized as an interlude between the unmaking of one set of class re-




Pedro Lozada is a survivor who believes that he has lived to celebrate 
his eighty-third birthday because of the grace of God. Frail and slowed 
by the infirmities of old age, Lozada resides with his son, daughter-in-
law, and two granddaughters on a narrow street in a neighborhood that 
he and a wave of other peasant refugees created in the 1980s, when 
the army and allied paramilitaries drove them from the countryside. 
For much of his long life, Pedro Lozada pursued a vision of popular 
democracy that challenged the foundations of elite rule and the official 
state’s pronouncements about national progress. Because of his insis-
tence on far-reaching agrarian reform, the rights of workers to control 
the fruits of their labor, and the role of the state in promoting and pro-
tecting the common good, he and others like him unsettled local land-
lords and political bosses, who understood that a more open, demo-
cratic society posed a threat to their power. Lozada lived in the Middle 
Magdalena countryside for more than fifty years, struggling along with 
other peasant settlers to carve a productive farm from the jungle and 
withstand the pressures of acquisitive landlords and oil companies. He 
was an effective grassroots organizer for many years. With the backing 
of the Communist Party, Lozada established a rural school for peasant 
children in his community, and his various leadership positions—of a 
fisherman’s association, of peasant committees, and of neighborhood 
councils—as well as his militancy in the Communist Party, his election 
to the Puerto Berrío city council, and his participation in the Patriotic 
Union, all attest to the ways that he developed a sense of confidence in 
himself, envisioned a world that was free of the stifling constraints of 
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Colombian society, and dared to hope that he and others could make 
their vision a reality.
Lozada’s arrival in Barrancabermeja as a disoriented refugee was 
not the first time that he suffered violent, physical displacement. Dur-
ing the decades after World War II, Lozada endured multiple disloca-
tions, death threats, economic marginalization, and the loss of friends 
and family members, as privatized terror fueled interrelated pro-
cesses of dispossession, land concentration, and capital accumulation. 
His memories of the violence and persecution of the mid-twentieth-
century Violencia and of the late twentieth-century counterinsurgent 
terror were continuous and uninterrupted, and his descriptions of the 
horrific ruptures that split his life apart in the 1980s were only the 
most dramatic of a series of upheavals that he had experienced and 
would continue to experience well into the twenty-first century. Para-
militaries, he said, transformed a region of “green gold” into a “land 
of cannibals” (tierra de antropófagos). They did not just force people 
to leave. According to Lozada, they gutted them, fried and consumed 
their internal organs, and threw the corpses into the river. The image 
of bloodthirsty cannibals symbolized how he and others like him ex-
perienced the dirty war as a devastating, horrific trauma. The savage 
inhumanity terrified him, tore him from the political and social net-
works that maintained him as a local leader, and demolished a form 
of collective politics that was meaningful and felt connected to social 
movements elsewhere.
Not surprisingly, Lozada most enjoys discussing his childhood 
memories, prior to the political turmoil of the last seventy years, and 
these memories are filled with nostalgia. “Life was very beautiful in 
those times,” he says. “People were happy, and there was a lot of soli-
darity among them. . . . There was no hunger in the Middle Magdalena 
[because] food was abundant.”1 He fondly recalls the times that he and 
his brother fished under a full moon, when schools of catfish swarmed 
along the riverbank and rattled the reeds that grew in the shallow 
water, beckoning fishermen to pluck them into their nets. The steam-
boats that carried passengers up and down the river and the musi-
cal bands that accompanied them also held a special fascination for 
him. “In an airplane, you don’t dance,” he observed. “In a bus, nobody 
dances, and no one dances on a train, either, but on those boats, people 
danced while they traveled. [The boats] passed by with people danc-
ing, and [we] would wave from the riverbank. It was beautiful.” Lozada 
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remembers how the crews purchased yuca and plantains from peas-
ants who lived along the river and offered plates of food to those who 
paddled their canoes near the steamboats. He believes that it is impor-
tant to record this history, and he has taken great pains to preserve 
it in a personal memoir, which, despite failing eyesight and bouts of 
headaches, he continues to work on. During our periodic conversations 
over the course of several years, he enjoyed reading long excerpts that 
were filled with vivid descriptions of the flora and fauna and the idyllic 
nature of daily life in the Middle Magdalena countryside.
Lozada’s romantic portrait of his past life along the river contrasts 
with the poverty and social fragmentation that characterize his cur-
rent existence. Nowadays, the imperative to earn a living focuses the 
energies of residents in a city saturated with uprooted rural immi-
grants and downsized urban workers, and returning to a countryside 
transformed by the violent displacement of peasant communities, the 
spread of cattle ranching, and the emergence of African palm cultiva-
FIG. C.1 Pedro Lozada, his granddaughter, and neighborhood children.
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tion is impossible. Getting by in the present is difficult, too, because 
years of persecution, defeated political projects, violent displacement, 
and the murder of friends have created an emotional wasteland for 
him, where sustaining his spirit is a challenge. His son Alirio’s con-
version to evangelical Protestantism adds to his feelings of alienation.
Evangelicalism offers Alirio a refuge from his father’s politics and 
the family’s traumatic history. The elder Lozada tries to understand. He 
has attended services in different evangelical churches—the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, Light of Day, and Four Square—at the invitation of friends, 
yet he insists that he “has never heard an evangelical pastor talk about 
misery or inequality.” He has also sought spiritual fulfillment in the 
Catholic Church but has been disappointed. Although he lives in the 
Catholic parish of Nuestra Señora de los Milagros, where liberation 
theology flourished from the 1960s into the 1980s, the current priests 
demonstrate little interest in community organizing. Lozada is espe-
cially critical of one cleric who cut funds for outreach to neighborhood 
groups and refused Lozada permission to hold a meeting of displaced 
peasants on church premises. The individual, according to Lozada, also 
painted over a mural depicting social movement and union struggles, 
and he evicted a school from church property to install a shrine that 
would attract donations from more well-heeled believers in other par-
ishes.
Lozada’s gauzy memories of dancing travelers, abundant food, and 
social solidarity remain both peripheral and integral to his life in con-
temporary Barrancabermeja. They provide a sense of attachment to a 
social world that he remembers as tranquil, satisfying, and intimately 
connected to others, and they remain important to an elderly man who 
has endured the fear, grief, and loneliness of decades of violent repres-
sion, death, and ruptured relationships. Yet they are disconnected from 
the politics and social movements that, for decades, gave meaning to 
his life. Raymond Williams (1973) urges us to place the city and the 
countryside, and the ideas and values associated with them, within 
the same analytic framework because they are, he suggests, changing 
historical realities that cannot be reduced to static archetypes. By ex-
amining them in relation to each other, we can begin to understand 
how capitalist processes—the drive to accumulate wealth, the chang-
ing division and valuation of labor, displacement and dispossession, 
power relations—generate starkly contrasting images of the rural past 
and the urban present and produce alienation, separation, and longing.
CONCLUSION 241
This book has focused on how dispossession and displacement re-
configured the geography of political power in the Middle Magdalena, 
making and unmaking a working class, whose alliances spanned the 
city and the country, and remaking working people as individuals who 
have had to turn inward and find their way through the netherworld of 
capitalist development with little support, as old solidarities unraveled. 
It has argued that class is less an entity (e.g., wage laborers) that can 
be grasped and described at any particular moment than an emergent, 
dialectical relationship that arises around the tensions generated from 
capitalist development. These tensions have spawned assemblages of 
people that compose and recompose around the production and distri-
bution of wealth and the organization and regeneration of social life. 
They have induced social and political struggles at multiple geographic 
scales and produced shifting configurations of power in which, at dif-
ferent times, a foreign oil company, left-wing guerrillas, and right-wing 
paramilitaries tried to regulate the affairs of people within their do-
main and to naturalize the particular social relations and ideological 
assertions associated with their rule. Yet the clash and bang of com-
peting forces around the control of land, labor, mineral wealth, politi-
cal office, and the illegal cocaine traffic has generated intense violence 
and an ongoing crisis of hegemony in the Middle Magdalena, where 
nowadays the institutional state turns away from the needs of work-
ing people and guarantees a favorable investment climate for foreign 
corporations, while neoparamilitaries control the popular economy of 
working-class neighborhoods, repress challenges to the status quo, and 
oversee the violent accumulation of capital.
The violence that undergirds the contemporary social order is 
neither incidental nor peripheral to the process of class and state for-
mation; it is an intrinsic part of it. Although Barrancabermeja is an 
extreme example of the violent making and unmaking of class and un-
stable fields of power, it is indicative of a much broader pattern that we 
must understand in order to grasp how dispossession, displacement, 
and disorganization periodically unravel the institutions, relation-
ships, understandings, and ways of life that undergird working-class 
power and force people to constantly struggle anew to reshape their 
lives and livelihoods. Indeed, if, as David Harvey (2005) argues, neolib-
eralism involves the restoration of capitalist class power, the destruc-
tion of nodes of concentrated working-class strength, from northern 
England and the American Midwest to highland Bolivia and Chile, 
242 CONCLUSION
illustrates how the upward redistribution of wealth emerges from a 
wellspring of imposed disorder.
The current moment of social fragmentation and radical insecurity 
in Barrancabermeja makes it hard to grasp why the concept of class re-
mains an important analytic concept for comprehending the profound 
transformations that are reconfiguring social life in Colombia and the 
world. It might seem that concepts like “the poor” or “microentrepre-
neur” are more salient categories of analysis for understanding every-
day life in urban “informal sectors.” That is why I have adopted a long 
view of class formation and taken a step back from the simmering vio-
lence and disorganization of the present. When understood historically 
and processually, class helps us to grasp the emergent, open-ended, 
and always contingent ways that different kinds of working people 
come together as they try to make sense of their experiences and create 
livable lives. And, as Gavin Smith (2014: 150–76) notes, it also helps us 
to understand how, at times, the potential for collective action, always 
inherent in this “coming together,” shifts from a latent possibility to an 
active rejection of the terms on which social life is organized.
For much of the twentieth century, class action in Barrancaber-
meja arose from the refusal of oil workers, displaced peasants, impov-
erished urbanites, petty merchants, and others to accept the working 
conditions, lack of public services, harassment, and repressive con-
trol of, first, the Tropical Oil Company, and then the Colombian state. 
It emerged as they made and remade their connections to each other 
amid the disruptions set in motion by the discovery and production 
of oil, the capitalist modernization of the countryside, migration and 
forced displacement, the explosion of urban shantytowns, dirty war, 
and economic restructuring, all of which re-created old inequalities 
and gave rise to new forms of difference. Working people found ways 
to downplay their divisions, construct organizational forms, pressure 
the TROCO and then ECOPETROL, and advance their own vision of the 
future that charged the institutional state with responsibility for the 
social and economic welfare of its citizens. They exercised a powerful 
democratizing force that went beyond the specific workplace concerns 
of organized labor to address facets of working-class experience in 
urban neighborhoods and rural communities.
By the late twentieth century, the democratizing momentum had 
crested. Popular struggles that sought to expand the parameters of 
political, economic, and social democracy increasingly became de-
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fined within the overheated, polarized rhetoric of the cold war, and 
Colombia and militarized states across Latin America targeted work-
ing people with violence in the name of fighting communism. Political 
violence wrenched individuals from networks of solidarity, tore them 
from their homes, dismantled popular organizations, eliminated the 
most dynamic leaders, and narrowed the horizons of what was po-
litically possible. As Greg Grandin (2004) has so powerfully demon-
strated, it laid the basis for neoliberalism to flourish, by reconfiguring 
the relationship between self and society and replacing broader, social 
understandings of democracy with a more limited notion in which per-
sonal liberties trumped efforts to overcome social inequality. Barranca-
bermeja was an extreme example, but it was not an exception.
As many scholars have observed, the cold war was less a contest 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, or a battle between 
proxies of the two superpowers, than “an attempt by the United States 
(and its local clients) to contain insurgencies that challenged post- 
(or neo-) colonial social formations predicated on dependent econo-
mies and class, ethnic, and gender inequalities” (Joseph 2010: 402; see 
also Grandin and Joseph 2010; Joseph and Spenser 2008; Saull 2006). 
Moreover, it did not end with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. The cold war wound down in Central America with 
the signing of peace accords in the 1990s but continued in Colombia 
under another name, the “war on drugs,” which provided a gloss for on-
going counterinsurgency against so-called narco-guerrillas and justi-
fied continuing U.S. military aid for the Colombian security forces well 
into the twenty-first century.2 In Barrancabermeja, it reached a violent 
denouement with the paramilitary takeover, the routing of the insur-
gencies, and the subsequent paramilitary demobilization, which were 
followed, in 2012, with the initiation of peace talks between the Colom-
bian government and a vastly weakened FARC. The strength of mid-
twentieth-century social movements in the Middle Magdalena was a 
measure of the savagery directed against people who were unwilling to 
accept a violently unjust social order as their cross to bear.
Barrancabermeja became less an example of a militant outpost of 
working-class power in a conservative country than a typical instance 
of the devastation wreaked by the new, neoliberal order that counter-
insurgency, backed by the U.S. and Colombian governments, had 
brought into existence. Together with frontier regions such as Putu-
mayo, the Guajíra, Meta, and Caquetá, working people in Barranca-
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bermeja were incorporated into the neoliberal nation on terms that 
were not their own. They became part of violent, authoritarian hier-
archies, under the control of paramilitaries and their successors, in 
which they enjoyed neither rights nor protections. At the same time, 
the spatial coordinates of class power recohered around regional poles 
of development based in extractive industries, such as coal, gold, oil, 
cattle ranching, African palm cultivation, and cocaine trafficking. These 
nodes of capitalist power represented the demise of an older vision of 
citizenship and social security in which the nation-state was respon-
sible for social well-being. They represented a recalibration of national 
space for global commodity flows that were produced through orga-
nized violence and intensified capital accumulation, and they consti-
tuted a new form of labor discipline in which efforts to regulate the 
harshest aspects of the market were replaced by a no-holds-barred ap-
proach to the exploitation of labor.3 Such assemblages of public and 
private power demonstrated how the making and remaking of spaces 
of capital accumulation were never entirely contained. They were tied 
to government policies and social struggles unfolding in different spa-
tial fields, from the defeat of working people in Barrancabermeja and 
the rise of narco-paramilitarism to U.S. security doctrine and the ad-
vent of neoliberalism.
In the neighborhoods of northeast Barrancabermeja, the privatiza-
tion of state agencies, the rise of paramilitaries and neoparamilitaries, 
the strength of violent networks, and deepening poverty continue to 
raise questions about who speaks in the name of the state and where 
“it” is located. This study has demonstrated that the state is not a con-
tainer for social, political, and economic processes that operates exclu-
sively through the apparatus of government institutions. It has shown 
how, for more than a century, class struggles, the imperial power of the 
United States and its corporations, counterinsurgent war, and the vio-
lent narco-economy have shaped the command of space and conflict-
ing claims to legitimate rule. “The state” has always worked through 
alliances with “nonstate” actors, such as corporations and clandes-
tine paramilitary groups, who shape how “it” is conceived. Nowadays, 
working people must grapple with constant insecurity as they contend 
with reconfigured, neoparamilitary networks whose contours are only 
partly visible, whose links to past terror are obscured by government 
claims that they represent little more than a contemporary manifes-
tation of common criminality, and who do not hesitate to repress any 
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challenge to the established order, as the boundaries between politi-
cal and criminal violence grow more opaque. Because violent networks 
control many of the economic opportunities available to poor men and 
women, separating from them not only poses risks to working-class 
livelihoods but also endangers people’s lives, as neoparamilitary and 
criminal entities who have their own agendas prey on newly vulner-
able people. Such a dismal scenario is similar to that faced by working 
people in many other parts of the world, where criminals, landlords, 
employers, and politicians, often with connections to the security 
forces, use coercion and violence to regulate social life in the absence 
of labor rights and other protections (e.g., Breman 2003). All of this 
has consequences for how neoliberal democracy is practiced at a time 
when wealth and power are being redistributed upward, and points to 
the importance of new economic opportunities and relationships for 
urban residents.
I appreciated what was lost in Barrancabermeja, as well as how 
still unresolved its future is, one sweltering afternoon in 2013, when 
I looked over a collection of striking photographs with the archivist 
of the USO. One dramatic image showed a large crowd of protesters 
outside the oil refinery in 1986, carrying a sign that read “The people 
speak, the people rule.” Another photograph captured a group of young 
men defending a street barricade during a 1977 civic strike. And still an-
other caught oil workers in broad-brimmed straw hats marching on the 
mayor’s office, during one of the first labor strikes in the 1920s. They all 
illustrated how, at different moments, people had organized, pushed 
back against the established order, and become protagonists in the 
making of history. They radiated hope and a sense of possibility that 
had moved people to understand existing conditions in their work-
places and their neighborhoods as transitory. I asked the archivist what 
made Barranca special. “People in this city always fight back,” he said.
Indeed, during certain moments in the history of the city and 
the Middle Magdalena, movements against domination have always 
arisen, from the Barranca Commune, the peasant Bolsheviks, and the 
labor strikes of the early twentieth century to the civic strikes of the 
1960s and 1970s and more recent protests against human rights vio-
lations. And working people have always found ways to organize and 
construct institutions—unions, neighborhood associations, peasant 
associations, coordinating committees, and so forth—to advance their 
claims on the powerful. How they might do so in the future is impos-
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sible to predict. Yet the sheer persistence of Pedro Lozada, William 
Mendoza, Enrique Jaraba, Yolanda Becerra, Juan Carlos Galvis, Jacke-
line Rojas, and other people encountered in this book, despite every-
thing that has happened to them, speaks to the resilience of the human 
spirit and to their persistent struggles not just to survive from one day 
to the next but to strengthen the tattered threads of the social fab-
ric and demand justice. We can see this persistence in Pedro Lozada’s 
treks from his home in the northeast, over the bridge, and into the 
city center to meet with other displaced peasants to discuss how they 
are going to reclaim stolen lands. We can appreciate it in William Men-
doza’s leadership of SINALTRAINAL—the scrappy union that never suc-
cumbed to paramilitary terror and corporate efforts to dismantle it—
and in the inspiration he has found in the popular struggles taking 
place in neighboring Venezuela, where working people have challenged 
neoliberalism and established new institutions and practices. And we 
can hear it in Yolanda Becerra’s worries from internal exile that NGOs
are assuming too much importance in the Middle Magdalena, sup-
planting the strikes, assemblies, and marches of once-powerful social 
movements with circumscribed development projects. “The country 
has become NGOized,” she frets. “The work of an NGO is valuable but it 
is not the same as a social movement. . . . I think that we have a lot of 
work to do to reconstruct a social movement. If there are not strong 
social movements, it is impossible to advance a peace process.”4 These 
people force us to appreciate that, even in periods of intense repression 
and hopelessness, possibilities for crafting a different social order are 
always present. They experienced, and in some cases helped to bring 
about, the rise of powerful social movements in the Middle Magdalena 
and then lived through their subsequent demise, but the eclipse of Ba-
rrancabermeja’s radical political culture is not complete. The embers of 
critical consciousness still glow in the daily lives of people who refuse 
to “forget” in a country awash in amnesia.
When I first arrived in Barrancabermeja, in 2004, and was cast in 
the role of human rights observer, the activists I met were a source 
of inspiration and hope, and they still are. They were full of insight-
ful political analyses that were not taking place in my home country 
and were relentless in their condemnation of the Uríbe administration 
and the paramilitarism that they associated with it. Yet their struggles 
for human rights reflected less the birth of a new political force with 
the power to challenge an emergent narco-bourgeoisie and the policies 
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of the Colombian and U.S. governments than defensive, rearguard ac-
tions that represented a desperate call for help from a social movement 
that was largely defeated. This book has argued that, although human 
rights activism created some room for a new politics to take shape in 
the repressive environment of late twentieth-century Barrancaber-
meja, it shrunk understandings about what was politically possible 
and narrowed visions of a different world. It did so by placing human 
rights testimonies outside of politics, removing working people from 
their conflicted history of political struggle, and treating them as long-
suffering victims. All of this happened as extreme violence was destroy-
ing the class identities and organizations that had shaped how working 
people understood the world. Indeed, the practice of human rights re-
quired no social base, and human rights activists were obliged to sepa-
rate themselves from the politics of the victims in order to establish 
their legitimacy in the eyes of international organizations, an impera-
tive that further aggravated the narrowing of political possibilities.
What is at stake in Barrancabermeja is how ordinary people speak 
to each other about their lives and histories in ways that bring them 
together and keep them talking, despite the different ways that the 
past is silenced and neoparamilitaries threaten their safety. Repairing 
the social fabric means coming to terms with the deep divisions that 
violence and neoliberalism have created among them, constructing a 
historical narrative that links the past to the present, and forging new 
alliances and institutional forms to channel popular demands and lay 
claim to the future, all of which are fundamentally projects for work-
ing people. Despite the current limitations of human rights discourse 
and practice, the struggle over universal principles and conceptions 
of rights has not ended. Even though human rights activism has re-
mained a defensive movement in Barrancabermeja that has not re-
articulated a common class project, it does not necessarily follow that 
decent jobs, minimum wages, adequate health care, potable water, 
and quality education cannot be expressed in the language of rights, 
together with respect and equality for gays, indigenous peoples, Afro-
Colombians, and women. Anthropologist Karen Ann Faulk (2013), for 
example, describes how working people in post-dictatorial Argentina 
have demanded that the neoliberal state uphold notions of collective 
well-being by expanding the notion of human rights to include free-
dom from corruption and impunity. Which rights are demanded in the 
future and how they are conceptualized will depend on whether and 
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how diverse working people in Barrancabermeja rebuild social, insti-
tutional, and personal ties to each other. It will also depend on their 
ability to develop wider coalitions and alliances to provide them with 
both broader societal credibility and the capacity to oppose repression 
and the impunity that accompanies it.
The issue for scholars who want to create an alternative is how to 
support working people, if asked to do so, during a period of demobili-
zation and defeat, when they are regrouping and figuring out the way 
forward once again. Practicing a critical anthropology is about nego-
tiating the shoals of daily life with our research subjects, as they con-
front the challenges of daily life. It means doing our best to appreciate 
the goals and understandings during the brief time that we are with 
them, documenting their setbacks and detours, and negotiating when 
and how to prod the process of social change along. The outcome of the 
struggles of ordinary barranqueños remains an open question.
NOTES
Introduction
1 The rationale behind international accompaniment was that because of 
the political, economic, and military connections between the United 
States and, to a lesser extent, the European Union, the Colombian gov-
ernment and allied paramilitaries seek to minimize the political fallout 
of gross human rights violations that might arise if a foreigner witnessed 
a human rights crime. According to this thinking, Colombian activists 
accompanied by foreign—especially EU and North American observers—
were less vulnerable to attack (Mahoney and Eguren 1997).
2 Although I coordinated the visits of two delegations of U.S. activists to 
Colombia with the U.S.-based human rights organization Witness for 
Peace in July 2006 and again in 2010, I never worked for a human rights 
organization. I always introduced myself as a U.S.-based university pro-
fessor writing a book about political violence in Colombia.
3 To this end, I am deeply indebted to the work of August Carbonella and 
Sharryn Kasmir and have benefited from many fruitful discussions with 
them.
4 For notable anthropological exceptions, see, for example, Sider (1986) 
and Striffler (2002).
5 E. P. Thompson, for example, did not focus just on the workplace but also 
explored how the British working class was “made” in neighborhoods 
and churches. Although Thompson’s work has shaped the development of 
labor history over the last half century, a brief interdisciplinary engage-
ment of anthropology with working-class and labor history prompted by 
Thompson’s writings was marginalized and never fully developed (e.g., 
Cooper 2000; Kalb 2000).
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6 See, for example, Nugent (1997) for an important discussion of state for-
mation in Chachapoyas, Peru.
7 See Appel (2012) for an interesting discussion of how oil corporations 
seek to control labor on an offshore oil rig and remove it from entangle-
ments with onshore social life. Appel calls this process “modularity.”
8 See Striffler (2002) and Striffler and Moberg (2003) for a discussion of the 
transformation of foreign-controlled banana enclaves.
9 For more on the CIA program, see Priest (2013).
10 Colombian government estimates of the number of displaced persons 
continue to rise. See the web page of the Red Nacional de Información at 
www.rni.iunidaddevictimas.gov.co. The NGO Consultoría para los Dere-
chos Humanos y Desplazamiento (Human Rights and Displacement Con-
sultancy, CODHES) has documented the process of forced displacement in 
Colombia for many years. For more information, go to www.codhes.org.
11 The political neutrality of Human Rights Watch has also been called into 
question, as a number of its board members have close ties with the U.S. 
government, including the CIA (Bhatt 2013). See also Tate (2007) for an 
interesting discussion of the professionalization of human rights practice 
in Colombia and its separation from the programs and practices of the 
left.
Chapter One. Black Gold, Militant Labor
1 Beliefs about national development emerged from a vision of economic 
liberalism in which free trade, individual sovereignty, propertied citizen-
ship, and “whitening” through mestizaje would produce national pros-
perity. Although Colombia’s Liberal Party and Conservative Party were 
divided during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, male elites 
in both parties embraced the liberal vision to a considerable degree. See 
Safford and Palacios (2002). See also Tinker Salas (2009) on Venezuela, 
where oil and national development were closely intertwined.
2 In total, the TROCO paid 10 percent royalties to the Colombian state on 
the oil produced from the wells around Barrancabermeja. This “tax” was 
considered high by foreign investors (van Isschot 2015: 219).
3 See LeGrand (1998) for a discussion of the Caribbean banana zone that 
challenges traditional notions of tightly bounded enclave economies.
4 See Santiago (2006) and Tinker Salas (2009) for insightful accounts of 
the development of the Mexican and Venezuelan oil industries, which 
was happening at the same time as oil production was expanding in 
Colombia.
5 The practice of hiring West Indian workers extended beyond Barranca-
bermeja to Standard Oil operations in Venezuela. Miguel Tinker Salas 
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cites a Standard Oil official in Venezuela who described the West Indians 
as “British Negros” who could “more easily learn our ways” and who were 
less likely to mix with Venezuelan workers and unionize (Tinker Salas 
2009: 111).
6 The lands claimed by the Texas Petroleum Company were located in what 
was then known as the “territorio Vásquez.”
7 Interview with Pedro Lozada, Barrancabermeja, July 2011.
8 The tendency to mythologize the relationships between oil workers and 
prostitutes is still alive in Barranca today. Several oil workers whom I 
interviewed characterized these relationships as warm, long-term, and 
committed based on what they had read or heard from others.
9 Women did not win the right to vote until 1954.
10 For an insightful discussion of the land conflicts that shaped late 
nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century Colombia, see LeGrand 
(1986).
11 Some of the children of the so-called Bolsheviks would participate in 
the Liberal guerrilla movement of Rafael Rangel, after the 1948 assassi-
nation of Liberal presidential candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán. They were 
also among the founding members of the ELN in the 1960s. For example, 
the father of ELN leader Nicolás Rodríguez (aka “Gabino”) was one of the 
leaders of the uprising in San Vicente de Chucurí (A. Vargas 1992: 57–58).
12 Santiago (2006) makes a similar point for the Mexican Huasteca.
13 Interview with Pedro Lozada, Barrancabermeja, July 2011.
14 Interview with Ramón Rangel, Barrancabermeja, July 5, 2009.
Chapter Two. Cold War Crucible
1 Van Isschot (2015) uses the expression “state-run company town” to de-
scribe Barrancabermeja during the two decades that followed the depar-
ture of the TROCO.
2 See Giraldo and Camargo (1985) for a broader discussion of Colombian 
civic strikes.
3 Interview with Pedro Lozada, Barrancabermeja, July 2007.
4 Interview with Pedro Lozada, Barrancabermeja, July 2007.
5 Interview with Pedro Lozada, Barrancabermeja, July 2007.
6 See Grandin (2004) for a similar description of how participation in the 
Communist Party provided an avenue for mid-twentieth-century Guate-
malan indigenous to forge a workaday understanding of democracy and 
develop a collective sense of entitlement. Grandin also makes the impor-
tant point that Marxism did not impose a rigid ideological uniformity on 
the indigenous who engaged with it but, rather, facilitated the develop-
ment of a sharpened sense of individual agency.
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7 Interview with Pedro Lozada, Barrancabermeja, July 2007.
8 E-mail communication, December 27, 2012.
9 See Fischer (2014) for a discussion of how fears of communism shaped 
perceptions of shantytown life in mid-twentieth-century Latin America.
10 See Striffler (2004) for a useful discussion of the uneven relationship be-
tween class formation, industrialization, and urbanization.
11 German Pinzón, “De Barranca sale la unidad sindical,” La Calle, Decem-
ber 5, 1958, cited in Vega, Núñez, and Pereira (2009: 222–23).
12 The suspension illustrates the intensity of cold war tensions in this 
period and the oil company’s antipathy toward the Communist Party, 
which likely organized the trip.
13 See Rabe (2012) for a good summary of the United States’ involvement in 
cold war Latin America.
14 Plan Lazo was one such early initiative. Adopted in 1962, it was the cre-
ation of General Alberto Ruíz Novoa, who commanded a battalion of 
Colombian soldiers who fought with the United States in the Korean War. 
The idea behind Plan Lazo was to isolate the peasant support base of the 
guerrillas by providing development assistance in conflicted parts of the 
country. At the heart of the plan was the militarization of peasant com-
munities through the creation of a network of collaborators and paramili-
tary units trained to find and kill alleged subversives.
15 According to Alejo Vargas (1992), many peasants around Barrancabermeja 
saw the arrival of the ELN as a continuation of the struggle waged by the 
Liberal guerrillas of Rafael Rangel.
16 Interview with former ELN guerrilla, Bogotá, March 7, 2009.
17 Forrest Hylton (2014) argues that a key explanation for the cold war de-
feat of the Colombian left was the failure to build popular power in the 
exploding urban shantytowns.
18 Interview with William Mendoza, Barrancabermeja, July 9, 2006.
19 Interview with Yolanda Becerra, Bucaramanga, July 18, 2009.
20 Interview with Yolanda Becerra, Bucaramanga, July 18, 2009.
21 Interview with teacher, Barrancabermeja, July 20, 2010.
22 Interview with Eduardo Díaz, July 15, 2013.
23 Interview with Yolanda Becerra, Bucaramanga, July 18, 2009.
24 Interview with Ramón Rangel, Barrancabermeja, July 5, 2009.
25 Interview with urban resident, Barrancabermeja, July 10, 2006.
26 The Colombian government would use the military court system, in 
which defendants had none of the protections of the civilian system, to 
try oil workers throughout the 1970s.
27 Interview with Jubencel Duque, Barrancabermeja, July 30, 2009.
28 El Bogotano, October 31, 1977, qtd. in Vega, Núñez, and Pereira (2009: 
346).
29 Interview with Pedro Lozada, Barrancabermeja, July 2007.
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30 Paramilitaries assassinated thousands of UP militants around Colombia 
and literally exterminated the party. For more on the Patriotic Union, its 
relationship to the FARC, and its decimation at the hands of the paramili-
taries, see Dudley (2004).
31 See Ballvé (2012) for a useful discussion of this process in the Urabá re-
gion.
32 Most of the urban militias belonged to the ELN and were divided into two 
groups: the Frente Urbano de Resistencia Yarigués (FURY) and Capitán 
Parmenio. They were followed by the FARC’s Milicias Bolivarianas and the 
EPL’s Milicias Obreras.
33 Interview with urban resident, Barrancabermeja, July 1, 2009.
34 Interview with social movement leader, Barrancabermeja, July 2009.
35 Interview with former member of the Coordinadora Popular de Barranca-
bermeja, Barrancabermeja, July 2009.
36 The PCC elaborated the thesis of the combination of all forms of struggle 
during its ninth party congress in 1961, but it was a strategy that was 
adopted, with less doctrinaire fanfare, by other insurgencies as well. It 
would later be used to most devastating effect by the AUC.
37 Interview with a leader of a popular organization, Barrancabermeja, July 
2007.
Chapter Three. Terror and Impunity
1 My account of Yesid Peña’s abduction draws on interviews with his father, 
Jaime Peña, in Barrancabermeja in 2007.
2 More than one thousand people were murdered and three hundred 
others forcibly displaced between 2000 and 2003 (CINEP/CREDHOS 2005). 
In 2000, Barrancabermeja, a city of 250,000, had a homicide rate of 227 
per 100,000 inhabitants. Los Angeles, a city of almost 10 million, had a 
homicide rate of 6 per 100,000, and Washington, DC, the U.S. capital of 
550,000, had a homicide rate of 44 per 100,000 (Human Rights Watch 
2001: 53). Between January and February of the following year, one resi-
dent of the city died every twelve hours (Madero 2001).
3 See Klein (2007) for a discussion of the ways that crisis fuels capitalist 
transformation.
4 Interview with human rights worker, Barrancabermeja, February 2007.
5 Interview with William Mendoza, Barrancabermeja, July 2010.
6 These betrayals intensified conflict between the EPL and the FARC, which 
had long competed with the EPL in Barrancabermeja and elsewhere. See 
Chomsky (2008: 195–207) for a discussion of the right-wing shift of the 
EPL in the Urabá banana zone.
7 Interview with Barrancabermeja resident, Barrancabermeja, February 
2007.
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8 Many residents reported that guerrillas who initially collaborated with 
the paramilitaries were subsequently killed, once they were no longer 
useful.
9 Interview with urban resident, Barrancabermeja, July 2009.
10 Interview with urban resident, Barrancabermeja, July 2010.
11 Excessive extortion demands also turned onetime peasant supporters 
away from the FARC in the Puerto Boyacá–Puerto Berrío region of the 
southern Middle Magdalena region. The FARC initially won the support of 
peasants and even some cattle ranchers after it brought theft and cattle 
rustling under control. However, when the insurgents leaned too heavily 
on their support base for “contributions,” they quickly fell out of favor. It 
was middle peasants, such as future paramilitary chieftain Ramón Isaza, 
who formed so-called self-defense groups and collaborated with the 
armed and local elites to fight the guerrillas.
12 Interview with urban resident, Barrancabermeja, July 2007.
13 A similar process of militia decline and guerrilla defeat was simulta-
neously taking place in Medellín, Colombia’s cocaine capital. The military 
coordinated Operations Orión, Mariscal, and Estrella VI with the para-
militaries, and by 2003, “Don Berna” had vanquished the guerrilla mili-
tias, as well as a rival paramilitary group, the Bloque Metro. With the 
consolidation of paramilitary power, violent crime then dropped dramati-
cally. An abundant literature documents the shifting boundaries between 
youth gangs, guerrilla militias, and paramilitaries in Medellín (Aricapa 
2007; Ceballos-Melguizo 2001; G. Medina 2006).
14 Amelia González is a pseudonym. The interview took place in Bogotá in 
July 2007.
15 Gerald Sider (2008) makes a distinction between an everyday life in 
which people enjoy a relative stability and can more or less effectively 
organize a livelihood, and a daily life characterized by chronic insecurity 
and unpredictability.
16 See Narotzky and Besnier (2014) for an insightful discussion of crisis, 
hope, and livelihood strategies.
17 Interview with Pedro Lozada, Barrancabermeja, July 2013.
18 Interview with urban resident, Barrancabermeja, February 2007.
19 Tania Li (2009) notes the importance of connecting political and eco-
nomic processes that generate and shape fear to the actual experience of 
it. See also the collection of articles that address the question of fear in 
the same issue.
20 Interview with urban resident, Barrancabermeja, March 2007.
21 Linda Green (1999) writes about fear as a way of life among Mayan 
widows in rural Guatemala in the aftermath of the civil war.
22 In 2011, two men broke into the Galvis home at a time when Jackeline 
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and her daughter, who suffers from cerebral palsy, were home alone. One 
of the intruders put a gun to the young girl’s head and threatened to kill 
her if Jackeline did not reveal the whereabouts of her husband and son. 
They then defaced the walls with red paint and sprayed paint onto Jacke-
line, before leaving with several of the couple’s valued possessions. Be-
cause of this incident, the family moved to another city.
23 Juan Carlos Galvis, for example, was one of the plaintiffs in a case 
brought in U.S. court against the Coca-Cola corporation in which the 
company was accused of collaborating with paramilitaries to terrorize 
and murder trade unionists. Jackeline repeatedly spoke out against the 
paramilitaries in public forums and denounced their threats and harass-
ment of others to the public prosecutor in Barrancabermeja.
24 Interview with urban resident, Barrancabermeja, March 2007.
25 Interview with former TELECOM worker, Barrancabermeja, March 2007. 
The name is a pseudonym.
26 Although the guerrillas repressed homosexuality within their ranks, they 
did not target gay-friendly establishments to the same degree as the 
paramilitaries, according to several local people.
27 Interview with urban resident, Barrancabermeja, July 2010. The name is a 
pseudonym.
28 Interview with urban resident, Barrancabermeja, July 2010.
Chapter Four. Unraveling
1 Interview with Osvaldo Torres, Bogotá, May 2004.
2 The combinación tactic was first articulated by the FARC, and it was em-
braced more by this insurgency than any other.
3 Telephone interview with Adolfo Cardona, August 2004.
4 Interview with SINALTRAINAL president, Javier Correa, May 2004.
5 See Romero and Torres (2011) for a comparative discussion of Chiquita 
and Drummond, which operated on the north coast of Colombia.
6 In 1999, there were eleven anchor bottlers around the world, including 
Coca-Cola Enterprises in the United States, South Africa’s SABCO, and 
Mexico’s FEMSA.
7 Spatial fixes, according to David Harvey (1996), periodically arise from 
the contradictions that shape the uneven history of capitalist develop-
ment. “The tensions between place-bound fixity and spatial mobility 
of capital,” he notes, “erupt into generalized crisis . . . when the land-
scape shaped in relation to a certain phase of capitalist development . . . 
becomes a barrier to further accumulation. The geographical configura-
tion of places must then be reshaped” (296).
8 Interview with Barrancabermeja worker, Barrancabermeja, August 2006.
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9 The Federación Sindical Mundial is an international federation of labor 
unions that was founded in Paris in 1945. It has backed struggles against 
apartheid, racism, colonialism, capitalism, and the policies of the United 
States and NATO.
10 This is a pseudonym. Interview conducted in Barrancabermeja, June 
2007.
11 This is a pseudonym. Interview conducted in Barrancabermeja, July 2006.
12 Interview with Efraín Zurmay, Barrancabermeja, June 2009.
13 This is a pseudonym. Interview conducted in Barrancabermeja, July 2007.
14 Interview with Efraín Zurmay, Barrancabermeja, June 2009.
15 Interview with Efraín Zurmay, Barrancabermeja, June 2009.
16 This is a pseudonym. Interview conducted in Barrancabermeja, June 2007.
17 Interview conducted in Barrancabermeja, June 2007.
18 Interview conducted in Barrancabermeja, June 2007.
19 This is a pseudonym. Interview conducted in Barrancabermeja, July 2007.
20 Interview conducted in Barrancabermeja, July 2007.
21 Interview with Efraín Zurmay, Barrancabermeja, July 2009.
22 Interview with Efraín Zurmay, Barrancabermeja, July 2009.
23 Edilberto Araújo is a pseudonym.
24 Quotations in this section are taken from interviews with William Men-
doza conducted in Barrancabermeja in 2009 and 2010.
25 Saul Ramírez is a pseudonym.
26 Interview with Juan Carlos Galvis, Barrancabermeja, June 2004.
27 E-mail communication from William Mendoza, October 2012.
Chapter Five. Fragmented Sovereignty
1 See Hylton (2010) for a similar analysis of the city of Medellín, where a 
different regional power bloc established the social and political condi-
tions for the emergence of a finance, insurance, real estate, and service-
sector economy underwritten by cocaine profits.
2 In a move to reorient discussion away from the law and formal ideologies 
of rule, Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat understand de facto 
sovereignty as “the ability to kill, punish and discipline with impunity” 
(2006: 296).
3 Christopher Krupa and David Nugent (2015) raise these questions in a 
discussion of state formation and daily life in the Andes.
4 See, for example, Joseph and Nugent (1994); Krupa (2010); Krupa and 
Nugent (2015); Nugent (1997).
5 Castaño had turned against Medellín cartel leader Pablo Escobar and 
joined with his brother, Fidel, to form a vigilante group that fought the 
cartel until Escobar’s death in 1993. The group, called Personas Persegui-
das por Pablo Escobar (People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar, “Los Pepes”), 
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was allegedly financed by the Calí cartel and linked to the Colombian 
national police. It represents an early instance of ties between the future 
leader of the AUC and state security forces. For more on “Los Pepes,” see 
Bowden (2001).
6 Because of the success of the counterinsurgency war, the guerrillas have 
been substantially weakened over the last decade, and in some parts of 
the country, they have devolved into criminal enterprises with little ex-
plicit political program. The ELN has been virtually defeated, except in 
Arauca department, where it survives on revenues extorted from the oil 
industry. And the FARC, since 2012, has been negotiating peace with the 
government, after suffering serial defeats at the hands of the Colombian 
armed forces and losing several key leaders. Ramírez (2011) claims that 
nowadays in Putumayo department, the FARC is less interested in re-
placing the state than in coexisting with it. Moreover, as a result of the 
increasing involvement of the guerrillas in the narcotics traffic, the in-
surgents have reportedly collaborated with paramilitary groups in some 
parts of the country.
7 Jonathan Fox (1994: 153) defines authoritarian clientelism as an unequal 
bargaining relationship in which clients are subordinated through the 
threat of violence.
8 See Romero, Olaya, and Pedraza (2011) for a fuller accounting of the pri-
vatization of the health care system and the theft of public resources in 
northern Colombia.
9 A widely circulated 2001 video shows Iván Roberto Duque Gaviria, alias 
Ernesto Báez, proselytizing for another candidate of Convergencia Ciu-
dadana, the cattle rancher Carlos Clavíjo, before an audience in Barranca-
bermeja. He states, “Gentlemen, leaders of Barrancabermeja . . . with the 
leadership of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, we are launching a 
single list for the Senate of the republic for the entire Middle Magdalena. 
A list headed by Carlos Clavíjo and Carlos Higuera” (www.youtube.com
/watch?v=Iox9ydYCL4). Clavíjo was subsequently elected and served in 
the Colombian Senate from 2002 to 2006. It was widely believed that, 
following the BCB takeover of Barranca, Duque controlled the municipal 
budget, and any decisions about expenditures passed through him.
10 Interview with former union leader, Barrancabermeja, July 2006.
11 Interview with former union leader, Barrancabermeja, July 2006.
12 Interview with former union leader, Barrancabermeja, July 2006.
13 Interview with former union leader, Barrancabermeja, July 2006.
14 Juan Sebastián Sánchez is a pseudonym.
15 Interview with Barrancabermeja resident, Bogotá, July 2006.
16 See Narotzky and Smith (2006) for an interesting discussion of how fear 
and uncertainty regulated social life in post–Civil War Spain.
17 See CINEP/CREDHOS (2005) for a full list of the rules.
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18 At the time, two thousand pesos were worth slightly less than US$1.
19 Interview with urban resident, Barrancabermeja, 2007.
20 Interview with urban resident, Barrancabermeja, 2010.
21 In the case of Urabá, Ballvé (2012) documents the extensive involvement 
of paramilitaries, through the JACs, in a range of development projects, 
such as street lighting, water and sewage systems, and trash collection, 
financed through public monies channeled through paramilitary front 
companies.
22 See Auyero (2009) for a discussion of clientelism that focuses on the daily 
“problem-solving” capacity of clientelistic networks rather than simply 
their capacity to deliver votes in exchange for favors at election time.
23 Leonardo Páez is a pseudonym.
24 Interview with urban resident, Barrancabermeja, July 2010.
25 The front was named for the late brother of AUC leader Carlos Castaño.
26 E-mail communication with Barrancabermeja human rights defender, 
September 2013.
27 Interview with Pedro Lozada, Barrancabermeja, July 2013.
28 Winifred Tate (2007: 215–55) argues convincingly that even though state 
human rights agencies presented opportunities for action against rights 
violations, especially at the local level, they had no enforcement capacity 
and ended up producing impunity through the endless circulation of re-
ports and information.
29 In addition to providing security, the DAS issued visas, controlled immi-
gration, and collected intelligence on both domestic and international 
threats. Because of repeated scandals, it was dissolved in 2011 and re-
placed by the National Directorate of Intelligence.
30 Interview with Barrancabermeja union leader, Barrancabermeja, Febru-
ary 2007.
31 Interview with Gloria Gaviria, Ministry of Social Protection, Bogotá, 
April 2007.
32 Interview with Rafael Bustamante, Ministry of Interior, Bogotá, April 
2007.
33 Interview with William Mendoza, Barrancabermeja, March 2007.
34 See Mitchell (1991) for a discussion of the state as “the effect” of spatial 
and temporal arrangements, surveillance, and social and political process 
that create the distinction between state and society.
Chapter Six. Narrowing Political Options and Human Rights
1 Alfredo Arango is a pseudonym.
2 Compare Luis van Isschot (2015), who argues that human rights activism 
in Barrancabermeja was mainly about the continuation of preexisting 
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projects of social change. See Striffler (2015) for an important discussion 
of how the rise of human rights was transforming the practice and under-
standing of U.S.–Latin American solidarity at the same time.
3 Several important studies demonstrate how the understandings and 
practice of human rights become vernacularized, as groups use inter-
national legal frameworks and concepts of rights to make claims on the 
state, while simultaneously shaping new notions of human rights that 
emerge from specific social, cultural, and political histories (e.g., Faulk 
2013; Merry 2006; Tate 2007).
4 Pierre Bourdieu interviewed by Droit and Ferenczi (2008).
5 I am following Greg Grandin (2004), who makes this argument more gen-
erally about cold war Latin America.
6 Interview with Ramón Rangel, Barrancabermeja, July 2009.
7 Interview with William Mendoza, Barrancabermeja, July 2009.
8 Interview with Ramón Rangel, Barrancabermeja, July 2009. Manuel Cha-
cón was murdered by a navy death squad in 1988. He not only had been 
a charismatic leader of the USO but also was one of the leaders of the 
Coordinadora Popular and was associated with the ELN-affiliated legal, 
political movement A Luchar.
9 Quotation from Article 13 of the Colombian Constitution, http://confinder
.richmond.edu/admin/docs/colombia_const2.pdf.
10 Charles R. Hale (2002) argues that “neoliberal multiculturalism” divided 
indigenous peoples in Central America into those who were “acceptable” 
to the state and those who were not. See also Speed (2008), Gustafson 
(2009), and Postero (2006) for additional discussion on the politics of 
multiculturalism under neoliberalism.
11 Interview with William Mendoza, Barrancabermeja, July 2009.
12 Barrancabermeja was similar to postwar Guatemala as described by 
Oglesby (2007). See also Jelin (2003).
13 Interview with Yolanda Becerra, July 2009.
14 Interview with human rights activist, Barrancabermeja, February 2007.
15 Interview with Yolanda Becerra, July 2009.
16 Frederick Cooper challenges scholars to understand the past and the 
present “with a vision wide enough to appreciate multiple forms of social 
connections and imagination and to recognize power and exploitation 
where they are constituted, with all their limits, contingencies, and vul-
nerabilities to new forms of imagination and connection” (2000: 67).
17 Interview with Yolanda Becerra, July 2009.
18 See Lancaster (1992: 235–79) for a more detailed discussion of the mean-
ing and practice of homosexuality in Managua’s working-class neighbor-
hoods.
19 Enrique Jaraba is a pseudonym.
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20 Interview with Enrique Jaraba, Barrancabermeja, July 2010.
21 Jaraba is referring obliquely to the kinds of political and military actions 
once organized by the guerrillas when they occupied the Northeast.
22 Interview with Enrique Jaraba, Barrancabermeja, July 2010.
23 See J. Green (1999) for an interesting discussion of the development of 
male homosexual identities and their politicization in twentieth-century 
Brazil.
24 The quotations in the two previous paragraphs come from an interview 
with Jaraba on July 15, 2010, in Barrancabermeja.
25 Interview with trade unionist, Barrancabermeja, June 2012.
26 ECOPETROL constructed the Club Infantas in 1954 to address the “recre-
ational, sporting, and cultural needs” of its workforce.
27 Interview with Enrique Jaraba, Barrancabermeja, July 2012.
28 See Mahoney and Eguren (1997) for more on the philosophy and practice 
of international accompaniment.
29 Interview with social movement activist, Bogotá, July 2009.
Chapter Seven. The Aftermath of Counterinsurgency
1 Forrest Hylton noted this conceptual problem in a presentation at the 
conference of the Latin American Studies Association in Chicago in 2014.
2 Interview with William Mendoza, Barrancabermeja, July 2013.
3 Pablo Lucerna is a pseudonym.
4 Osvaldo Jiménez is a pseudonym.
5 Carola Goméz is a pseudonym.
6 Interview with Yolanda Becerra, July 2009.
7 On August 30, 2013, Pérez Alzáte was convicted of a long series of of-
fenses, which included aggravated homicide, kidnapping, forced disap-
pearance, torture, terrorism, acts of barbarism, and hydrocarbon theft. 
He was sentenced to eight years in prison.
8 At the time, the leaders of a peasant organization headquartered in Ba-
rrancabermeja were detained in a prison as state prosecutors investigated 
their alleged links to the FARC. After a long imprisonment, they were 
freed, and the charges were dropped.
9 From the first decade of the twenty-first century, the CIA and the Na-
tional Security Agency operated a covert action program in Colombia 
funded by a multimillion-dollar black budget that was separate from the 
millions of dollars channeled to the Colombian military through Plan 
Colombia. This program helped the Colombian security forces kill at least 
two dozen rebel leaders, including FARC commander Raúl Reyes (Priest 
2013).
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Conclusion
1 Interview with Pedro Lozada, Barrancabermeja, July 2011.
2 Even as the “war on drugs” provided a gloss for counterinsurgency in 
Colombia, it targeted poor minority communities in the United States 
and criminalized them. Initiated by Richard Nixon and escalated under 
the Reagan and Clinton administrations, the domestic drug war allowed 
whites to channel their antipathy toward African Americans in race-
neutral language that focused on crime and to oppose the reforms won 
by the civil rights movement.
3 Deborah Cowan and Neil Smith (2009) describe this process as a shift 
from geopolitical to geoeconomic logics.
4 Interview with Yolanda Becerra, July 8, 2009.
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